Young William James Thinking
Page 30
were impor tant to ensure the coherence of judgments, and philosophical
use of Reason was the way to “establish what is true.” The Stoics argued for
the existence of the divine because, if something exists that is more com-
plex than the capacity of the human mind, this must have emerged from
reasoning that surpasses the human. 55
Physics and logic were essential factors in the makeup of their ethics, the
third and most impor tant ele ment of their philosophy. This was especially
true of the Roman Stoics, and Marcus in par tic u lar emphasized personal
discipline and character development in his commitment to Stoicism. Their
ethics was built on the Stoic attention to Reason; this awesome immanent
force gives humans the ability to reflect about and analyze the world around
them and to make free choices. This capacity lifts humans above the tan-
gled and mysterious vicissitudes of life and into the distinctive realm gov-
erned by human volition. 56 The world’s destiny operates by chance forces
that are beyond human comprehension, only fully understandable from the
perspective of the All. That comprehensive perspective is ever out of reach
of human understanding or control, but our will is a precious island in the
All, the only spot removed from this sea of chance. James was drawn to
both the Stoic cosmic picture of Reason in the world and the commanding
role for the will in human life.
From this picture, the Stoics developed their central ethical dictum, a
fundamental distinction between what does and what does not depend on
human power. We cannot control the direction of the world and most of
what happens to us, but we can control our own wills. This fire within de-
fines the self, and with enough discipline, it is an almost impregnable for-
tress; it is also a gatekeeper since the will controls what enters the mind. The
Stoics had a very bald, uncomplicated view of this psychological pro cess:
they advocated adopting only adequate or objective mental repre sen ta tions,
ones that, from their perspective, correspond directly to real ity. Their point
was to emphasize peering directly at objects and events in the world by
The Ancient Art of Natu ral Grace 167
“penetrating into them and exposing their real nature,” as opposed to look-
ing at them with perceptions clouded by our hopes and personal values,
which inevitably bring false judgments. Taking a perception of something
as it is and stripping it of the “cloak of verbiage that dignifies it” will bring a
direct grasp of real ity; while this approach can seem naïve by comparison
with modern psychological views of under lying motivations and skepticism
about objectivity, it also has a robust experiential directness: put aside
wishful expectations that distract from the main course of events. They ex-
pressed these ideas with blunt bodily statements that would have appealed
to James’s eagerness to understand the role of physiology within psy chol-
ogy and spirituality; for example, Epictetus asserted that “you are nothing
but a little soul carry ing a cadaver. ”57 While physical facts set limits, the
Stoics pointed beyond material constraints to the personal will that orches-
trated the other wise powerless body.
With this standard for real ity in natu ral facts, and the advice to be con-
cerned only with what we can control, the Stoics proposed that it is not
things that trou ble us but only our judgments or repre sen ta tions of them—or,
really, our illusions: most people are weighed down by feelings of longing,
regret, or frustration, even though these are the very parts of the situation
that we can control. From this outlook flowed the well- known Stoic view
that we should be happy with the pres ent and not expend useless thoughts
on what is beyond our grasp, since such striving will simply result in fruit-
less worry and wasted effort. An upshot of this was that the Stoics advocated
finding contentment in life, no matter one’s material condition, even to the
point of physical suffering. If the condition was really beyond one’s control, it
should be treated with indifference; if not, Epictetus observed, “I make a
slave of myself” to the things out of reach. However, living life within the
limits of one’s own control, with full recognition of human finitude, could
give mere mortals the opportunity to live a godlike existence, with abso-
lute control over their own domains. This liberating tough- mindedness
also gave Stoicism a reputation for sternness; but despite the proverbial
“stoical” attitudes toward suffering, the phi los o phers themselves adopted
this posture not in resignation but with a drive to serve humanity. This
riveted attention to dignity within each person prompted the Stoics to pro-
duce some of the first philosophical commitments to universal re spect for
the human worth of all people no matter their condition; from Zeno’s ini-
tial impulses to find serenity in chaos, the Stoics strug gled against injus-
tices, which are, in effect, the world’s lack of serenity. 58
168 Young William James Thinking
For the Stoics, the point of doing philosophy was not to construct refined
arguments or even to have anything written down. Instead, philosophy was
a practical tool for guiding one’s life. As Martha Nussbaum has pointed out,
Stoicism was among the Hellenistic theories that had medical conceptions
of the philosophic vocation: argumentation would serve as therapy for iden-
tification of the diseases of belief and judgment that plague mankind and
would foster guidance through the thoughts and actions that will heal those
diseased perceptions; James read daily doses of Marcus Aurelius in just this
spirit, and while he was studying medicine no less. Cicero called Stoic phi-
losophy “a medical art for the soul,” and with this intellectual therapy, we are
“capable of doctoring ourselves.” Marcus had first become attracted to the
moral toughness and personal commitment of the Stoic outlook in his youth,
and he converted during his twenty- fifth year. He became especially devoted
to this guiding outlook during his reign as emperor, which began fifteen
years later in 161 ce; although he enjoyed the privileges of power, the weighty
responsibilities of his position also felt like a prison. The duties were par-
ticularly difficult because this was a time when Rome was enduring early
phases of severe challenge to its vast geographic reach. He wrote the Medi-
tations in Greek, in the tradition of hypomnēmata, or personal notes, in or-
der to keep his philosophical bearings during the turmoil of his reign; in
fact, he wrote the notes that make the book while on a military campaign in
170–180 ce in con temporary Serbia and Hungary—in other words, he wrote
for himself while far from home and under duress. He never intended pub-
lication, and he did not even include a title. Over the centuries, these notes
have been printed in many editions with many titles, each pointing to as-
pects of his purpose in writing: “On His Life,” “Moral Life,” “On the Duty of
Life,” “Notes Which He Wrote for Himself,”
“About Himself to Himself,”
“Paths toward Himself,” or simply “To Myself”; and a translation under its
more familiar title even became a bestseller in 2002. Marcus gave “proof of
his learning,” as ancient historian Herodian said in appreciation of Stoic
goals, by the “temperate way of life” that he presented with transparent
simplicity. The text provided James with a model for coping with his own
challenges.59
The lived philosophy and practical purposes of the Meditations explain
several striking features of the emperor’s reflective work, including its lack
of any special order, its continuous repetitions, and its frequent use of quo-
tations. These were part of Marcus’s deliberate efforts to control his inner
discourse for self- persuasion in order to fulfill the Stoic dictum to distinguish
The Ancient Art of Natu ral Grace 169
what he could influence from what he could not. These hastily composed
notes— and they almost certainly remained that way until after Marcus’s death,
when his supporters edited them for public distribution— bear some similar-
ity to James’s diary entries; both works were personal notes, unselfconscious,
unpolished, and not intended for publication, but they have flashes of deep
insight, and they were each the recordings of deeply reflective men trying
to muster and maintain a philosophy of life that would serve as a guide in
a sea of turmoil— albeit in very diff er ent settings. The timing of James’s
reading of the Meditations and the similarly reflective character of his di-
ary entries on the ancients suggest that he may have been influenced in
the composition of his notes by Marcus’s method itself. James even used
Marcus’s approach to philosophy as a kind of inner citadel for personal
striving: by 1870, when James was particularly discouraged about his pros-
pects, he wrote, “[I]n that inner solitary room of communion with his own
good will, there lies for every man comfort”— and there also lies the site for
“battling with misfortune. ”60 He certainly admired the ancient Roman, and
he would have known that, for a Stoic, writing directional thoughts to one-
self would be part and parcel of philosophy as a way of life, not just as ab-
stract theorizing. The Stoic willingness to regard the work of philosophy as
a means for treating unhealthy frames of mind served James as edifying
personal therapy, much like his use of alternative medical therapies.
James’s admiration for Stoic philosophy continued to appear in his pri-
vate and public writings. He sometimes referred to its ideas, especially about
the will’s inner citadel, without even mentioning Stoic names. For example,
shortly after arriving in Germany during the fall of 1867, he paused from his
study of psy chol ogy to read lit er a ture, which inspired a spirit of “compro-
mise with the nature of things.” When he was back home in 1869 studying
for his medical degree, he wrote to his friend Henry Bowditch with ex-
tended worries about the small amount of studying he was able to do. Then
he stopped himself short with the comment, “I’ve done what I can, and it[’]s
a mean thing for a man to fret, about what is accidentally & externally
imposed on him.” Whether or not James’s trou bles were fully imposed ex-
ternally, Epictetus or Marcus could not have better expressed the need to
resign oneself to things beyond one’s control. A few years later, after his
darkest discouragements, James even remembered the ancients at a light
moment, in admiration for the family dog for his “roman firmness and in de-
pen dence of his character.” Toward the end of his life, he gave Marcus’s
Meditations as a gift, declaring its Stoic outlooks “creditable to human nature”
170 Young William James Thinking
and full of “comfort in extreme old age. ”61 From daily life to the deepest of
reflections, James’s youthful inspirations from Stoicism would remain a
constant touchstone. This ancient philosophy, with worldly settings for im-
material forces, would supply him with encouragement for his own will to
believe before he would develop the theory: Stoicism brought the edifying
demand to stand with the power of his will even when burdened by impos-
ing constraints.
The Ancient Dispensation and Prospects
for Finite Absoluteness
As William James became established in his personal life and in his career,
he made fewer references to the ancients. In 1873 he applied his character-
istic ambivalence to his youthful fascination: “It’s the most idiotic thing in
the world to say on[e] thing about either antiquity or civilization.” And yet
his interest in the ancients persisted, dispersing into his later thoughts. By
the mid-1870s, he was already acting on many of the insights he had gleaned
from the ancients, and he was weighing the characteristics of both ancient
and modern times for construction of his own decisive integration of their
messages. Rather that choosing one correct outlook, he learned from each;
he found a deep paradoxical significance in diverse and even clashing views:
“[N]othing is true unless with the admission that its opposite is also true.”
The ancients would become major factors within his convictions about the
importance of mediating contrasts and avoiding generalized abstractions,
both as one perspective among others and for their tolerant messages them-
selves. Even at the peak of his youthful interest, he had not fully adopted
ancient views, and then as his interests dissipated, the attractions of his
youth remained a touchstone for much of his thinking. British phi los o pher
F. H. Bradley called the religious strands of James’s mature philosophy “good
Stoicism,” and James himself occasionally referred to his commitment to the
will as “my stoicism”; but he chaffed at the “hardness” of this ancient out-
look, “which sometimes oppresses me. ”62 Despite the appeal of Stoicism, he
searched for more.
James balanced his admiration for Stoic views of nature and the sturdi-
ness of the human will with critiques about why Stoicism did not endure
beyond ancient times, and even with some sharply worded denigration. In
his psychological texts of the 1890s, James identified the Stoic readiness to
“dispossess yourself . . . of all that was out of your own power” as a way to
illustrate the profile of rather “unsympathetic characters” who “retract . . .
The Ancient Art of Natu ral Grace 171
their Me,” a position that generates a “definiteness in the outline” of the self
as consolation “for the smallness of its content.” But he also acknowl-
edged that this resolve gave the Stoics heroic courage “without fear”
even to face one’s own death. In The Va ri e ties of Religious Experience (1902),
James gave psychological expression to the mainstream historical interpre-
tation that the ancient Greeks and Romans “knew no joys comparable in
quality of preciousness” with those of “twice- born people whose religion is
non- naturalistic,” born again to transcendent forces much loftier than
those of the h
ere and now. Citing religions with such “renunciation” of
merely earthly existence, he also went beyond the mainstream in referring
to these twice- born commitments held not only by Christians but also by
“Brahmans, Buddhists, . . . and Mohammedans.” By contrast, the “con-
sciousness [of the] Greek or Roman . . . even in Homeric times was full to
the brim” with “sad mortality” from being only once- born creatures of “this
sunlit world.” Despite all their august achievements, the ancients could of-
fer no hope for “another and a better world. ”63 Yet their focus on depths of
meaning in nature provided a resource for his program of future science, in
critique of scientific tendencies to reduce experience to material forces.
James’s attraction to the ancient views of nature provided ways to cope
with his simultaneous re spect for science and curiosity about the role of im-
material forces in life. He envied the ancients’ absence of longing, and he
relished the German romantic writer Friedrich Schiller’s characterization
of the naïve yet graceful posture of the ancients; but he was fully aware that
these perspectives had been eclipsed with the growing authority of modern
science and even since ancient times after religions of transcendence had
come to dominate. James admired mainstream religions not with full en-
dorsement but with respectful acknowl edgment of their deep human appeal.
In the 1870s, he called his posture an “attitude . . . of deference rather than of
adoption,” but from “sheer stress,” he himself was sometimes attracted to
such religious assurance, even if not as “an everyday comfort.” While the
great faiths generally offered absolute convictions with renunciation of na-
ture, James himself was more attracted to the attitude of the ancients, who
had a cosmopolitan tolerance of diff er ent beliefs and a spirituality of nature.
In 1869 his cousin and good friend Mary (or Minny) Temple said even
more sharply what James was already feeling: institutional religions clearly
appealed to many with “the ‘remote possibility’ of the best thing”— namely,
the glory of redemption into a transcendent afterlife. Temple, a self-
professed modern “pagan,” was willing to “put . . . up with the second- best,”
172 Young William James Thinking