Sikunder Burnes

by Craig Murray

  Before returning to Burnes’ Kabul negotiations we should note that the other members of the mission had successes in their designated tasks. On 10 January 1838 Burnes was able to report Lord’s initial success in recovering Moorcroft’s papers,45 and while this first batch proved to be printed volumes from Moorcroft’s library, it was not long before manuscript notes and journals started to come in. The haul included material from an unknown and unidentifiable early British traveller.

  Wood travelled among the Hazara people and produced one of the first accounts, in which he correctly identified them as Shia and of Central Asian origin, in contrast to later more romantic British conjectures. He noted they were pacific and much subject to slave-raiding by the Sunni Uzbeks.46 Wood surveyed and outlined the high passes of the Hindu Kush.

  Burnes was concerned about the lack of reliable information on Russian progress in the Uzbek Khanates of Bokhara, Khiva and Kokhand. He suggested to Macnaghten that they send secret agents disguised as merchants to the Russian trade fair at Nizhni Novgorod. Burnes feared that Russian intelligence on Central Asia was better than Britain’s.47 He submitted an intelligence digest including the observation that in Bokhara the Emir had become erratic, and less inclined to pay attention to the moderate Kush-Begi. The report detailed slave-raiding by Khiva, and concluded that both Russians and Persians had legitimate grievances against that Khanate, which it was in the British interest to neutralise lest they become excuses for Russian conquest.48

  On 20 October Burnes sent Macnaghten a lengthy account of Russian activity in Central Asia since his journey to Bokhara, starting with the visit of ‘Mirza Jafer’ in 1832, who Burnes identifies not by name but as a Russian officer posing as a Muslim. In 1835 Russia had established the fortified port of Mungusluk on the eastern shore of the Caspian, and a ‘hunting party’ from there had set out towards Bokhara. The whole party of 120 had been captured and all but the two Russian officers – who remained hostages – sold into slavery. In retaliation Khivan merchants at Nizhni Novgorod had been incarcerated, and the standoff continued. Burnes’ sympathies were with Russia against Khiva.49

  In Kabul, Burnes was in continual contact with Masson, who became effectively a member of the mission. The two usually met daily, and often exchanged short notes. Those Burnes sent to Masson are preserved and they show that Burnes wrote to Masson on average more than once a day throughout his stay. Any day they were not able to meet, they sent an explanation. They shared journals and books. The notes show that Jabbar Khan and Akbar Khan were part of Burnes’ daily social life, and that he regularly invited Masson to join them for a meal or a picnic. A few quotes give the tenor of Burnes’ relationship with the Kabul rulers: ‘I have had Mahomed Akbar Khan here for a long time and have had much general conversation’;50 ‘I am going out to dinner tonight to meet the Nawab taking a soiree at Burr u Deen’;51 ‘I was just coming over to you […] when the Ameer dropped in – Today I am writing as hard as I can for the packet just starting which will also prevent my coming over but I hope to bring you over to have a chat with us at dinner.’52 All the senior Afghans took an interest in discussing Burnes’ and Masson’s antiquarian researches, including Dost Mohammed, who sent them sketches of artefacts at Bamian.53 Burnes also maintained a relationship with senior clergy, including Mulla Rahim, to whom he made several payments.54 Alex felt that Masson was poorly treated by Wade, particularly over salary and expenses. On 27 October Burnes wrote to Masson offering to advance him all outstanding payments and criticising Wade’s ‘prevarication’.55

  Apart from Rattray and Campbell, there was a further European in Dost’s service commanding a regiment, an American doctor named Josiah Harlan. Like so many of the flotsam and jetsam of white mercenaries, Harlan had previously served the Company and then held minor commands under Ranjit Singh and Shah Shuja. Harlan repeatedly tried to insinuate himself into Burnes’ negotiations with the Emir, which Burnes resisted, returning Harlan’s letters unopened.56 Harlan was a braggart, but there appears some truth in his claim that he played an important role, as an agent of Ranjit, in exacerbating the distrust between Dost Mohammed and his half-brother Sultan at Peshawar, which was a major obstacle to Burnes’ negotiations, to which we now return.

  On 13 November Dost sent for Burnes and showed him a copy of an agreement between Kandahar and Persia. Burnes already knew from his agents that this was genuine, and that in return for the alliance Qambar Ali had cancelled his further mission to Kabul and was returning to Persia with senior Dil Khan children as hostages. Kandahar had agreed to supply troops for the siege of Herat.57 Dost now suggested to Burnes that Britain and Kabul were on the same side in the face of a Persian/Russian advance:

  It was very evident there was some crisis at hand in the affairs of the West and that Herat certainly and Kandahar probably would fall into the hands of Persia if some arrangement were not speedily entered upon […] [as] Persia could not of herself act in this manner she must be assisted by Russia. His motive in having sought this private interview was to assure me he was entirely English in his views […] and that his […] power [was] at our disposal […]58

  This was a clear offer of alliance against Russia. Burnes had, however, no instructions to make such an alliance and he temporised, pointing out that the authenticity of the Kandahar/Persian treaty was dubious.59 He also said Herat was not yet under attack and the danger was not immediate. The Emir must have been disappointed by this lukewarm response.

  Burnes had recruited paid spies in the Afghan court, and the next day he received a copy of a letter to Dost from his Ambassador to Persia, Haji Ibrahim, enclosing one from Count Simonicz. Simonicz’s letter was carefully bland, but he had given a spoken gloss to Ibrahim:

  The Shah directed me to inform you, that he will shortly send an ambassador, who […] will proceed to Ranjit Singh, to explain to him […] that if he will not restore all the Affghan countries to you, he must be prepared to receive the Russian army. When the Shah takes Herat, he has promised to send you money and any troops you want.

  The Russian Ambassador who is always with the Shah, has sent you a letter which I enclose. The substance of his verbal messages to you is, that if the Shah does everything you want, so much the better, and if not, the Russian Government will furnish you with everything wanting. The object of the Russian Ambassador, by his message is to have a road to the English, and for this they are very anxious.60

  Four days after sending back this evidence of Simonicz’s intentions, Burnes wrote on 19 November asking the Government to think ahead to what they should do if Herat fell, and requested instructions:

  It may perhaps therefore appear worthy of consideration […] to decide how far Government can go in its offers, either of money, countenance or protection, to divert the chiefs of Afghanistan from a Persian alliance […] when Herat is threatened from day to day and may fall it will not […] be premature to consider what may be done in that event in Cabool and Candahar.

  In fact, the great outlying fortress of Ghorian had already fallen to Persia, not without treachery by its commander, and the Persian siege of Herat began just three days after Burnes’ letter was written.

  The Persian forces included a regiment of Russian ‘deserters’, which the British regarded as a ruse to supply Tsarist troops. This was probably a wrong imputation. In 1830 Arthur Conolly had noted that some 7,000 Russian military absconders were resident in north-east Persia; that though most had become nominally Muslim, they were in general very drunken, and that 3,000 were in the Shah’s military service.61 Stoddart paints a more creditable picture, saying that many were Poles who had rebelled against Russian rule. They had performed well at Qochan but played little part in the siege of Herat and seemed ‘but little indisposed towards the Heratees’. This ‘regiment’ refused an order to return to Russia once the siege was lifted.62

  Dost Mohammed was concerned that Herat would fall. He was aware that Herat was more defensible than Kandahar, and also that Herat was a good base of suppl
y for provisioning an army. A fall of Herat could lead very quickly to a situation in which either Kandahar would also fall, or would ally with Persia against Kabul.63

  Burnes now received a letter from Eldred Pottinger who had been detained in Herat by the vizier Yar Mohammed Khan as a possible asset or hostage in the Persian siege, but was not being mistreated otherwise. The bumbling young man had lost his surveying instruments, and wrote that he had been trying to make a compass by striking iron.64 Burnes sent Eldred his own spares.

  Five weeks later, news of the attack on Herat had still not reached Auckland and Macnaghten as they wrote a reply to Burnes, following Christmas festivities in a splendid camp at Kanpur. They were dismissive of the threat to Herat, and made plain that Burnes’ aim must be to maintain the status quo – something clearly now impossible. Burnes would not have received these infuriatingly obtuse and pompous instructions until February, when Herat had been under siege for ten weeks and a Russian envoy had been six weeks in Kabul offering alliance to Dost:

  Captain A Burnes

  On a Mission to Cabool

  Sir,

  1.I am desired […] to acknowledge the receipt of your letters dated the 10th, 15th, 16th, 18th and 19th ultimo regarding the latest intelligence respecting the designs of Persia eastward, the probable result of an attack on Herat and the ulterior motives which has Russia to Herat […]

  2.In reply, I am directed to acquaint you that the information acknowledged is interesting, but it is not sufficiently authentic to admit of any satisfactory conclusion being formed as to the designs of Persia on Candahar, or to lead to any immediate apprehension that the integrity of Herat will be impaired […]

  3.It would be useful if the conviction could be impressed on the Herat and Candahar chiefs that by their mutual contests, they are furnishing the means of threatening and injuring both, to Persia […] The same reasoning will apply […] to any attempt on the part of the ruler of Cabool to found upon your presence at his court any pretensions of superiority, or to an undue influence over the chief of Candahar – and whilst His Lordship thinks that he can trace in some of your dispatches some such design on the part of Dost Mahomed, he relies […] upon your strict attention to the instructions which have already been given to you […] the most studious caution is indispensably necessary and […] a visit of friendly intercourse from you or from some member of your mission, designed to mark our recognition of that independence to the courts of Candahar and Herat may become desirable at an earlier period than you seem to anticipate. In the precarious position in which Dost Mahomed is placed our good offices for the peace and security of his remaining territory should be thankfully accepted by him […]

  I have etc

  Sir W H Macnaghten

  Secty to the Govt of India

  With the Governor-General

  Camp at Cawnpore

  The 27th Decr 183765

  So Burnes was to visit Kandahar and Herat to assure them of support, not against Persia, which was invading, but against Dost Mohammed who was not threatening them.

  CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

  Stand-off

  Persia had begun the siege of Herat in earnest with a full assault on 22 November 1838. On 25 November Burnes received another letter from Ranjit Singh. Ranjit knew very well the course of the Kabul discussions from his own agents. After copious expressions of friendship, and a pointed reference to an assurance from Auckland that nothing would be done in Kabul against his interests, Ranjit turned to Peshawar which he stated was held by Sultan Mohammed and Pir Mohammed as chiefs under him in return for a tribute of ‘horses of noble breed’. Ranjit ignores the role of Avitabile and stationing of Sikh forces. He concludes that he hopes that Burnes will ‘not do any injury to the countries under me’. The letter is a warning off, but does not close the door on a revised tributary arrangement for Sultan Mohammed.

  In the evening of 11 December Charles Masson came to see Burnes. He talked long of his antiquarian researches and his health, and suggested that he leave Kabul for three months to recuperate. The next day Burnes wrote giving his permission for Masson to take three months’ leave on full pay and offering to pay outstanding expenses claims. He criticised Wade for niggardliness, adding:

  These are all public matters but in private – if my own purse can avail you […] the use of it will always be to me a very gratifying proof of your confidence – I know that you have friends to do such service for you, but they are absent and I am present.1

  As usual, the Emir simply turned up at Burnes’ house to tell him startling news from his son at Ghazni. The Russian agent, Witkiewicz, was on his way from Ghazni to Kabul. Burnes immediately sent a note to Masson:

  I should feel very much obliged if you could come over as I wish to speak particularly with you – the Russian has arrived here!!! & the Ameer has been with me to know what to do – I would come over to you but I am not certain the Ameer will not call me to him.2

  Witkiewicz had ridden from St Petersburg as far as Moscow with Dost Mohammed’s Envoy, Haji Hussain Ali, who had delivered the Emir’s letter to the Tsar. Witkiewicz was bringing the reply. The Haji had been taken ill, and Witkiewicz had left him at Moscow. Witkiewicz had been spotted en route, travelling by night, by Henry Rawlinson in a famously romantic encounter in the deserts of north Persia. Rawlinson was himself an astonishing character, with heroic achievements as archaeologist and military adventurer. At school, I copied diagrams of his death-defying acrobatics, which involved using ladders to bridge gaps in ledges over dizzying chasms, as he noted down rock-cut cuneiform inscriptions. He became the first to decipher the ancient Mesopotamian and Persian languages.

  Witkiewicz had pretended not to have any common language with Rawlinson, though in truth they had several. He had then gone on to join the Shah’s camp at Mishapur, en route to Herat. Colonel Stoddart, British Military Attache with the camp reported that Witkiewicz had told the Shah that a large Russian force was to arrive at Astrabad to support the Persian attack.3 This was an untruth, probably fed to Stoddart. But certainly Witkiewicz conveyed from St Petersburg further encouragement of the Shah’s attack. Burnes shared with Masson: ‘The Elchee is from Moscow but last from Count Simonitch from him he has letters to say his word is my word and his doings are my doings.’4

  Dost was acutely aware of the problems this unsought visitor might bring him with the British. As Burnes reported to Auckland:

  Dost Mohammed Khan said […] that he wished to have nothing to do with any other power than the British, that he did not wish to receive any agent from any other power whatever, so long as he had a hope for any sympathy from us; and that he would order the Russian agent to be turned out, detained on the road, or act in any other way I desired him.

  Burnes replied that the Emir should receive Witkiewicz, but report everything that transpired. This is precisely the response that an MI6 officer today would give. Burnes was confident he could intercept all Witkiewicz’ communications and gather intelligence on Russian intentions.5

  The clash of Burnes and Witkiewicz, pushing the British and Russian interests in Kabul, encapsulates the romance and intrigue of the Great Game. Witkiewicz was long viewed in Britain as splendidly mysterious. Historians were baffled by Masson’s claims that Witkiewicz was not really a Russian agent, combined with the fact that he was strenuously disowned by Nesselrode, who keen to avert a clash with Britain, wrote to Palmerston on 20 October 1838 that Witkiewicz was merely a local appointment by Count Simonicz, the Russian Ambassador in Persia, and his remit was purely commercial. This was untrue – prior to his embassy to Kabul, Witkiewicz was on the staff of the Governor-General of Orenburg, and the letters of credence he carried were from the Tsar himself. But it suited the British to pretend to believe Nesselrode.

  Burnes had no doubt that Witkiewicz was who he said he was, an Envoy of the Imperial Russian court. Witkiewicz had already been received in Kandahar, where he had attempted to persuade the Dil Khans to join the Persian forces attacking Hera
t. He flourished the Tsar’s commission. He wore spectacular Cossack uniform, and wore it well. He promised presents, spoke of large subsidies, and let it be known that a major Imperial army was assembling at Astrabad, ready to combine with the Persian army.

  In short, Witkiewicz was the nightmare of the British Raj personified. His instructions from St Petersburg were almost an exact mirror of Burnes’. In addition to the usual surveying and intelligence gathering, he was to persuade Kabul and Kandahar that an alliance with Russia offered them the best protection from aggression. He was to induce Afghan merchants to go directly to buy goods at Nizhni Novgorod. And ‘he was to indicate to Dost Mohammed and Kohan Dil Khan that Russia would not assist them to expand their respective domains, but that Russia would intercede as a friend on their behalf through Persia’.6

  To make matters worse, Burnes now received intelligence that Herat would soon fall and Kandahar was committing to an alliance with Russia and Persia. He had no reply yet to his letter of 19 November asking whether finance might be offered to Kandahar to take the British side, but felt obliged to act. On 21 December he confided to his diary:

  I received such messages from Candahar that I resolved to offer the Chiefs there pecuniary assistance if they would not join Persia […] how else can I uphold British Interests […] My despatches explain my reasons & they may bring on me high satisfaction or high disapprobation so wide are my instructions.

  He was right in imagining that this decision would be pivotal to his career. On 22 December Burnes made a careful facsimile of the Pole’s credentials and the Tsar’s letter and sent them to Macnaghten, noting in his journal, ‘This is a very serious affair. The promises of the Emperor and the calligraphy of his letter are equally splendid which are saying a great deal.’7 The next morning he addressed a long personal letter to Auckland, in which he directly disabused Auckland of the notion that the Sikhs posed a direct threat to Kabul, explained the need to aid Kandahar against a Russian-inspired Persian advance; and pleaded that the proposals for Peshawar be discussed with Ranjit Singh.8