Stealing the Atom Bomb: How Denial and Deception Armed Israel

by Roger Mattson

  The 1978 inquiry conducted by McTiernan concluded, based on interviews with Duckett and the eleven NRC attendees at the briefing, “No CIA packet of information was offered to or refused by NRC at the February briefings. The results of the interviews indicated generally that the briefer spoke informally from a folder or loose papers.”

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  Shortly after McTiernan’s report was released, including the third page of Duckett’s interview, John Fialka, writing for the Washington Star, called it “the latest evidence to emerge from the agency showing confusion, alarm, and secrecy that still surround the loss of 206 pounds of highly enriched uranium from a private plant in Apollo, Pa., sometime in the mid 1960s.”558 The New York Times focused on Duckett’s description of Johnson’s involvement.559

  John Fialka also noted the diversity of views among NRC commissioners and staff reflected in McTiernan’s report.560 In addition, he reported that in January 1978 investigators from three Congressional committees concerned with NUMEC interviewed Richard Helms. They found his memory “hazy” on the possibility that President Johnson may have prevented a more thorough investigation. Helms did recall for the Congressional investigators “that Apollo was a subject of concern when he was CIA director.” He said he had no recollection of telling President Johnson in 1968 that CIA had evidence that Israel possessed atom bombs. Asked whether he would deny any events described by Duckett, Helms said, “I don’t say they didn’t happen, I just have no recollection of them.”561 Henry Myers attended the meeting with Helms. He later told Udall that Helms recalled that “Shapiro was an agent of the government of Israel and he [Helms] recommended that FBI conduct the [1968-69] surveillance.”562

  Avner Cohen also interviewed Helms on these matters, but much later than Myers and others from the Congressional committees. In 1996, Helms told Cohen that he had no recollection of Johnson asking him to keep information from Rusk and McNamara. He said he did not recall how Teller’s opinion on the Israeli bomb “and other circumstantial evidence regarding diversion of nuclear material” got to his attention, but he thought “it likely that Duckett passed the information on to him and he conveyed it to Johnson.”563

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  In June 1978, NRC staff finally requested a briefing on FBI’s ongoing investigation into the Apollo-NUMEC matter. The letter from NRC Executive Director Gossick asked for a briefing “on the progress and results to date of any FBI investigations of the NUMEC matter.”564 Although FBI had briefed many people by that time, it had managed to keep NRC in the dark. The FBI provided a top secret briefing on July 14, 1978 for two settings of NRC officials (evading the Sunshine Act once again), including the four commissioners, Gossick, his deputy William Dircks and senior staffers from the offices of International Programs, Inspection and Enforcement, General Counsel, Executive Legal Director and Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards.565 Three months later, NRC and FBI established a Memorandum of Understanding for “continued liaison, cooperation and exchange of information . . . in nuclear matters.”566

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  On June 21, 1978, Bill Knauf and Jim Anderson from DOE’s Division of Inspection interrupted former AEC Chairman Seaborg’s California retirement. Seaborg’s notes on the meeting indicate that they came to talk about NUMEC and the allegation that Zalman Shapiro “diverted large amounts of highly enriched uranium-235 to Israel in the 1960’s.”567 The inspectors focused their questions “on the degree of surveillance of the Atomic Energy Commission commissioners on the NUMEC and the actions of the commission when the loss of material was reported.” They also questioned Seaborg on his interactions with Attorney General Mitchell on whether to give Shapiro a hearing if upgrading of his security clearance was to be denied. “They told me that as late as 1971 CIA wanted to pursue this further but Mitchell declined to do so.” Seaborg continued,

  I asked them if any responsible persons feel that Shapiro actually diverted material to Israel. They replied that nobody with a scientific background believes this but that it is difficult to convince some members of Congress. They said that some enriched uranium-235, which can be identified as coming from the Portsmouth, Ohio plant has been picked up in Israel, which, of course, has excited some members of Congress. However, such enriched material has been sold on an official basis to Israel and this could be the source of the clandestined sample.

  This Seaborg interview record is further confirmation of the Portsmouth signature for the HEU found by CIA near Dimona in 1968. It came packaged with a novel euphemism, “clandestined.” Putting aside that tangential reference to the CIA, it is surprising that Seaborg would not have understood the difference in enrichment levels between the 93 percent enriched HEU in the Nahal Soreq reactor that came from Oak Ridge and the 97.7 percent enriched HEU that came from Portsmouth and was processed into naval fuel.

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  Later in 1978, Congressman Dingell requested the General Accounting Office to conduct an independent investigation of the NUMEC affair. The GAO did so, but FBI and CIA refused to allow publication of GAO’s report. This prompted Dingell to charge that there were “widespread suspicions of a government coverup of either a real or a feared diversion.” The CIA said the reason for classification of the GAO report was classified.568 Both FBI and CIA had initially said they would go along with an unclassified report, possibly with some classified portions. Within a few months, both agencies insisted that no part of the report could be released to the public. Their unity in this reversal suggests White House involvement. The Camp David peace talks among President Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin occurred in September. The GAO report, even as indefinite as it turned out to be, would have been embarrassing to the three parties in the ongoing peace talks.

  On May 6, 2010, the government released the December 18, 1978 GAO report and related correspondence to the public in response to an FOIA request by Grant F. Smith. There were multi-page redactions in the report encompassing almost every paragraph that referred to the CIA, even though the report was then 32 years old.569 On March 18, 2014, responding to an appeal by Grant F. Smith, ISCAP released a less redacted version of the GAO report. It is clear from the report that in 1978 GAO had added its voice to a growing chorus saying a diversion could not be ruled out. Important points recorded by GAO in the report were as follows:

  •GAO was denied access to reports and documents on the alleged incident by CIA and FBI;

  •Based on the totality of GAO’s inquiry . . . the allegations have not been fully or adequately answered;

  •GAO cannot say whether or not there was a diversion of material from the NUMEC facility;

  •Federal investigations of the alleged NUMEC incident were uncoordinated, limited in scope and timeliness, and, in GAO’s opinion, less than adequate;

  •Each [AEC] inspection [before 1966] revealed significant deficiencies but [AEC] allowed the facility to continue nuclear operations even though a key field investigator at one point recommended that [AEC] stop providing nuclear material to the facility;

  •The FBI did not focus on the nuclear diversion possibility until 1976, eleven years after the alleged incident;

  •The 1965 [AEC] inspection of Apollo found that the inventory difference was about 2 to 3 times higher than experienced by similar facilities operating at that time;

  •The $1.1 million fine for lost material in 1965 was paid by NUMEC’s line of credit with Mellon Bank, then ARCO bought NUMEC in 1972 [and assumed NUMEC’s debts];

  •NUMEC had mixed material among various contracts, a practice that was explicitly prohibited by [AEC];

  •FBI agents involved in the current investigation [1978] said that while there exists circumstantial information that could lead an individual to conclude that a diversion had occurred, there is no substantive proof that a diversion occurred;

  •GAO contacted 11 former and current CIA employees, but CIA then “blocked our efforts to continue;”

  •“In an August 1977 meeting a form
er high ranking CIA official [probably Carl Duckett] informed GAO, in the presence of several current CIA officials, that information was developed by the CIA that made it appear that the NUMEC facility was the ‘most likely’ source of the material (redacted). GAO’s understanding of the information that was presented at this meeting was subsequently provided to CIA in a memorandum of conversation. A knowledgeable CIA official who reviewed the memorandum expressed no opposition to GAO’s use of the term ‘most likely.’

  •“Later, in a November 1977 meeting with CIA officials, GAO was informed that there [were] no data to specifically support such a conclusion. Further, GAO was informed by CIA officials that characterizing NUMEC as the ‘most likely’ source of the uranium-235 held by Israel was not the official position of the Agency but of perhaps one or two former Agency officials. . . . Subsequently, however, two former senior CIA officials responsible for collecting and analyzing such data told GAO that information does exist within the CIA linking the unaccounted for NUMEC material to Israel. One of these former officials was one of the five highest ranking employees of the CIA and reported directly to the Director of the CIA on this matter [Carl Duckett].”

  •CIA refused to allow a former NRC chairman [Anders and Rowden were the only possibilities] to discuss with GAO a particular CIA briefing [probably the NRC briefing by Carl Duckett in early 1976];

  •Discovery that a large amount of weapons-grade material could have been diverted would have been embarrassing to [AEC] and detrimental to its promotional responsibilities;

  •The FBI’s efforts to effectively investigate the incident were impeded by its lack of technical expertise—the agent in charge of the 1978 investigation thought the FBI was not competent to investigate an incident involving missing uranium;

  •FBI agents involved in the 1978 investigation believe that there is a substantial amount of information that tends to support the diversion theory;

  •CIA Director, Admiral Stansfield Turner, added comments in a letter attached to the report. “While it is agreed that the nuclear material that has been unaccounted for since 1965 is uranium-235, it is less clear, despite lengthy investigations and inspections conducted at different times over the past thirteen years by GAO, the FBI and DOE [including AEC], as to what actually happened to this uranium;” and

  •In Turner’s words, “In a policy sense the key allegations that continue to circulate relative to the material unaccounted for are:

  a.The material was illegally diverted to Israel by NUMEC’s management for use in nuclear weapons.

  b.The material was diverted to Israel by NUMEC’s management with the assistance of the CIA.

  c.The material was diverted to Israel with the acquiescence of the United States Government.

  d.There has been a coverup of the NUMEC incident by the United States Government involving a President of the United States.”

  •Turner also commented on the apparent change in CIA’s position on the evidence of a diversion cited by Duckett. “This new material was not challenged at the time it was presented, but subsequent checks revealed that some of it could not be confirmed by documentary data. This does not mean the information as stated was not true.”

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  On December 21, 1978, Congressman Udall interviewed Shapiro at the Longworth House Office building in Washington, DC. The interview lasted from 3:00 to 5:00 p.m. Henry Myers and Michael McNulty represented the staff of the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee for the majority (Democrats). Robert Terrell represented Congressman Robert Bauman (R-MD). McNulty was a 26-year-old intern and a recent law school graduate. Myers had a doctorate in physics and was a veteran of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the NRC.

  Three lawyers appeared on behalf of Shapiro: Abe Krash, Leonard H. Becker and Hadrian R. Katz. All three worked in the Washington office of the Arnold & Porter law firm. Arnold and Porter LLP has been for many years a registered agent for the State of Israel under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938.570, 35 Udall dubbed the interview “an informal meeting.” Shapiro was not under oath. However, he and his lawyers filed a thick brief before the interview, a 116-page verbatim transcript was taken, written opening statements by Shapiro and Udall were appended, and Shapiro’s attorneys submitted supplemental remarks and corrections of the transcript on January 16, 1979.571

  Udall led the questioning and covered a wide range of subjects. The transcript reveals that he hurried through some of the material and missed several opportunities to ask more penetrating questions. However, at the time of the interview, Udall did not have access to FBI accounts of its investigations, including the one that was ongoing, nor did he have insights gained through the investigative journalism of Seymour Hersh or the memoirs of Glenn Seaborg.

  Morris K. “Mo” Udall

  Democrat, Arizona

  U.S. Congressman

  1961-1991

  Shapiro made a number of significant points during his interview and provided new information about NUMEC. He started by saying that an “enormous burden” had been imposed on him and his family

  by years of repeated investigations and reinvestigations of both NUMEC and myself, in response to vague, secret allegations by nameless, faceless accusers. My scientific career has been severely damaged; I have been foreclosed from the opportunity to do useful work in various areas in which I am highly qualified; and my family and I have experienced great anguish over these unwarranted and scurrilous charges. I would welcome the opportunity to confront my unidentified accusers and to refute their charges, but to my great regret, that opportunity has never been afforded to me. Accordingly, I can do little more than reiterate my denial of any involvement in any unlawful diversion, and attempt to respond to your questions to the best of my recollection after these many years.

  Shapiro was adamant in his denial of the allegations of a diversion. “Let me state emphatically that I have never participated in any theft or diversion of special nuclear material. I have no knowledge or information concerning any such diversion. Furthermore I am not aware of any factual basis for the repeated allegations that material unaccounted for at NUMEC was caused by an illegal diversion.” He said the material unaccounted for was explained by normal processing losses.

  Shapiro said that ISORAD facilities in Israel were located “initially at Nahal Soreq, which was the Israel Atomic Energy Commission’s research center and there were several irradiation facilities, one of which was in the pool of the pool reactor, and we constructed the facilities for this. . . . Later on there were other radiation facilities that were put in operations.”36 A month later, Shapiro’s lawyer added, “Dr. Shapiro would like to add for the record that he has never visited the Israeli facility at Dimona, he has never been invited, and he has never asked to go.” Apparently, Shapiro was concerned that his familiarity with Nahal Soreq and “other radiation facilities” not be interpreted to imply a familiarity with Dimona.

  Dr. Henry R. Myers

  House Interior Committee

  1976-1991

  Shapiro said that allegations in the press that he used a scrambler telephone to avoid FBI wiretaps were “unadulterated goomwah.” His lawyer later supplemented the record of the interview with Shapiro’s recollection, “on one occasion, while visiting the Israel Investment Authority office in New York, he may have used a telephone there as a matter of convenience to discuss some business venture with the Israeli scientific counselor in Washington. He has no knowledge whether the telephone contained an encoding device. . . .”

  Shapiro said he established NUMEC because “I wanted to go into business for myself. . . . Initially the investors were private investors. I believe there were 25 of them, and the funds were raised . . . through the Apollo Steel Company, and I believe they owned somewhere in the neighborhood of 30 percent of the stock initially.” Shapiro said that although he did not invest any of his own money in NUMEC, he received stock but could not recall how much. He was vague about the amount invested by the 25
original owners, saying it was “in the thousand dollar investment category.” This statement contrasts with his recollection that the total startup investment in NUMEC was $250,000, implying an average of $10,000 for each of the initial investors. He said the individual investors were principally investors in Apollo Steel, but he helped to recruit some others. He hesitated in identifying Lowenthal as the “main person in charge of Apollo Steel.” He said he and Lowenthal had no prior business dealings, “but I had met him through organizational work.” He strongly denied that there was any Israeli money involved in NUMEC operations.

  Shapiro said that the $250,000 raised from investors was insufficient capital to begin operations, so NUMEC borrowed another $250,000 from the Potter Bank in Pittsburgh. NUMEC secured the loan with the equipment it purchased for the Apollo plant.

  Shapiro argued that some of his AEC contracts allowed crossover of material to other contracts while others did not. He also explained that crossover was necessary to operate the dissolution columns in the scrap recovery process; i.e., the process required enough scrap uranium to fill the various process elements and crossover of material among contracts was needed to provide that much scrap.