Rise and Kill First

by Ronen Bergman

  “Raful used to blow up with anger” Interview with Dayan, June 4, 2012.

  chief of staff Eitan was obsessive about killing Arafat Interview with Sella, April 7, 2013.

  Eitan took a helicopter ride to Beirut Later that evening, Eitan flew back to report to a cabinet meeting. and Sharon told the ministers proudly about how chief of staff Eitan “took part in a bombing raid in Beirut” that morning. Transcript of cabinet meeting, August 4, 1982, 7 (author’s archive, received from “Eric”).

  now an object of global sympathy Schiff and Yaari, Israel’s Lebanon War, 273–76 (Hebrew).

  “someone should go and kill Sharon” Interview with Dayan, May 15, 2012. While I was working on this book, some of the men from the Paratroop Recon unit, one of the elite IDF infantry units that spearheaded the invasion forces, sent me a copy of a letter they had written to Prof. Amnon Rubinstein, a liberal member of parliament, in September 1982. “Today the situation no longer allows for silence,” they wrote, followed by a grave indictment of Sharon for dragging Israel into a war with his lies and deceptions—an unnecessary war that allowed for the perpetration of grievous war crimes.

  “the famous kaffiyeh on the famous head” Interview with “Simon,” April 1994.

  It would have been so easy to kill him Interview with Yaalon, August 16, 2011.

  One of the commanders was in radio contact Interview with Gilboa, August 4, 2015.

  Arafat was already in Athens “Arafat in Greece in Snub to Arabs,” New York Times, September 2, 1982.

  CHAPTER 16: BLACK FLAG

  the Lebanese parliament voted IDF and Mossad personnel including Meir Dagan and Rehavia Vardi oversaw the armed “escorting” of members of parliament who refused to attend the vote out of fear of the Syrians and the PLO. Mossad, “Minutes of Meeting Between Maj. Gen. Amir Drori and Gemayel,” July 27, 1982. Interview with Rehavia Vardi, August 19, 1997. Menachem Navot, deputy Mossad director responsible for activities in Lebanon, claims these were merely “persuasive conversations.” Interview with Navot, April 6, 2017. Navot’s typed personal diary, copied by the author and located in his archive, 99–103.

  “How will we be able to take care of the terrorists” Notes of Sharon’s meeting with heads of Shin Bet and Mossad and Sharon’s account of cabinet meeting, August 21, 1982 (author’s archive, received from “Dorris”).

  suggested that the Phalangists go into west Beirut Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, Protocol No.118, September 24, 1982, 22 (author’s archive, received from “Eric”).

  Begin liked this idea Protocol of cabinet meeting, June 15, 1982 (author’s archive, received from “Dorris”).

  The Mossad embellished this proposition Interview with Azulay, July 6, 2015.

  Gemayel was instead murdered Sharon report to cabinet, September 16, 1982, 9 (author’s archive, received from “Dorris”).

  “I saw the boys of Elie…sharpening their knives” Interview with Ravid, January 17, 2013.

  a group commanded by Marom Mashalani Interview with Robert Hatem, February 2005.

  a horrific massacre: Sayigh, Armed Struggle, 539.

  Sharon would later claim “Main Points of Defense Minister’s Version at the Inquiry Commission,” document submitted to the Kahan Commission, par. 34 (author’s archive, received from “Eric”).

  the barbaric behavior pattern of the Phalange “AMAN’s References to Phalange Characteristics, Dec. 1981–September 1982,” document submitted to Kahan Commission, par. 29 (author’s archive, received from “Dorris”).

  “they will rape and loot and kill” Sharon was speaking half a year before Israel invaded Lebanon, as part of the preparation for the campaign, which makes his subsequent conduct all the more grave. Ministry of Defense, “Minister’s Visit to the Northern Command,” January 14, 1982 (author’s archive, received from “Dorris”).

  began counseling the Maronite militia Interviews with Yuval Diskin, October 18, 2011, Gilad, July 31, 2012, Nevo, January 5, 2016, Gilboa, January 8, 2014, Amir Drori, May 1996, and Ron Ben-Yishai, March 30, 2014. Mossad, Summary of Meeting Between the CoS and CoS of Lebanese Forces, September 19, 1982. Schiff and Yaari, Israel’s Lebanon War, 334 (Hebrew).

  Testifying behind closed doors “Minister of Defense at the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee,” September 24, 1982, 11 (author’s archive, received from “Eric”).

  “He realized that Sharon had hoodwinked him” Interview with Nevo, January 5, 2016.

  His condition deteriorated so much Police Minister Yosef Burg suggested sending police in to move the demonstrators out of hearing, but Begin, the heart-and-soul democrat, responded: “By no means. It is their right to protest.” Interview with Nevo, January 5, 2016.

  “A very embarrassing situation” Interview with Nahum Admoni, July 23, 2006, Begin Center. Thanks to Rami Shahar of the Begin Center for assistance in locating the material.

  his aides worked to conceal his true condition Shilon, Begin, 411–37 (Hebrew).

  “I told them to classify the schedule ‘Top Secret’ ” Interview with Nevo, January 5, 2016.

  “giving orders over chief of staff Eitan’s head” Interview with Sella, May 31, 2011.

  “Sharon dominated the meetings” Interview with Admoni, July 23, 2006, Begin Center Archive.

  Operation Salt Fish morphed into Operation Goldfish Interview with Gilboa, December 30, 2013.

  Arafat was traveling frenetically Interview with “Sally,” May 2016, and “Tavor,” June 2011.

  There was no question of shooting it down Interview with Gilad, December 30, 2013.

  AMAN saw no possibility of assassinating him Interview with Gilboa, January 17, 2016.

  demanded that a number of operational steps be taken Interview with Gilboa, March 1, 2016.

  they found their opening in Greece Interview with Admoni, May 29, 2011.

  Sharon kept up constant pressure Interview with Ivri, April 18, 2011.

  one of the Caesarea operatives in Athens Documentation of the operation was shown to the author by “Dvir.”

  He was still stalling for time Interview with Ivri, April 18, 2011.

  a phone jangled in Canary Interview with “Eldy,” August 2014.

  another report came in to Canary Interviews with Ivri, April 18, 2011, and “Tavor,” June 2011.

  Aviem Sella couldn’t believe his ears Interview with Sella, April 9, 2014.

  General Gilboa expressed his sharp opposition Interview with Gilboa, January 17, 2016.

  Gilboa could feel his heart thumping in his chest Interview with Gilboa, January 17, 2016.

  “The distinguishing mark of a manifestly illegal order” Military prosecution against Captain Malinki, 3/57, 213–14.

  refusing to obey orders that they believed to be manifestly illegal Interview with Sella, April 9, 2014.

  On each of the five occasions One of the pilots on the alert for intercepting Goldfish was “Amit,” a twenty-four-year-old airman who had already acquired a reputation for being one of the Israeli Air Force’s aces. “To this day I am plagued by the question of what I would have done if the moment had come when I was ordered to shoot the plane down. Would I have opened fire? Would I have disobeyed the order? In many conversations that I’ve had with trainees over the years, I have raised these questions, asked them what they would do. I would of course like to hope that all of us would refuse to shoot and fly back to base.” Interview with “Amit,” April 2013.

  “we simply drew the time out” Interview with Sella, May 31, 2011.

  after heavy international criticism In February 1983, Time magazine ran a story by the journalist David Halevy saying that Sharon knew in advance of the planned revenge. Sharon sued Time for libel in a New York court. Halevy said Time paid a senior officer, an associate of Sharon, for the classified documents about
the affair. The judge, however, did not allow the submission of the documents as evidence. A jury found that Sharon indeed had been libeled, but as the magazine had not been motivated by malice, he was not entitled to damages. Interviews with David Halevy, September 20, 2016, and Dov Weissglass, December 23, 2014. Ariel Sharon, Plaintiff, v. Time, Inc., Defendant, United States District Court, S.D. New York, 599 F.Supp. 538 (1984).

  made the first cracks in Sharon’s monolithic power While the commission was hearing its witnesses, the Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners struck again. On January 29, 1983, it detonated a car bomb close to the Fatah HQ at Shtura, in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, and another in West Beirut, close to the HQ of the left-wing Mourabitoun, which was close to Fatah. Some sixty people were killed and hundreds wounded. This was the Front’s last act.

  The commission recommended that Sharon be dismissed immediately A summary of the activities of the Kahan Commission from Cabinet Discussions of Establishment of Kahan Commission and Its Conclusions, February 10, 1983, published by Israel State Archives on February 1, 2013.

  CHAPTER 17: THE SHIN BET COUP

  acts of Jewish terrorism against Arabs The details come from Rachum, The Israeli General Security Service Affair, 44–45 (Hebrew).

  Conducting the negotiation was the Shin Bet’s senior expert Interview with Nahman Tal, November 24, 2016.

  got the impression that if the Shin Bet managed Interview with Barak, March 8, 2013.

  when he realized they were not dangerous Interview with Shai Avital, December 2010.

  was questioning both of them Interview with Micha Kubi, September 8, 2013.

  “Shalom became the most important person in the security establishment” Interview with Carmi Gillon, January 27, 2016.

  subordinates considered him a manipulative and ruthless dictator Dror Moreh, The Gatekeepers, 33. Shalom used to ambush latecomers at the Shin Bet HQ in north Tel Aviv and penalize them by, for instance, confiscating their vehicles. Once, an operative nicknamed Spartacus because of his massive size came a half hour late after a tiring night’s work in the field. Shalom told him that for a month he would have to travel to and from work by bus. The gigantic Spartacus loomed over Shalom, who was quite short, and roared that he was not prepared to accept the penalty. Shalom didn’t flinch and said he saw Spartacus’s conduct as “an act of treason.” Then he confiscated his car for two months. Interview with “Avishag,” May 2008.

  “Avrum [Shalom] was holding a pistol” Interview with Kubi, June 11, 2013.

  Shalom signaled to the unit’s commander Moreh, Gatekeepers, 37 (Hebrew).

  the beating they had supposedly received from civilians and soldiers Interview with Kubi, June 11, 2013.

  Every now and again, a PLO activist would simply disappear Interview with Weissglass, recounting his conversations with Ginossar, December 23, 2014.

  “there are times when it’s not worthwhile to take prisoners” Interview with “Raphael,” March 2006.

  summary executions of suspects Interview with “Elvin,” January 2013, and “Yan,” August 2017.

  Some of the detonations in Weights operations Interview with “Edgar,” January 2013.

  “More than a few innocent people were killed” Interview with “Raphael,” May 2011.

  The Shin Bet implemented a strict policy of telling the truth Maiberg, The Patriot, 66–67 (Hebrew).

  “We never invented facts we did not believe to be true” Hadar also admitted that on at least one occasion a man’s confession turned out to be false, but Hadar insists that the moment this became evident he himself informed the Justice Ministry what had happened. Interview with Hadar, October 9, 2011. Report of committee of inquiry into interrogation means used by the General Security Services (Landau Commission), part 1, paragraph 2.27.

  after a flawed bomb killed a Shin Bet operative Before that, an IDF officer was killed on the outskirts of Raffah when he approached a pit in which he suspected weapons had been hidden, but which had been booby-trapped by the Shin Bet and exploded as he lifted the cover. Interviews with Hadar, October 9, 2011, Bandori, September 11, 2017, and “Edgar,” January 2013. The Shin Bet posted a page dedicated to Moshe Goldfarb, the operative killed that day, https://www.shabak.gov.il/​memorial/​Pages/​110.aspx.

  “All we did was control the war” Moreh, Gatekeepers, 28–29 (Hebrew).

  Almost all the heads of the intelligence community Interviews with Peri, May 21, 2011, Gillon, January 27, 2016, Ayalon, January 21, 2013, Avi Dichter, November 4, 2010, Uri Sagie, June 3, 2012, Amos Yadlin, January 15, 2012, Aharon Zeevi Farkash, November 7, 2016, and Danny Yatom, April 7, 2011.

  That freedom of action affected Avraham Shalom Maiberg, Patriot, 108.

  “When I snapped that shot, I didn’t know who he was” Gidi Weitz, “The Bus 300 Affair,” Haaretz, February 28, 2013.

  he quickly switched the rolls in his camera Interview with Alex Levac, October 1998.

  “terrorists had died when troops attacked the bus” David K. Shipler, “News of Hijacking Denied to Israelis,” New York Times, April 14, 1984.

  Hadashot defied the censor and ran the story anyway David K. Shipler, “Israel Said to Name Panel on 4 Hijackers,” New York Times, April 28, 1984.

  The publication of the photographs The Hadashot daily broke censorship and reported on one of the panels. It was penalized for this: shut down for four days, while its editors were prosecuted. The editors were convicted by the District Court but acquitted on appeal by the Supreme Court. Criminal Appeals 93/1127, State of Israel v. Yossi Klein and Others, Judgment mem-het (3) 485.

  Shalom and his men took an oath Ministry of Justice, Opinion in the Matter of the Investigation of the Terrorists on Bus 300, December 20, 1986, 31 (author’s archive, received from “Liran”).

  They knew that if they told the truth Kill Them! a documentary film by Levi Zeini and Gidi Weitz, Channel 10, October 2011.

  “a preplanned campaign against the institutions of law” Interview with Hazak, June 21, 2012.

  Shalom’s Trojan horse The term “Trojan horse” regarding Ginossar is taken from the report of the commission of inquiry into the Shin Bet methods, part 1, paragraph 2.4.

  “so many actors outside of the Shin Bet were there” Maiberg, Patriot, 65.

  “Not telling the truth is an integral part of removing the problem” Interview with Yossi Ginossar (thanks for arranging the meeting to journalist Rami Tal, September 2002).

  the commission sat in a Defense Ministry meeting room Ministry of Justice, Opinion in the matter of the investigation of the terrorists on bus 300, December 20, 1986, 33, 34.

  framing innocent Israeli soldiers for the two murders Interviews with Mordechai, March 22, 2015, and Ginossar, July 22, 1999. Maiberg, Patriot, 95.

  “Who did you see doing the hitting?” Gidi Weitz, “The Bus 300 Affair,” Haaretz, February 28, 2013.

  The commission did not determine who had killed the prisoners A number of Shin Bet operatives, meanwhile, including Yatom and Kubi, were tried by an internal disciplinary tribunal and cleared. Interviews with Kubi, September 20, 2017, and Peri, May 21, 2011.

  but almost no one believed him Interview with Barak, April 2, 2014.

  “I and my family went through hell” Interview with Mordechai, August 28, 2015.

  examined the evidence and felt that something was wrong Interview with Menachem Finkelstein, July 18, 2012.

  Finkelstein fought against the Shin Bet “Lethal Blow and Blow of a Lethal Nature,” Opinion of Judge IDF Advocate General’s HQ (author’s archive, received from “Bell”).

  his meticulous legal work was instrumental in the trial Additional help had come in the form of an anonymous phone call received the night before the trial, at the home of Maj. Gen. Haim Nadel, who had been appointed the head of the special court-mar
tial. The voice on the other end told Nadel he was being led astray and that Mordechai did not kill the terrorists. The voice belonged to Kubi, whose conscience was bothering him. Interview with Kubi, June 11, 2013.

  the court acquitted Mordechai Mordechai went on to become a general and after retiring from the IDF, he went into politics and became minister of defense in Benjamin Netanyahu’s first government, in 1997.

  “because of the cover-up” Interview with Peleg Raday, April 1, 1998.

  “The moral basis…has collapsed” Interview with Nevo, January 14, 2016. Kill Them! Zeini and Weitz, Channel 10, October 2011.

  With Peres’s full backing, Shalom dismissed the three whistleblowers Black and Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars, 406.

  “I felt as if the sky had fallen down” Interview with Yehudit Karp, January 7, 2016.

  “the untrammeled powers of the Shin Bet” Shin Bet conference on “Bus 300 Affair,” Beinish speech, Kibbutz Tzuba, June 2004.

  Eventually, Shalom resorted to simply lying under oath Ministry of Justice, Opinion in the Matter of the Investigation of the Terrorists on Bus 300, 22.

  on charges of murder Rachum, General Security Service Affair, 101.

  writing down the names, places, and dates Interview with Weissglass, December 23, 2014. Maiberg, Patriot, 223–29.

  “You can choose how to die” New York Times, July 10, 1984. Black and Morris, Israel’s Secret Wars, 397.

  called it the Skulls Dossier Interview with “Elvin,” January 2013.

  “He told me, ‘Don’t you dare’ ” Moreh, The Gatekeepers: A Documentary, 2012.

  a stenographer who would record the proceedings Interview with Danny Yatom, July 7, 2011.

  “a junta in some remote Latin American state” In 1992, when Rabin was elected prime minister, Ginossar asked to be appointed director general of the Housing Ministry. Rabin said it would be difficult because of his past. Ginossar did not give up. He turned to “Amos,” a senior Shin Bet official, and offered him a deal: “He promised me that if I assisted him in getting the appointment as D.G. of the Housing Ministry he would give me a top job in the ministry. He wanted me to come with him to Rabin and extort him by saying that if he didn’t name Ginossar, we’d expose assassination operations that he’d approved in the 1970s.” Amos threw Ginossar out of his house. Ginossar made a similar threat in a meeting with the journalist Dan Margalit, apparently intending for it to get to Rabin’s ears. Margalit left the meeting in anger, and he wouldn’t speak to Ginossar after that for a very long time. Rabin, however, gave in to Ginossar’s pressure and granted him the post he was so eager to get. But after a petition was lodged with the Supreme Court, the court ruled in a sharply worded judgment, “An offender who committed perjury and perverted the course of justice and in so doing violated individual freedom, how could such a person direct a government ministry?” In the end, Rabin did give Ginossar a senior post with regard to which the Supreme Court could not intervene: to serve as his liaison with Yasser Arafat, a position that Ginossar, without Rabin’s knowledge, parlayed into large-scale private business deals with leaders of the corrupt Palestinian Authority, making him a very rich man before he died in 2004. Interviews with “Amos,” July 2013, and Dan Margalit, January 17, 2017. Interview with Yossi Ginossar, May 1999. Ronen Bergman, “The Man Who Swallowed Gaza,” Haaretz, March 4, 1997. Margalit, I Have Seen Them All, 180 (Hebrew). Yoel Eisenberg v. Minister for Construction and Housing, High Court of Justice 6163/92.