28. MITI, 1964, p. 238.
29. Yamamura, in Borg and Okamoto, pp. 28889, 300.
30. History of Industrial Policy Research Institute, 1975, 2: 17173. See also Yoshitomi, pp. 14855.
31. Industrial Policy Research Institute, p. 234; MITI, 1960, pp. 12324.
32. Shiroyama, Aug. 1975, p. 307; Berger, pp. 12324.
33. Yoshino Shinji Memorial Society, pp. 29599. See also Yoshino's pamphlet of late 1937,
Nihon kokumin ni uttau
(Report to the Japanese people).
Page 352
34. Yoshino Shinji, 1962, pp. 36566; History of Industrial Policy Research Institute, 1975, 2: 17677.
35. Nakamura, 1974, p. 44.
36. MITI, 1964, p. 141.
37. History of Industrial Policy Research Institute, 1975, 2: 271.
38. For a table of the 41 most important imperial ordinances derived from the law, see Arisawa, 1976, p. 156.
39. It might be noted that
busshi
doin
*
keikaku
is also the technical Japanese term for Soviet-type planning. See Ueno, p. 16. Concerning the original Japanese butsudo, Ito* comments that "conceptually, it was a plan for materials mobilization, budgeting in materials in place of what was formerly expressed with currency." Ito Mitsuharu, p. 361.
40. On the influence of the butsudo and Soviet precedents, see Nakamura, 1974, pp. 24, 16467; MITI, 1964, p. 124; and Tanaka, p. 655. Publication of the book by Tanaka was sponsored by Inaba Hidezo*, Tokunaga Hisatsugu, Sahashi Shigeru, and other leaders of postwar industrial policy.
41. Tanaka, p. 11.
42. Arisawa, 1976, pp. 14952; Inaba, 1965, pp. 22, 4044.
43. Inaba, 1965, pp. 26, 59; Ito Mitsuharu, p. 362; and Tanaka, preface.
44. Two MITI vice-ministers have drawn attention to their work on the butsudo*Hirai Tomisaburo* (
Tsusan
*
jyanaru
*, May 24, 1975, pp. 2830) and Ueno Koshichi* (MITI, 1960, p. 123). Ueno specifically mentions Sakomizu Hisatsune as a central figure in creating and executing the butsudo.
45. Nakamura, 1974, p. 63.
46. Yoshino Shinji Memorial Society, pp. 31012.
47. Shiroyama, Aug. 1975, p. 308.
48. In Morley, p. 311.
49. Maeda, 1968, pp. 3132; Kumagai, quoted in Suzuki Yukio, 1969, pp. 9293.
50. MITI, 1964, p. 148.
51. See Miyake.
52. See "Nihon keizai no saihensei to Ryu* Shintaro*," in Goto* Ryunosuke*,
Showa
*
kenkyu
*
kai
(The Showa* Research Association) (Tokyo: Keizai Orai* Sha, 1968), pp. 22534.
53. See Arisawa, 1976, pp. 200203; Nakamura, 1974, pp. 95102; and MITI, 1964, pp. 44449. For an interesting defense of the Economic New Structure, see Tsukata.
54. Anderson, pp. 149, 154.
55. Kakuma, 1979a, p. 231; and Imai.
56. Fujiwara, p. 446.
57. Inaba, 1965, pp. 5580; and Inaba, 1977.
58. On Inaba's connection with the Kyocho* Kai, see Inaba, 1977. Yoshida Shigeru, the first director of the Cabinet Research Bureau, was also affiliated with the Kyocho Kai, and he brought from it to the Research Bureau Inaba, Katsumata, and Minoguchi Tokijiro*, a prominent professor of economics at Hitotsubashi University after the war. On the Kyocho Kai, see Japan Industrial Club, 1: 103.
59. For the text of the ordinance and a chart of the most important control associations and their presidents, see MITI, 1964, pp. 45865, 508.
60. Shiroyama, Aug. 1975, pp. 31112.
61. Bisson, p. 3.
62. Peattie, p. 219.
Page 353
Five
1. Cohen, p. 54.
2. MITI, 1964, p. 501.
3. Arisawa, 1937, pp. 4546 and note.
4. Kakuma, 1979a, pp. 23839.
5. MITI, 1965, pp. 16465.
6. MITI, 1964, p. 488.
7. Tanaka, pp. 25, 111.
8. Hadley, p. 124.
9. See Important Industries Council. This work includes an informative article by Yamamoto Takayuki, then chief of the Production Expansion Section in the General Affairs Bureau. It also includes a list of key corporate personnel. In addition, see Tsukata, pp. 3442.
10. MITI, 1965, p. 275.
11. See MITI, 1960, pp. 1045; and
Tsusan
*
jyanaru
*, May 24, 1975, p. 25.
12. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Monograph 48, "Textile Industries," p. 73.
13. For the text of this policy, as well as the two ordinances, see MITI, 1964, pp. 56272. See also Kakuma, 1979a, pp. 23738.
14. Cohen, p. 56.
15. Tanaka, p. 260; and Maeda, in Arisawa, 1976, p. 212.
16. Bisson, p. 96.
17. MITI, 1964, p. 524.
18.
Radio Report on the Far East
, no. 28 (Aug. 31, 1943), p. A20.
19. On Fujihara's secret appointment, see
ibid.
, no. 34 (Nov. 24, 1943), p. A1; for his critique, see MITI, 1964, p. 525.
20. The most important primary source on the Munitions Ministry and the Munitions Companies Law is Kitano Kitano worked in MCI and the Ministry of Munitions from 1926 to 1946; he retired as chief of MCI's Mining Bureau. From November 1943 to November 1944 he was chief of the Documents Section in the Munitions Ministry. On the nationalization of the munitions factories during the last weeks of the war, see MITI, 1965, p. 382 (s.v. entries for June 8 and July 10, 1945); and Roberts, p. 362.
21. Bisson, pp. 116, 202.
22. Nawa, 1974, p. 28.
23. Okochi*, "Nihon no gyosei* soshiki" (The organization of administration in Japan), in Tsuji, 2: 9293.
24. Kishi, Oct. 1979, pp. 29899.
25. See Imai. See also Tajiri, p. 115.
26. The full details of the postwar recreation of MCI have never been revealed by the participants. For Yamamoto's and Shiina's comments, see MITI, 1960, pp. 49, 103, 114. Nawa Taro* of the
Asahi shimbun
, writing under both his own name and his pseudonym of Akaboshi Jun, has supplied the information about the other participants. See Nawa, 1974, p. 29; and Akaboshi, pp. 1516. Nawa is probably mistaken about Hirai's being present; according to Hirai himself, he worked in Singapore from 1942 to December 1945. See
Tsusan jyanaru
, May 24, 1975, p. 29. For evidence of the deep hostility to the military within MM, see the memoirs of Sahashi, 1967, pp. 7476.
27. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Monograph 13, "Reform of Civil Service," pp. 2425.
28.
Ibid.
, p. 27.
Page 354
29. For a discussion of how close SCAP came to producing a communist revolution in Japan, see Johnson, 1972.
30. For a breakdown of the ranks within Japanese companies, see JETRO,
Doing Business in Japan
(Tokyo: JETRO, 1973), p. 9. For a biography of Yoshida, see J. W. Dower,
Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience 18781954
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979).
31. Hadley, p. 72.
32. "U.S. Banker Honored Here,"
Japan Times
, Sept. 20, 1975.
33.
Tsusan
*
jyanaru
*, May 24, 1975, pp. 4445.
34. See MITI, 1972, p. 19.
35. Hata, p. 373; MITI Journalists' Club, 1956, p. 15.
36. Ichimada's name is difficult to romanize; his family name sometimes appears as Ichimanda and his given name as Hisato. I have used the form given in
The Yoshida Memoirs
, p. 255. On Yoshida's offer of the Finance portfolio to him, see Shioguchi, p. 32; and Abe, pp. 109, 239, 255.
37. See, inter alia, Kakuma, 1979a, pp. 24849, 26
4; Matsumoto, 2: 95; MITI Journalists' Club, 1956, pp. 24951; and MITI Journalists' Club, 1963a, p. 16.
38. On SCAP's belief that a "planned economy was necessary" for Japan, see Shiroyama, Aug. 1975, p. 313. For SCAP's affinities with the socialist Katayama government, see Haji, p. 235.
39. Kakuma, 1979b, p. 14.
40.
Fifty Years
, p. 215.
41. Quoted in Nakamura, 1974, p. 154.
42. For Ichimada's connection with Whitney, see Shioguchi, pp. 31, 24850.
43. On the RFB, see Arisawa, 1976, pp. 28689.
44. On coal policy, see History of Industrial Policy Research Institute, 1977a, pp. 461. The author of this important monograph is Takahashi Shoji* of Mie University. See also Kojima Tsunehisa; and Kato*, pp. 2830. For Okamatsu's recollections of the "food for coal" policy, see MITI, 1960, pp. 10910.
45. On MCI's Planning Office and priority production, see the memoirs of Kojima Keizo*, in Industrial Policy Research Institute, p. 256.
46. The basic source on the ESB is Economic Planning Agency, 1976, pp. 2473, including Arisawa's recollections, pp. 4057.
47. On an American precedent for the ESB, see MITI, 1962, p. 349.
48. On the purge of Ishibashi, see Watanabe, pp. 5155; Wildes, p. 138; and
The Yoshida Memoirs
, p. 93.
49. See "Yamaguchi hanji no eiyo* shitchoshi*" (The death of Judge Yamaguchi because of insufficient nutrition), in
Showa$pe3
:
shi jiten
, pp. 28384.
50. On the coal nationalization law, see Arisawa, 1976, p. 291; and MITI, 1965, p. 446. Takahashi Hikohiro notes that the only people who were enthusiastic about the nationalization of coal were MCI bureaucrats. See his "Shakaito* shuhan naikaku no seiritsu to zasetsu" (The establishment and collapse of the Socialist party cabinet), in
Iwanami
koza
*, p. 286. In 1975, twenty-eight years after he worked on the law and while he was serving as president of the nation's largest enterprise (Japan Steel), Hirai Tomisaburo* still spoke fondly of coal nationalization and how he had worked hard to achieve it. See
Tsusan jyanaru
, May 24, 1975, p. 29.
Page 355
51. For Kudo's * comment, see Kakuma, 1979b, p. 29. For Ikeda's, see Shioguchi, p. 112. See also Japan Development Bank, p. 484; and Ikeda.
52. See Akaboshi, p. 16.
53. Cohen, p. 431.
54. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Monograph 50, "Foreign Trade," p. 152. (This monograph was declassified only on February 27, 1970.)
55. Boeki-cho* translates literally as "trade agency," but the BOT itself used the title "Board of Trade" on its stationery and other official documents. For the creation of the BOT, see MITI, 1965, p. 414; and MITI, 1971, p. 361.
56. For Toyoda's recollections, see MITI, 1960, pp. 1056; and
Tsusan
*
jyanaru
*, May 24, 1975, p. 24.
57. Japan External Trade Organization, p. 3.
58. Inaba, 1965, pp. 21837. See also Fukui Haruhiro, "Economic Planning in Postwar Japan: A Case Study in Policy Making,"
Asian Survey
, 12 (Apr. 1972): 33031.
59. Kakuma, 1979a, pp. 1314, 25355; MITI, 1960, p. 113 (Matsuda Taro's* recollections); Nawa, 1974, p. 33; and Shiroyama, Aug. 1975, p. 314.
60. See Shioguchi, pp. 4042.
61. For Inagaki's speech, see MITI, 1962, pp. 38687.
62. See Ozaki, 1972; and MITI, 1971, pp. 39099.
63. MITI, 1962, pp. 44849.
64. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Monograph 50, "Foreign Trade," p. 110.
65. Hollerman, 1979, p. 719.
66. Charles S. Maier,
Recasting Bourgeois Europe
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 580, 582.
Six
1. Nakamura, 1969, p. 313.
2. Japan Development Bank, p. 17.
3. See Johnson, 1972.
4. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Monograph 47, "The Heavy Industries," p. 120.
5. Boltho, p. 55
n
.
6. Note John Campbell's comment: "Not only was Ikeda an expansionist, but he had a far more activist conception of his office with respect to domestic policy in general and the budget in particular than any prime minister since Yoshida and until Tanaka." Campbell, p. 233.
7. See Chalmers Johnson, "Low Posture Politics in Japan,"
Asian Survey
, 3 (Jan. 1963): 1730.
8. See MITI Journalists' Club, 1956, p. 42; Kakuma, 1979b, p. 84; and Abe, p. 255.
9. Ito* Daiichi, 1968, p. 465.
10. Broadbridge, p. 88.
11. Watanabe, p. 234.
12. See MITI,
Tsusho
*
sangyo-sho
*
nempo
* (fiscal 1949), p. 129 (hereafter cited as MITI,
Nempo
*).
Page 356
13. As an example of the misplaced cultural explanation, note the following: "Neither profitability nor common financing or trading activities explain the grouping of firms along the keiretsu lineage. The basic motivation for the grouping of keiretsu firms lies in sociological factors. The tendency to form a group is an inherent part of Japan's cultural tradition." Haitani, p. 124.
14. Ikeda, pp. 14850.
15. See "Mergers Revive Trade Concerns Splintered in Japan in Occupation,"
New York Times
, Dec. 7, 1952; and "Broken-up Concerns in Japan to Reunite,"
New York Times
, Mar. 31, 1955.
16. MITI,
Nempo
* (fiscal 1954), p. 80; MITI, 1965, pp. 57375; and MITI Journalists' Club, 1956, p. 42.
17. Abegglen and Rapp, p. 430.
18. The standard work on the alleged incompetence of Japanese planners is Watanabe Tsunehiko, "National Planning and Economic Development: A Critical Review of the Japanese Experience,"
Economics of Planning
, 10 (1970): 2151.
19. Japan Development Bank, p. 23.
20. See the memoirs of Tamaki Keizo*, in MITI, 1960, p. 116; and the comments of Hayashi Shintaro*, in
Ekonomisuto
Editorial Board, 1: 99101. See also Japan Development Bank, p. 28.
21. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Monograph 39, "Money and Banking," p. 42.
22. MITI,
Nempo
(fiscal 1950), p. 151. Note that these annual reports were prepared well after the fiscal year they covered; thus, for example, the report for fiscal 1950 bears a preface dated October 1, 1951.
MITI and the Japanese miracle Page 55