The Old Contemptibles

by Robin Neillands

  Le Cateau was a neat little battle, planned in haste but professional in execution. The credit for the success of this engagement goes to General Smith-Dorrien, the troops of II Corps and of the two divisions, the 4th and the Cavalry Division, who gave them such unstinting support. Smith-Dorrien also records his debt to Sordet's French cavalry and d'Amande's men at Cambrai, who held up the German advance on the left flank throughout the day and used their 75mm guns to great effect against the German infantry.

  In the words of the Official History, 'With both flanks more or less in the air II Corps had turned on an enemy of at least twice their strength; struck him hard and withdrawn - except on the right flank of 5th Division- practically without interference.' (20) Not without loss, alas, but the enemy had been stopped, and for some days the BEF retreat continued unimpeded. When the fight at Le Cateau was over, with his men marching south again, Smith-Dorrien was naturally elated.

  This elation did not last. On the evening of 26 August Smith­Dorrien went back to report the day's events to French at St Quentin and found that GHQ had shifted back to Noyon, 20 miles farther south. Smith-Dorrien arrived at GHQ at 0100 hours on the morning of 27 August- his fourth night without sleep- and found everyone in bed, slumbering peacefully and less than pleased at being aroused. Field Marshal French eventually appeared, in no very good humour, and when Smith-Dorrien reported on the success of the day rebuked him in front of the staff for being 'too cheerful'. It is hard to see why the good news was unwelcome; earlier that evening the general view at GHQ was that II Corps was lost and Colonel Huguet - no Anglophile at the best of times - had reported to Joffre that 'the English Army appears to have lost cohesion' and the battle at Le Cateau was a great defeat.

  To be fair, Field Marshal French had just had a very bad day. Apart from his worries over II Corps - worries that did not seem to involve taking any interest in its affairs - he had been summoned to a meeting with Joffre and Lanrezac in which Joffre explained the thinking behind General Order No. 2, his plan for a counter-attack, and expressed the hope that the BEF would conform to it. French retorted that he had not yet seen General Order No.2 and was less than happy with his treatment by the French so far; Lanrezac had retreated, exposing his right flank, his troops were exhausted, he was opposed by superior numbers and half his force was in danger of envelopment at Le Cateau even as they sat here, discussing an Order he had never received.

  It then transpired that Henry Wilson, the Sub-Chief of Staff, had the order and had had it for some time. General Order No.2 had arrived the previous evening but, said Wilson, it had not yet been translated into English- though why Wilson had not simply read the order to the Field Marshal is not immediately apparent. This failure to pass on at least an outline of the order to his commander rather negated the purpose of the meeting, which petered out after a couple of hours without any BEF commitment to conform with the French plan - and leaving Joffre in some doubt about the reliability of his British allies. Joffre went back to Chantilly to brood about the English and French went back to Noyon for his later confrontation with Smith-Dorrien.

  When the battle is over, the controversy begins. In the case of Le Cateau, the argument began some time later and can be traced to French's virulent animosity towards Smith-Dorrien. In his September dispatch, covering the events of the retreat from Mons, French gave full credit for the engagement at Le Cateau to Horace Smith-Dorrien, but in his memoir, 1914, published in 1919, French withdrew his praise of Smith-Dorrien and set in train an argument that was to rock the British Army. 'In my despatch of September 1914,' he wrote, 'I refer eulogistically to the battle at Le Cateau ... It [the dispatch],was completed, of necessity, very hurriedly, and before there had been time to study the reports immediately preceding and covering the period of that battle, by which alone the full details could be disclosed ... I accepted without question the estimate made by the commander of II Corps as to the nature of the threat against him and the position of the German forces opposed to him ...' (21) French withdraws.the favourable comments in his dispatch entirely. The broad thrust of his later argument is that Smith-Dorrien had not deserved so much praise and needed cutting down to size. French's explanation for doing this does not bear close inspection, for his dispatch was not written hurriedly or amended in haste. Twelve days passed between the fight at Le Cateau and the issuing of the dispatch ... and five full years and an entire war had passed before French saw fit to refute much of what the dispatch contained.

  By then everyone knew that Smith-Dorrien was perfectly correct in disobeying the order to retreat, indeed had a duty to do so. Actions of this kind are covered by Army Field Service Regulations. (22) 'If a subordinate, in the absence of a superior, neglects to depart from the letter of his order, when such departure is demanded by the circumstances and failure ensues, he will be held responsible for such failure.'

  By any standards of accuracy or veracity 1914 is a most distressing work. It might well be ignored as a historical source or treated by historians with the contempt it truly deserves but for the insights it offers into the character of Field Marshal Sir John French, commander-in-chief of the BEF at a critical time in its history. The overall impression is that French was in a state of chronic paranoia over Horace Smith-Dorrien. His book gradually becomes a diatribe against his former subordinate and, as is so often the case, does far more damage to the reputation of the attacker than to that of the man attacked with its mixture of innuendo, distortion and downright lies.

  For example, on page 80 of 1914 French writes: 'In more than one of the accounts of the retreat from Mons, it is alleged that some tacit consent at least was given at Headquarters at St Quentin to the decision arrived at by the commander of II Corps. I owe it to the able and devoted officers of my staff to say that there is not a semblance of truth in that statement.'

  This is simply not true. French's message to Smith-Dorrien on 26 August - cited above - clearly gives tacit support to Smith­Dorrien's decision to stand at Le Cateau, even to the point of saying that the 4th Division must back him up. French then states: 'It was not until 8 am on the 26th that I knew that the left wing of the Army was actually committed to the fight ... staff officers were sent to General Smith-Dorrien carrying peremptory orders to break off the action and continue the retreat forthwith.' (23) This is another lie. The reply sent from GHQ to Smith-Dorrien, giving tacit consent to his stand- the reply later refuted by French in his book- was timed at 0500 hours on arrival at Smith-Dorrien's HQ, three hours before French claims to have heard that Smith­Dorrien's corps was in action at all.

  On page 84 of 1914 French refers to 'the shattered condition of the troops which had fought at Le Cateau', overlooking the fact that these same troops, though undoubtedly weary, marched more than 30 miles on the two days after the battle and had reformed by the end of the second day. French contradicts himself on this point in his memoirs, for on page 89 of 1914 he records standing beside the road at Ham on 28 August, two days after the fight at Le Cateau, and watching the troops march by 'whistling and singing', adding that 'Their one repeated question was "When shall we turn round and face them again?'" and that they would add, "'We can drive them to hell."' These hardly sound like the comments of men in a 'shattered condition'.

  French seems to have understood very little of what was going on in France at this time, but he knew how to bear a grudge. The Field Marshal kept his resentment simmering as the soldiers of the BEF trudged south from Le Cateau, the Germans snapping closely at their heels.

  The Retreat to the Marne 27 AUGUST-5 SEPTEMBER 1914

  I would never have believed that men could be so tired and so hungry and yet live.

  British Official History, 1914, Vol. I. p. 260

  The action at Le Cateau, brief as it was, proved very useful to Field Marshal French's weary little force. It was a full day before von Kluck could remuster his forces and renew the pursuit, and Smith­Dorrien records that his Corps was not seriously troubled, 'except by mounted troops and detach
ments which kept a safe distance,' (1) for the next week. Le Cateau was certainly not a major battle but it was the perfect example of a 'stopping blow', which is all that Smith-Dorrien intended.

  This being so, 27 August, the day after that engagement, would be a good time to assess the BEF, after two small battles and at the start of a long retreat. Losses so far had not been severe; at Mons the BEF had lost 1,638 men, all but fifty from II Corps. (2) At Le Cateau II Corps lost 7,812 men, killed, wounded or missing, and thirty-eight guns. I Corps had lost very few men and the cavalry division even fewer, so total losses so far barely exceeded 14,000 men. (3) The problem was that these losses had fallen almost exclusively among the rifle battalions and artillery batteries, some of which had been virtually destroyed- all this in just four days. That enemy losses had been far higher is not relevant at this time; the enemy had more men to lose.

  Even so, and as already described, losses in action were not the biggest problem confronting the BEF as it marched south from Le Cateau. The real problem was that the men were exhausted, the weather continued hot, the cobbled roads of France were purgatory to sore and blistered feet, and long marches, scanty food, a shortage of water and very little sleep were taking their inevitable toll. Many of the men were so tired they went to sleep on the march; whole battalions went to sleep whenever they stopped beside the road and had to be dragged to their feet or kicked awake by their officers and NCOs. In the main, though, discipline, unit pride, the support of their comrades and bursts of activity against the enemy kept the men on their feet. They did not enjoy retreating but orders were orders and the retreat continued.

  Haig's I Corps had not been significantly engaged while II Corps made its stand at Le Cateau, but from 26 August on I Corps losses would start to mount- on 26 August Haig lost 405 men, on 27 August 874.4 After the night skirmish at Landrecies, Haig had continued to withdraw towards the south, while keeping in loose contact with the Fifth Army on his right. On the night of 26 August, I Corps was in billets in and around the village of Etreux; the only significant event during the day was the loss of some 300 officers and men of the Connaught Rangers in a series of skirmishes with the enemy at Marbaix and Le Grand Fayt. By nightfall on 26. August, I and II Corps were 30 kilometres (18 miles) apart and Haig was entertaining justified fears that the enemy would soon be thrusting forces into this gap. It therefore seemed advisable to withdraw without delay; at 0100 hours on 27 August Lanrezac's HQ agreed that Haig's corps could use the only road south through Guise and I Corps marched on again at 0400 hours.

  This was another day of hard marches and intermittent skirmishes, the largest involving the 2nd Royal Munster Fusiliers, now commanded by Major P. A. Charrier. This battalion formed part of Brigadier General Ivor Maxse's 1st Guards Brigade, the designated rearguard, and fought off the enemy for most of the morning until ordered to break off any contact with the enemy and withdraw. This proved difficult; the order went out at 1300 hours but failed to reach the Munsters, who continued to fight on while moving back towards Etreux, which the rest of the 1st Division had long since left. At around 1400 hours Maxse received a message from Charrier stating: 'We have two wounded German prisoners who say that about 2 regiments are opposing us and some guns,' adding that this force belonged to the German I 5th Reserve Infantry Regiment of the Guards Reserve Division. (5) By 1735 hours the Munsters were surrounded and running out of ammunition.

  Major Charrier led three charges against the German positions at Fesmy and was eventually killed attempting to blast a way through. All the other battalion officers being killed, wounded or missing, the command descended on Lieutenant E. W. Gower, who mustered the remaining men in an orchard, ordered them to take up any defensive position they could find and fight on. The Munsters continued to resist until 2115 hours when, out of ammunition, under fire from machine guns at very close range and down to fewer that 250 men, the battalion surrendered, having sustained the fight against great odds for over twelve hours - yet another outstanding example of what disciplined British infantry could do. (6)

  While the BEF were trudging south towards the River Somme, events were moving to a close in Belgium. On 27 August a brigade of the Royal Marine Light Infantry came ashore at Ostend but stayed only three days, being too small a force to defend this port, before re-embarking on 31 August. The Belgian garrison in the Antwerp fortress was still holding out, their resistance obliging von Kluck to divert several divisions and a number of heavy guns to the siege, but it was clear that without assistance this resistance could not be prolonged.

  The brisk actions at Etreux and Fesmy were followed by similar actions in the days that followed; the enemy were still coming on and it was necessary for the French and BEF rearguards to face about from time to time and beat the enemy back. The weather continued hot and as well as suffering from fatigue the men – and the horses- were increasingly short of food and frequently short of water. These shortages arose from the fact that they were not retreating down their line of advance to the south-west, on which lay their supply bases, but south towards Noyon, Compiegne and Soissons, Meaux and the Marne. In an attempt to provide the men with rations, Major-General Robertson started dumping supplies beside the roads, hoping the men could fill up their packs as they marched past, but most of these supplies fell into the hands of the enemy- and helped to convince the German commanders that the BEF was in desperate straits.

  In fact the situation of the BEF was gradually improving. With every day of the march after 28 August the two corps drew closer together, and on that day even the chronically pessimistic Field Marshal French could see that, whatever their fatigue, the private soldiers, NCOs and officers of the battalions and regiments were in good spirits and getting fitter. All they really needed was a chance to rest, a square meal and an opportunity to hit back at the enemy. On 29 August the BEF, apart from the cavalry, enjoyed their first day of rest, a brief halt largely devoted to sleep.

  Nor were the steady losses doing much to erode the BEF's fighting strength for new units were coming up and a trickle of reinforcements were arriving from the UK. On 30 August the 19th Infantry Brigade and Snow's 4th Division were formed into III Corps under Pulteney which, with the other two corps, continued the march south, crossing the Aisne later that day without any significant interference from the enemy.

  The prospect of an Anglo-French counter-attack was now increasing, as the German supply lines lengthened and the German soldiers became ever more weary. On 26 August General Joffre completed his plans to form a Sixth Army on his left wing, west of the BEF Joffre had informed French of his intention during a visit to French's HQ on 27 August, and by the following day the first units of this new army were detraining at Villers-Brettoneux, east of Amiens. On that day Joffre also ordered General Lanrezac to launch an attack against von Bulow's Second Army at St Quentin, hoping thereby to take some of the pressure off the BEF By the evening of 28 August, Lanrezac was in position to mount this attack, a well-handled affair which became known as the Battle of Guise.

  This attack at Guise provided Field Marshal French with an opportunity to score off his new enemy, General Lanrezac. Lieutenant-General Sir Douglas Haig had noticed that the German Second Army was now exposing its flank to the Fifth Army and offered to support General Lanrezac's attack with I Corps. Lanrezac accepted this offer, but on the evening of 28 August a message from French to GQG withdrew this support: 'Compiegne, 28 August, 1914. 6.55 pm. Marshal French regrets his inability to co-operate with you in tomorrow's general action in the measure desired by you. Troops very tired, must have at least one day's rest on the ground occupied tonight. After tomorrow they will be able to occupy the line of the Crozat Canal if necessary; if ultimately the French Army is victorious, the Field Marshal will place his troops at your disposal as a reserve.’ (7)

  Spears describes this message as, 'really amazing', (8) but the fact that Haig's corps had been forbidden to cooperate with Lanrezac was confirmed when a staff officer from Haig's Corps HQ arrived at Lan
rezac's headquarters later.

  Spears records that 'Lanrezac's anger was terrific' and that 'terrible things were said concerning Sir John French'. (9) Spears also adds that 'For the first time I felt that we were in the wrong ... The great complaint of the British against General Lanrezac was that he could not be induced to attack. Now that he was about to do so, nothing would induce the British to co-operate. They were doing as they would be done-by.'

  Clearly that disagreeable first meeting with Lanrezac ten days previously still rankled, and his reason for blocking Haig's participation, that the BEF soldiers were 'very tired and must have a day's rest', was a limp excuse indeed. All the soldiers, British, French and German, were equally tired, and the I Corps battalions were, if anything, rather less tired than many other BEF units - and very eager to engage the enemy.

  French certainly had another reason - or another excuse – in that part of his orders from Kitchener told him to consider carefully before 'participating in forward movements where large bodies of French troops were not engaged and where your forces may be unduly exposed to attack'. However, large French forces were involved at the Battle of Guise on 29 August and Lanrezac can be forgiven for describing French's response as 'une félonie' (a betrayal). (10)

  To describe French's attitude towards Lanrezac as petty-minded is to seriously understate the case, but Field Marshal French and his principal subordinates, Lieutenant-Generals Haig and Smith­Dorrien, were putting up a varied performance at this time.Haig's I Corps had hardly been engaged so far, and while those units, such as the 2nd Munsters and the Guards, that had met the enemy had put up a creditable performance, very little generalship had been required and any judgement on Haig's command skills must wait. Haig was obeying orders, keeping his corps together, continuing the retreat and striking the enemy when the opportunity arose. His hour of trial had yet to arrive.