Grasping Gallipoli
Page 27
3. Z2010 Gallipoli Peninsula. Sketch plan showing results of Air Reconnaissance to 14 April 1915. Issued 14-4-15. Note. Coastline taken from 1:40,000 supplied by the War Office (683). [Unsquared. Helles sector only]
4. Z2011 Gallipoli Peninsula. Sketch plan showing results of Air Reconnaissance to 18 April 1915. Issued 18-4-15. Note. Coastline taken from 1:40,000 supplied by the War Office (683). [Unsquared. Helles sector only]
5. Z2012 Gallipoli Peninsula. Sketch plan showing results of Air Reconnaissance to 18 April 1915. Issued 18-4-15. Note. Coastline taken from 1:40,000 supplied by the War Office (683). [Squared. Includes area northwards to Anzac Cove]
6. Z2012A Gallipoli Peninsula. Sketch plan showing Amended results of Air Reconnaissance to 20 April 1915. Issued 20-4-15. Note. Coastline taken from 1:40,000 supplied by the War Office (683). [Squared. Includes area northwards to Anzac Cove]
7. A further edition was produced before the Second Battle of Krithia (6 May): Z2013A Gallipoli Peninsula. Sketch plan showing Amended results of all Air Reconnaissance to 3 May 1915. Issued 3-5-15. Note. Coastline taken from 1:40,000 supplied by the War Office (683). [Squared]
8. Copies of one or two untitled 1:40,000 squared lithographed sketch maps, carrying details of Turkish defences obtained from air reconnaissance, of the Gaba Tepe–Anzac–Suvla–Maidos area, were specially printed by the GHQ Printing Section for the Anzac Corps before the landings. One was dated 18 April.73 These showed clearly the development of the Turkish entrenchments on the Peninsula. As they showed the area right across the Peninsula, they were clearly intended to be used for the Corps’ main thrust to Mal Tepe, to cut off the Turkish forces in the Helles sector.
Conclusion
Controversially, in the face of received wisdom, it can be said that the maps produced by the Allies in advance of the landing were the best available – the only ones available – for their attempt on the Dardanelles, that the expedition had been well ‘mapped-up’, and that the map supply was adequate for swift operations. The intelligence maps supplied by GHQ provided crucial tactical intelligence, updated at frequent intervals from air photos. Much maligned by historians of the campaign, the maps became a convenient scapegoat, and with minute scrutiny of their shortcomings, have remained so for the past 100 years. But there was other terrain intelligence available, from the air and on the sea, and ultimately, from the capture of the newly issued Ottoman maps themselves, as we shall see in the succeeding chapters.
Intelligence map prepared before the April landings from air photos; revised to 18 April and reproduced by the GHQ Printing Section
Notes
1. Chasseaud, Peter, ‘Mapping for D-Day: The Allied Landings in Normandy, 6 June 1944’, The Cartographic Journal, London, 38(2), pp. 177–89.
2. Ibid.
3. Pritchard, Maj.-Gen. H L, The History of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Vol. VI, Chatham: Institution of Royal Engineers, 1952, p. 15.
4. Nasr, Seyyed Hossein, Islamic Science, London: World of Islam Festival Publishing Co., 1976, pp. 27–48.
5. War Office (1944), Notes on Maps of the Balkans, July 1944, Confidential, Directorate of Military Survey, London, p. 40.
6. Anon. (probably Col. Mehemmed Shevki Pasha), ‘The Topographical Service in the Ottoman Empire and the Modern Turkish Cartography’, L’Universo, No. 1, 1920, pp. 127–36.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Planheft Südosteuropa, Südlicher Teil, 1 Juli 1943 (German Military Survey), Berlin, given in War Office (1944), Notes on Maps …, op. cit.
10. MI4 (1924), Latitudes of the Turkish Mapping System, typescript note by MI4, dated 8/8/1924, in MCE, RE.
11. Plates to Accompany the Military report on Eastern Turkey in Europe and the Ismid Peninsula [General Staff, War Office, London] (Second Edition, 1909). (B414) 200 6/09 H & S 454-2WO. Foolscap, maps, plans and photographs covering Constantinople, Central Plains (Adrianople, etc.), Istranja Balkan District, The Eastern Rhodope District. TNA(PRO) FO 881/9513X.
12. Col. Mike Nolan, in his unpublished notes ‘1907–1917 – The Golden Years in the Development of Cartography in the Ottoman Empire’ (2000), states ‘printed between 1910 and 1911 or 1913–1914’.
13. Dowson, E M, Mapping from Aeroplane Photographs in Gallipoli, Secret, duplicated typescript report with maps and photos, Survey of Egypt, c.Sep 1915, p. 3.
14. MI4, op. cit.
15. Anon, op. cit.
16. VA11 War Diary, Bayerisch Hauptstaatsarchiv, Kriegsarchiv, Munich.
17. See Chasseaud, Peter, Artillery’s Astrologers – A History of British Survey and Mapping on the Western Front 1914–1918, Lewes: Mapbooks, 1999 for artillery survey in the period before and during the First World War.
18. Two copies are held in the Australian War Memorial collection.
19. Copy in Australian War Memorial; photograph of this in TNA(PRO) WO 153/1058.
20. Cunninghame, Minutes of Evidence to the Dardanelles Commission, p. 1155, TNA(PRO) CAB 19/33.
21. Sheets J8 (Kuchuk Keui), J10 (Hissarlar), K10 (Chamlija), L10 (Maltepe and Islands), in TNA(PRO) WO 301 pieces 171, 177, 187, 192, respectively.
22. F Cunliffe Owen to The Secretary, Army Council, 27-9-1927, in IWM Department of Documents.
23. A 1:100,000 contoured sheet in TNA(PRO) WO 153/1058 has no graticule; it carries a 1915 print date.
24. Anon., op. cit.
25. Nicholas to Hedley, TNA(PRO) WO 301/46.
26. In TNA(PRO) WO 153 and WO 301.
27. Anon., op, cit.
28. In Report from Major R.H. Phillimore, R.E. (8th Field Survey Co., R.E.) on Turkish Staff Maps 1:25,000 and 1: 5,000 of Gallipoli and Chanak Kale, with list of Conventional Signs Employed. 20/2/1919. MCE, RE.D 30, 3(4).
29. Nicholas to Hedley, 8 May 1915, in TNA(PRO) WO 301/46.
30. TNA(PRO) WO 153/1055.
31. War Office (July 1944), Notes on Maps of the Balkans, op. cit.; Planheft Südosteuropa, op. cit., and other sources.
32. TNA(PRO) WO 153/1058.
33. MI4 (1924), op. cit.
34. Carte de la Presqu’Ile de Gallipoli (in two sheets); published in 1854 by the Dépôt de la Guerre, Paris, under the direction of Colonel Blondel (engraved by Erhard, 42 rue Bonaparte), printed Chez Kaeppelin, Quai Voltaire.
35. Reports and Memoranda relative to Defence of Constantinople and other positions in Turkey. Also on Routes in Roumelia. Strictly Confidential, Printed at the War Office by Harrison & Sons. 1877. [0631] 103 WO. TNA(PRO) FO 358/1; FO 881/3676; WO 33/29.
36. Memorandum on the Passage of the Dardanelles by Major J C Ardagh RE, in Paper No. 797, Seizure of the Dardanelles as a means of coercing the Porte, War Office, 1880, in TNA(PRO) WO 33/35.
37. Reports and Memoranda, op. cit.
38. The Dardanelles Commission 1914–16, London: The Stationery Office, 2001, p. 118.
39. Callwell, Maj.-Gen. Sir C E, The Dardanelles, London: Constable, 1919 (2nd edn 1924), pp. 47–8.
40. Catalogue of Maps Published by the Geographical Section of the General Staff, War Office, London, 1923, p. 7.
41. Gallipoli Campaign 1915, Maps, TNA(PRO) WO 301/473.
42. Close, Col. C F and Cox, Capt. E W, Text Book of Topographical Surveying, 2nd edn, London: HMSO, 1913, p. 183.
43. Ibid, p. 180.
44. Hamilton, Sir Ian, A Staff Officer’s Scrap Book During the Russo–Japanese War, 2 vols, London: Edward Arnold, 1905.
45. Jones, H J, The War in the Air, Vol. II, London: OUP, 1928, p. 2.
46. Gallipoli Campaign maps in TNA(PRO) WO 153 and WO 301.
47. Bullen, John, List of Maps of Gallipoli Campaign, n.d., in the Australian War Memorial, Gallipoli, Vol. I, p. 8.
48. Travers, Tim, Gallipoli 1915, Stroud: Tempus, 2002, p. 68.
49. De Robeck to Churchill, 5 May 1915, 13/65, Chartwell Papers, Churchill College, Cambridge.
50. Diary and papers of General C Cunliffe Owen, p. 18. TNA(PRO) CAB 45/246.
51. Ibid, p. 19.
52. Ib
id, Extracts from a lecture on Artillery at Anzac, given at the R.A. Institution by Brig. Gen. C. Cunliffe Owen, p. 1.
53. Dowson, E M, ‘Further Notes on Aeroplane Photography in the Near East’ Geographical Journal, 58, 1921, p. 359.
54. Moorhead, Alan, Gallipoli, London: Hamish Hamilton, Four Square edn, 1963, p. 108.
55. Peter Chasseaud’s study of Sheets 1, 2 and 3.
56. Ibid.
57. Dowson, ‘Further Notes …’, op. cit.
58. Royal Naval Division misc. correspondence & arrangements for embarkation 1915, p. 39, PRO ADM 137/3088A.
59. Anzac Corps General Staff War Diary, TNA(PRO) WO 95/4280.
60. Secretary, War Office, London to GOC-in-C, Egypt, rec’d 9/3/15, in TNA(PRO) WO 158/574.
61. Ibid.
62. Hickey, Michael, Gallipoli, London: John Murray, 1998, p. 58.
63. Diary of Brig.-Gen. S W Hare, GOC 86th Brigade, 29th Division.
64. Anzac Corps General Staff War Diary, op. cit., referring to ‘Copy of W.O. Cablegram 4008 (recd 9th) – re maps’.
65. Anzac General Staff War Diary, op. cit.
66. Lt-Col. Ward, Mudros, Lemnos to Maps Officer, W.O. , recd 10/4/15, in TNA(PRO) WO 158/574.
67. Secretary, War Office, London to Director of Intelligence, Cairo, recd 10/4/15, in TNA(PRO) WO 158/574.
68. Col. Ward [GHQ Mudros] to Int. Dept Maps Section [Cairo], recd 13/4/15, in TNA(PRO) WO 158/574.
69. Secretary, War Office, London to Director of Intelligence [Cairo], recd 17/4/15, in TNA(PRO) WO 158/574.
70. Royal Naval Division, General Staff, War Diary, TNA(PRO) WO 95/4290.
71. Anzac Corps, Intelligence War Diary, TNA(PRO) WO 157/678, Appendix Z12.
72. TNA(PRO) WO 301/499-503, Gallipoli Campaign 1915, maps.
73. Anzac Corps, Intelligence War Diary, in TNA(PRO) WO 157/668 & 678.
1. Butler’s air photo of Turkish defences at Achi Baba on 24 April, the day before the landings (IWM HU 81412).
2. Butler’s air photo of De Tott’s battery and the landing at S Beach, 8am, 25 April (IWM HU 81414).
3. Butler’s air photo of Sedd-el-Bahr and the beached River Clyde, 25 April (IWM HU 81413).
4. Butler’s air photo of Turkish defences at V Beach (Helles) on 21 April, four days before the landings (IWM HU 81411).
5. River Clyde at V Beach, Sedd-el-Bahr (RE Institution).
6. Observation across the entrance to the Dardanelles and the Asiatic shore (RE Institution).
7. View of X Beach and the dominating limestone cliffs at Helles (RE Institution).
8. General view of the Helles Sector, along the Krithia Road, looking north-east (RE Institution).
9. View from A Beach (Suvla) south to Lala Baba, with the Sari Bair range in the background (Peter Doyle).
10. View from Plugge’s Plateau (Anzac) towards the south-west, showing Gaba Tepe and the cliffs of the Helles sector (Peter Doyle).
11. The Maidos coastal road, heading eastwards towards Kilye Bay, with the imposing cliffs of the Kilid Bahr Plateau to the left (Peter Doyle).
12. The Sphinx dominating the view from Walker’s Ridge (Anzac) towards Ari Burnu (Peter Doyle).
13. Ocean Beach, Nibrunesi Point and the Salt Lake (Suvla), from Walker’s Ridge (Anzac); the Kirech Tepe Ridge dominates the skyline (Peter Doyle).
14. The scrub-filled Monash Valley from The Nek (Anzac) (Peter Doyle).
15. W Beach looking south-east, showing the Helles lighthouse and memorial situated on the Guezji Baba hill (the southern knoll of Hill 138) (Peter Doyle).
16. The entrance to Gully Ravine at Gully Beach (Peter Doyle).
CHAPTER 7
Gallipoli from the Air
It might be thought that the introduction of the air dimension and imagery intelligence would dispel the fog of war. Despite the initial air intelligence failure (the British lack of appropriate photogrammetric techniques, photographic equipment, personnel and material) the air dimension was a crucially important one at Gallipoli, with several different services and units being involved. British and French seaplane and aeroplane squadrons supplied vital photographs and intelligence, as well as spotting for naval gunfire. However, it was a matter of too little, too late, for this to make a great difference to the quality of the maps, or to the outcome of the landings.
Early operations suffered from the British services’ failure to develop their air photographic, and photogrammetrical, capability before the war. They lagged significantly behind the French, and even further behind the Germans. Nevertheless, borrowed apparatus and improvised methods led to air survey for trench mapping became highly developed from late-May, even if not at this stage of the war an exact science.
Air surveys
Could it be argued that the British, or the Allies, should have made an air survey of the Peninsula in the pre-war or early war period? Unfortunately the Allies had not developed their photogrammetry to a sufficient extent by early 1915, by which time they were only just beginning to develop crude techniques for the graphic plotting of the planimetry from air photographs, and even then they needed a fairly dense net of ground points to which to fit the air photo detail. Such control points might conceivably have been obtained from the new Turkish 1:25,000 survey, but the trigonometrical data were not available to the Allies. Interpretation of relief from air photos only began to be developed from 1915 onwards through comparative shadow analysis and the study of stereo-pairs. The use of precision instruments to plot points and contours from air photographs was only slowly achieved during the war (by the Germans, but not by the Allies who were not even considering instrumental air photogrammetry) as the war drew to a close.1
The remarkable pioneering work of Scheimpflug, an Austrian, was completely ignored by the Allies, even though they were aware of it. Using rectified vertical and oblique air photos taken with a special seven-lens camera, he was able not only to plot planimetry but also to draw contours using a stereocomparator.2 Even had the resulting map not been as accurate as necessary for artillery fire, it would still have given the command a compelling terrain model on which to base their plans. It was clear that the British flyers over Gallipoli were convinced, from what they could see from the air, that the terrain was particularly difficult from a tactical point of view. A close-contoured plan or photo-map might well have convinced the command of the impossibility of the endeavour. The experience of studying air photos during this and the subsequent Salonika Campaign led Alan Ogilvie and T C Nicholas to write a pamphlet on interpreting ground-forms from air photos. There is no reason why this could not have been done at an earlier stage if better air photographic resources had been made available.
Questions of international law in transgressing Turkish air space apart, an air survey in the 1913–14 period should not have been out of the question but, although considerable progress had been made in this direction, particularly in Austria and Germany, the British and French lagged behind and had few resources for such a venture. While Scheimpflug had already developed his system for stereoscopic photogrammetric mapping and contouring from air photos before the war, the RFC and RNAS were only just beginning to organise their air photography, which was still in the experimental stage, and in any case were thinking of reconnaissance rather than mapping. This is not to say that in different circumstances, with imagination, will and resources, an air survey map of great operational value could not have been produced, but rather to ignore the political, cultural and financial realities of the time. Such a map would not have been of great accuracy, particularly in terms of relief and terrain depiction, but would have given an invaluable picture of the difficult terrain, and been much more accurate than the 1908 one-inch map of the Peninsula. From this point of view, a photo-map or mosaic would have sufficed. Unfortunately, this did not become a feasible proposition until mid-1915, by which time better cameras and gathered experience had revolutionised the situation.
The air dimension and photogrammetry problem
; The advantage of the bird’s eye view for intelligence and mapping had been obvious to the military mind for centuries, and we have seen that in 1862 Captain Grover RE, who reconnoitred the Suvla– Gaba Tepe–Maidos route on foot in 1877 was a prime mover in starting British Army ballooning. To see the terrain spread out below, withholding few secrets, was worth much expenditure of money and effort. The enemy’s defences could be identified, as could his movements and dispositions. Key features of the terrain could also be picked out, though variations of relief were subdued in the view from the air. At certain times of day, when the sun was low, the shadows thrown by terrain features gave a striking picture of relief. In theatres where the terrain was inaccessible and relatively unknown, no commander would wish to have to make do with no aerial reconnaissance – to be blind. Even where he knew the ground, air reconnaissance was still crucial, as experience on the Western Front, notably the Battle of the Marne, had already shown in August and September 1914, for identifying the enemy’s positions, movements and strengths.
An Italian airman, Captain Tardivo, had taken air photos in 1911 at Tripoli for operational mapping purposes during the war with Turkey, when Italian gunboats also got inside the Dardanelles and attacked shore installations. Subsequently, aeroplanes were used for reconnaissance during the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, when pilots from Britain, France and other European powers flew with the armies of both sides. However, there was no air survey of the Gallipoli Peninsula, systematic or otherwise, though it is possible that the Bulgarians photographed the area of the Bulair Lines during their operations against them.