Stealing the Atom Bomb: How Denial and Deception Armed Israel

by Roger Mattson

  Shapiro claimed that the Astronuclear contract was where he learned that “our [prior] losses were greater than we had estimated and, therefore, the amount that we allocated to each [predecessor] contract and shipped back to the customer was greater than it should have been based on the actual losses that did occur versus those that were estimated. Is that clear?” Unfortunately, Udall replied, “Yes I think I follow” and turned to other matters. The interview might have taken another course if Udall had admitted uncertainty and said something along the lines of “No, it is not clear because I think this is your fourth theory for how you might have lost all that uranium. Which one of the four is now your best theory?” The four theories were, of course, 1) buried along with other wastes, 2) normal process losses, 3) holdup within process lines and in the cracks and crevices of the plant and 4) underestimates of prior project losses.

  Shapiro said Lovett shared his conviction that there was misplaced complaining by AEC and Oak Ridge staffers about discarded production records at Apollo and records lost in the 1963 vault fire. Such records “had no relevance. . . . They were just grabbing at straws.” He said supervisory personnel discarded some unnecessary production records while they were cleaning up the plant during a two-month-long strike in 1964. When Charles Keller of Oak Ridge read these statements by Shapiro, he told Myers in 1979, “We thought in 1964 and I personally believe today that the ‘missing’ records would have been useful in establishing what happened to some of the materials.”572

  Shapiro claimed that NUMEC would have exhumed more U-235 from the burial pits if AEC had not insisted on a prompt recovery because time was short and weather was adverse. He recalled, quite accurately, that NUMEC found 10 pounds of U-235 in the burial pits. The AEC’s records from the time showed the amount exhumed was 5.5 kilograms, or about 10 pounds, and that AEC added that amount back into inventory before it calculated the amount of U-235 that was missing. Shapiro did not claim in 1965 that any significant amount of U-235 remained to be found in the burial pits, but he did in 1978.

  Shapiro also claimed that, “in a couple cases,” his overseas shipments “were intercepted [by AEC] and checked.” No such occurrence was found in any of the investigations of NUMEC, and AEC staffers told the commissioners in early 1966 that there were no such inspections of any overseas shipments before that time.

  Shapiro left the impression that security at Apollo was good. He said there was a chain link fence around the whole Apollo operation. Photos and layout drawings of the Apollo plant site from the 1960s show an eight-foot fence at the front of the building and no fence at the back and sides of the building or between the loading dock and the highway that passed in front of the building. In any event, Shapiro’s statements conflicted with AEC and NRC’s conclusions that the security was inadequate to protect against a sophisticated conspiracy.

  Shapiro confirmed that guards were stationed around the clock at the single point of entry to the Apollo plant and the guards had regular rounds. He did not say whether they were armed before 1966. They were not. He said NUMEC could easily have detected intruders because they had to go through the change room before entering the processing areas and gaining access to locked vaults containing enriched uranium. He said all NUMEC employees had badges and either Q or L security clearances issued by AEC. He said the weight of material prepared for shipment would make “it almost impossible for one person by himself” to remove it from the plant. He did not point out that the criticality-safe packages of HEU were radioactively safe to handle and that an individual could easily carry several of them at a time. Udall did not ask Shapiro why some NUMEC employees told AEC investigators in 1966 that it would have been possible to steal HEU from the plant.

  Shapiro said that MUF [ID] was inevitable because the processed uranium found its way to immeasurable places. He listed discarded waste, airborne dust that stuck to interior surfaces of the plant and equipment or exhausted to the environment, liquids spilled on floors and then lost with the mop water, liquid spills held up in porous concrete, coatings on the inside of pipes, liquid effluents from the plant, and disposal of worn-out, contaminated equipment. Udall did not ask Shapiro if NUMEC and AEC accounted for all of these loss mechanisms before they concluded in 1965 that 93.8 kilograms of U-235 were still missing. They did. Shapiro claimed that NUMEC’s losses “were not larger than those of other plants doing similar work” and cited a 1977 DOE report to support his claim. Udall did not ask him why AEC held the opposite view in 1965 and its successor agencies, including DOE, had maintained that position ever since.

  Shapiro said he “would have required many people [inside the plant] to help” arrange a diversion of a substantial amount of uranium. Udall did not ask him whether it was possible for one knowledgeable insider to steal enriched uranium a little at a time over a period of months or years and sequester it before shipping a substantial amount to a secret location. A year or so after this interview, NRC staff concluded that one such insider, with or without the assistance of outsiders, could have diverted 93.8 kilograms of U-235 from the plant without detection.

  Shapiro told Udall he did not recall that Avraham Hermoni ever visited Apollo, but he did recall that David Peleg, administrative director of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, visited Apollo on two or three occasions in connection with “our joint operations of ISORAD.” Cohen said that David Peleg served as Israel’s science attache in Paris in the 1960s [while Dimona was under construction and starting up]. Peleg later served in various roles in the IAEC, including deputy director general and acting director general in the 1980s.573

  Shapiro said that Hermoni “conducted the business, the ISORAD business, on behalf of the government of Israel. And in addition to that he was interested in technical assistance from time to time.” Shapiro said he met Hermoni “probably less than a half dozen times” and denied knowing that Hermoni was associated with the Israeli nuclear weapons program. Udall apparently did not have access at that time to the FBI report of Hermoni’s visit to Apollo in 1968; nor did Udall know of Hermoni’s nuclear and intelligence duties for Israel, of which CIA and FBI should have known but apparently did not communicate to Udall.

  Shapiro said he had been to Israel 17 times and shortly after the Six-Day War in 1967 accepted a special flying tour of the Sinai Peninsula and the Egyptian frontier. He attributed his special treatment in Israel to his support for Israel bonds, the Jewish National Fund and the Zionist Organization of America.

  Udall asked if Shapiro intended to immigrate to Israel. Shapiro replied, “I never took steps towards it, but I certainly considered it because I think any Zionist considers what is called ‘aliyah,’ and I certainly considered it.”37

  Shapiro denied any relationships or contacts in the U.S. with Israeli intelligence operators but admitted meeting the head of military intelligence in Israel to discuss “a long-lived battery to be used in intrusion detection.” This was Shapiro’s fourth different explanation of his involvement with Israeli intelligence and atomic energy officials, i.e., plutonium-powered electric generators, water supply integrity, food irradiation and intrusion detection. Udall did not ask Shapiro if any of the projects had come to fruition.

  Shapiro was asked whether experience gained by foreign scientists at NUMEC could have been applied in nuclear weapons programs. He answered, “Not that I can see at all.” Since the experience gained by Bernard Cinai in plutonium metallurgy at the Parks Township facility of NUMEC was directly applicable to the manufacture of plutonium weapons, Shapiro’s unequivocal denial was not justified.

  Shapiro explained that his June 20, 1969 meeting at the Pittsburgh airport with Jeruham Kafkafi involved an overdue payment for equipment that NUMEC provided to Israel. He said the meeting was important and hastily arranged for Kafkafi’s convenience because of an upcoming financial audit in connection with ARCO’s acquisition of NUMEC. He claimed Kafkafi went on from Pittsburgh to Dayton to visit his daughter. This statement contradicts what Shapiro told AEC’s Secur
ity Director Riley on August 14, 1969, that is, he and Kafkafi “met at the airport and Kafkafi returned to Washington, DC shortly thereafter.” Similarly, Shapiro denied to Udall that he gave a package to Kafkafi, although other information shows the contrary. Later, in a follow up letter, he said he was unable to recall the exchange of any item at the meeting with Kafkafi.

  Shapiro said he abandoned his quest for a higher security clearance for his work at Kawecki Berylco because the job at Westinghouse paid a lot better. He admitted that while his application for a security clearance at Kawecki Berylco was dragging along he consulted Avraham Hermoni on how to overcome the obstacle presented by his Israeli connections. Udall did not probe this answer by asking why Shapiro thought it appropriate for an intelligence official of a foreign state to address Shapiro’s qualifications for one of the highest security clearances in America.

  Shapiro insisted under tough questioning by Terrell that he had no knowledge of whether Israel did or did not have a nuclear weapons program. In his later review of the transcript of the interview, Duckett found this claim was implausible.574 Shapiro’s tour of the Sinai in 1967 was evidence to the contrary—he was vitally interested in the security of the nation to which, at one time, he hoped to immigrate. In addition, the people with whom Shapiro had close contacts, such as David Bergmann, were intimately knowledgeable of Israel’s nuclear weapons program. Shapiro’s lawyers were quick to deny in their supplement to the record of the interview that Shapiro had any knowledge of Dimona. Evidently, Shapiro had enough knowledge of the Israeli weapons program to know it was important for him to avoid associating with Dimona.

  Then, out of the blue, two-thirds of the way through the interview, McNulty blurted, “I have a question . . . does Plumbat ring a bell?” Shapiro responded, “I have heard the name.” McNulty said, “It’s supposedly some scheme to divert some unknown tons of material . . .” Krash interrupted, “There is a book on the subject . . .” McNulty interrupted, “Yes.” Krash plunged ahead, “published by the London Times, Sunday Times, which I assume you have seen.” McNulty replied, “Right. And I just wonder if you had known anything about it. This book fairly convincingly portrays the ability of Israeli intelligence to—well, I guess ‘divert’ is a good word—to divert a whole shipload of yellowcake from the middle of the Mediterranean. You talk about how extremely difficult it would be to divert uranium from NUMEC. If they are so skilled as to be able to carry out this ‘Plumbat’ affair, it just seems to me that that same skill could be used. I just wanted to throw that out. I guess you really couldn’t comment on that.” Udall stepped in, “That was pretty far afield.” McNulty, abashed, replied, “Yes.” Udall then turned to another question. Imagine how Shapiro might have felt at that moment:

  •He knew about Plumbat;

  •He knew the formerly secret affair had become public (the book mentioned by Krash was derived from Leventhal’s disclosure of the Plumbat affair the year before);

  •He knew that in 1968, two months before the Plumbat affair, he met in his office at Apollo with Rafi Eitan and Avraham Bendor, two likely planners of Plumbat and two of the most notorious officers of the most effective intelligence services in the world;

  •He had just failed to identify his meeting with Eitan and Bendor in response to a direct question from Udall about contacts with foreign intelligence agents;

  •Based on the book alone, he knew that he arrived in Israel within days of the Plumbat uranium; and

  •He was one of the most knowledgeable men in the world for converting the Plumbat uranium into Dimona fuel.

  His attorney (Krash) alerted Shapiro to the danger in McNulty’s question only moments before by reminding him to hew to the outline of the Plumbat affair described in the book. Surely, Shapiro also must have sensed the danger. It had to have appeared to him that McNulty understood the circumstances precisely. Then, suddenly, Udall interjected, McNulty hesitated and the questions moved in another direction. Without uttering a word, Shapiro was spared from explaining the circumstantial evidence of his association with the Plumbat affair. Of course, the only one in the room at the time of the interview who knew of his 1968 meeting with Hermoni, Eitan, Biegun and Bendor was Shapiro, and maybe Krash, because the details of the meeting were then still hidden in the classified files of DOE and FBI.575 Close call.

  McNulty could still recall, thirty years after the fact, the look on Shapiro and his lawyers’ faces, “Like they swallowed a canary.” With the benefit of hindsight, McNulty excused Udall’s cutting him off, saying Udall probably deflected the question for fear it would expand the scope of his inquiry.576 It is too bad Udall did not realize how close McNulty was to the truth. However, the fact remains, with hindsight, Shapiro left out a number of people when he said his only contact with Israeli intelligence officers was in Israel where he met the head of military intelligence.

  Later in the interview, Shapiro conceded that fines paid to the government for lost U-235 caused cash flow problems for NUMEC, but these were overcome by the company’s line of credit with Mellon Bank. He confirmed that before the Astronuclear contract, “we had already declared losses, as I recall it, of 149 kilograms of material, and we had to pay for those, so this was the difference between 149 and 178, so we had already been paying heavily for the material.” Shapiro had three-figure recall of the missing uranium but moments earlier he could not recall meetings he held with Israeli intelligence agents.

  Shapiro volunteered that NUMEC stock yielded $135 per share at the time of ARCO’s buy out. He said, “I would have been ahead except for the fact that I put my heart and soul into this whole thing, and I don’t know how much one can pay for that in money.” The $135 per share quoted by Shapiro was nearly six times the $23.05 per share reported by the Pittsburgh press in 1967 based on information provided to NUMEC stockholders at the meeting where they approved ARCO’s acquisition of their company.

  At the close of the interview, Udall told Shapiro, “You are a very effective witness in your own behalf and, if what you told us today is true, you have got every right to feel aggrieved about the way you have been treated.” Shapiro did not respond, and the interview ended.

  On January 2, Myers wrote to Udall that Duckett had reviewed the transcript of the Shapiro interview.577 “

  His initial impressions include the following: It is not plausible that Shapiro’s knowledge of Israel’s nuclear weapons was, as Shapiro stated, based only on press reports. Shapiro was not truthful when he said he had no relationship or contacts with people known to him to be Israeli intelligence operators; everyone has always assumed that there was no question but that Kafkafi had flown not to Dayton but back to Washington after the airport meeting.

  ***

  On January 1, 1979, John Fialka wrote a nine-page summary account of the NUMEC affair in the Washington Monthly.578 He included the following key points.

  During the late 1960s, Central Intelligence Agency operatives were able to prove something that U.S. officials had wondered about for several years. The question was whether Israel had quietly entered the world’s nuclear “club,” a possibility that had long been suggested by U.S. scientists returning from the Middle East.

  The answer was yes. The CIA’s highly sophisticated array of monitoring equipment had found evidence that somewhere in Israel there was a laboratory working with sizeable quantities of highly enriched uranium—the same metal used to incinerate Hiroshima in the closing days of World War II.

  Once the Israeli capability had been established, the question became which of the five nations that then enjoyed the club status was the source of the Israeli material?

  And the answer, at least from what the CIA could see, was that the bomb-grade metal had come from the U.S. The prime suspect was a private company, the Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corp. (NUMEC), located in Apollo, Pennsylvania, a small town about 30 miles northwest of Pittsburgh.

  Their suspicion was that the nation’s most vital safeguards system had been penetrated
by one of our closest allies. It was, as one highly placed source later described it, “like dealing with the fact that your sister has been raped by a dear friend. It’s not the sort of thing you rush to make public.”

  In 1968, after obtaining scientific proof that the Israelis were working with highly enriched uranium at a facility near Dimona in the Negev desert, Helms went to J. Edgar Hoover and asked him to put Shapiro under FBI surveillance.

  The FBI told several Congressional investigators working on the case that its surveillance showed that in 1968 Shapiro traveled throughout the U.S. recruiting scientists, all of whom were Jews, for work on various technical problems confronting Israel. . . .

  NRC [was briefed by] Carl Duckett, then the CIA’s deputy director for science and technology and one of the government’s official keepers of the NUMEC secrets. (Conran was not invited.) As some of the NRC commissioners recalled the briefing, Duckett’s hands were shaking as he produced a file on the conference table. It was stamped “Top Secret,” the highest national security classification. It was so secret that its existence was classified a secret. Duckett told the NRC commissioners that by the mid 1960s the U.S. had come to suspect that Israel had a nuclear weapons capability. The evidence included a type of bombing run being practiced by pilots of Israel’s A-4 jet. According to Duckett, the maneuver “would not have made sense unless it was to deliver a nuclear bomb.”

  From this and more direct evidence gathered by CIA, Duckett said, in 1968 the Agency had drawn up a National Intelligence Estimate reporting Israel’s entry into the nuclear club and submitted it to Richard Helms, then CIA director. Helms, Duckett recalled, told him not to distribute the estimate to other sections of the CIA or outside the Agency, and added that he would take the report to President Lyndon Johnson. (In the subsequent meeting with Johnson, Helms was told in no uncertain terms to drop the matter. “Don’t tell anyone else. Not even Dean Rusk (then Secretary of State) and Robert McNamara (then Secretary of Defense)’ Johnson allegedly instructed Helms.)”