The Complete Idiot's Guide to Middle East Conflict

by Mitchell G. Bard, Ph. D.

  * * *

  The Israeli electorate then did what neither Bush nor the Arabs could do, by voting the Likud Party out of power and replacing it with a Labor-led coalition, which expressed a willingness to trade land for peace. To immediately demonstrate the difference between his administration and that of his predecessor, the new prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin—yes, the same man who had resigned in disgrace roughly 15 years before—declared a settlement freeze. As a reciprocal display of good faith, Bush agreed to provide the loan guarantees he had denied to Shamir.

  Rabin’s election created a new sense of optimism, but the negotiations were slowed by the American election campaign. Consequently, for the last several months of 1992, the parties only went through the motions during their meetings, awaiting the outcome of the election across the Atlantic.

  When Bush was defeated, the Palestinians began to get a sense that they would have to make the best deal possible while they still could. Thus, in the early months of 1993, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators tried to hammer out a compromise bearing some resemblance to Camp David. At times, prospects appeared hopeful. The Palestinians were said to be willing to accept autonomy and to be prepared to put off decisions on the more intractable issues. In later rounds, however, they backtracked and emphasized issues, Jerusalem in particular, which Israel insisted (and the United States agreed) belonged in the final status negotiations.

  Secrets in Oslo

  Meanwhile, the Israelis had been secretly negotiating directly with the PLO for the first time. This was initially viewed as merely an exploratory option, but by August 1993, there were rumors of high-level discussions between the Israelis and PLO officials. No one had any idea, however, that negotiations had been going on for months or that anyone as senior as Israeli foreign ministry director-general Uri Savir had participated.

  Israeli journalist Ron Pundak and Haifa University professor Ya’ir Hirshfeld began to meet with Abu Alaa, the number two man in the PLO. The Norwegians helped set up the contacts, and more than a dozen rounds of talks were held in Norway and another country, with some of Arafat’s top lieutenants involved.

  * * *

  Ask the Sphinx

  Norway was in a unique position to play midwife to the negotiations. The ruling political party had good relations with both the PLO and the Labor Party. In addition, Norway was not a member of the European Community (EC), so, from Israel’s perspective, it did not carry the pro-PLO baggage of the EC member nations.

  * * *

  To ensure that the meetings remained secret, elaborate measures were taken so that the Israelis and Palestinians were never seen together. For example, they arrived at different airports, stayed in different hotels, and were closely guarded by intelligence officers. The meetings were held at an isolated farmhouse, in “safe houses,” and other secure locations.

  The talks grew increasingly serious as the PLO intermediary expressed a willingness to make concessions the Palestinians negotiating in Washington were unprepared to accept and that Rabin did not expect. The Israelis originally proposed the idea of withdrawing from the Gaza Strip first to test the Palestinians’ trustworthiness, but the PLO wanted Jericho included in the package to create a link between the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Ultimately, these “back-channel” talks produced a draft declaration of principles that both Israel and the PLO found acceptable. It was signed by Savir and Alaa in Oslo on August 20.

  Whereas the Oslo talks were being conducted secretly, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators were engaged in public talks that had originated in the Madrid conference. Neither the members of the Palestinian delegation nor their PLO advisor, Nabil Shaath, knew about the back-channel meetings. They did not see the agreement until an Israeli journalist provided them with a translation from the newspaper Yediot Ahronot. Eli Rubinstein, head of the Israeli negotiating team with the Palestinians, was also kept in the dark and was furious when he found out.

  Hoping for a Handshake

  Under the Oslo agreement, Israel and the PLO recognized each other and announced that the Palestinians would be given self-rule first in Gaza and Jericho. Later, the two sides were to negotiate the details of autonomy for the rest of the territories. Even before this was completed, however, Israel agreed to “early empowerment,” giving the Palestinians responsibility for health, education, welfare, taxation, tourism, and other civil functions throughout the West Bank.

  * * *

  Sage Sayings

  Let me say to you, the Palestinians, we are destined to live together on the same soil in the same land. We…who have returned from battles stained with blood;…we who have come from a land where parents bury their children; we who have fought against you, the Palestinians, we say to you today in a loud clear voice: “Enough of blood and tears. Enough!”

  —Yitzhak Rabin

  * * *

  Israel, meanwhile, retained responsibility for security throughout the territories and control over the bridges to Jordan. The Israeli Defense Forces were to move out of heavily populated areas but not fully withdraw from the territories. All the Israeli residents were allowed to remain in the West Bank and

  Gaza under Israel’s protection. The question of the status of Jerusalem was to be deferred until the third year of the five-year autonomy period.

  The formal agreement was signed on the White House lawn on September 13, 1993. With the major issues already decided, the main source of suspense was over whether Rabin could bring himself to shake hands with Arafat—the enemy and terrorist he’d fought and despised for three decades. Although he looked like he’d rather be having a root canal, Rabin did accept Arafat’s outstretched hand, to the wild applause of those attending the ceremony.

  Explaining the Sea Change

  When the shocking news of the Oslo accord was first announced, observers wanted to know why the PLO had seemingly abandoned positions it had held for nearly three decades and why Israel had reversed its longstanding objections to negotiating with the PLO. The answer to the second question was simple. As the months passed, Rabin became convinced that the official Palestinian negotiators were incapable of making any decisions. As it was, they shuttled back and forth between PLO head quarters in Tunis and frequently found their positions subverted by Arafat.

  Close Enough for the Israelis

  Most importantly, the agreement itself was so close to Israel’s preferred solution that it would have made no sense to risk seeking a better deal with the local Palestinians. Although Israel said that the accord was not dependent on reaching a second agreement for mutual recognition with the PLO, the truth was that this was necessary for its implementation.

  The price of Israeli recognition of the PLO amounted to Arafat’s seemingly total capitulation to Israeli demands: recognition of Israel, renunciation of terrorism, and a promise to revoke the provisions of the PLO’s covenant that call for the destruction of the Jewish state. Israel’s concession was that it legitimized the PLO on the basis of its words without first testing to see that its deeds were consistent with them.

  Palestinian Support Eroding

  The PLO’s turnabout was more complex. A variety of forces impelled the PLO to announce the end of its nearly 30-year armed struggle to liberate “Palestine” and to recognize Israel’s right to exist within secure and defensible borders—thus paving the way for the signing of an agreement that closely resembles the one offered to the Palestinians 15 years earlier.

  One important reason for the PLO’s shift was the collapse of the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War eliminated a major source of financial and political support for the Palestinian cause. The PLO’s financial problems did not reach crisis proportions, however, until the Gulf War, when Arafat’s decision to support Iraq alienated its benefactors in the Gulf, notably Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The lack of money put constraints on the PLO’s activities, in particular its ability to provide benefits to Palestinians whose loyalty to the organization was largely a result of these payoffs. In addition, Arafat c
ame under increasing criticism for mismanagement and corruption.

  While the PLO’s resources were declining, Islamic fundamentalists were growing in power, particularly in the Gaza Strip. “Moderate Palestinian” leaders in the territories, such as Faisel Husseini, also were becoming increasingly influential at Arafat’s expense.

  The intifada (see Chapter 18) also had proved a failure. The insurrection had generated tremendous publicity and tarnished Israel’s image in 1988–89, but the Gulf crisis erased the memories of the clashes between rock-throwing youths and Israeli soldiers. By 1992, the fiery intifada was little more than an ember that no longer attracted media attention or concerned Israeli decision-makers.

  Arafat Loses a Friend

  The most important factor in determining the timing of Arafat’s decision was probably the change in American administrations, which forced Arafat to give up hope that the United States would impose his conditions on Israel.

  Although George Bush was seen as the most sympathetic president the Palestinians had ever dealt with, Bill Clinton was viewed as clearly pro-Israel. When Clinton refused to force Israel to take back a group of Hamas activists deported in January 1993, it was obvious U.S. policy had swung back in Israel’s favor. This meant that the Palestinians would have to wait at least four years and hope another Bush would come along, but they realized this was unlikely. Thus, the American electoral cycle, combined with his own age and waning influence, convinced Arafat that his only chance of retaining power was to demonstrate that he could deliver an agreement that would finally end his people’s suffering.

  * * *

  Mysteries of the Desert

  One of Israel’s most controversial policies was the deportation of terrorists. In December 1992, Islamic radicals kidnapped and murdered an Israeli soldier. In response, Rabin deported 415 members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad to Lebanon for a “temporary” period. The reason for the expulsions was the threat of new bloodshed as the two groups tried to sabotage the peace process. The Israeli action drew international condemnation, but Clinton’s muted response ensured that Israel would not suffer any serious consequences for its action.

  * * *

  A Bird in Hand…

  Critics assert that Israel rescued the PLO from the dustbin of history—that its demise would have allowed the local Palestinians to make a deal. Others say that the PLO’s weakness made it possible to get a deal favorable to Israel, that waiting for the PLO’s complete collapse would have taken too long, and that it would have given Hamas the opportunity to gain greater influence. The cynical political view is that Rabin was no less desperate than Arafat to cling to power and that he had to deliver an agreement before the next Israeli election.

  In the end, whatever the motivations, Israel succeeded in negotiating an agreement that offered the promise of ending the “Israeli problem” (that is, the dilemma of how to remain a Jewish state and stay a democracy if it ruled more than one million Palestinians). And the Palestinians finally had achieved a measure of self-determination and could legitimately expect to one day have an independent state in Palestine.

  The Least You Need to Know

  The Palestinians’ support for Iraq in the Gulf War undermined Israeli faith in their willingness to make peace.

  James Baker persuaded the Arabs to sit down for the first time for negotiations with Israel at Madrid, paving the way for the agreements that would come later.

  Bush went to the mat to oppose loan guarantees for Israel in an effort to blackmail Shamir to stop building settlements. U.S.–Israel tensions contributed to Shamir’s election defeat.

  Israelis and PLO officials’ secret meetings in Oslo led to an agreement to grant the Palestinians autonomy in Gaza and Jericho.

  Part 7

  Why Can’t We All Get Along?

  These final chapters explain the developments in the Arab-Israeli peace talks and the key issues, including settlements, Jerusalem, and the refugees. The region is shaken by the assassination of Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, and Palestinian violence escalates, bringing the peace process to a halt. In an effort to break out of the stalemate, Israeli prime minister Barak offers unprecedented concessions, but the Palestinians reject the offer that would have given them their state.

  The collapse of the negotiations is followed by the onset of a new intifada. The dramatic upsurge in terrorist attacks against Israel leads President Bush to call for the Palestinians to replace their leadership. Yasser Arafat resisted calls for reforms up until his death, which marked the end of an era, but also created the possibility that his successor would put an end to violence.

  This section also looks at the recent history of the Arab world as various territories win independence and build modern countries. The history of terrorism in the region is reviewed, and the effort to combat this danger is discussed.

  The concluding chapter looks at the prospects for the future and the reasons not to completely give in to the cynicism that suggests there is no hope of ending Middle East conflict.

  Chapter 22

  The Oldest City’s New Rulers

  In This Chapter

  Peace gets a tryout in Gaza and Jericho

  Jordan takes the plunge

  Assad plays the heavy

  First steps toward Palestinian independence

  The Oslo negotiations changed the dynamics of Middle East diplomacy and created dramatic momentum for peace. Suddenly, Israel was openly negotiating with one of its most hated enemies, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Although everyone knew it would take long, torturous discussions to reach a permanent settlement, a timetable was in place and the outcome was fairly clear: Israel would withdraw to the 1967 borders, with modifications, and the Palestinians would have an entity, probably an independent state, in the parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip from which Israel withdrew.

  This was an agreement that probably could have been achieved a quarter century earlier—if not in 1947—had the Arabs been prepared to accept Israel at that time. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the evolution of U.S.–Israel strategic relations, and the growth of the Israeli economy—as well as the strength of its military—all contributed to the change in circumstances that made a breakthrough possible.

  Once the Palestinian issue was being addressed, Jordan’s King Hussein finally felt confident enough to focus on his country’s own interests. He wasted little time in negotiating agreements and normalizing relations with Israel.

  The one other aggrieved party, Syria, was now left in the cold. For decades, Syrian president Assad had succeeded in keeping a united Arab front that demanded justice for all or justice for none. After PLO leader Arafat and Jordanian king Hussein abandoned him, Assad had no real leverage over Israel. Oh, in theory he could go to war, but lacking a powerful Soviet Union behind him, Assad had no illusion as to the outcome of a military fight. Slowly, even he began to make references to peace that were interpreted as an effort to prepare the public for a change in policy—but the rhetoric was not matched by deeds.

  Chipping In for Peace

  A major function of the Oslo agreement (formally known as the Declaration of Principles [DoP]) was to encourage economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The territories are closely linked economically with Israel, and it is hard to foresee them becoming independently viable. Therefore, Israel and the Palestinians agreed to work together to create new economic opportunities there. This was to be accomplished by the creation of a variety of Palestinian authorities, including a Palestinian electric authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority, and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority.

  The success of these plans was thought to be dependent on international financial assistance. Many nations supported development efforts in the territories, some had long espoused the Palestinian cause, and most recognized it was critical that the Palestinians have
an economic base in order for there to be stability. Accordingly, the United States convened a donors conference in Washington on October 1, 1993, to solicit contributions for long-term development plans.

  Money from the West

  In all, delegates from 43 nations attended and pledged $2 billion in aid over the following 5 years for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The United States promised $500 million over 5 years. Israel pledged a grant of $25 million and a loan of $50 million. The European Community pledged $600 million over 5 years, Japan $200 million over 2 years, and the Nordic countries $150 million over an unspecified period.

  Pittance from the Arabs

  The Arab states, meanwhile, were largely silent. The big hope was that Saudi Arabia would make a major commitment, but the Saudis agreed to give $100 million the first year and made no commitment for after that. This lack of financial support from the Arab world was consistent with its history of publicly declaring fealty to the Palestinian cause while privately offering minimal amounts of money.

  Talk Is Cheap

  Israel gambled that the PLO’s assurances would be quickly translated into deeds. The asymmetry in the Declaration of Principles was that it laid out a timetable for Israeli actions but placed no specific time limits for the fulfillment of Palestinian promises. Thus, for example, Arafat pledged to change the PLO covenant, but did not do so until pressured into it five years later to secure an Israeli commitment for a further withdrawal. The Palestinian side was slow to prepare for the various committees created to resolve outstanding issues. This was one reason for Israeli prime minister Rabin’s unexpected meeting with Arafat on October 6, 1993. Rabin went to tell Arafat that the Palestinians needed to get a delegation together for the October 13 talks relating to the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho. Rabin also wanted to reassure Arafat that the IDF’s recent raids in Gaza were directed at Hamas and not the PLO.