Grasping Gallipoli
Page 26
It has been suggested by Tim Travers48 that inaccurate maps, as well as disagreement as to the intended landing place, may have led to the Navy landing the Anzac Corps too far to the north. He based his argument on a signal from de Robeck to Churchill on 4 May: ‘Admiralty map does not extend sufficiently far North to include this [Anzac] position also land features on map are inaccurate. Military squared one [1:40,000] is being used.’49 The actual criticism is unclear. The ‘Admiralty map’ was Chart X95, an enlargement based on the 1871 chart, and the topography was only shown in general terms by horizontal hachures. In fact, it included the southern part of the Anzac bridgehead area. Given that the 1:40,000 map was in general use by the Navy, attention should focus on that. But why blame the map? The cliff feature on Gaba Tepe with its look-out station and poled telegraph lines, was shown very clearly on the map. Travers was taking de Robeck’s statement out of context; the Admiral was merely explaining to Churchill how to follow the operations on his charts and maps in London. The Navy was very familiar with this coast, had reconnoitred it for months and produced panorama drawings, and had identified the key coastal features necessary for a correct landfall. It is more likely that the current and approach in darkness led to navigation problems which could not be rectified at the last minute. If the approach had been buoyed, an insecure thing to do, the Turks might well have moved the buoys, as they were known to do in some places.
Brig.-General C Cunliffe-Owen (the Anzac Commander Royal Artillery) noted that three days after the landing at Anzac he held a conference of ships’ captains, gunnery lieutenants and land observers, in which the point was made that explaining targets by map was very difficult ‘as there was an error of 400 yards in compass bearings taken’ (clearly this error increased with the range). On 29 April he noted that ‘it was unfortunate that our squared map was not accurate, as ships depended on compass bearings’.50 On 4 May he ‘sent Jopp, my staff officer, ashore to fix certain points, and our line by compass bearings… locating our line in such precipitous country was practically impossible from the sea’.51 After the war, speaking of artillery work on the Peninsula, he claimed that:
the chief difficulty was the absence of a reliable map. The map we had was one that had been done in 1840, I think [he was probably confusing the 1854 survey with the hydrographic survey executed fifteen years earlier by Captain Graves RN]. It was divided into two mile squares, with smaller squares marked by letters, and each subdivided by nine numbers. These maps did not agree with the ground, and what was most important for ships fire, the compass bearing was two degrees out.52
There are two issues here. One is the topographical inaccuracy, and the other is the supposed faulty alignment of the compass roses. The former was a result of the original hasty survey undertaken in 1854, and the subsequent redrawing in 1908 and enlargement in 1915; apart from the unhappy decision to space the contours at only 100-feet vertical interval, the map was compiled from the best available sources. As far as the compass roses were concerned, they were superimposed, together with the Naval grid, at the Survey of Egypt, which was faced with a difficult task as the Naval charts were plotted on the Mercator projection, while the Army’s map was on the Bonne. The 1:40,000 sheets did, however, carry a statement explaining the distortion factor.
The Intelligence Department in Egypt
As early as August 1914, Ernest Dowson, Surveyor-General of Egypt, had been asked by Colonel Hedley (MO4) to undertake general map work and reproduction for the ‘Near Eastern Theatre’.53 Until reasonable maps and information about the Ottoman Empire had been obtained or made, and operations were being considered at several widely spaced locations (not necessarily the Dardanelles), Maxwell’s staff officers tried to compensate for the absence of maps of Asia Minor, Syria, Palestine and Arabia by scouring the shops of Alexandria and Cairo for guide books.54 In March 1915, and while Hamilton’s Force was reloading its ships at Alexandria, the one-inch map was enlarged by the Survey of Egypt to 1:40,000 (a standard British Western Front scale), in three sheets.
These were beautifully printed sheets, on strong linen-backed paper, with topographical and tactical detail (roads, villages, the Bulair Lines, Turkish forts, barracks, trenches, batteries, cables and telegraph lines and other defence information) printed in purple, form-lines (at 100-feet vertical interval) in bistre, hydrographic information for the Navy, including large numbers of soundings, in black, and coastline, watercourses and marsh in blue. Tactical information such as batteries, not shown on the normal edition of the one-inch map, was taken from the secret edition. Additional ‘going’ information such as ‘steep sandy bluffs’ and ‘thick scrub’ was again taken directly from the one-inch map. As the map was intended for use by the French as well as the British, the ‘instructions for the use of squares’ were bilingual. No indication was given about sources or the degree of accuracy, other than the statement that it was a copy of a War Office map – i.e. the one-inch map.55
The Survey of Egypt thus had a great deal of work to do in a very short time, as these new 1:40,000 sheets were not begun until after Maxwell received the news in February that a special force under Birdwood was to be sent to the Dardanelles. This was well before the decision made after 18 March to land a large force (under Hamilton) on the Peninsula. Sheet-lines had to be recast, colour-separations made, new tactical information added, lithographic plates prepared for each colour (including another plate for the red artillery squaring system), and thousands of copies of each sheet printed, folded and packaged for distribution.
The sheetlines were recast, with considerable overlaps, so as to enable each of the main landings (29th Division at Helles and the Anzac Corps from Gaba Tepe north to Fisherman’s Hut) to have its own sheet, which included their respective landing areas and the Kilid Bahr Plateau. These were Sheets 1 and 2 respectively. The larger Sheet 3 covered the Peninsula from the Narrows to east of the Bulair Lines, and hardly overlapped with the other two sheets. This arrangement shows that considerable care and thought had gone into the process.
Although not as accurate, in detail and ground forms, as later large-scale maps produced from captured Turkish material, these 1:40,000 sheets gave good indications as to the difficult terrain to be encountered by any landing troops attempting to push inland.56 Squared and unsquared editions were printed, including a first squared edition carrying an artillery squaring system in red on the Western Front model. Unfortunately the Navy objected to this army grid and, as the Navy was the principal source of fire support, the whole first edition had to be scrapped and the maps reprinted with the Naval grid and compass roses with 1915 magnetic variation superimposed.57 As C Cunliffe-Owen noted, compass bearings taken from the map were two degrees out, but a ‘distortion note’ on the map clearly explained this. To enable correct bearings to be taken from the map, the note explained that the reference squares and protractors (compass roses) printed on the map had been distorted to correspond to the map distortion (Bonne projection), and gave ‘combined corrections’ for sectors of the compass.
Map supply from London and Cairo
All the 1:250,000, one-inch and 1:40,000 sheets supplied by the War Office, the Ordnance Survey and Survey of Egypt were printed on excellent, hard-wearing, linen-backed paper, as were the 1:20,000 sheets printed after the landings. The British could not be accused of providing maps which were poor in this respect. Questions of accuracy have already been dealt with. While initial map supplies were generally adequate, there is some evidence of insufficient quantities of 1:40,000 sheets being printed before the first landings. However, scales-of-issue at this time were relatively small in every theatre; it was only as the war went on that they became more lavish. In early 1915, whether on the Western Front or in Gallipoli, the Staff worked on the basis that each officer should carry one copy of each sheet. GSGS at least cannot be faulted on this score.
Troops of the Royal Naval and 29th Divisions leaving England for the Dardanelles were supplied before they left with copies of the o
ne-inch map, overprinted with red ‘artillery squares’ on the Western Front model, and with 1:250,000 sheets. The first two battalions of the Royal Marines ‘Special Force’, part of the Royal Naval Division, intended to form landing parties to destroy guns, left England on 6 February; most of the rest of the Division left Avonmouth on 1 and 2 March. The Royal Naval Division was informed on 24 February by Colonel Hedley (MO4) that its maps were ready, folded and in packets, to be collected by an officer. They were:58
1-inch Gallipoli Peninsula Sheets 1 & 2 300 copies of each
1-inch Constantinople Sheets 1–4 1,000 copies of each*
1/4 inch [1:250,000] sheets Constantinople, Gallipoli & Rodosto 300 of each
*300 for the use of RN Div, remaining 700 of each of 4 sheets to Egypt in reply to a request, to be handed over on arrival.
On 21 February, on being informed of impending operations against the Dardanelles, Maxwell cabled the War Office in London: ‘621E. Your 3180 Cipher. We have no maps available here. Please supply.’59 In reply, the War Office in London informed Maxwell on 9 March 1915:60
Following maps have been sent from here:
Gallipoli
scale 1-inch to mile.
Constantinople
scale 1/250,000
Rodosto
-do-
700 copies on ‘Dunluce Castle’
Gallipoli
-do-
Gallipoli
1-inch squared with
1000 yard squares
1000 copies on ‘Minnetonka’
All the troops from home will be supplied with similar maps.
Copy to GOC’s file 10/3/15
Copy to Maps officer –do-
GOC A&NZ Corps
The 1:250,000 sheets, 700 copies of each of which were on the Dunluce Castle, were those being sent out with the Royal Naval Division and referred to in Hedley’s letter of 24 February.
Twenty-two cases of maps were on board the Minnetonka,61 which sailed on 8 March for Lemnos, carrying elements of the Royal Naval Division. In the case of units of the 29th Division, which left Avonmouth around 17 March, the maps of Turkey arrived just two days before departure.62 The 29th Division was issued with the one-inch map, smaller-scale maps, and various handbooks. Brig.-General Hare of 86th Brigade noted that before leaving Coventry they were issued with 1:250,000 maps of Turkey and one-inch maps of the Gallipoli Peninsula, as well as the Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations, Handbook of the Turkish Army and Murray’s Guide.63 Given that British practice at this time was to issue maps to all officers, but as a rule not to NCOs, the War Office (GSGS/MO4) had made good provision for mapping-up the Force which left the UK.
It is not known exactly when the reproduction work for the 1:40,000 sheets was carried out by the Survey of Egypt, but on 10 March Birdwood’s Anzac Staff received a cablegram about maps from the War Office (probably a copy of the one above, passed on by Maxwell), to which they responded by deciding ‘to proceed with preparation of Gallipoli squared map in spite of this – as new map squares would be smaller’.64 Clearly by this date the production of the 1:40,000 sheets in Egypt was already in its early stages. With the naval fire-control squaring, the sub-squares on the 1:40,000 were about 5⁄8-inch, whereas if the army squaring of the one-inch map had been enlarged proportionately to the map, at 1:40,000 they would have been 7⁄8-inch. Smaller squares implied greater accuracy in fire-control. The Navy in any case wanted its own squaring to be used.
The production of 1:40,000 sheets in Egypt was delayed by the scrapping of the first edition with the Army squaring and the printing of a new edition with naval squaring. No record of printing dates has survived, but stocks of the final edition were issued to the Anzac Corps over several embarkation days starting on 4 April. On that day, the Anzac Staff sent Mr Cairns, their printer borrowed from the Survey of Egypt (with the newly formed Printing Section), to Alexandria with instructions, taking maps for the Anzac HQ and for the Australian Division transports. On the 4th and 5th, special arrangements for them having been made, the maps for the covering force, the 3rd Australian Brigade, were obtained and issued to the OC troops on board the Osmanieh. On 5 April maps for the Anzac HQ and New Zealand Division were received and issued. The Anzac Staff informed Sinclair-MacLagan, the commander of 3rd Australian Infantry Brigade, that: ‘A box of maps is sent herewith. The maps are made up into parcels for delivery to the ships of your force. The maps of Gallipoli (Sheet 1) handed to you at Mudros by Major Wagstaff, should be put aside and kept quite distinct from the maps sent to you now for issue.’ These were probably the one-inch squared maps brought out from England. On the 8th, stocks of 1:40,000 Sheet 2, obtained from the Egyptian Survey, were packed and issued to the New Zealand Division. Maps were also ordered for troops on board Surada, and the Corps General Staff office finally packed up. The Australian Division’s maps were distributed at sea on the 10th.65
Thus it appears that the production of the 1:40,000 sheets continued through the whole of March and into April. Either mapping-up requirements and scales-of-issue of the 1:40,000 sheets had not been properly thought out beforehand, or there had been insufficient time for printing, as there was a critical shortage of Sheet 3, covering the Gallipoli–Bulair area. On 10 April Hamilton’s Intelligence Chief, Lt-Colonel Ward, telegraphed from Mudros to Cairo asking for more copies: ‘At least 500 copies of Sheet 3 of Gallipoli urgently required by GHQ. 500 more copies of Sheet 1 [Helles–Kilid Bahr] and as many more copies as you can of Sheet 2 [Anzac–Suvla] at an early date. Advise despatch to base and GHQ.’66 No figures survive for the total numbers of 1:40,000 sheets supplied from Egypt, but several thousand were printed. These continued in use during the early weeks of the campaign, being gradually superseded by new 1:20,000 sheets copied from captured Turkish maps.
It must be remembered that Kitchener and the War Council envisaged military operations beyond the Gallipoli Peninsula – indeed all the way to Constantinople. On 10 April Hedley (MO4) advised Clayton in Cairo that more small-scale (1:250,000) maps were on the way: ‘3968 Cipher. M.O.4/384. Following left on P&O Osterley April 9th. 71 cases, 1400 each, Constantinople, Rodosto, Gallipoli, Adrianople, 1000 Ismid, 500 Gumuljina.’67 This was further evidence that MO4 was being thorough in its preparations.
Further evidence that all was not well with map supply from Egypt surfaced on the 13th, when Ward again telegraphed to Cairo about supplies of 1:40,000 sheets:
250 Sheet II [Anzac–Suvla], addressed GHQ received yesterday. Were any squared copies sent for use of Navy, if so, on what date and to whom addressed? Navy will be requiring 250 more squared unfolded copies of Sheet I [Helles] and a total of 500 each of Sheets II [Anzac–Suvla] and III [Bulair]. Sheet III squared urgently required. Please stamp ‘squared’ or ‘unsquared’ on future folded copies.68
Such stamping was duly carried out, as surviving copies attest. The Navy needed unfolded, squared copies for its fire-support operations.
The War Office was still despatching maps on 16 April. MO4 telegraphed to Clayton on the 17th:
4090 Cipher M.O.4. 393 – Following despatched by P&O Egypt April 16th
1⁄4-inch
Constantinople, Rodosto,
2600 of each.
Gallipoli, Adrianople
1-inch
Constantinople
4 sheets.
3000 of each.
General Map
Balkans.
500 copies.
Your I.G./128 March 5th. Charts asked for except Persian Gulf No. 2862.69
I.G. (or I.g.) was the section of Clayton’s Intelligence Department dealing with geographical matters, including maps.
The Royal Naval Division’s Order No. 1 of 21 April referred only to ‘Sheets Rodosto & Gallipoli 1/250,000’.70 However, other RND orders referred to the one-inch map. Given that the RND was to be taken round to Helles and landed there after its demonstration at Bulair, it was probably issued with sheets of the 1:40,000 map. However, copies of both sheets o
f the one-inch map survive which were apparently used by the RND at Bulair and at Helles, perhaps because of shortages of the 1:40,000 sheets.
Following the landings, Turkish maps were captured which were immediately reproduced by the Printing Section at Hamilton’s GHQ, using its limited hand-litho facilities, and were also sent back to Cairo for more sophisticated reproduction in large quantities on the powered presses of the Survey of Egypt. Map production during the Campaign is dealt with in Chapter 9.
Maps produced by Hamilton’s GHQ Printing Section before the landings
The GHQ Printing Section is dealt with in Chapter 9; suffice it to say here that it was equipped in Egypt with hand-lithographic and duplicator printing equipment, and reproduced vitally important intelligence maps (utilising the results of aerial photography and reconnaissance) and diagrams in black for the assault force before the landings. The principal intelligence maps were:
1. 1:40,000 ‘Sketch map Square 177 Showing defences of Achi Baba correcting former reconnaissances on 13/4/15’; printed to update existing maps.71
2. Successive editions of a 1:40,000 lithographed sketch map of Turkish field defences, from 14 April in the Helles, and from 18th in Anzac, sectors, based on RNAS air photos and visual reconnaissance; dated 14, 18 and 20 April:72