Complete Works of Onasander

by Onasander

  XVIII. DISPOSITION OF LIGHT-ARMED TROOPS IN A BROKEN COUNTRY

  If the battle should happen to be in a country that is level in some places but hilly in others, then the light-armed troops should by all means be stationed in the uneven section, and then, if the general himself should have seized the plain and some part of the enemy’s phalanx should possess the heights, he should send against them the light-armed troops; for from the uneven ground they can more easily hurl their weapons and retreat, or they can very easily charge up the slopes, if they are agile.

  XIX. THE PHALANX SHOULD LEAVE INTERVALS FOR THE LIGHT-ARMED TROOPS TO RETIRE THROUGH THE RANKS

  [1] There should be intervals within the ranks, so that, when the light-armed troops have discharged their weapons while the enemy is still advancing, before the two armies come to close quarters, they may about-face, pass in good order through the centre of the phalanx, and come without confusion to the rear. For it is not safe for them to go around the whole army, encircling the flanks — since the enemy would quickly anticipate them in this manoeuvre, coming to close quarters and intercepting them on the way — nor is it safe for them to force their way through the closed ranks, where they would fall over the weapons and cause confusion in the lines, one man stumbling against another. [2] Attacks of the light-armed troops on the flanks cause the enemy greater loss, since they cast their javelins from the side and of necessity strike the body where unprotected. [3] The sling is the most deadly weapon that is used by the light-armed troops, because the lead slug is the same colour as the air and is invisible in its course, so that it falls unexpectedly on the unprotected bodies of the enemy,a and not only is the impact itself violent, but also the missile, heated by the friction of its rush through the air, penetrates the flesh very rapidly, so that it even becomes invisible and the swelling quickly closes over it.

  XX. HOW TO ATTACK, WITHOUT LIGHT-ARMED TROOPS, AN ENEMY WHO HAS MANY

  [1] If the general himself should lack an auxiliary force of light-armed troops while the enemy has a large force of them, the front rank men should advance in close formation, with shields the height of a man, tall enough to protect the whole body, and those who follow and the ones behind them, even to the last rank, should carry their shields above their heads, while they are within bowshot of the enemy. For thus roofed in, so to speak, they will suffer no danger from missiles.b [2] But if each army should have a number of light-armed troops, the general should order his own light-armed men to be the first to hurl their weapons against their opponents before the hand-to-hand battle; or after the clash of the phalanx, attacking from the flank, they should make use of their missiles, for thus the enemy will be forced together into a narrow space and will be greatly confused by such tactics.

  XXI. THE NEEDLESSNESS OF LENGTHENING THE PHALANX IN FEAR OF AN ENCIRCLING MOVEMENT OF THE ENEMY

  [1] The general who wishes to guard against an encircling movement of the enemy should not so extend his forces lengthwise as utterly to weaken the phalanx by giving it no depth. For this would result in the enemy somewhere quickly breaking through; and no longer attempting an encircling movement on the flank, but piercing the centre instead, they would take their opponents in the rear; and this very manoeuvre the general should not only guard against but also strive to execute if he discovers that the enemy’s phalanx is weak and thin. Nor should he contract his phalanx, drawing it out toward the rear to great depth to such an extent that the enemy would easily outflank and surround it. [2] But he should make his rear and the flanks of his wings as strong as the front ranks. For those in the rear will prevent the phalanx being encircled no less than those who are posted so as to extend the flanks, if the general, anticipating what is to happen, spreads out his rear guard and posting it on either flank of the phalanx opposes his rear to the front of the enemy, or if he commands those who are already encircled to turn their backs to the backs of the front ranks and fight on a double front.

  [3] A shrewd general who sees that the enemy has many troops when he himself is about to engage with fewer, will select, or rather make it his practice to find, localities where he may prevent an encircling movement of the enemy, either by arranging his army along the bank of a river, or, by choosing a mountainous district, he will use the mountains themselves to block off those who wish to outflank him, placing a few men on the summits to prevent the enemy from climbing above the heads of the main army. [4] Not alone does knowledge of military science play a part in this matter but luck as well; for it is necessary to have the luck to find such places; one cannot prepare the terrain for oneself. To choose the better positions, however, from those at hand, and to know which will be advantageous, is the part of the wise general.

  [5] It is often the custom of generals who are in command of a powerful and numerous army to march to battle in a crescent formation, believing that their opponents also wish the battle to come to close quarters, and that they will thus induce them to fight; then, as their opponents are bent back into the road at the points of the crescent, they will intercept them with their enveloping folds, joining the extremes of their own wings to form a complete circle. [6] Against troops advancing in this fashion, one should not likewise adopt the crescent formation, but dividing his own army into three parts, the general should send two against the enemy, one against each wing, but the third division, that which faces the central hollow of the crescent, should stand still, opposite the enemy, and not advance. For if the enemy maintain this crescent formation, those drawn up in the centre of their army will be useless, standing still and doing nothing; but if marching forward they wish to advance in a body, changing from the crescent formation to a straight line, they will be crowded together and will lose their formation — for while the wings are remaining in the same position and fighting, it is impossible for a crescent to return to a straight line. Then when they are confused and their ranks disordered, the opposing general should send the third and reserve division against the men advanced in disorder from the centre of the curve. [7] But if the enemy remain in the crescent position, the general should post his light-armed troops and archers opposite them, who with their missiles will cause heavy loss. [8] However, if he advances with his whole phalanx obliquely against one wing of the enemy, he will make no mistake in attacking in this manner, as far as the encircling movement of the crescent formation is concerned; for the enemy will be prevented for a long time from coming to close quarters with their whole army, and will be thrown into confusion little by little, since only those of one wing will be fighting, that is, those who will necessarily be the first to be engaged because of the oblique attack.

  [9] It is sometimes a useful stratagem for an army facing the enemy to retire gradually, as if struck by fear, or to about-face and make a retreat similar to a flight but in order, and then, suddenly turning, to attack their pursuers. For sometimes the enemy, delighted by the belief that their opponents are fleeing, break ranks and rush forward, leaping ahead of one another. There is no danger in turning to attack these men; and those who have for some time been pursuing, terrified by the very unexpectedness of this bold stand, immediately take to flight.

  XXII. HOLDING RESERVES FOR THE ASSISTANCE OF EXHAUSTED TROOPS. HOLDING RESERVES IN CONCEALMENT

  [1] The general should also have somewhere a picked corps, stationed apart from the phalanx as military reserves, that he may have them ready to give assistance to those detachments of his force that are exhausted. These fresh troops are of not a little advantage in attacking tired men; for, besides relieving those of their own men who are worn out, they attack in their full freshness a wearied enemy. [2] It would be even more advantageous for the general to send a certain part of his army some little distance from the encampment — as far as seems best to him, — unseen by the enemy, with orders to rise up and hasten when the battle is begun, which they will learn from scouts. This is especially to be done when expected reinforcements come too late for the battle, for the enemy believe that these are the reinforcements
arriving from some place or other for their opponents; then possibly even while these reinforcements are still advancing and before they enter the battle, the enemy will take to flight, judging this force to be, not what it is, but much greater. [3] Besides, the arrival of unfamiliar hostile troops at the very moment of battle lowers the morale; for anticipating some greater misfortune than they are about to suffer, soldiers regard the future with greater fear.

  [4] Most terrible, or rather most effective, of all manoeuvres, is a sudden attack against the enemy’s rear. For this purpose, if in any manner it should be possible, a detachment of soldiers should be sent ahead by night, with orders for all to march around the enemy in order to come to their rear, so as to start up from ambush early the next morning, after the battle is begun, and to appear suddenly on the enemy’s rear. For no hope of safety would remain for them in flight, and they would be unable to turn backwards, since the opposing army would attack, or to go forward, because of the detachment assailing their rear.

  XXIII. ANNOUNCING FAVOURABLE NEWS IN THE MIDST OF BATTLE; EVEN IF FALSE IT IS ADVANTAGEOUS

  [1] Sometimes the general should ride along the lines and call out to his men, if he happens to be on the right wing, “Our left wing is defeating the right wing of the enemy,” or if he is on the left he should say that his right wing is conquering, whether this is true or not, for deceit is necessary when “a great strife has arisen.” For example, when the leader of the enemy is some distance away either on one wing or holding the centre, he should call out, “The general of the enemy has been killed,” or “the king,” or whoever it may be. [2] And one should shout this in such a manner that the enemy also may hear; for his own soldiers, learning that their side is more successful, are encouraged and doubly eager to fight, while the enemy, learning of the misfortunes of their side, lose heart, so that sometimes they start into flight immediately on hearing such a report. [3] In this way it is very often useful to deceive both one’s own army and that of the enemy by false news, good for the former, but bad for the latter.

  XXIV. IN THE RANKS FRIENDS MUST BE PLACED BY FRIENDS AND ACQUAINTANCES BY ACQUAINTANCES

  It is the part of a wise general to station brothers in rank beside brothers, friends beside friends, and lovers beside their favourites. For whenever that which is in danger near by is more than ordinarily dear the lover necessarily fights more recklessly for the man beside him. And of course one is ashamed not to return a favour that he has received, and is dishonoured if he abandons his benefactor and is the first to flee.

  XXV. THE GENERAL MUST NOT GIVE THE SIGNAL FOR BATTLE OR ANY OTHER ACTION TO HIS ARMY IN PERSON BUT THROUGH HIS OFFICERS

  [1] The general should give every command or watchword or countersign through his officers, for to come and give orders personally to the whole army is the act of an unpractised and inexperienced commander. Time is lost in passing orders down the line, and confusion arises, as all the soldiers question each other at the same time. One man through ignorance adds something to what the general has said and another omits something. [2] But one should communicate his orders to his higher officers and they should repeat them to the officers next below them, who in turn pass them to their subordinates, and so on to the lowest, the higher officers in each case telling the orders to those below them. In this manner the soldiers will learn the commands quickly with order and calmness, just as a message is carried by fire-signals. [3] For after the first signaller uplifts his fire, the second signals to the next, and the third to the fourth, and the fourth to the fifth, and the fifth to the sixth, and one by one follows the other, so that in a short time, over a distance of many stades, the message signalled by the first is known to all.

  XXVI. ON GIVING BOTH WATCHWORDS AND COUNTERSIGNS

  [1] He should give the countersign not by the voice but by some gesture, as a wave of the hand, or the clash of weapons, or dipping a spear, or by a side-wave of his sword, in order that when confusion arises the soldiers may not have to trust to the spoken watchword alone — for the enemy hear this so often that they are able to get it — but also to the countersign. [2] This is most useful in the case of allies who speak a different language, for, unable to speak or to understand a foreign tongue, they differentiate between friends or enemies by this countersign. One should instruct the army in these signals in camp, even if it is not about to fight, as a protection against confusion and uncertainty.

  XXVII. SOLDIERS SHOULD NEVER LEAVE THE RANKS WHETHER IN FORMATION OR IN RETREAT

  One should command both retreats and pursuits to be made in formation, so that, if defeated, the soldiers may suffer less injury, when in their flight they encounter the enemy, by not being scattered, man by man, and, if successful, they may inflict greater injury on the enemy by keeping their ranks and companies unbroken, appearing stronger to the fugitives, and moreover being safer themselves. For often the enemy, observing their opponents advancing without order, by a concerted plan about-face, form ranks once more and reverse the pursuit. In a word, the general should say that nothing is more advantageous to his men than remaining in rank, and nothing more dangerous than breaking ranks.

  XXVIII. THE GENERAL MUST BE ATTENTIVE TO THE SPLENDOUR OF THE ARMY’S EQUIPMENT

  The general should make it a point to draw up his line of battle resplendent in armour — an easy matter, requiring only a command to sharpen swords and to clean helmets and breast-plates. For the advancing companies appear more dangerous by the gleam of weapons, and the terrible sight brings fear and confusion to the hearts of the enemy.

  XXIX. SHOUTING IN THE MIDST OF BATTLE

  [1] One should send the army into battle shouting, and sometimes on the run, because their appearance and shouts and the clash of arms confound the hearts of the enemy. [2] The dense bands of soldiers should spread out in the attack before coming to close quarters, often waving their swords high above their heads toward the sun. The polished spear-points and flashing swords, shining in thick array and reflecting the light of the sun, send ahead a terrible lightning-flash of war. If the enemy should also do this, it is necessary to frighten them in turn, but if not, one should frighten them first.

  [3] It is sometimes advantageous before a critical battle for the general not to be the first to form a line of battle but to wait within the camp for a time until he observes the battle array of the enemy, its character, arrangement, and position.

  XXX. THE GENERAL MUST DECIDE BEFORE BATTLE WHO SHOULD OPPOSE WHOM AND THUS IN ORDER ARRANGE HIS OWN OFFICERS AGAINST THOSE OF THE ENEMY

  Next the general must consider which troops to oppose to which of the enemy, and in what manner; just as a good doctor who foresees an illness of the body, he must bring forward his defences and arrange his forces as it seems to him most advantageous; for generals are often compelled to equip and marshal their own armies with reference to the armament, nationality, and customs of the enemy.

  XXXI. NARROW PLACES MUST BE CHOSEN IF THE ENEMY ARE SUPERIOR IN CAVALRY

  [1] If the enemy are superior in cavalry, the general should choose if possible a locality that is rough and hemmed in, near mountains which are least suitable for riding, or he should avoid battle so far as he may until he finds an appropriate place, adapted to his own circumstances. [2] A certain number of soldiers must be left behind at the palisade to guard the camp and the baggage in order that the general of the enemy may not discover that the camp is deserted and send men to plunder its contents and seize the place.

  XXXII. THE GENERAL MUST DO NOTHING RASH

  [1] Generals who destroy their own defences or cross rivers or who post their armies with steep cliffs or yawning gulfs in the rear in order that the soldiers may either stand and conquer or in their desire to escape be killed, I am not wholly able to praise nor yet to blame, for everything that is ventured rashly is rather than the part of recklessness than of wisdom, and has a greater share of luck than of good judgement. [2] For in a case when one must either win a victory and prevail, or else be defeated and lose everyth
ing, in such a case how could anyone attribute victory to foresight or defeat to deliberate choice? [3] But I do believe that certain soldiers of the army must be allowed to run desperate risks — for if they succeed they are of great assistance, but if they fail they do not cause corresponding loss, — yet I cannot countenance gambling with the entire army as the stake. [4] Most of all those generals seem to me to be at fault who make use of stratagems which in the event of victory will cause small loss to the enemy, but in defeat the greatest loss to their own army.

  [5] If the destruction of one’s army is evident, except through the use of some daring strategy, and if the destruction of the enemy by defeat is also evident, then I do not think a general would be at fault in cutting off the retreat of his own army. For it is better, by showing courage at a time when it is uncertain whether one will perhaps escape a severe defeat himself, to endeavour at the very same time to inflict a defeat, rather than, when it is certain that all will perish if they remain inactive, to keep quiet like cowards. [6] He should not only point this out in those localities where in actual fact there is no safety for fugitives, but also in every locality and every battle he must show by many reasons that death is certain for those who flee, since the enemy would at once press on freely, as soon as no one is able to hinder the pursuit, and could dispose of the fugitives as might suit them; but for men who stand and defend themselves, death is not certain. [7] For the men in the lines who chance to believe that if they flee they will perish shamefully while if they remain in rank they will die a glorious death, and who constantly anticipate greater dangers from breaking the ranks than from keeping them, will prove themselves the best men in the face of danger. [8] On this account it is a good plan if the general can win over his whole army to this opinion, or, if not all, at least as many as possible, for thus he either gains an absolute victory or meets with but a slight defeat.