Stealing the Atom Bomb: How Denial and Deception Armed Israel

by Roger Mattson

  Shapiro told his AEC interviewers that he met Jeruham Kafkafi, a subordinate of Hermoni, “about a half dozen times.” The interviewers reported that Shapiro was “calm throughout the entire interview except when pressed for the details of his meeting with Kafkafi on June 20 at the Pittsburgh airport.” In fact, Shapiro did not remember the meeting (it occurred two months before the interview) until prompted by his AEC questioner and then said he and Kafkafi talked about an overdue invoice and a “power supply unit and whether or not it could be adapted to the Israeli intrusion detection device.” They also discussed “difficulties they had been encountering in the potato irradiation project.” Shapiro’s demeanor in this area of questioning prompted the follow-up telephone call by Riley and Parks on August 26.

  The AEC interviewers told Shapiro at the start of the interview that it resulted from questions that arose in a routine investigation by AEC to continue Shapiro’s security clearance. Shapiro said he viewed this interview as “related to the losses of material at NUMEC in 1965 and the fact that the staff of the JCAE had indicated he had probably carried the unaccounted-for material to Israel presumably for use in the Israeli weapons program.” Shapiro “expressed his concern that his company as a result of process losses of materials in 1965 has been blackballed and that recently NUMEC had been denied a contract in the safeguards area that it had expected to receive.” The interviewers responded, “that insofar as the losses of material at the NUMEC plant were concerned, the Commission had conducted a complete investigation and that this matter was closed.” Either the interviewers lied or, more likely, they did not know of the ongoing FBI investigation that CIA requested after it found HEU near Dimona.

  The interview summaries twice repeated Shapiro’s statement that “he has never been requested to furnish classified information, has never furnished classified information and would not, if asked to, furnish classified information to unauthorized personnel.” The interviewers noted that Shapiro made this statement in the specific context of his associations with Israeli officials. The interview summaries included no mention of the restrictions on transfer of sensitive nuclear technology compared to the restrictions that apply to classified information.

  Riley concluded, “On the basis of the information developed during this interview, particularly Dr. Shapiro’s statement that throughout his associations with Israeli officials he has never been asked to furnish classified information, has never furnished, and would not, if asked to, furnish such to unauthorized persons, the Commission does not contemplate further action in this matter at this time.” The interview summary touched on the following additional points:

  ○When asked about his foreign contacts, Shapiro listed many and named Israel as “one of his foremost customers.”

  ○Shapiro discussed ISORAD’s slowly developing irradiation projects and the possible use of a 5-watt nuclear generator to supply power for intrusion detection devices in Israel.

  ○Shapiro admitted meeting a number of Israeli “national officials” and said that several of them had visited his facility under authorization of the AEC.

  ○Shapiro “pointed out the only classified work NUMEC has had is in producing Navy fuel and he has had no Navy fuel work for years.”

  ○Shapiro said “he has cooperated with other government officials, including [redacted short acronym] which according to Shapiro frequently [two lines redacted].”

  It is possible that Shapiro was alluding to CIA when he told Riley and Parks that he had cooperated with a federal agency. Years after the interview, Newsweek reported, “Zalman Shapiro’s foreign connections—which often had made him a valuable source to the CIA itself—brought him under suspicion.”390

  Riley and Parks recorded at the end of their summary of the first interview that Shapiro was calm except when confronted with the AEC’s knowledge of his recent airport meeting with Kafkafi. They also said he was less than candid in describing the circumstances of the November 3, 1968 meeting in his home with the other scientists and Hermoni. They implied they believed his statements about never furnishing classified information to the Israelis. On August 26, 1969, twelve days after the interview, they called Shapiro to inquire further into his airport meeting with Kafkafi. They told him that the reasons he had given for the meeting did not appear to justify flying from DC to Pittsburgh to meet in person. Shapiro said there also had been some discussion of the political situation in Israel but that the reason was the long-overdue $32,000 owed by Israel to NUMEC. He told Riley and Parks “the account was settled shortly thereafter.”

  On September 8, Shapiro called Riley to say he had been mulling over the August 26 telephone conversation and, since the AEC attached some significance to the airport meeting, he had given more careful thought to it. “The only additional detail he wanted to include in his general statement was that Hermoni (the AEC memo of conversation refers to Hermoni when it presumably means Kafkafi) asked him if he knew an individual from Oak Ridge, whose name he (Shapiro) has since forgotten, but whom he understood from the general line of questions asked by Hermoni was a nuclear physicist and was to participate in an inspection of facilities in Israel.” Shapiro said he told Hermoni, “that he did not know this individual and thus was in no position to comment.”391 Neither an overdue invoice nor a reference check on an Oak Ridge physicist appear to justify a round trip flight from Washington to Pittsburgh for a one hour meeting. Perhaps there was something else to justify the time and expense compared to a phone call, such as a subject that the Israeli spies did not want to discuss on a phone line that was tapped.

  The FBI never asked Kafkafi for his version of why he went to Pittsburgh to meet Shapiro at the airport. However, Avner Cohen did ask Kafkafi many years later.392

  Around 2011 or so, I went to visit an old neighbor, the very old Yerucham Kafkafi, who by that time was already living in a nursing home in Kfar Saba. For decades the Kafkafi family lived on my street, about five houses away from my parent’s house in Ramat Hasharon. Indeed, as a child I was very close to one of the sons, Amnon, who was a year younger than me, so I knew his parents. By the time of my visit, Yerucham was 94 years of age (if I recall correctly). I sensed this was the last time to ask him about NUMEC and about that airport meeting, which I subsequently learned about. Kafkafi, still with good cognition and memory, understood immediately my question. He told me that the meeting at the Pittsburgh airport was about payments for those nuclear batteries that NUMEC delivered to Israel, with permission, but Israel was late to pay. He elaborated that it was a long overdue payment that Israel had owed NUMEC, and that Shapiro was impatient about it for a while, so they decided at the embassy that given their long and close relationship with Shapiro, it was worthwhile to fly and hand him the payment in person.

  Two weeks after AEC’s interview of Shapiro, Seaborg wrote letters to the Justice Department, the FBI and the Joint Committee to summarize what AEC learned. He indicated,

  •Shapiro’s account of a particular meeting with an Israeli official was consistent with other reports AEC received of the meeting,

  •Shapiro appeared to be less than completely candid in the discussion of his relationship with some officials of the Government of Israel. . . . He was vague and uncertain as to details that he should have been able to recall, and

  •Shapiro stated that he had never been asked to furnish, had never furnished and would not furnish classified information to Israeli officials.

  Seaborg concluded the AEC did “not contemplate further action in this matter at this time.”393

  Seaborg and his staff did not address the fact that some types of technology transfer are prohibited even if they do not involve classified information. The Atomic Energy Act required AEC to approve in advance any transfer of “sensitive nuclear technology” to other nations. That term is defined as any information that is not available to the public that is important to a uranium enrichment facility, a nuclear fuel reprocessing facility, or a heavy water production facility. Sensiti
ve nuclear technology can take a tangible form, such as models, prototypes, blueprints or operations manuals, or an intangible form, such as technical services. Apparently, Riley and Parks did not distinguish between classified information and sensitive nuclear technology in their 1969 interview of Shapiro. Unauthorized disclosure of either type of information to a foreign state was a violation of the Atomic Energy Act.

  Riley later said more about the 1969 interview than was recorded in the interview summary. In a May 1979 FBI interview, Riley recalled that Shapiro expressed respect and admiration for Israel, said American and Israeli interests were one and the same, and said if he helped Israel he would be helping the United States. Shapiro also told Riley that he would like to immigrate to Israel someday.394 It is intriguing that Riley waited ten years to tell the FBI of these important parts of the 1969 interview.

  Several things are remarkable about Shapiro’s statements as they were recalled by Riley but not reported by Seaborg or included in the summary of the interview. For one thing, Shapiro appeared to think that anything he did to help an American ally was okay. To the contrary, the Atomic Energy Act does not differentiate between friend and foe in setting rules that govern the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology. The test for espionage is whether the unsanctioned transfer of information could injure the United States or assist another country in development of nuclear weapons. For another thing, by saying that he would like to immigrate to Israel someday, Shapiro conceded a conflict of interest in his protection of nuclear technology.

  ***

  Riley summarized the Shapiro interview in a letter to Hoover on August 28, 1969.395 Hoover replied to Riley on September 3.396 Hoover said in his response the Bureau had conducted a

  thorough and extended investigation . . . [that] developed information clearly pointing to Shapiro’s pronounced pro-Israeli sympathies. . . . It is believed most unlikely that further investigation will develop any stronger facts in connection with the subject’s association with Israeli officials. The basis of the security risk posed by the subject lies in his continuing access to sensitive information and material and it is believed the only effective way to counter this risk would be to preclude Shapiro from such access, specifically by terminating his classified contracts and lifting his security clearances.

  Seaborg quoted from this letter in one of his memoirs, saying Hoover strongly implied AEC was making a mistake in not revoking Shapiro’s security clearance.397

  Hoover wrote to Helms the same day he wrote to Riley. The Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library first released a redacted copy of Hoover’s letter in March 2009.398 The ISCAP released a less redacted version of the letter in 2014.399 Hoover’s letter to Helms was very similar to his letter on the same day to Riley. It read in part as follows:

  As you are aware, this Bureau has been conducting an investigation of Dr. Zalman Mordecai Shapiro, head of the nuclear processing firm, NUMEC, Apollo, Pennsylvania, since May 1968. Copies of reports covering our inquiries, including a summary report prepared by our Pittsburgh Office under date of February 18, 1969, have been furnished to your Agency on a continuing basis. . . .

  We have conducted a thorough and extended investigation of Shapiro for more than a year, including substantial physical surveillance coverage. We have developed information clearly pointing to Shapiro’s pronounced Israeli sympathies [one and a half lines redacted]. It is believed most unlikely that further investigation will develop any stronger facts in connection with the subject’s association [half line redacted]. The basis of the security risk posed by the subject lies in his continuing access to sensitive information and material and it is believed that the only effective way to counter this risk would be to preclude Shapiro from such access, specifically by terminating his classified contracts and lifting his security clearances. However, after careful consideration, including an interview with Shapiro, AEC has advised that it plans no further action at this time. Under these circumstances, we are discontinuing our active investigation of the subject.

  Both AEC and FBI decided at that point to discontinue further action regarding Shapiro. Seaborg provided his simple justification for not going further. “The FBI still gave us no evidence; harboring pro-Israeli sympathies and meeting with Israelis were still legal activities, as far as I could ascertain.”400

  AEC’s Director of Security William Riley soon replied to Hoover.401

  We are, of course, fully aware of the extensive effort on the part of the Bureau in this case. The investigation, however, did not produce evidence which would provide AEC a sufficient basis either to revoke Dr. Shapiro’s security clearances under our established personnel clearance procedures or to bar him from further classified contract activity. . . . In this regard, the Attorney General, in his letter to the Chairman, AEC, on April 4, 1969, advised that the Department has no evidence which would support any action by the Department.

  ***

  On September 8, 1969 DCI Helms wrote a three-page memorandum for President Nixon.402 The CIA released the memo in September 2015 in connection with an FOIA lawsuit and redacted all but the first five lines of the memo. Those lines said the information was being provided to the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense personally. Helms sent the memo soon after receiving Hoover’s memo signaling an end to FBI’s investigation and just before a visit by Golda Meir to the United States for a meeting with President Nixon. The memo did double duty when it came to informing presidents: According to notes on the copy released by CIA, DCI William Colby had the memo retyped for President Ford on August 20, 1974.

  ***

  On September 19, 1969 in preparation for Meir’s visit, the State Department prepared a briefing book for Kissinger and Nixon on “Israel’s Nuclear Weapon and Missile Program.”403 The department noted, “It has been the consensus for some time that the acquisition by Israel of nuclear weapons would be seriously counter to our worldwide interests.” The department went on to suggest ways that Kissinger or Nixon might say to Meir that the United States frowned on the whole idea. Imbedded in the suggestions was a short summary of what the Department knew about the status of the Israeli nuclear program.

  Israel has the technical ability and material resources, including unsafeguarded uranium, under her control to produce weapons grade material for a number of weapons. All the facilities required for production of plutonium have been identified with the exception of the separation plant. Israel may also have acquired highly enriched U-235, possibly through development of a small gas centrifuge separation capability. Some have reservations about whether or not Israel has produced and assembled a complete nuclear weapon, but do not dispute the likelihood that she could and soon might; others feel confident that Israel has one or more nuclear weapons now. The first such weapon would probably be in an air-drop configuration, so that Israel might very well now have a nuclear bomb.

  The September 1969 meeting between President Nixon and Prime Minister Meir marked the end of Washington’s political pressure on the Israeli nuclear program. There is no written record of their private discussion; even Henry Kissinger was excluded from the meeting. In all likelihood, Meir informed Nixon that Israel had acquired the bomb and pledged to keep it invisible, i.e., untested and undeclared. In exchange, Nixon agreed to stop asking for annual visits to Dimona and to stop badgering Israel to sign the NPT.404 Israel’s policy on its nuclear arms became known as nuclear opacity. The United States has remained a willing coconspirator in that deception for nearly 40 years, which undermines its credibility.

  Richard Nixon and Golda Meir

  In the words of Avner Cohen, “Set against contemporary values of transparency and accountability, the Nixon-Meir deal of 1969 is now a striking and burdensome anomaly. . . . It is time for a new deal to replace the old Nixon-Meir understandings of 1969, with Israel telling the truth and in doing so finally normalizing its nuclear affairs.”405

  ***

  The relationship between FBI and CIA reached its nadir when lia
ison officer Papich resigned in March 1970 and urged Hoover to redouble FBI’s efforts to cooperate with CIA. On March 2, Hoover sent a secret Teletype to FBI field offices in cities where CIA maintained a presence. “IMMEDIATELY DISCONTINUE ALL CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL CIA OFFICE.” Hoover’s knee jerk reaction did not succeed. His G-men and CIA officers were too good at clandestine operations; they simply continued to cooperate as best they could behind the director’s back.406

  ***

  On March 5, 1970, Helms issued a National Intelligence Estimate concerning Soviet policies in the Middle East. He noted that Soviet calculations surely took into account the fact that Israel had the capability to develop and produce and might soon be in a position to deploy nuclear weapons. He surmised the Soviets would believe that Israel primarily relied on such weapons as a deterrent against Arab invasion, only to be used if Israel faced a desperate situation.407

  * * *

  18 In FBI’s release of this document in the mid 1980s, it completely redacted the interview summary. In December 1989, CIA responded to an FOIA request from the NRDC and provided 35 documents relating to NUMEC, including a letter from AEC Assistant General Manager Howard Brown, Jr. to Richard Helms transmitting a mostly unredacted copy of Riley’s summary of the Shapiro interview. In 2008, in response to my FOIA request, while I was unaware of the NRDC documents, CIA refused to acknowledge that it had a copy of Riley’s letter. Separately, in 2008 CIA also refused to declassify a copy of the same letter that resides in James Connor’s files in the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. How or why CIA refused to declassify a document it refused to acknowledge it had is a mystery. In any event, in 2008, Tom Cochran provided me the NRDC’s mostly unredacted copy. Then, in 2009, in response to my FOIA request, FBI provided another essentially unredacted copy of the interview, which was attached to an August 28, 1969 letter from Riley to Hoover. Curiously, FBI redacted the names of the AEC lawyer and Kafkafi.