Stealing the Atom Bomb: How Denial and Deception Armed Israel

by Roger Mattson

  Hoover transmitted the summary report to AEC’s director of security on February 18 by a letter stating, “This report summarizes the results of our investigation concerning Shapiro. Our investigation is substantially completed. . . . You are requested to advise as expeditiously as possible what action will be taken by the AEC with respect to the current security clearances of Shapiro and the classified contracts held by the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation.”367

  In two of his memoirs, AEC Chairman Seaborg discussed that FBI letter and the summary FBI report. He said, based on his personal notes at the time, “an officer of a certain industrial nuclear facility may have diverted appreciable amounts of uranium-235 to Israel over the last several years. This possibility has apparently been brought to the attention of the president.” Seaborg said that the FBI strongly suggested revocation of Shapiro’s security clearance and cancellation of NUMEC’s classified contracts. He also said Hoover made it clear that the suspected offenses included not only diversion of material but also divulging of classified information to representatives of Israel. Oddly, Seaborg claims that Hoover did not name the person (Shapiro) or the company (NUMEC) in the transmittal letter.368 That is incorrect; both are named in the documents released by the Bureau to Shapiro’s coauthor, Benjamin Loeb. Loeb was an economist who joined the AEC staff in the mid 1950s and worked as a writer and editor. He transferred to NRC after AEC was abolished. After his retirement from the NRC staff in 1976, he and Seaborg coauthored three books.

  This was not Seaborg’s only factual misstep in describing the NUMEC affair. He later wrote a biographical sketch for the Lawrence Hall of Science that he helped to found.369 Having served as AEC chairman for three presidential administrations, Seaborg described Shapiro in veiled terms, as follows.

  If “vigor” was the watchword of the Kennedy [era], and “compassion” that of Johnson’s, “toughness” was the hallmark of the Nixon regime. We had to be tough, I heard over and over again from chief of staff H.R. Haldeman on down, and I suspect I wasn’t nearly tough enough. . . . I certainly didn’t share the above-the-law attitude that culminated in the Watergate scandal. Based on flimsy and implausible evidence from one of their favorite methods—a wiretap—an AEC contractor was accused of diverting plutonium to Israel’s nuclear program. . . . Attorney General John Mitchell insisted the AEC ignore its own regulations and cancel the contractor’s security clearance without a hearing. I refused and stalled for time until I found a way to defuse the situation. . . . It was increasingly difficult to defend administration policies that I disagreed with, and when my commitment ended in 1971, I returned to Berkeley with relief.

  No one accused Shapiro of diverting plutonium. Even though his memory was poor, Seaborg maintained his support of Shapiro.

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  The same day that Hoover wrote to AEC to transmit the report of the Bureau’s investigation of Shapiro, an internal FBI memorandum indicated continuing interest by the White House, the Justice Department and the Bureau in the relationship between Shapiro and the AEC Commissioners and staff.370 It said, in part,

  Riley [director of AEC security division] was advised (1) of the President and Attorney General’s interest in this matter, (2) [redacted], and (3) that Bureau has kept AEC advised on continuing basis of FBI investigation of Shapiro. Mr. Riley was asked what action AEC planned with respect to the classified contracts and clearance held by Shapiro. . . . Riley further stated that AEC was waiting for a final report from the FBI together with a decision by the Justice Department as to possible prosecution. . . . With respect to our inquiries, this investigation is for practical purposes completed. . . . There does not appear to be any basis at this point for the Justice Department to initiate prosecution of subject although substantial information is available to support AEC administrative action against Shapiro as a security risk. . . .

  By letter 2/14/69 Assistant Attorney General J. Walter Yeagley, Internal Security Division, referred to prior recent FBI memoranda sent to the Attorney General on Shapiro. Yeagley pointed out Attorney General desired any additional information available regarding subject’s past and present connections with AEC and in particular extent of his contacts with members of commission or other AEC personnel.

  Our investigation has not developed any information as to any unusual, improper, or contacts of a strictly personal nature between Shapiro and AEC personnel. . . . Although prosecution does not appear feasible, in view of AEC’s comments as to the possibility of prosecution, we are requesting [Justice] Department’s opinion on this score for the record.

  A separate internal FBI memorandum written the same day noted, “in view of his activities, Shapiro has been placed on the Security Index.” The Security Index was FBI’s secret list of persons to be arrested without warrant and detained in the event of a national security emergency. The maintenance of such lists by FBI was controversial in the past and remains so.371

  The flurry of communications in early 1969 in response to President Nixon’s interest in NUMEC appears to have caused a bureaucratic scramble. The FBI did not have enough useful information on Shapiro to recommend his prosecution; Justice hated to tell the president that it thought Shapiro’s actions were suspicious but did not have enough evidence to prosecute; and AEC commissioners were unwilling to admit the possibility of a diversion on their watch.

  John Fialka reported that Attorney General John Mitchell wrote to CIA in 1969 that he was closing the case because the Justice Department had no legal grounds “to hang its hat on.” However, FBI sources told Fialka, surveillance of Shapiro continued in 1969 but without a wiretap.372 Fialka’s sources were wrong. Records of the FBI demonstrate the presence of wiretaps through much of 1969 and included a “Justification for Continuation of Technical or Microphone Surveillance” dated August 28, 1969. That memorandum said that three phone lines into “the personal residence of Shapiro” were tapped and had been tapped since September 1968.373 It also said,

  Since the submission of last [report], this source [wiretap] has furnished pertinent information pertaining to subject’s activities, the majority of which would not otherwise be available to this office. Subject continues his contacts with representatives of the Israeli scientific, technical and economic fields, including [redacted], Science Attaché, Dr. Avraham Hermoni, Scientific Counselor, both of the Embassy of Israel, Washington, D.C.; [redacted] Research Metallurgist, Israel AEC; and [redacted] Israel Investment Services, Israel Government Investment Authority, New York City. In view of the continued interest in subject on the part of the United States AEC as evidenced by that Agency’s recent interview of subject and the current tension in the Mid East concerning which this source [wiretap] could supply intelligence data of value to the internal security of this country, it is recommended that this installation be continued for at least an additional three-month period and as long as file security can be assured. If, at the conclusion of the three-month period, information of value has not been obtained from the source appropriate recommendations will be submitted to discontinue this installation.

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  The FBI records from 1969 are a hodgepodge. Some are highly redacted; some show AEC dragging its feet in deciding on a proper course of action, some report continuing physical surveillance of Shapiro and some show communication between the Bureau and the Justice Department. Then there is the strange case of “Dr. X.”

  In late February, FBI noted two articles in a local newspaper called The Advertiser, published in southern Allegheny County, which is suburban Pittsburgh. The longer of the two articles was attributed to a staff writer named Mack Track and was captioned “Middle East ‘Powder Keg’ May Be Fissionable-Type if Israel Loses Friends.” The article reviewed the American and French deals with Israel on military aircraft and said that the press does not pay attention when things are done to Israel but is enraged when Israel retaliates. The article then asked, “But the big question mark is nuclear. Will Israel, which certainly has the know-how and facili
ties to do it, build a hydrogen bomb? . . . It’s pretty certain that Israel doesn’t want to go the nuclear route. However, time is against the Israelis and they know it.”

  The second article was in a small box adjacent to the first article. Entitled “Dr. X,” it read, “Once or twice a month at Greater Pittsburgh airport a Pittsburgh physicist takes off for JFK International Airport where he boards an El Al plane for Tel Aviv. Dr. ‘X’ is one of the nation’s best informed men on nuclear materials. He once worked for Westinghouse at Bettis until he and a few others left to start a business for themselves. Now he’s a ‘consultant’ to several Israeli firms and the government on handling radioactive materials and related matters.”374

  The FBI took these newspaper articles seriously and issued a report in May of its “investigation to ascertain the identity of Dr. X.” The report mentioned that confidential sources were consulted. It was sent to Secret Service, among others.375

  In its investigation, the FBI interviewed Richard L. Barnes, publisher of The Advertiser, people who knew of his credit situation, the local chief of police, representatives of the company that owned The Advertiser and Barnes’ former employer at another local newspaper. The FBI learned that Barnes was “aggressive, energetic and ambitious” but not disloyal, and that The Advertiser was a cheap production, a shopping guide and a legitimate operation of benefit to the community. The FBI learned that an associate of Barnes, Frank K. Noll, had written the two articles of interest and claimed he had gotten the information about Israel from Life magazine. He acknowledged to the agent that Dr. X was Dr. Zalman Shapiro. He claimed he met Shapiro on an airplane bound for Israel in 1962 and Shapiro told him about NUMEC’s interest in developing food irradiators for sale in Israel and Shapiro’s credentials as a metallurgist and former Westinghouse employee. Noll said he recalled all this information in 1969 upon reading an article in Life and decided to write something provocative to promote sales of The Advertiser.

  The FBI agent doing the fieldwork in 1969 might not have appreciated the fact that in 1962 Noll learned about Shapiro’s intentions in Israel, or his cover story, whichever is correct, before either the AEC or the FBI. Perhaps Shapiro was testing his elevator speech with an anonymous seatmate on an overnight flight to Israel.

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  On March 28, 1969, the Attorney General approved continuation of electronic surveillance of Shapiro for another three months.376

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  AEC Chairman Seaborg resisted FBI’s recommendation in February 1969 to cancel Shapiro’s security clearance and NUMEC’s classified contracts. Seaborg wrote to Attorney General Mitchell in April saying AEC could not just cancel the clearance and the contracts without telling Shapiro why. In addition, Seaborg said AEC had to use the derogatory information that FBI had provided if Shapiro requested a hearing to contest the cancellation of his security clearance. To do so would be to admit to the Bureau’s use of warrantless wiretaps, which Justice was averse to do. Instead, Seaborg suggested that AEC interview Shapiro. Although Seaborg thought Mitchell would resist this course, on April 23 he received the attorney general’s blessing to go ahead with the interview.377

  The interview did not happen right away because of scheduling difficulties. However, Shapiro and Seaborg managed to fit a private, one-on-one meeting into their calendars just a scant two weeks later, ostensibly concerning other matters. According to AEC’s Director of Security, Seaborg and Shapiro met on May 6, 1969 and discussed NUMEC’s contracts with AEC, not the ongoing FBI investigation.378 Perhaps Seaborg was too much scientist and not enough public administrator to realize that the appearance of a conflict of interest can be as damaging to credibility as an actual conflict of interest.

  Meanwhile, FBI wiretap data showed Shapiro continued to be in contact with Israeli intelligence and atomic energy officials and to express his willingness “to help that country in any way he can.” The wiretaps disclosed “the possible identity of a ‘friend’ at AEC” and recorded continued interactions between Shapiro and Avraham Eylonie of Israeli Military Intelligence.379 There were other lengthy FBI reports of wiretap information later in 1969.

  The wiretaps disclosed a May 2 conversation between Shapiro and an undisclosed individual at Israeli Investment Services, an arm of the Israeli Government Investment Authority in New York City. In the conversation, it appeared that Shapiro was chafing under the management of NUMEC’s new owner, ARCO. “Subject [Shapiro] indicated he wanted to go to Israel in June 1969, in spite of the fact his employers wanted him to visit Europe on Company business. Subject stated that he was tempted to tell his employers to ‘go to hell.’ [Redacted] discouraged subject from taking this [course] of action by informing subject that he was too valuable in his present position with NUMEC.”380

  At about the same time, the Joint Committee showed renewed interest in the NUMEC case. On May 13, Assistant Attorney General Yeagley and AEC Security Director Riley briefed JCAE Chairman Holifield, Staff Executive Director Edward Bauser and Deputy Director George Murphy on how communications to the committee on the NUMEC matter should go forward in the future. Yeagley said, “It would not be possible to produce the FBI reports for their [Joint Committee] examination principally because of the sensitive sources and investigative techniques usually involved in such an investigation.”381 In addition, the records disclosed the existence of FBI’s warrantless wiretaps and must have contained information about CIA and the investigative techniques it employed in Israel because there were many redactions.

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  On June 20, Shapiro met Jeruham Kafkafi of the Israeli embassy at the Pittsburgh airport. Kafkafi left Washington by air early that day, met with Shapiro for about an hour and returned directly to Washington. The FBI observed the meeting in secret.382 Kafkafi has been described variously as a Mossad case officer (katsa), who ran agents in America, and a “possible Israeli intelligence officer.”383

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  On June 25, high-level officials met in Washington to discuss whether to interview Shapiro. Attendees included Peter Flanagan, assistant to President Nixon, Clay Whitehead, assistant to Flanagan, Seaborg and Riley. On June 30, Whitehead told AEC to go ahead with the interview.384

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  On July 19, Henry Kissinger wrote to President Nixon to spell out alternatives for addressing the status of the Israeli nuclear program. A special group comprised of Kissinger, David Packard from Defense, Richard Helms from CIA, Elliott Richardson from Justice and General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was convened to address the topic. Kissinger noted that the Israelis would have 10 surface-to-air missiles programmed for nuclear warheads by the end of 1970. He explained that the Israelis were interpreting their promise to not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East as meaning “they could possess such weapons as long as they did not test, deploy or make them public.” The special group wanted the administration, in upcoming discussions with Yitzhak Rabin and Golda Meir, to obtain Israel’s commitment to sign the NPT and to not possess nuclear weapons.385 Kissinger apparently changed his mind since his earlier agreement with Nixon to not push other nations to sign the NPT. Kissinger’s special group also told the President,

  There is circumstantial evidence that some fissionable material available for Israel’s weapons development was illegally obtained from the United States by about 1965. . . . This is one program on which the Israelis have persistently deceived us—and may even have stolen from us.

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  Finally, four months after Attorney General Mitchell gave the go ahead, William Riley at AEC told the FBI that he had contacted Shapiro and arranged an interview for August 14, 1969 in Washington. Riley said Shapiro did not question the reason for the interview.386 On August 28, Riley sent Hoover a summary of AEC’s interview of Shapiro.387,18

  The summary of the “Informal Interview” is nine pages long and has an additional two-page attachment describing a follow-up interview by telephone on August 26. The follow-up interview was “in speci
fic reference to the information he had provided . . . concerning the circumstances of his meeting at the Pittsburgh airport on June 20, 1969, with Jeruham Kafkafi.” The two summaries were signed by Franklin N. Parks, AEC Office of the General Counsel, and William T. Riley, Director, AEC Division of Security, who conducted the interviews.

  The summaries contain several notable points and omissions. First, they provide a detailed account by Shapiro of his interaction with Avraham Hermoni, scientific counselor of the Israeli embassy, and “a number of U.S. technical and scientific personnel” in the November 3, 1968 meeting arranged by “a scientist from the University of Cornell, a member of the physics department . . . (Benjamin Morton Siegel).”388 An intermediary in setting up the meeting in Shapiro’s residence was a University of Pittsburgh professor (Jerome Laib Rosenberg).389 Shapiro said the “general tone of the meeting concerned ways and means the group could be of assistance to Israel in solving some of its technical problems.” Shapiro listed the areas in which Israel sought assistance from him and the other scientists, i.e., water contamination, saboteur detection, long-life power sources and military activities.

  The interviewers also reported, “In response to a question, [Shapiro] said he did not know why Hermoni had not requested information on these topics from the U.S. military.” Shapiro said he thought he met Hermoni for the first time in Israel and he thought Hermoni was a professor at a university, not an employee of the Israeli Ministry of Defense. He also “said that when Colonel Hillel Aldag, Hermoni’s predecessor, was transferred he [Shapiro] was invited to a reception at the Israeli embassy to meet Hermoni at which time he renewed his acquaintance with him.”