Sikunder Burnes

by Craig Murray

  On Christmas Eve Burnes sent Masson a note: ‘We have seen the Russian & a very gentlemanly good sort of fellow – he is to dine with us tomorrow – he was in full tog & belongs to the Cossacks!’9 And on 27 December he recorded:

  The Russian agent Mr Vitkiewitsch gives one room for a great deal of curious reflection and consideration – If his private history is to be relied upon he is in the service of Russia as an Officer in the Cossacks at Orenburg – he is about 28 or 30 years of age – he speaks and writes French fluently – he also knows Toorkee and Persian […] he has been three times to Bokhara, twice on government business and once on his own […] he has been all round the Northern part [the Aral] and as high up the Sir […] as Tashkent. All that country he says has been examined by Russian officers but the Govt of that country does not allow officers to publish what reseignments they make – he had examined the unfrequented road by Lash and Seistan from which he travelled to Candahar and Cabool.10

  Good personal relations apart, Witkiewicz alarmed Burnes by letting it be known that he had come as a result of Dost’s letter telling the Tsar that he feared the British intended to back Shuja against him, and suggested that Afghanistan be taken under Russian protection.

  Witkiewicz’ report back to Simonicz of his first meeting with Dost was not entirely positive:

  The reception of Dost Mohammed Khan […] was sufficiently marked, polite and kind.

  I was lodged in the house of the first minister […] and after three days, I demanded an audience, when I delivered the Imperial credentials and the letter of your lordship […] I added verbally, that the object of my coming was […] to declare that His Majesty the Emperor […] vouchsafed to him protection and friendly alliance; that the rulers of Afghanistan […] should acknowledge, or place themselves, under the dominion of Persia, with whom Russia is connected by truly friendly relations.

  It is unsurprising that Dost did not leap at the Russian offer, when the first point was Persian suzerainty. In fact the Russians were constrained in their offers by their relationship with Persia, just as the British were by their relationship with the Sikhs. Dost replied:

  that a friendly treaty of the Affghans with the Persians could not be because an English envoy, Captain Burnes […] was concluding a mutual treaty. That Dost Mahomed Khan, having collected as large an Affghan army as possible, would go to the assistance of Kamran, against the Persians besieging Herat, and by the treaty the English bound themselves […] to make over the possession of Affghan Peshawar and the other conquests of Runjeet on the right bank of the Indus […]11

  This account by Dost Mohammed is a wild exaggeration of anything Burnes had said. It was invented to persuade the Russians to match this fictitious British offer. The Emir wrote to Simonicz, thanking him for his offers of support but noting that: ‘Before the arrival of your agent the English government had deputed Alexander Burnes, who is now with me in Kabul. That officer is sowing the seeds of friendship between Ranjit Singh and myself; nothing is yet settled, however, but let me wait the result.’

  Burnes’ informants told him that Witkiewicz had offered Dost large funding for war against Ranjit.12 Witkiewicz makes no mention of any such offer. The sophisticated Afghans were feeding both Burnes and Witkiewicz with false reports of offers, in order to bid up the rival powers. Kohan Dil Khan had written to Dost suggesting this strategy.13 This is confirmed by Josiah Harlan, who was present in the Afghan counsels, and wrote ‘every subterfuge that duplicity could devise, and every pretext that cunning could suggest, were used to work upon the English agent. The imaginary terrors of a Russian invasion were prominently displayed to him.’14 Harlan fails to note the Afghans were similarly playing on Witkiewicz.

  Dost had himself given Burnes an account of Witkiewicz’ audience. He also showed Burnes the letter he had written to the Tsar in 1836, stating ‘The British Government exhibit no favorable opinions towards me,’15 explaining that he had sent it after his friendly advance to Auckland had been rebuffed. Burnes reported to Auckland that

  Mr Vickovich informed Dost Mahomed Khan, that the Russian Government had desired him to state his sincere sympathy with the difficulty under which he labored; and that it would afford great pleasure to assist him in repelling the attacks of Runjeet Singh on his dominions; that it was ready to furnish him with a sum of money for the purpose, and to continue the supply annually, expecting in return the Ameer’s good offices.16

  The Emir had much more frequent and direct contact with Burnes than Witkiewicz, who could, however, negotiate through his host the Mirza. Witkiewicz blamed his lack of direct access on Burnes.

  Masson tried repeatedly to persuade Burnes that Witkiewicz was an impostor. He produced a conical loaf of sugar from the market, and suggested that the wax seal affixed to Witkiewicz’ credentials was created from the Russian export duty stamp on the bottom of the cone. Burnes was in fact already aware of these stamps, having noted them on 27 September.17 He believed the sugar loaves to be of British manufacture and re-exported through Russia.

  As we have seen Nizamuddin had written to Masson from Bokhara in 1836 that Witkiewicz was a Russian diplomat. So why had Masson been at such pains to deny Witkiewicz’ identity, even going through the charade with a loaf of sugar? Years later Burnes acquired compelling evidence that Masson had been deceiving him. On 22 November 1840 Burnes wrote to Lord from Kabul:

  A couple of years before our mission arrived at Cabul, Vicovitch (the true Vicovitch) came to Bokhara, called at Ruheem Shah’s relative’s house, and asked him to send letters to Masson at Caubul for MM. Allard and Ventura. The King of Bokhara took offence at Vicovitch’s presence, and the Koosh-Begee sent him off sharp. So the letters were never sent. This shows an earlier intention to intrigue on the part of Russia; but how came Masson not to report this, and if he reported it, how came he to give, years afterwards, twenty-one reasons for Vicovitch not being what he was? I cannot unravel this. I once spoke of this before to you, and to no other man […]18

  As Burnes realised, Witkiewicz would hardly have been seeking to forward letters through the British newswriter at Kabul without some prior arrangement with Masson. Masson had separately suppressed reports about Witkiewicz from Nizamuddin; it is not plain if Burnes also eventually discovered this. But what is certain is that Masson was faking lack of knowledge of Witkiewicz and trying to plant false doubts about the Pole’s authenticity.

  Allard and Ventura, to whom Masson had been supposed to forward letters from Witkiewicz, were both originally sent into Sikh service by the Russian Ambassador in Persia,19 after the British government had pressured the Shah to dismiss his French officers. The British had also stipulated that Persia should prevent the French officers from joining Ranjit Singh, so Allard and Ventura had to travel in disguise.20 On arrival in Lahore in 1822, their first act had been to inquire as to Moorcroft’s progress into Central Asia, and what force accompanied him. Moorcroft had intercepted at Yarkand a message from Nesselrode to Ranjit, (the Russians believed Moorcroft killed their messenger).21

  The Frenchmen maintained their own intelligence contacts in Kabul, independent of Ranjit particularly through Jabbar Khan.22 As the British had forced them from Persia, it would be surprising if their network did not include some contact with Russian intelligence. The evidence that Masson was part of the Russian intelligence network seems strong. The obvious possibility is that Witkiewicz, ‘Mirza Jafer’, or Allard and Ventura had recruited Masson to supply intelligence to Russia.

  Correspondence between Pottinger, Wade and Masson was routinely sent via Allard and Ventura, who forwarded it through qasid exchanges at Peshawar.23 Given that the British were avowedly engaged in an intelligence battle with Russia, their communication security appears naive. They were more concerned with internecine dispute. With the advantage of seeing communications in both directions, Wade could time his internal policy intervention to maximum effect. In January 1838, Wade suggested to Auckland that the solution to the problem of Afghanistan lay in ‘fa
cilitating the return of Shah Shoojah’:24

  Runjeet Singh would be brought with difficulty to acknowledge the elevation of Dost Mahomed Khan to the sovereignty of the Afghans, while, should the consolidation of that people become a measure of indispensable necessity to the establishment of security on the frontier of the Indus, the election of Shah Shooja, would only be in fulfilment of the compact which was formerly made with him, and would exact no new concessions.25

  The same week Burnes was bemoaning to his diary, ‘It is proper that all governments should be difficult to move and that much scrutiny should be used before acting, but Captain Wade offers his opinions which are not grounded in experience and these seem to confuse government.’26

  There was another influence undermining Burnes’ position with Auckland.27 As the gubernatorial procession reached Patna, and as Witkiewicz approached Kabul, a visitor for Auckland arrived ‘warning him against Burnes’ loquacity’. That visitor was General Ventura. While Ventura was acting in the Sikh interest in countering Burnes’ proposals for Peshawar, he was also promoting the Russian interest in undermining Burnes in Kabul. Count Simonicz, the pro-active Russian Ambassador in Teheran, had himself been a Napoleonic officer, and was reputed to know some of Ranjit’s officers from that time.28

  Burnes was receiving reports from McNeill that Persia planned to march on Kandahar, but also that the Dil Khan sirdars there were considering a separate alliance with Persia. On 22 December Burnes received a letter from the Dil Khans, representing to him that he had led them into a position of hostility to Persia, which placed them in danger, but had provided no security. On Christmas Eve Burnes received another visit from the Emir, who told him that Witkiewicz had claimed that a Russian army 4,000 strong had moved east of the Caspian Sea to tie up the Turkmen in support of the Shah’s siege of Herat.29

  On 26 December, at Macnaghten’s direct instruction,30 Burnes sent Leech to bolster the chiefs of Kandahar. Leech also carried Burnes’ unauthorised offer of three lakhs of rupees to finance the defence. Burnes wrote to George Jacob:

  Herat has been besieged fifty days, and if the Persians move on Candahar, I am off there with the Ameer […] We have good stuff, forty-six guns and stout Afghans, as brave as irregular troops need be. I am on stirring ground, and I am glad to say I am up to it in health and all that, and was never more braced in my life.31

  Burnes established a regular messenger service to Leech at Kandahar, and soon was feeding hopeful reports to Dost that the Persians had been defeated before Herat, which was true, and had fallen back on Meshed, which was not. Witkiewicz complained to Simonicz ‘all this has occasioned Dost Mohammed to behave very coldly towards me’. Burnes seemed to be winning again.

  Lieutenant Mackeson had now been moved from Peshawar to be Resident at Lahore. This infuriated Wade, who was still Resident at Ludhiana but, although Mackeson reported through him, was now cut off from direct contact with Ranjit. The Maharaja had a letter from the Qazi of Kabul read out to Mackeson:

  That the Russian envoy and Captain Burnes occasionally meet in durbar before Sirdar Dost Mohammed Khan and have warm discussions […] That lately in presence of Captain Burnes the Russian Envoy had remarked in a loud tone to the Amir that […] [he] would not do well to rely on the promises of the English nation who had come so far from their own country to make conquests in the east and who would succeed […] if the Amir allowed himself to be cajoled by their soft words. On hearing this remark both Dost Mohammed and Captain Burnes remained silent.32

  Neither Burnes nor Witkiewicz give any account of joint meetings with the Emir. But plainly the Qazi believed Ranjit’s sympathies to be with Russia. He also reported that Burnes had sent Witkiewicz wine and fruit, showing that Britain was tributary to Russia – an unfortunate interpretation of Burnes’ well-meaning welcome. But it does seem that Witkiewicz and Burnes continued some friendly communication in Kabul – for example they updated each other on their reports from Herat.33

  Witkiewicz now attempted to push Russian diplomacy right to the frontier of British India by proceeding to Lahore for discussions with Ranjit Singh. He wrote to Avitabile in Peshawar to inform him.34 Avitabile asked Ranjit for instructions, and Ranjit asked Mackeson for advice. Mackeson, a cynic about the ‘Russian threat’, appeared unconcerned. This attitude was reinforced by the fact that Ranjit had just given him news of the Persian defeat before Herat.35 There were senior Sikhs who argued that a Russian agent should be welcome to counter the demands of the British.36

  Mackeson received instructions from Macnaghten to give Ranjit Singh a different reply:

  Regarding the supposed intention of the Russian agent […] to proceed to Lahore […] the Governor-General would strongly discourage the reception of that individual by the Maharajah. Captain Vicowitch is […] reported to be the minister of Persian intrigue and his objects must be regarded with suspicion. To Lahore he has no accredited mission, and his reception by the Ruler of the Punjab would be open to misconstruction […]37

  By 6 January 1838 Auckland felt confounded, and he blamed Dost, writing to Hobhouse:

  Burnes is well established at Kabul, with only this disadvantage, that he can hardly hope that Dost Muhammad will be satisfied with anything that would not be offensive to Ranjit Singh; and yet he ought to be satisfied that he is allowed to remain at peace, and is saved from actual invasion. But he is reckless, and intriguing, and will be difficult to keep quiet […]38

  Auckland was still under the misapprehension that a Sikh invasion of Afghanistan was realistic, and that Dost feared it. Auckland, like Burnes, believed the conflict between Russia and Britain would more likely be resolved between the principals: ‘It is in Europe and Persia,’ wrote Colvin to Burnes ‘that the battle of Afghanistan must probably be ultimately fought.’

  In Kabul Burnes was still attempting to construct an acceptable compromise over Peshawar on the basis of Auckland’s pronouncements. Then on 20 January 1838 a messenger arrived from India bearing two letters, finally giving Burnes clear instructions. Macnaghten declared it impossible that Ranjit Singh should be asked to cede control of Peshawar to Dost Mohammed. But he might agree to hand it to Sultan Mohammed.

  This was not incompatible with Burnes’ own plan, tentatively agreed with Dost. But of all his half-brothers, Dost Mohammed was on the worst terms with Sultan, who had designs on heading the family himself. Sultan had betrayed Dost’s original jihad for Peshawar. The Emir regarded Sultan as a traitor and a collaborator. Sultan viewed Dost as having treacherously seized the throne of Kabul from him. There was also a personal hatred. Sultan had been promised a Saduzai princess, Aga Taj, in marriage. As she prepared to leave Kabul for Peshawar, ‘The Amir also had lost his heart for her beauty, and got hold of her by force and married her immediately. This at once created […] a fatal animosity between the brothers.’39 So a second rape of a Saduzai princess by Dost was to have fatal consequences.

  Burnes sought an immediate meeting with Dost to put forward Macnaghten’s plan. The Emir saw him straightaway, with Nawab Jabbar Khan, whose advice Dost relied on very heavily; they conferred every morning. The meeting lasted nearly five hours,40 and Burnes wrote a detailed account to Macnaghten41. With trifling differences of language, this could have been a note of a meeting sent back by an Ambassador during my diplomatic career, right down to format.

  Dost noted that he had agreed to Burnes’ previous idea of sending ‘tribute, horses and apology’ to Ranjit Singh, and holding Peshawar under him. He said in doing so, he had intended to continue to allow Sultan Mohammed his jaghir, or revenues, from Peshawar uninterrupted. But while he did not doubt the good intentions of the British, they must not understand that Sultan had sought to overthrow him before in league with Ranjit, and might do so again. The Emir concluded that he understood why the British did not want Kabul or Kandahar allied with Persia; but to set up Sultan at Peshawar would be to invite his own destruction.42

  Burnes replied that the British government had proposed friendly inte
rvention with the Sikhs to help the Emir, because he had agreed to renounce an alliance with Persia. But Dost should consider the boost to his reputation from putting the Sikhs back across the Indus, and thus allowing the Muslims of Peshawar to practise their religion. If war with the Sikhs were ended, the Emir would save much expenditure. The Barakzai family would control Kabul, Peshawar and Kandahar. The British government may take further measures to restrain any possible attack on Kabul.

  Dost countered that he was currently under no threat from Ranjit’s possession of Peshawar, but would be so if Sultan were there. Rather to Burnes’ surprise, Jabbar Khan joined in and said it was true that the bad blood between Sultan and Dost would make it unsafe to set up Sultan in Peshawar.

  Burnes had believed that Dost Mohammed was committed to recovering Peshawar for Islam. This conversation proved that Dost was, rather, interested in recovering Peshawar for himself. To explain this apparent selfishness, the Emir now reluctantly revealed to Burnes that he had new intelligence. Sultan had just sent a message to Shuja, offering with Sikh support to help restore Shuja in Kabul, thus reinstating the alliance against Dost of 1834. Sultan was to be Shuja’s wazir in Kabul.