Sikunder Burnes

by Craig Murray

  Jabbar Khan suggested a solution. Peshawar’s revenues should be split equally between Dost and Sultan; both would pay an annual tribute to Ranjit. This was a reinstatement of the arrangement when Ranjit had first briefly taken Peshawar, in 1823. The Emir agreed to this, adding that Jabbar should govern the city, on behalf of the co-proprietors.

  Burnes undertook that the British government would consider this proposal. That ended the meeting, and Burnes concluded his report with the recommendation that Jabbar Khan’s proposal deserved serious consideration. It would meet British objectives of keeping a powerful buffer in Afghanistan by cementing an alliance with the Emir, while the proposal on Peshawar should meet the needs of Ranjit Singh.

  It is typical of Alexander Burnes that, at this crucial moment, with issues of war and peace at stake, he still managed to pursue scientific interests. And it is typical of that equally remarkable man, Jabbar Khan, that he was enthusiastically co-operating with Burnes in a scheme to introduce the potato and other crops into Afghanistan, from seed Burnes had brought. Burnes had discussed horticulture with the Nawab, who was an enthusiast, at their first meeting in 1833 and had written to Jabbar ahead of his return that he was bringing ‘hundreds of seeds’.43 Jabbar had already begun agricultural improvements on his Afghan estates, on European lines, and had shown his work to Josiah Harlan. Dr Wallich of Calcutta Botanic Garden had supplied Burnes with 356 different types of seed, and Dr Lush of the Bombay Botanical Garden had contributed more.44 Burnes had a serious intent to introduce useful new crops and varieties into Afghanistan, with active Afghan coadjutors.

  The Sikh Empire was very much Ranjit’s personal creation, and started a spectacular implosion immediately on his death. Yet Burnes is the only one who seems to have factored Ranjit’s imminent demise seriously into his policy thinking – he was unable to get Macnaghten to do so, despite explicitly arguing the point with him.45 In fact Macnaghten had somehow convinced himself that on Ranjit’s death the Company would acquire the Sikh Empire peacefully. He had advised Bentinck that ‘after his death I look upon it as certain that his supremacy will devolve upon us by the national consent’.46

  Burnes therefore was trying to find a peaceful resolution over Peshawar, while his superiors were itching to annex it. Burnes waited anxiously for the reply to his proposal. What he got was a bombshell.

  On 22 February 1838 he received a letter from Macnaghten dated 20 January, covering another from Auckland addressed to Dost Mohammed. Macnaghten told Burnes that the Governor-General rebuked him strongly for exceeding his authority, in offering to provide subsidies to help defend Kandahar from any Persian advance.

  These promises are entirely unauthorized […]They are most unnecessarily made in unqualified terms and they would […] commit the government upon the gravest questions of general policy […] But the rulers of Candahar must not be allowed to rest in confidence on promises so given […] you will endeavor to set yourself right with the chiefs […] his Lordship feels he could not enlarge upon his strict injunction that you in the future conform punctually on all points to the orders issued for your guidance.

  Positive engagements to assist opposition to actual invasion from the westward, by arms or subsidies, have not been contemplated by his Lordship – Not to speak of the exceeding inconvenience of political engagements at a distance so great from our own resources, these measures might raise questions of serious national difficulty, which ought, if possible, to be reserved for the unfettered consideration of the Government of England.47

  Macnaghten instructed Burnes to speak to Dost in a way that was insulting and designed to provoke conflict between Britain and Kabul, admonishing the Emir ‘to behave in a less mistaken manner’ to Ranjit Singh, and ‘That, in the precarious position in which he was now placed, our good offices for the peace and security of his remaining territory should be thankfully accepted by him’.

  In fact, Dost’s position at Kabul was secure; the main threat to him was from the British – something he was coming to understand. These instructions had been sent before Macnaghten received Burnes’ account of his recent major meeting with the Emir. Burnes might have used that fact to delay acting on these highly unpalatable instructions. But he went ahead to act precisely as instructed.

  Burnes was further instructed to insist that Dost dismiss Witkiewicz immediately – and to state that if the Emir would not do so, then he would himself leave and ‘the act will be regarded as a direct breach of friendship with the British government’.48

  Burnes delivered this message, tantamount to a threat of war, to Dost the very next day, as he reported back to Macnaghten on 23 February. Josiah Harlan was in the Emir’s council when Auckland’s insulting letter was handed round, and wrote that there followed an ‘embarrassed silence’ before the storm of indignation broke.49 On 5 March Burnes sent a further report, saying that the Emir was holding nightly counsels in the Bala Hissar, and powerful nobles were pressing him to ‘take the British at their word’ and send Burnes away. The Emir himself had ‘given vent to very strong expressions’.

  At this stage, Masson claims, Burnes had a nervous breakdown, hiding his head in towels and closeting himself from the world. Certainly his prestige had taken a severe knock – for example Auckland wrote to John McNeill informing him that Burnes had been reprimanded.50 But there is no evidence to support Masson’s account that Burnes disintegrated. Burnes’ notes to Masson continue at least once a day. His journal continues, and notes the setback quite phlegmatically. The flow of correspondence with Calcutta and with Wade, McNeill, Lord and Leech is unbroken.

  Masson was becoming less attached to the mission. Burnes’ notes to him are increasingly about Masson’s failures to turn up, generally on a plea of illness. Masson claimed to be in constant pain, and Burnes is continually sending him medicine for his unspecified illness – and money, with polite hopes that the pain was bearable. Also books, articles, pens and paper, brandy, wine and numerous other considerations, and always more money. Burnes does betray some impatience: ‘I hope nothing will prevent you joining us tomorrow […] but however glad we shall be to have you it will be very wrong if we do not leave you a free agent.’51

  Witkiewicz was now led, preening in his Cossack uniform, through the streets of Kabul with a large cavalry escort. He was for the first time received by Dost Mohammed in full durbar.

  Witkiewicz was delighted. He reported to Simonicz:

  On the 21st February was received from Lord Auckland a reply decidedly to refuse all that Burnes had negotiated […] Dost Mahomed Khan, abandoning his hopes of assistance on the part of the English, has sent to Candahar the letter received from Lord Auckland, and requested for cooperation and consultation one of the Sirdars of that place. Burnes has written to Lieutenant Leech at Candahar, that he should by all means endeavor to dissuade the Sirdars from coming to Cabool […] But the ill-conducted intrigues of Leech have been disclosed […] and led the Affghans to adopt the opposite course, to join Dost Mohammed Khan and break off all connection with the English, and place themselves under the sway of Persia, with the guarantee of Russia […] and that after the taking of Herat, the Shah himself, with his troops, should advance into Affghanistan for the recovery of provinces occupied by Runjeet.52

  Auckland had scored an own goal. Witkiewicz reported that ‘Burnes declares’ that Auckland himself rejected the Peshawar compromise which Ranjit would have accepted. It is interesting to speculate who told Witkiewicz this. Masson?

  CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

  ‘Izzat wa Ikram’

  Jabbar Khan had returned to his country estate, but on hearing of these developments rushed back to Kabul. He called on Burnes on 3 March. Burnes did not attempt to soften the line:

  in regard to Maharaja Runjeet Sing, that we could tender our good offices, which consisted in an endeavour to use our influence at Lahore to put a stop to future aggression on the part of the Ruler there on the Affghan dominions […] I further told the Nawab of the views of Government
regarding Peshawur, of its restoration being in the hands of Runjeet Sing, but most certainly it would not be given to the Ameer.

  The Nawab replied that this was a misunderstanding; Kabul was in no danger from Ranjit Singh. Britain was insisting that Kabul cut all communication with Russia, Persia and Turkestan, in return for nothing except a pledge to advise Ranjit Singh against attacks he was not going to make.

  Burnes said that if Kabul wanted more, he had not been told of it. What precisely did the Emir want? ‘Izzat wa Ikram’, replied the Nawab. Dignity and respect. It was a devastating reply, and it touched precisely on what British diplomacy was trying to take from the Afghans. Jabbar continued ‘and to be looked upon in the light of being able to do something for the British Government, and for such service to receive its real friendship and not a proffer of its sympathy’. Afghanistan wanted the dignity of a nation, not British condescension.

  He then asked Burnes a perceptive question. What were Auckland’s real intentions – to break with the Afghans, or to ally with them? Burnes replied that he could not say more than was in Auckland’s letter. At which point these men, who greatly liked each other, realised they would soon be at war. The Nawab then proposed – in a last ditch effort – that if the British plan was, as originally stated, to install Sultan Jan in Peshawar, Kabul would not interfere.

  The next day the Emir’s Secretary visited Burnes and told him Dost Mohammed was extremely depressed. In seeking friendship with the British, he had brought their enmity upon himself. The Emir’s chief nobles were urging him that the formal concession of Peshawar to Ranjit Singh would disgrace him in this world and damn him in the next. The Emir thought that the hostility of the British may have come from a misunderstanding of the nature of his dealings with Witkiewicz, who they had ordered to quit Kabul after Navruz (21 March). Burnes said the delay was not acceptable, and demanded the originals of correspondence with the Russians. The Secretary did not agree to this humiliating demand.

  On 5 March Burnes received a letter from Stoddart with the Shah of Persia’s camp at Herat, enclosing another from Eldred Pottinger. The Persian forces were baffled. This changed perceptions in Kabul, where the fall of Herat had seemed imminent and Dost had been more and more identifying with the Qizilbash and other Shia factions.

  Burnes’ communications with Eldred had been cut by the siege, but Stoddart had got his message through, shielded by his diplomatic status in the Shah’s camp. Burnes had been sending advice, instructions and money which had all been intercepted, leaving Eldred feeling abandoned.1 Stoddart was himself in dire financial straits and Burnes promised to get Rs10,000 to him.

  By 15 March Burnes realised he had been firmly displaced in Kabul by Witkiewicz, who was now receiving musical entertainments from Jabbar Khan. Burnes noted ‘they are off with the old love and on with the new’. He refers to Witkiewicz as ‘the Pole’, so evidently had learnt something of his antecedents.2

  For the first time, in reporting to Auckland, Burnes did not argue against policy. His report stiffly concludes: ‘I am aware that the views of Government are decided, and it would be highly presumptuous in me to make any observations […]’ He now requested permission to leave Kabul.

  Extraordinarily, throughout Burnes’ negotiations, the British never asked Ranjit Singh if any of the proposed compromises over Peshawar was acceptable to him. Wade thought the proposal for the Barakzais to hold Peshawar from Ranjit and pay tribute was ‘reasonable’ and in line with Ranjit’s own proposal the previous August. On 3 March 1838 Wade had written to Macnaghten that:

  I am ready […] to communicate the proposition now made to Ranjit Singh, and to support by every argument that I can use the expediency of its acceptance by him.3

  Macnaghten instructed Wade not to put Dost’s proposal to Ranjit. Burnes wrote to Masson: ‘I am astonished at his not having told R Sing a word of what has passed here.’4 Burnes wrote to Macnaghten asking directly for Ranjit’s reaction. Macnaghten’s reply, dated 22 May 1838, was a mixture of sophistry and petulance:

  You dwell on the long silence as to the feelings of Ranjit Singh regarding Peshawar […] it was distinctly stated in the instructions of the 20th January and 7th of March that Dost Mohammed must first disclaim all intention of making a sine qua non of the restoration […] to him […] of Peshawar, before we could enter. […] on the subject with Ranjit Singh. That disclaimer […] he has never made […] he has insisted on pretensions in a spirit directly the reverse, so that for the result he has only to accuse himself.5

  Only four months previously Auckland had written, ‘I am thoroughly convinced that it is for the best interests of Runjeet Singh himself that he should come to terms of proper accommodation with the Afghans’. Auckland’s views had changed completely, and rendered Burnes’ mission impossible.

  At the celebration of Navruz the Emir’s minister Mirza Sami Khan held a dinner for Witkiewicz. During the evening it was decided that Burnes had better also be invited. He, however, declined; Mohan Lal would represent him. Seated next to Witkiewicz, Mohan was pumped for information. How many British troops were stationed at Ludhiana? How far apart were the garrisons of Karnal, Merat and Kanpur? What percentage of Company troops were Muslim? How much residual loyalty remained towards the old Mughal emperor?

  On 25 March 1838 Dost wrote to Auckland, attempting one last direct appeal:

  I have no […] inclination to enter into any […] alliance but with the British. The Russians are publicly assisting the Persians & have made a breach in the treaty which has long forbidden them & the British stepping into the country of the Afghans. If such things do take place what then prevents yr Ldshp remedying our grievances […]?6

  On 29 March, Burnes met a new arrival in Kabul, a French adventurer named Cerron, a connection of Ventura. Burnes found him ‘really a good fellow’, and invited him to dinner. Cerron claimed to be on the way to Bokhara.7 On 1 April, Dost visited Burnes and stayed a full three hours but found him sulky and unhelpful. Burnes had convinced himself that it was Dost’s inflexibility over Peshawar which had caused the failure of his negotiations. He wrote to Masson:

  This brings the Ameer to ask in which way he has not met the wishes of Govt. I might have asked in which way has he but I am sick of the matter […] never touched on business – Why should I – Vitkievitch is here and has no intention of moving – the good Ameer declines all preliminaries for peace with Runjeet and writes to Candahar –8

  Burnes had lost sympathy with Dost’s hostility to Sultan, which he believed was having disproportionate effects: ‘But all what the Ameer has done about Peshawar by his abuse of Sooltan Md Khan – he deserves it.’9 Burnes’ warm personal friendship with Sultan perhaps affected this mood. He began to adopt an openly antagonistic attitude to the Emir and satirised Dost’s pleas: ‘He gave the old story – no benefit – no one cares for a falling nation – I offered my wares for sale & you would not buy’, while equally boasting of how robust he had been in response: ‘I gave it fearfully & left him in a furious rage but not a word was forgotten of what I purposed for him.’10

  In the first week of April, Burnes’ position in Kabul became still more impossible. Witkiewicz had sent further messages to the Sirdars of Kandahar, and Leech was able to obtain these and send them on to Burnes. The message purported to be from the Tsar, and promised that if they united with Dost Mohammed against the Sikhs, Russia would send them arms and Persia money. Russia would then assist them to take Multan, Derajat and Sind. In return Russia asked them to accept a Russian Agent at Kandahar who would control their foreign policy: ‘they were to make war when desired and make peace when desired’.11

  Mehir Dil Khan arrived from Kandahar to firm up Burnes’ offers of support against Persian attack, and weigh up the British against the Russian offers. This put Burnes in a difficult position. He had offered subsidy and his own presence if Kandahar were attacked. He had been reprimanded by Auckland for doing so. Burnes received Mehir Dil Khan in the humiliating position of havin
g to withdraw, face to face, his offers of assistance. Burnes tried to argue that the presence of Leech in Kandahar was already sufficient evidence of British government support. He reported: ‘[T]he Sirdar […] declared that neither he nor his brothers could accept such general promises’.

  There are few positions more embarrassing than that of the repudiated Envoy. I have been there myself. My stringent public criticisms of the Uzbek dictatorship had won me a measure of influence with the Uzbek government. In Central Asia, strength and forthrightness are respected – diplomatic politeness is viewed as weakness. But when the British government took fright at my criticisms of our ally, they signalled to the Uzbek authorities that I did not have my government’s support.12 My influence evaporated immediately. A repudiated Envoy is in a position of stinging personal humiliation. Burnes wrote to Auckland on 25 April 1838 informing that he was leaving Kabul straightaway, ‘The immediate cause of such a step being necessary, is the arrival of Sirdar Mehir Dil Khan […] and the demands in consequence made by him […] for a direct promise of protection from Persia, should Herat fall.’13

  On 15 April Burnes received a large delegation representing both the Kabul and Kandahar Barakzais, headed by Jabbar Khan and Mehir Dil Khan. They offered to break off relations with Persia and Russia and place both Kabul and Kandahar under British protection in return for two mildly worded demands:

  First, a direct promise of its good offices to establish peace at Peshawar; and second, a promise to protect them from Persia, in whatever way the British judged it best for their interests.

  Burnes had been warned so strongly to stick to his instructions, that even this offer, worded to be face-saving for the Afghans rather than binding on the British, had to be turned down flat. Witkiewicz was supported by a Cossack escort and staff from the Russian Legation in Teheran. It was the Legation’s Secretary, M. Goutt, who delivered to Dost the further promises – including financial and military support for the recovery of Peshawar – which had sealed the failure of Burnes’ mission.14