The Old Contemptibles

by Robin Neillands

Meanwhile the 4th Division, commanded by Major-General T. d'O. Snow, the first element of what would become III Corps, was taking position on the left of II Corps, on a line between the villages of Fontaine au Pire and Wambaix. The first battalion to come up, the 2nd Inniskilling Fusiliers, marched into Bevillers, where they immediately encountered a troop of German cavalry followed by six lorries full of German infantry- a rare example of the Germans using motor transport at this time. The Inniskillings promptly opened fire and the enemy quickly retreated.

  When dawn arrived on 26 August it was clear that there was no major danger at Landrecies but the I Corps retreat continued. The only effect of this alarm was to deprive the soldiers of yet another night's sleep, but as Haig's soldiers marched south they heard the sound of artillery and rifle fire coming from the direction of Le Cateau, where II Corps, the 4th Division and Allenby's cavalry were now heavily engaged.

  To pick up the developments that led to the II Corps battle at Le Cateau it is necessary to go back to the evening of 25 August. When Smith-Dorrien's staff reached Le Cateau at around 1730 hours they were aware that Haig's corps was some thirteen kilo­ metres (eight miles) away to the north-east and moving into billets. II Corps were less fortunate; Smith-Dorrien's units had become dispersed during the day and units of the 3rd Division were still trailing into Le Cateau at midnight or later, many of the battalions in some disorder, all the men weary beyond description. Other units were equally tired; the cavalry were exhausted, horse and man, and the men of the 19th Infantry Brigade, who had been marching with Allenby's cavalry, were quite worn out. With the exception of Snow's battalions, the BEF had now been marching or fighting or digging trenches for three days and nights with very little sleep and not much in the way of food.

  There was, however, nothing wrong with their morale. No soldier enjoys retreating, but these were professional fighting men who had quickly realized the gravity of the situation confronting the BEF and their French allies; in the circumstances a retreat was sensible and they did not let it depress them. They also knew that they could give the enemy a bloody nose whenever the opportunity arose, and even if they had ceased to cheer or shout 'Are we downhearted? No!' their spirits were high; all they needed to restore them to full fighting trim was a good night's sleep and a hot meal.

  Smith-Dorrien established his HQ in Bertry, a village five kilometres (three miles) south-west of Le Cateau, where he received a message from Henry Wilson, telling him that orders would shortly be issued for a continuation of the retreat. This order duly arrived at 2215 hours, when the situation of II Corps was as described above; the units were scattered, some battalions were just coming in and the location of many others was still unknown. Smith-Dorrien therefore had a problem; how could he distribute this order to his widely dispersed and weary forces when their location was often unknown ...and were the units he could locate in any state to continue marching?

  Units continued to trickle in all night, their commanding officers reporting to Smith-Dorrien's HQ. None of these officers was eager to carry on retreating and all confirmed that their men were exhausted and some companies or battalions incomplete. At 0200 hours General Allenby arrived to tell the II Corps commander that his cavalry brigades were widely scattered and his men and horses were also 'pretty well played out'. This being so, said Allen by, with only the 4th Cavalry Brigade intact, he would not be able to occupy the high ground at Viesly overlooking Solesmes and the proposed II Corps line of retreat the next day. He therefore urged Smith-Dorrien to get away in the dark, for strong German forces would certainly attack Le Cateau at daylight.

  Smith-Dorrien then consulted his two divisional commanders, Hamilton and Fergusson. Both confirmed Allenby's views but added that their men were tired out and their battalions were still coming in. The general conclusion was that II Corps could not move as a body before 0900 hours next morning- and that was the optimistic prediction. (13)

  Smith-Dorrien wisely took a little time to make a full assessment of the situation and consider the difficulties and alternatives. His corps was in grave danger, tired, hungry, dispersed and short of support. If he continued the march the men would grow even more exhausted, many units would never catch up, and it seemed highly probable that from the high ground around Solesmes the enemy would be able to bar the retreat and catch the scattered BEF units on the move; it might be better to stay put and muster his forces against the enemy.

  On the other hand, he had been ordered to continue the retreat. If he did not do so and II Corps were caught by the enemy and destroyed, the BEF would lose a large part of its strength- and the full weight of Field Marshal French's wrath would surely fall upon him. So, what to do? The loneliness of command can rarely have been more apparent, but Smith-Dorrien did not flinch from the only possible decision; his units could no longer retreat, therefore they must stand and fight.

  Before announcing this decision Smith-Dorrien asked Allenby whether he would act under his command should he make a stand at Le Cateau. 'Allenby replied in the affirmative,' says Smith­ Dorrien, 'and I remarked, "Very well, gentlemen, we will stand and fight and I will ask General Snow to act under me as well."' (14) General Snow also agreed to put the 4th Division under Smith­Dorrien's command, and with that much decided the troops began to prepare for battle, their weariness falling away at the prospect of action. If less tired than the other units, Snow's force was not without problems; his division was still without its cav­ alry, heavy artillery, ambulances and engineers -and its ammunition train. With luck, this would not matter; Smith-Dorrien was not planning a long engagement. He intended to strike the enemy hard - dealing them 'a stopping blow' in military parlance - and slip away before they could recover. He sent a note of this decision by staff car to GHQ at St Quentin, explaining the circumstances that required his forces to stand and fight rather than continue the retreat.

  Field Marshal French's reply came back at around 0500 hours: 'If you can hold your ground the situation appears likely to improve. 4th Division must co-operate. French troops are taking the offensive on right of I Corps. Although you are given a free hand as to method, this telegram is not intended to convey the impression that I am not anxious for you to carry out the retirement and you must make every effort to do so.'

  This somewhat equivocal communication cheered Smith-Dorrien up considerably. It appeared that the Field Marshal understood his reasons for making a stand and fully approved of this decision. Smith-Dorrien's intention, as he told Henry Wilson later that day, was to 'give the enemy a smashing blow and slip away before he could recover', and he felt he had a good chance of doing that. Wilson's reply was fully in support of this intention: 'Good luck to you ... yours is the first cheerful voice I have heard in three days.' (15) As at Mons, the fight at Le Cateau did not last long or make any great demands on the generals; Le Cateau was a soldier's battle. It required the British soldier to do what he does best, occupy a position and defy eviction, taking a toll on the attacking enemy, forcing them to halt and deploy. Once the enemy had been halted, and hopefully somewhat damaged, Smith-Dorrien would break off the action and get his men away before the enemy counter­attacked. This was his sole intention at Le Cateau and he succeeded brilliantly.

  The British position at Le Cateau was not unlike that taken up at Mons, a long front facing north with a bend at the small town, which had a population of around 10,000 people in 1914 and stands at the junction of the east-west road to Cambrai and the north-south valley of the River Selle, and a shorter front facing west along the river valley. The 3rd Division faced north along the Le Cateau-Cambrai road while the 5th Division occupied the town and held the high ground along the Selle, their front extended by Snow's brigades. Sordet's French cavalry kept the open, western flank covered and beyond that a French Territorial division under General d'Amande held the town of Cambrai. Allen by's dismounted cavalry brigades were in support, taking up positions to the rear of the infantry or on the flanks. The eastern flank was wide open, for Haig's corps was no
w too far away to give any assistance and was given no orders to halt or turn back. Smith­ Dorrien's men therefore held a thin, curving line, some 16 kilometres (10 miles) in length, facing north or along the Selle, and they cannot have expected to hold it for long.

  Von Kluck attacked the British employing much the same tactics he had employed at Mons. The greatest German asset was a superiority in numbers and plenty of artillery, but instead of pounding the British positions with his guns, to which the BEF had no viable response, and then sending in a single, massive infantry attack, von Kluck sent in four army corps, the IV, IV Reserve, Cavalry Corps and III Corps, in separate attacks against the British line, while his II Corps engaged General d'Amande at Cambrai.

  The Official History (16) reminds the reader that 26 August was the anniversary of the Battle of Crécy in 1346, another occasion when a British- actually an Anglo-Welsh- army stood its ground in France against a superior force. The 7th Division of the German IV Corps attacked Le Cateau and quickly forced the defending soldiers, from the st East Surreys and the rst Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry (1st DCLI), out of the town on to the higher ground to the south. There, backed up by dismounted troopers from the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, the rapid rifle fire of the British infantry stemmed any German progress up the slopes.

  The morning of 26 August was misty, promising another hot day, and under cover of a thin fog the Germans managed to infiltrate through the 5th Division positions and proceed down the valley of the River Selle. As more and more German units came up and were engaged by the British field and horse artillery and infantry, the fighting gradually spread west, as the Germans attempted to find a way round the British line. German artillery fire had been the main problem for the British since Mons, and heavy shellfire took a steady toll of the exposed artillery batteries and the soldiers of the 2nd Suffolks and the 2nd King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (2nd KOYLI).

  The main thrust of the German attack on the right flank was made against the infantry battalions in Le Cateau and along the Selle. These units broke up attack after attack with their rapid and accurate rifle fire, with the guns of the 11th Battery, RFA, in support of the Suffolks frequently engaging the enemy over open sights. The gunners stood to their guns throughout the morning, their ranks gradually thinned by rifle and artillery fire. By mid­ morning, when a heavy concentration of German troops came forward west of Le Cateau, all the artillery officers had been killed or wounded and the 11th Battery had been reduced to one gun­ that gun, however, remained in action.

  This repulse of the German infantry was a considerable feat of arms, particularly when it is remembered that the troops involved were hungry and tired and many battalions were much reduced in numbers. The infantry brigades on the right flank held off the German attack for six full hours and the troops in the centre- the 13th Brigade of the 5th Division and the 3rd Division- held up any advance there until well into the afternoon.

  On the left flank, however, the Germans enjoyed greater success. Here they were moving against the units of Snow's 4th Division. This attack began at 0600 hours when the 1st King's Own of the 12th Brigade were hit by machine-gun fire while still in column-of-route and lost around 400 men before they could scatter; the survivors quickly remustered and fought on for the rest of the day. Other units of this brigade, the 1st Hampshires, the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers and the 2nd Inniskilling Fusiliers, then came up to join the fight.

  Snow's battalions displayed great tenacity in holding their ground at Le Cateau under heavy artillery fire and frequent infantry attacks. They endured the artillery fire in the open, having had no time to dig trenches, but they repulsed the German infantry and dismounted cavalry with rifle and machine-gun fire, taking a heavy toll on their attackers. By mid-morning, in spite of their advantage in numbers and artillery, the German attacks had come to a virtual standstill while the enemy regrouped and rethought his tactics.

  When recalling the weariness of the BEF, it has to be remembered that the German infantry had also been marching and fighting since they crossed the German frontier. They were equally weary, none more so than the troops of von Kluck's First Army, which had marched the greatest distance and been in action for the last three days. One of the fundamental flaws in the Schlieffen Plan was now about to become evident; the plan had always relied heavily on the marching ability and physical fitness of the German infantry soldiers, and those soldiers were now tired out.

  Von Kluck's aim was now to envelop the British line, and shortly after noon it gradually became apparent that on the right flank this tactic was starting to work. Fergusson's 5th Division was being gradually outflanked, and by early afternoon Fergusson found it advisable to start withdrawing some of his units.

  The weak point in the British line at Le Cateau was the right flank, left uncovered by the retreat of Haig's corps, now withdrawing to the south. Field Marshal French seems to have taken no interest in the events at Le Cateau on 26 August; one might wonder why, instead of harassing Smith-Dorrien to break off the action and continue the retreat, he did not order Haig to stop his withdrawal and either support II Corps or create some diversion to relieve the pressure on those BEF units fighting at Le Cateau. John Terraine records a comment made by Henry Wilson to Smith-Dorrien after the latter had requested help from I Corps: 'Troops fighting Haig cannot fight you', (17) a remark which ignores the fact that very few Germans were actually fighting Haig on 26 August 1914.

  Eventually, around midday, the relentless German pressure on the II Corps position began to tell. Though the Germans were suffering losses and being held along the line, fresh units were coming up and extending the line of their attack in a bid to envelop the entire II Corps position. It was clearly time to go, and Smith­Dorrien therefore ordered a general withdrawal, commencing on the right flank.

  The first problem was to extract the guns, many of which were now well forward, deployed in close support among the infantry positions. Here the soldiers of the 5th Division artillery showed the infantry what gunners could do, the gun teams of the 11th Battery galloping their horses up to the guns, hooking up guns and limbers and galloping away, all under heavy fire from the Germans; one team was shot down but the other five guns were retrieved, the gunners cheered by the infantry as they hurtled back to shelter over the rough ground.

  The Official History records the extraction of the 122 Battery, RFA, supporting the 5th Division:

  The teams . . . galloped through the lines of the West Kents, who stood up and cheered loudly as they dashed between the trenches and down the slope towards the guns. As they came in view of the enemy they were struck by a hurricane of shrapnel and bullets from machine-guns on the Cambrai road, but still they went on. One officer was killed, one team shot down in a heap before the guns were reached but two guns were carried out without mishap. A third gun was limbered up but the horses instantly went down. It was an extraordinary sight; a short, wild scene of galloping and falling horses, and then four guns standing derelict, one on the skyline, its pole vertical and dead men and dead horses everywhere. (18)

  That horses are no longer employed on the battlefield is one of the few benefits of early-twenty-first-century warfare. Horses were essential to the armies until well into the Second World War, and the suffering of these willing and gallant animals throughout the First World War was terrible- and heartbreaking.

  Further attempts to bring out the guns of the 123 and 124 Batteries, RFA were abandoned; twenty-five field guns and a howitzer were left on the field after their gun-sights had been smashed and their breech blocks removed. Considering that the guns were virtually in the front line it is astonishing that any at all were extracted. To quote the Official History again: 'the feat redounds to the eternal honour of the officers and men of the 5th Division Artillery'. Three of these gunners, Captain Reynolds and Drivers Drain and Luke of the 37th Battery, RFA, received the Victoria Cross for extracting the guns at Le Cateau.

  The removal of the guns alerted everyone - including the enemy - to th
e fact that II Corps was about to pull out. Steadily, battalion by battalion and company by company, in perfect order, the infantry now began to fall back, in section parties and platoons, moving from one patch of cover to another, turning back at intervals to engage the enemy with rapid bursts of rifle fire, one company or platoon engaging the enemy while their comrades retired, entire battalions leapfrogging to the rear, held together by discipline and regimental élan. With the guns back and in position to cover a withdrawal, the infantry began to push its way past the advancing patrols of the German III Corps, which was moving in to cut off the II Corps line of retreat down the Selle valley.

  The Germans had meanwhile assembled in strength along the Cambrai road and were making a heavy attack on two battalions of the rearguard, the 2nd Suffolks and the 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders. After a final vicious fight these units were finally overwhelmed at around 1500 hours, having stood off the enemy for nine full hours. The 3rd Division in the centre got away smoothly, though a battalion in the 8th Brigade, the 1st Gordon Highlanders, did not receive the order to retire and the soldiers fought on until they were overrun. The end of this fierce action at Le Cateau came at about 1800 hours when the sth Division broke off contact with the enemy.

  In general, the disengagement at Le Cateau went well and this efficient action did wonders for morale. Later that day Smith­Dorrien saw the men of his corps streaming down the road past his position and described the sight as 'like a crowd coming away from a race meeting, the men smoking their pipes and chatting over the events of the day, apparently completely unconcerned'. The Germans made no attempt at pursuit and, as II Corps withdrew into the gathering dusk, German shells were still falling on their abandoned positions.

  That said, casualties at Le Cateau had been severe. According to the Official History, (19) they amounted to 7,812 men, killed, wounded or missing, and the Official History attributes some of this loss to the fact that the 4th Division had no ambulances in which to remove its wounded, many of whom therefore became prisoners. German losses cannot be computed as the German accounts include Le Cateau as part of the wider engagements that day around St Quentin; it seems certain that by pressing on with their tactic of massed infantry attacks they incurred far higher losses than the British.