The Old Contemptibles

by Robin Neillands

  All in all, though, 24 August, the first day of the retreat from Mons, had gone very well; von Kluck's attempt at envelopment had been defeated and the BEF had successfully disengaged. Smith-Dorrien's corps had beaten off all attacks, though at some cost; BEF losses for the day, mostly in II Corps, amounted to around 2,000 men, killed, wounded or missing. Most of these casualties were in the rifle battalions, which had now lost some 3,500 men in two days of action, but II Corps was still confident, rightly proud of what it had achieved - and full of fight. Haig's corps again saw very little fighting on 24 August, casualties not exceeding roo men; with total casualties of 4,000 men, the BEF was virtually undamaged. The main problem was weariness; the men had been without rest for three days and were very tired, in urgent need of rest, sleep and food. These casualty figures must also be placed in context; the bulk of them fell among the infantry battalions, the cavalry units and the artillery, the 'teeth' of the force. While the 'ration strength' of the BEF remained impressive, the losses among the fighting men were rising steadily and would shortly rise again.

  The condition of the troops was not helped by the weather, which was extremely hot, or by the hard cobbles of the French roads, which caused agony to feet blistered by stiff new boots. Food was running out and thirst a problem, but the men kept moving, their third day of long marches interspersed with plenty of action for II Corps and very little rest for anyone. Morale remained high; various accounts recall that at the end of the day, when they arrived at their billets around Bavai, the troops 'marched in singing'.

  If so, the singing was probably due as much to the need to stay awake and keep moving as high spirits. The troops were now so tired that they could hardly put one foot in front of the other and fell asleep in the road the second their column halted ... and this was only the first day of the long retreat to the Marne.

  This weariness may have accounted for some of the tales that sprang up about the 'Angels of Mons', the legend that during the retreat from Mons the ghostly figures of English archers, armed and clad as for Agincourt or Crecy, had appeared in the sky to support their descendants in this present struggle. An investigation in calmer times revealed that these alleged sightings were pure fiction, the invention of a journalist. Nevertheless, the story of the Angels of Mons and reports of sightings continued to flourish, although Private Frank Richards of the Royal Welch Fusiliers reports: 'We retired all night with fixed bayonets, many sleeping as they marched along. If any angels were seen on the retirement, as the newspaper accounts said they were, they were seen that night. March, march, for hour after hour without no halt; we were breaking into our fifth day of continuous marching with practically no sleep in between. Stevens said, "There's a fine castle there, see?" pointing to one side of the road. But there was nothing there. Very nearly everyone was seeing things, we were all so dead-beat.' (5)

  Field Marshal French spent most of 24 August at his advance HQ at Bavai, sending messages to Lanrezac and Joffre. He went to visit Haig, finding him marching south with his corps, and had a meeting with General Sordet, commanding the French Cavalry Corps, which, with d'Amande's Territorial divisions, was the only force covering the open country between the BEF and the Channel coast, a force that would shortly be joined by the garrison evacuated from Lille. French then went off to greet General T. d'O. Snow, GOC of the newly arrived 4th Division, elements of which were detraining and coming forward to link up with the retreating battalions of the BEF, where Snow's division would soon become part of Major-General W P. Pulteney's III Corps. At 1500 hours on 24 August French issued orders directing the retreat to continue on the line Le Cateau-Cambrai. (6)

  On this day the field marshal appeared to be in full command of the situation, issuing orders, liaising with his allies and visiting his troops. It is very noticeable, however, that he apparently made no attempt to contact Smith-Dorrien or visit II Corps. This is strange, for Smith-Dorrien was commanding the only corps to be heavily engaged with the enemy at Mons and during the first day of the retreat, and surely warranted closer attention. It is the practice in the British Army for a commander to go forward and visit his subordinates during difficult times, to assess the situation on the ground, receive reports and offer support and advice. French did not do this; instead Smith-Dorrien appeared at GHQ in the late afternoon of 24 August and asked the Field Marshal for instructions - specifically, should he hold his ground on the fol­ lowing day or continue the retirement?

  Perhaps this was the question that rekindled French's latent animosity towards Smith-Dorrien. On 24 August, for all his apparent sangfroid, French was a very worried man, fully aware of the peril of his position. It was apparent that four German corps were advancing on his force and that the Fifth Army was in full retreat, leaving a 16-kilometre (10-mile) gap on his right. French was rapidly becoming convinced that the campaign was a disaster and that, unless he was very lucky or very astute, the BEF was lost. And now here was Horace Smith-Dorrien, badgering him for a decision about II Corps.

  According to Smith-Dorrien, French told the II Corps commander that 'he could do as he liked' (7) If this is true- and since it has never been denied there is no reason to doubt it- French's attitude toward his subordinate and his overall command responsibilities can only be described as remarkable. French's memoirs, which give a detailed account of his actions on this day, make no reference to this meeting with Smith-Dorrien, who adds in his memoirs that French had mentioned that Haig intended to start retreating again with his corps at 0500 hours on the following day, 25 August.

  From 24 August until the opening salvoes of the Battle of the Marne two weeks later, French's main concern was to save the BEE This was understandable; the BEF was the only trained army Britain had and he had been instructed to take good care of it. The other element of his orders, to cooperate closely with the French, was subordinate to this prime requirement.

  Anxious to avoid yet another dawn struggle with the German Army, Smith-Dorrien told French that he intended to get his men on the move by midnight and be across the Valenciennes-Bavai road before daylight - a requirement that would deny his weary men yet another night's sleep. French had learned that all three French armies on his right - or eastern - flank were now retiring, so after a brief delay while Sordet's cavalry corps crossed their line of retreat, the BEF began to march south again early on 25 August, French shifting his headquarters from Le Cateau to St Quentin.

  Joffre had now realized that the Germans were using reserve corps alongside their active formations, so increasing the size of their armies in the field. 'This', said Joffre, 'explained how they were able to extend the length of their front.' With that realization came another one; the Germans were fully capable both of holding up the French advance in Lorraine and sweeping south to envelop Paris, cutting off any French armies that got left behind on the northern frontier. Plan XVII, which had always been based on a belief that the Germans could not be strong everywhere, had clearly collapsed. This being so, Joffre's main task now was to keep the French forces in being, shore up any breach and prevent his armies being surrounded and reduced. To achieve this aim there was no option, for the moment, but further retreat. Under German pressure the French armies north and east of Paris began to bend back like a bow, pivoting on Verdun.

  However, on 25 August Joffre issued his second General Order of the war. In this he proposed creating a new French army, the Sixth, formed from divisions taken from the still-intact front in Lorraine where Crown Prince Rupprecht's Army Group were making no progress against the stubborn resistance put up by the armies of de Castelnau and Dubail. The Sixth Army, when formed, would take up a position on the extreme left flank of the French line, beyond the BEF, which would therefore be sandwiched between the Sixth and Fifth French Armies.

  This move served three purposes. First, it recognized, at last, that the main German thrust was from the north, an attempt to get round the French western flank and encircle the armies defend­ ing Paris. Second, it created a force of three French
armies - the Sixth, the Fifth and General de Langle's Fourth, which, together with the BEF, should be able to stem this German advance and then launch a counter-attack. Finally, it placed a force on the French left wing to which Joffre could give direct orders, knowing they would be obeyed. Negotiating with his British allies over what they would or would not do was not an option at this critic­ al time. Joffre anticipated that the Sixth Army would be formed, in position on the left wing and ready to fight by 2 September.

  With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to see that the French situation was not as grave as it then appeared. The Third and Fourth Armies in the Ardennes had not yet been seriously engaged and the Second and First Armies in Lorraine, albeit shedding men in great numbers, were still in being and holding up the German attack. On the northern front the Fifth Army and the BEF had not been enveloped and destroyed. Although off balance and in full retreat, nowhere had the French armies been defeated; they were still in line, still fighting hard and taking a toll of their enemies. The main danger lay in the situation now developing in the north, where a wide turning movement by three German armies, advancing on a front 120 kilometres (75 miles) wide, was threatening to destroy the BEF and the French Fifth Army. Both now had to pull back out of the trap as quickly as possible while maintaining a united front against the foe.

  It is important to understand that the French were still full of fight, if only to put the BEF's part in this campaign in context. While the BEF were in battle with von Kluck at Mons on 23 August, Lanrezac's army had been hotly engaged by von Bulow's Second Army at Charleroi, where the Germans had attempted to send three corps across the Sambre. The town of Charleroi straddles both banks of the river, and the Second Army forced the French III Corps back into the town and began to fight its way towards the river, street by street, house by house. Losses on both sides mounted quickly, the German formations decimated by the quick-firing 75s, the French defences and much of the town shattered by the plunging, high-explosive fire of German artillery. By the evening of 22 August the corps of the Fifth Army had suffered severely, with a particularly heavy toll among the officers. (8)

  The fighting at Charleroi continued unabated during 23 August­ on a far larger scale than that currently raging at Mons - and by the evening von Hausen's troops had established a bridgehead over the Sambre south of Dinant and Lanrezac's III Corps was forced out of Charleroi. Then came even worse news; the French Fourth Army, on Lanrezac's right flank, was being forced back from the Ardennes. To save his army from encirclement, Lanrezac decided to retreat - and made this decision without consulting Joffre or advising Field Marshal French; the retreat from Charleroi and the Sambre began on 24 August, even as the British pulled back from Mons.

  On 25 August, marching south from Bavai, the BEF encountered another problem. Across its path lay a thick wood, the Foret de Mormal, 22,400 acres in extent with good roads across from east to west, and roads on either side, but no roads directly through it from north to south. It was clearly desirable to keep the BEF together, but one road could not support four divisions; the only solution was for the corps to divide, I Corps passing to the east of the forest, Smith-Dorrien's corps to the west.

  Having passed the forest, the two corps were supposed to swing inward and join together again, but this did not happen. A gap of some miles opened up between Smith-Dorrien's troops and Douglas Haig's command which was not to be closed for another six days. Smith-Dorrien records that, as the march began, 'Communication with I Corps was a matter of supreme difficulty ...I heard nothing from I Corps throughout the day ... and no information was sent to me by GHQ concerning it. I imagined we would meet up at Le Cateau in the evening, according to orders.' (9)

  During the day Haig's formations became seriously entangled with elements of Lanrezac's Fifth Army retreating from Charleroi, with the French 53rd Division and Major-General S. H. Lomax's 1st Division of bone-weary men competing for the same road - which was also clogged with thousands of refugees. After another hard day's march and some mild skirmishing with the enemy, by 1800 hours I Corps were moving into billets at Landrecies and Maroilles, two villages on the south-east corner of the Foret de Mormal. This last village was the forward supply base for two French divisions, the 53rd and 69th, a fact which caused still more confusion and congestion as French supply wagons clogged the roads. So far Haig's Corps had seen little of the enemy and lost very few men, but constant marching and lack of sleep were taking a heavy toll of officers and men.

  II Corps, with the 19th Infantry Brigade and Allenby's cavalry division attached and moving west of the Foret de Mormal, had a much more difficult time. Delayed at the start by the passage of Sordet's Cavalry Corps across their rear, they were then continually engaged by elements of the German First Army, still attempting to either cut off II Corps or drive the entire BEF into Maubeuge. Smith-Dorrien and Allen by were able to beat off these German thrusts but the need to deploy and take up defensive positions time and time again meant that II Corps and its supporting elements became strung out over many miles of road.

  'It will be difficult to realise the fog of war which surrounded us that night,' writes Smith-Dorrien. ‘Communication was most difficult and although the Corps signallers performed miracles with their wires and cable it was impossible to find out the position of units until hours after they had reached them. It was not only as if I had II Corps to deal with, for mixed up with them was the Cavalry Division, the 19th Infantry Brigade and the 4th Division, none of which were under me but were reporting their movements and getting their orders from GHQ, twenty-six miles to the rear. It is true that GHQ issued an order at 1pm [1300 hours] 25 August, placing the 19th Brigade under II Corps, but it was then with the Cavalry Division and heaven knows when it got the order ... I only succeeded in collecting them next morning when they were start­ ing south from Le Cateau.’ (10)

  These skirmishes on 25 August were small affairs in comparison with the actions of the two previous days but they still cost II Corps another 450 men, mostly from the 3rd Division, and tired the men still more. The men perked up when they went into action, but when the firing died down and the march resumed their weariness returned, each time worse than before. By the evening of 25 August II Corps was scattered, somewhat disorganized and, to complete their general misery, just before dark a heavy thunderstorm drenched the marching troops, who arrived at Le Cateau both wet and weary.

  Over to the east, German patrols began probing I Corps positions at dusk, appearing first at Maroilles, where a skirmish with the 1st Royal Berkshires of the 6th Brigade in the 2nd Division cost the latter some 60 casualties while defending the bridge over the Sambre. After dark there was another flurry of activity when the 4th (Guards) Brigade in Landrecies fought a brief engagement with an uhlan patrol on the outskirts of the town. Haig was with this brigade during the fight and afterwards he made his way to GHQ, arriving there some time after midnight on the night of 25/26 August to tell French that the situation at Landrecies was 'very critical'. He therefore requested that II Corps, then trailing into Le Cateau, eight miles south-west of Landrecies, should be ordered at once to the Guards Brigade's assistance.

  There was no need for such action. The action at Landrecies was a minor affair, between the 3rd Coldstream Guards and infantry from the German III Corps. Skirmishing began at dusk and apparently went on until 0400 hours on the following morning, but the casualty figures - 120 from the Coldstream Guards and 125 Germans, killed, wounded or missing - confirm that the engagement at Landrecies was no real cause for alarm.

  Haig thought otherwise. He was quite convinced his Corps had been attacked in strength and at 0350 hours on the morning of 25 August he sent an urgent message to GHQ, demanding assistance from II Corps. Field Marshal French went farther. At 0500 hours the field marshal sent Colonel Huguet, the French liaison officer at GHQ, hurrying to Lanrezac's HQ with the message that 'I Corps has been violently attacked in its billets between Le Cateau and Landrecies and is falling back - if it can -
on Guise to the south; if not, south-east in the direction of La Capelle. Tomorrow the BEF will continue its retreat towards Peronne. Can Fifth Army come to FM French's aid by sheltering I Corps until it can rejoin the main body of the British forces?' (11)

  In his memoirs French goes even farther, claiming in a letter to Kitchener sent on 27 August that the Cold stream Guards had been attacked by at least a German Brigade, that 'a frightful panic ensued and in a very few minutes no less than 800 or 900 dead and wounded Germans were lying in the streets'.

  None of this was necessary and not all of it was true. I Corps had not been seriously attacked and was not falling back on Guise, and there was very little panic outside Corps HQ. Haig was not well at this time and it may be that the sudden outburst of night firing brought this normally phlegmatic Scots officer close to panic. According to his Intelligence Officer, Brigadier General John Charteris, 'D. H. ordered the whole town into a state of defence, wanted barricades erected across the streets with furniture or anything handy and ordered all official papers burned, saying, "If we are caught, by God, we will sell our lives dearly.'" (12) The action at Landrecies was brisk enough but a.minor skirmish compared with the heavy fighting on the II Corps front in previous days. However, since there was no way of quickly finding out what had actually happened, fears escalated, not least at Fifth Army HQ, where French's message spurred Lanrezac into offering assistance. It also created the impression that Haig's Corps had been broken and was in full retreat towards the safety of the French lines, while a German host poured into the gap so created. This impression was no less alarming for being totally untrue, and fears that the entire BEF was collapsing were spread to Joffre at GQG by Colonel Huguet. In fact, by dawn on 26 August, the Germans had been driven out of Landrecies and I Corps resumed its retreat unhindered.