Complete Works of Onasander

by Onasander

[7] The general should be cautious in the matter of foraging expeditions, and not allow troops, when invading a rich hostile country, to search for plunder in an undisciplined manner; for the greatest misfortunes befall men acting in this way, since it has often happened that the enemy, falling on men scattered and without order in their eager search for booty, on account of this lack of order and the fact that they were loaded with their booty have killed many as they were retreating, unable to give aid to their comrades or to use their arms. [8] If any men do plundering without the command of the general, they should be punished. When the general himself sends out foraging parties, he should send with the light-armed and unarmed men guards, both horse and foot, who shall have nothing to do with the booty but are to remain in formation and guard the foragers, that the return to camp may be safely accomplished.

  (3) SPIES

  [9] If the general should at any time capture spies, he should not employ any one single method in dealing with them. If he considers that his own army is weaker than that of the enemy, he should kill them, but if he has complete equipment of arms, thorough preparation for war, a powerful army, vigorous and disciplined, excellent officers, all trained by experience, he will make no mistake if, after making the spies examine his army drawn up in battle array, he occasionally even sends them away unharmed; for reported superiority of the enemy necessarily causes fear, but reported inferiority brings courage.

  (4) GUARDS BY NIGHT

  [10] The general should appoint guards and a rather large number of them, that, by dividing the night into watches, some may sleep and some stand guard. Men must not be compelled to stand guard the entire night, nor even if they volunteer to do so must they be trusted; for it is only reasonable that sometimes, now the body is tired, sleep will come of its own accord, even against one’s will. [11] The guards must remain standing while on duty; for seats and reclining positions, relaxing the body, are conducive to sleep, but standing erect and keeping the legs stretched makes the mind wakeful. [12] The guards must build fires at some distance from the camp. Thus because of the light they will see at a distance men advanced toward the camp, but those who come from the light will not perceive the guards, who are in the dark, until they fall into their hands.

  (5) SECRET RETREAT OF THE ARMY

  [13] If the general desires to withdraw his army by night without the knowledge of the enemy, either to be the first to occupy a certain position or to escape from the position he is in, or to avoid the present necessity of battle, he should retreat leaving many fires burning; for as long as the enemy see the fires they believe that the army is remaining in the same place, but if the camp becomes dark while the retreat is going on, the enemy will suspect their flight, send ahead ambushes, and follow in pursuit.

  (6) PARLEYS WITH THE GENERALS OF THE ENEMY

  [14] But if, while keeping his army in the same spot, he should come to a conference with the opposing general, either to make or to receive some proposal, he should choose as an escort the strongest and finest-looking of the younger soldiers, stalwart, handsome and tall men, equipped with magnificent armour, and with these about him he should meet the enemy. For often from the view of a part the whole is judged to be like it, and a general does not determine his course of action by what he has heard, but is terrified by what he has seen.

  (7) DESERTERS

  [15] If any deserters arrive in camp to tell of a suitable opportunity or hour for attack, or if they offer to act as guides over a road and assert that they will lead the army along it, unseen by the enemy, the general should lead these deserters with him securely bound, making it plain to them that, if they are truthful and bring safety and victory to the army, he will set them free and present them with fitting rewards, but that if they attempt to deceive him and wish to betray his army into the hands of their own friends, at that same ‘suitable opportunity’ they will be slain in their bonds by the endangered army. Confidence may be most safely placed in the word of a deserter, when he knows that his life is not in his own hands, but in the hands of those whom he leads.

  (8) ON THE INSPECTION OF THE ENEMY’S CAMP

  [16] The general should skilfully inspect the camp of the enemy. If he sees a circular palisade contracted into a small circumference, lying in a plain, he should not conclude that the enemy are few in number; for every circle appears to contain less than it actually does by the theory of proportionate geometrical contents, and the space enclosed within a circle can hold more men than one would think to see it. If the sides of the palisade happen to be long and close together in certain parts, or crooked with many acute angles, he should not conclude that the camp contains a great number of men; for this type of camp appears large but has no more men within its walls in every case than circular camps have. [17] Palisades on hills and mountains, unless compact in every respect, appear greater than those in plains, but they contain fewer men than the eye judges; for many parts of such camps are bare of men, since there must be many ravines in them and many steep and precipitous banks unsuitable for pitching tents, and as the palisade is built to defend the men, its length must be accordingly greater. [18] The general, therefore, judging merely the position and shape of a camp, should not be emboldened at the sight of a small contracted camp nor downhearted at the sight of an extended one.

  [19] With this knowledge he should make use of opportune strategy. Stationing his army in a small camp, according to the above-mentioned plan, and if necessary, even crowding the soldiers together, he should not lead them from the camp nor show them to the enemy encamped opposite, nor lead them into battle if the enemy challenge, but he should even give the impression that he is afraid. [20] For often the enemy, growing bold in the belief that their opponents are few, judging by sight and not by strategic experience, behave thoughtlessly. They go forth from their camp carelessly and without discipline, believing that their opponents will not dare to come out and attack; or they even surround and blockade the palisade, unaware of the multitude of men about to pour forth upon them; and with no expectation of danger soldiers become heedless. Then, seizing a favourable opportunity, the army must rush forth from the many little gates of the palisade, and in battle array courageously grapple with the task before them.

  [21] The general, having this knowledge, will know how to do his part, and even if he is out-generaled in these same matters, will be both wise in action and prudent in devising protection; for from the knowledge that instructs him in what he must do, he will know, when his opponent is trying to do this to him, what he must not himself suffer, since personal experience in inflicting damage warns of the designs of others.

  (9) SECRET PLANS

  [22] If the general must make a march by night or by day for some secret purpose, to seize a fortress, city, height, or pass, or to do anything else that must be done quickly without the knowledge of the enemy, which otherwise could not be done at all, he must tell no one beforehand against what place or for what purpose he is leading his army, unless he considers it necessary to warn some of the higher officers in advance. [23] But when he has reached the spot and the moment is near at hand when he must act, he must give his orders and point out what is to be done. These orders must be quick and brief, for at the same instant that the leaders receive instructions their subordinates also know them. [24] Thoughtless and futile is he who communicates his plan to the rank and file before it is necessary; for worthless scoundrels desert to the foes especially at critical times, when, by revealing and disclosing secrets, they believe they will receive honour and reward from the enemy. There is no army in which both slaves and freemen do not desert to the other side on the many occasions that war necessarily affords.

  (10) TAKING THE OMENS BEFORE BATTLE

  [25] The general should neither lead his army on a journey, nor marshal it for battle, without first making a sacrifice; in fact, official sacrificers and diviners should accompany him. It is best that the general himself be able to read the omens intelligently; it is very easy to learn in a br
ief time, and thereby become a good counsellor to himself. [26] He should not begin any undertaking until the omens are favourable, and he should summon all his officers to inspect the offerings, that, after seeing, they may tell the soldiers to be of good courage, since the gods command them to fight. Soldiers are far more courageous when they believe they are facing dangers with the good will of the gods; for they themselves are on the alert, every man, and they watch closely for omens of sight and of sound, and an auspicious sacrifice for the whole army encourages even those who have private misgivings. [27] But if the omens are unfavourable, he must remain in the same place, and if he is hard pressed for time he must patiently submit to every inconvenience — for he can suffer nothing worse than what Fate indicates beforehand, — since, if his condition is going to improve, he must have favourable signs in a sacrifice and he must sacrifice several times on the same day; one hour, even one minute, ruins those who start too soon or too late. [28] And it seems to me that the motions of the heavenly bodies, their risings and settings, and their positions — trine, square, and in opposition — are indicated by the art of extispicy, through another form of observation, and that trifling differences in these things have, in a single day, or rather in a single hour, led to power and deification, and have made both kings and captives.

  XI. (1) PURSUIT OF AN APPARENTLY FLEEING ENEMY MUST NOT BE CARELESS AND HAPHAZARD

  [1] Since frequently the omens from a sacrifice are favourable for battle and yet sometimes foretell the complete destruction of the army through battle, I have considered it of the utmost necessity to say a few words on this point. [2] The topography of the inhabited world differs widely in its various parts, and it is impossible to foresee in what sort of country a war will occur. Every man is well acquainted with his own country but not with foreign countries. [3] Often a general, on hearing that the enemy are but a day’s march distant, will call out his troops and lead them forward, hurrying to come to close quarters with the enemy, who, purposely retreating, do not make a stand against him; and so he assumes that they are afraid and pursues them. This continues until they come into a broken country, surrounded by the mountains on all sides, and the general, unsuspecting, still attacks them; next, as he marches against their positions, he is cut off by the enemy from the road by which he led his army in. They seize the passes in front of him, and all the heights round about, and thus confine their enemies in a sort of cage. But the general is carried away by his impetuosity, in the belief that he is pursuing a fleeing enemy, without noticing whom he is approaching; and later, on looking before and behind and on both sides, and seeing all the hillsides full of the enemy, he and his army will be destroyed by javelins, or, unable to fight and unwilling to surrender, he will cause all to die of hunger, or by surrender enable the enemy to dictate whatever terms they wish. [4] Therefore retreats on the part of the enemy should be suspected and not stupidly followed; the general should observe the country rather than the enemy, and notice through what sort of terrain he is leading his forces; and he should take into consideration that it is necessary to return by the same road by which he came, and should either refrain from advancing and turn aside from the route, or, if he does advance, he should take precautions, leaving forces to hold the mountain passes and connecting defiles in order that his return may be safe. [5] This advice is given for the purpose both of outwitting the enemy by these tactics and of not being outwitted oneself; for though it is a fine thing to be able in this fashion to ensnare the enemy, yet it is absolutely essential to avoid being ensnared oneself.

  (2) RECEIVING MESSENGERS

  [6] The general should receive every man who wishes to report anything, whether slave or freeman, by night or day, on the march or in camp, while resting, in the bath, or at table. For generals who procrastinate and are difficult of access, and who order their servants to keep out those who come to see them, naturally either miss many important opportunities or even through their negligence suffer complete ruin; for often men bring information at a critical moment about something that can be frustrated in the nick of time.

  XII. MEAL-TIMES

  [1] The general, if encamped opposite the camp of the enemy, should not be careless of the proper time at which to serve meals. For if he considers that it lies with him to lead out his troops to battle whenever he wishes, he may set a meal hour for his troops at whatever time he wishes. But if he should chance to have come into such extremities, because of the terrain, or the weakness of his camp, or for some other reason, that it is left in the power of the enemy to attack whenever they desire, and to compel his army to seize their arms and draw up for defence, he should not hesitate to order the first meal at sunrise, lest the enemy, by a prior attack, force his men to fight while still hungry. [2] On the whole, this matter must not be considered of slight importance nor should a general neglect to pay attention to it; for soldiers who have eaten moderately, so as not to put too great a load into their stomachs, are more vigorous in battle; armies have often been overpowered for just this reason, their strength failing for lack of food — that is, whenever the decision rests, not on a moment’s fighting, but when the battle lasts throughout the entire day.

  XIII. COURAGE ON THE PART OF THE GENERAL WHEN IN ADVERSITY

  [1] Whenever despondency or fear has fallen on an army because the enemy has received reinforcements or gained an advantage, then especially the general should show himself to his soldiers gay, cheerful, and undaunted. [2] For the appearance of the leaders brings about a corresponding change in the minds of the subordinates, and if the general is cheerful and has a joyful look, the army also takes heart, believing that there is no danger; but should he have a frightened, worried appearance, the spirits of the soldiers fall with his, in the belief that disaster is impending. [3] On this account, the general must inspire cheerfulness in the army, more by the strategy of his facial expression than by his words; for many distrust speeches on the ground that they have been concocted especially for the occasion, but believing a confident appearance to be unfeigned they are fully convinced of his fearlessness; and it is an excellent thing to understand these two points, how to say the right word and how to show the right expression.

  XIV. (1) WHEN ONE’S OWN ARMY MUST BE MADE TO FEAR THE ENEMY

  [1] Just as the recovery of courage at a crucial moment benefits an army, so also fear is advantageous. For whenever an army becomes idle and inclined to disobey its officers, the general should suggest the danger from the enemy, especially by representing their reserves to be formidable. It will not be possible thus to make the soldiers cowardly but only steady, since in despondency it is necessary to be of good courage, but in idleness to fear; for fear makes cowards bold and the rash cautious. [2] These two misfortunes happen to armies, to become so terrified of the enemy that they are unwilling to attempt any offensive, and so bold that they are unwilling to take any precautionary measures. With regard to each the general must arrange his plans, and know when by voice and look he must make the enemy appear weak, and when more threatening and formidable.

  (2) ENCOURAGING THE FRIGHTENED ARMY

  [3] On the eve of battle, when the army, uncertain of the outcome of the war, is distrustful and fearful, the general, if he is able, should manage to capture some prisoners by ambush or skirmishing, or some men who have strayed from their own camp. If he learns that they are strong in courage and in body, he should either kill them on the spot or turn them over, securely bound, to men assigned to this duty, with orders to guard them, so that not many of his own forces may see them; but if they are weak and cowardly and spiritless, after threatening them in the privacy of his own tent and enslaving their minds through fear, he should lead them, weeping and supplicating, before his army, pointing out to his soldiers how base and wretched and worthless they are, and saying that it is against such men that they are to fight, men who are so greatly afraid of death, who cling to the knees and grovel at the feet of every one. [4] The army is emboldened at all this, since they know be
fore the conflict the appearance of the enemy and his state of mind. For what a man has never seen he always expects will be greater than it really is; so also because of his fear of the future, a man measures his apprehensions by reference to the more grievous outcome.

  XV. THE DIFFERENCE IN BATTLE FORMATIONS

  Battle formation is not of one but of many and various kinds, with regard to arms and soldiers and terrain and enemies. These differences the general will have to know on the occasions themselves, but what pertains in large part to many formations I shall briefly summarize, without considering the details which, in the actions themselves, must necessarily be understood.

  XVI. BATTLE FORMATION WITH REGARD TO THAT OF THE ENEMY

  The general will arrange his cavalry not as he wishes but rather as he is compelled; for he will oppose his own cavalry to that of the enemy. As a rule, in pitched battles he should arrange his cavalry in column formation, in order that attacking both in front and on the flanks and covering a greater amount of space (if no other soldiers are drawn up in their rear), they may thus be able to make use of their skill in cavalry fighting.

  XVII. PLACING THE LIGHT-ARMED TROOPS, JAVELIN-THROWERS, BOWMEN AND SLINGERS, BEFORE THE PHALANX

  The general will assign his light-armed troops — javelin-throwers, bowmen, and slingers — to a position in front of the phalanx, for if placed in the rear they will do more damage to their own army than to the enemy, and if in among the heavy-armed, their peculiar skill will be ineffectual because they will be unable to take a step backwards in throwing their javelins or to charge forward and cast them, as other soldiers are in front of them and at their heels, nor will the slingers be able to execute the whirling of their slings, as their fellow-soldiers stand at their side and, in their turn, are caused to stumble in trying to avoid the whirling slings. If the bowmen are placed in front of the army, they will shoot their arrows at the enemy as at a target; but drawn up behind the ranks or in among the heavy-armed they will shoot high, so that the arrows have impetus only for their upward flight, and afterwards, even if they fall on the heads of the enemy, will have spent their force and cause little distress to the foe.