Rise and Kill First

by Ronen Bergman

  “uncovering the modus operandi of the Shin Bet” Chaim Herzog, interview in Yedioth Ahronoth, June 27, 1986.

  CHAPTER 18: THEN CAME A SPARK

  Abu Jihad spread out a map The film of Abu Jihad briefing his fighters was shot in 1985 and released by Fatah on the anniversary of the formation of the organization, January 1, 2012.

  “I used to call it ‘sharpening the sword’ ” Interview with Harari, March 23, 2014.

  The stars were now graduates of IDF combat units The new Bayonet executed its first mission on July 25, 1979, in an apartment house in Cannes on the French Riviera. When Zuheir Mohsen, the leader of the Palestinian pro-Syrian Al-Saiqa organization, arrived, “Berry” pumped four bullets into him and the team drove off. Mohsen expired later in the hospital. With his demise, Al-Saiqa ceased terror operations. The Mossad marked the hit down as a success. Interviews with Issaki, September 2, 2015, Pressler, July 6, 2017, and “Sally,” February 2015.

  As he was on his way to close the deal in Athens Interviews with “Sally,” February 2015, and Shmuel Ettinger, February 11, 2013. “Palestinian Shot Dead by Gunmen in Athens,” New York Times, August 21, 1983.

  enlisted him for one of his planned operations in Europe The mid-1980s were a peak period of Palestinian international terrorist acts. In 1985 alone, 105 men, women, and children were killed and 433 wounded in these acts. Merari and Elad, International Dimension of Palestinian Terrorism, 29–41 (Hebrew).

  Munzer Abu Ghazala…had been the object Prime Ministers Shamir and Peres approved the series of targeted killings. However, “the selection of targets came from below, from the field, from the operational echelons, via the head of the Mossad, to the prime minister,” says Nahum Admoni, the chief of Mossad from 1982 to 1989. “I don’t remember a single case where the political echelon instructed me to act against anyone.” Interview with Admoni, May 29, 2011.

  other PLO operations in Europe The Mossad also tried with all its might to find Muhammad Zaidan (Abu al-Abbas), a leader of the Palestinian Liberation Front. The Israelis kept him on their radar, but he took extreme precautionary measures and an opportunity to strike at him never arose. Nevertheless, thanks to this close surveillance, on October 7, 1985, AMAN’s Unit 8200 intercepted a phone call between Zaidan and a team of his men who hijacked the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, off the Egyptian coast. The terrorists murdered an elderly Jewish American man in a wheelchair, Leon Klinghoffer, and threw his body overboard. Later on, they agreed to leave the ship in Egypt in exchange for safe conduct to Tunisia. Israel tracked the plane they were on and informed the Americans, who sent fighters to intercept it and force it to land in a NATO base in Sicily. But the Italians freed Zaidan, who was on the plane, over the objections of the United States. Zaidan denied being connected to the ship hijack, but the then head of AMAN, Ehud Barak, making his first appearance on Israel TV, exposed the 8200 intercept and the terrorist’s lies. Barak’s polished and charismatic performance, at a time when Israel still had only one TV channel, made a huge impression and, some say, set him on course for his political career. Interviews with Barak, August 26, 2015, and “Cinema,” October 2014.

  Israel had known that an attack of some kind was planned Interviews with Ettinger, January 21, 2013, and “Ethan,” January 2015.

  four missile boats and Flotilla 13 commandos Interview with Ayalon, March 14, 2016. “Operation Hawk’s Way: How the Navy Operated in Algeria,” Israel Defense, August 8. 2015.

  refused the Israeli call to surrender Interview with Oded Raz, January 20, 2013. Michal Yaakov Itzhaki, “The Terrorists Planned to Arrive at the Kirya Base in Tel Aviv,” Maariv, April 12, 2013.

  Loud music blared in their cells A state inquiry commission headed by former Supreme Court justice Moshe Landau was set up following the revelations about the culture of lies and torture in the Shin Bet. In a secret annex to its report, the commission ruled that it was permissible to use “moderate physical pressure” while interrogating terror suspects. This phrase was very broadly interpreted in the internal regulations compiled by the legal advisers of the Shin Bet and AMAN Unit 504, in a way that made possible the use of “special measures,” a euphemism for torture. Shin Bet and 504 interrogators then proceeded to go a few steps further, torturing suspects with measures that were several times more aggressive and ignoring the new regulations. Again, suspects were being physically injured, subjected to severe trauma. Some died because of the torture. Unit 504, “Order on the Use of Auxiliary Interrogation Methods,” updated file, July 1994 (author’s archive, received from “Bell”).

  Were it not for AMAN’s precise intelligence Interview with Raz, January 20, 2013.

  These men would all land on the Tunisian shore Interviews with Mordechai, March 22, 2015, and “Nano,” March 2012.

  worried about the repercussions of an Israeli attack Interview with “David,” October 2015.

  Israel simply stole it Director of Central Intelligence, Foreign Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, October 1987, The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: A Damage Assessment, 4 (author’s archive, received from “Patriot”).

  “anti-Israeli attitudes among his colleagues” Director of Central Intelligence, Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case, 5.

  “I could not resist the temptation” Interview with Eitan, January 24, 2013.

  knew about the situation but turned a blind eye The prime minister’s military secretary under Peres and Shamir, Brig. Gen. Azriel Nevo, firmly denies that he, as the recipient of all intelligence material addressed to the prime minister, knew about Pollard or that Israel was running a spy in the United States. Interview with Nevo, January 5, 2016.

  sneaking huge quantities of documents out of his workplace Interview with Shlomo Brom, October 27, 2015.

  asked his spy for all available information Interview with Eliot Lauer, October 20, 2015. Director of Central Intelligence, Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case, 40.

  tried to persuade Rabin to back the sea-land proposal Interview with Mordechai, January 24, 2013.

  they are often driven by political concerns Three years later, Abu Jihad almost died as a result of exactly the same electoral strategy, when the Likud-led government was pressuring the IDF to kill him in Amman, the capital of Jordan. “It was totally transparent,” says Omer Bar-Lev, who commanded Sayeret Matkal at the time. “The Likud wanted it [the assassination of Abu Jihad] executed before the elections in July, so they would win. I was facing a difficult personal and political conflict.” Bar-Lev’s father, Haim, a former chief of the General Staff, was now a prominent politician in the Labor Party. The success of his son in killing al-Wazir would likely have a significant effect on his career. As it happened, those earlier plans were repeatedly postponed for operational, rather than political, reasons. Interview with Omer Bar-Lev, November 15, 2012.

  “waited for the Palestinians to arrive” Interview with Yoni Koren, March 22, 2013.

  on a ship named Opportunity The information was conveyed to the Mossad by the agent Amin al-Hajj, “Rumminegge,” who had relocated, at the Mossad’s request, to Cyprus and set up a network of drivers, customs agents, and prostitutes, which provided a great deal of information about the PLO to the Mossad. Interview with Amin al-Hajj, November 5, 2013.

  planning to use a shipping container Junction’s chief agent recruiter, Yehuda Gil, went to Piraeus, located the customs agent who was code-named Golden Earrings by the Mossad, and conned her into giving him information about the Palestinians who were transporting the containers of raisins via her agency. Abu Jihad, suspecting Golden Earrings of collaborating with the Mossad, dispatched two of his men to kill her. Yehuda Gil, who was running Golden Earrings, was credited with being a man “who could get a telephone pole to talk.” But later on it emerged that Gil had been one of the great failures of the Mossad’s apparatus for recruiting and overseeing its personnel. In 1974 he enli
sted “Red Falcon,” a Syrian army general, and ran him as an agent for many years. In 1996 it turned out that Gil had been making up the information ostensibly provided by his agent, because he feared having to admit that the recruitment had been a dud and he wanted to go on being relevant. This fake information twice almost led to wars breaking out between Israel and Syria. Gil was not the only Junction dramatic fiasco. Ben Zygier, an Australian Jew and a committed Zionist, immigrated to Israel and was recruited by the Mossad in 2003. These were the frenetic days of Meir Dagan’s directorship, when vast budgets were made available for the expansion of the organization. This entailed a reduction in the meticulousness with which recruits were selected. Zygier, who was born and grew up in a foreign country, was considered an ideal candidate. However, after finishing the Junction course, and while trying to penetrate firms doing business in Iran and the Arab states in order to recruit sources, it turned out Zygier could not do what the Mossad expected of him. He was called back to Israel with a deep sense of failure that he apparently could not cope with. He tried to initiate a rogue operation of his own, and without informing his superiors he met and tried to recruit a Hezbollah member, to prove that he could do it. However, his target was more cunning than he was and deceived Zygier into inadvertently disclosing information about the communication system used by Mossad agents and burning two of them. A joint Mossad–Shin Bet investigation cracked the case open, and Zygier was secretly arrested and imprisoned. He was indicted but committed suicide before the trial. Bergman, Operation Red Falcon, https://magazine.atavist.com/​operation-red-falcon. Interviews with Yehuda Gil, March 30, 2015, Dvora Chen, March 21, 2012, Haim Tomer, March 3, 2015, “Oktoberfest,” March 2013, and “Loacker,” December 2016. Ronen Bergman, Julia Amalia Heyer, Jason Koutsoukis, Ulrike Putz, and Holger Stark, “The Real Story Behind Israel’s ‘Prisoner X,’ ” Der Spiegel, March 26, 2013.

  According to medical documents submitted to the court Supreme Court, 861/87, Abu Sharah v. Lod Military Court, vol. 42(1), 810. Interview with Adv. Amnon Zichroni, January 27, 2011.

  raided an Israeli yacht Interviews with Eran Ron, August 1995, Talia Avner, August 1995, and David Avner, August 1995. Ronen Bergman, “Pilot’s Fate,” Haaretz, September 8, 1995.

  Preparations for the attack began immediately Erele Weissberg and Lior Yacovi, “ ‘Alpha,’ the Pilots Reported. ‘Terror Fortress Destroyed,’ ” Yisrael Hayom, September 18, 2015.

  All the targets were hit “Tunisia’s Leader Bitter at the U.S.,” New York Times, October 3, 1985.

  “I was filled with elation that I’d never felt before” “Remembering Wooden Leg, the longest-range attack,” Israeli Air Force website, http://www.iaf.org.il/​4373-37989-he/​IAF.aspx, September 27, 2011.

  the legend that his life was always saved by miracles “ ‘Alpha,’ the Pilots Reported,” Yisrael Hayom, September 18, 2015.

  “we decided he wasn’t a target” Interview with Koren, December 22, 2013.

  Only one senior official, Nur Ali, was killed Nur Ali was related to Princess Dina, King Hussein’s former wife and at that time the wife of Salah Tamari, a senior Fatah commander, who was imprisoned in an Israeli detention facility in South Lebanon. Dina and Ali were busy setting up a big prisoner exchange deal between the PLO and Israel, and afterward remained at the center of secret communication channels between the two sides. Interview with Gadi Zohar, July 8, 2017. Bergman, By Any Means Necessary, 83–84 (Hebrew).

  The failure to eliminate more of the PLO leadership There were some in the Mossad who supported killing a less famous but much more important target from an operational standpoint—the deputy chief of the Western Sector, Mustafa Liftawi (Abu Firas). The latter was seen as the brains behind the terror attacks, a man who “bathed in a tub of Jewish blood” according to Yisrael Hasson, the Shin Bet operative who was in charge of combating his activities. But in the end, the heads of the Mossad, and later the prime minister, preferred to go for a more emblematic figure, someone known to the public, and not the clandestine, anonymous Abu Firas. Interviews with Yisrael Hasson, November 17, 2010, Shimon Shapira, January 31, 2015, “Sally,” September 2016, and Raz, January 20, 2013.

  the Mossad could and should execute the mission itself Interview with Lipkin-Shahak, April 3, 2012.

  Israeli intelligence had also overlooked another dramatic development Schiff and Yaari, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising, 44–70 (Hebrew).

  “From an operational point of view” Interview with David Tzur, May 30, 2011.

  the Palestinian uprising against Israeli rule, the Intifada Interview with Nevo, January 14, 2016.

  rioting mobs hurled rocks “Fatalities in the First Intifada,” B’Tselem website (Hebrew), http://www.btselem.org/​hebrew/​statistics/​first_intifada_tables.

  Israel was now Goliath Shalev, The Intifada: Causes and Effects, 19–36.

  “The Intifada” Interview with Admoni, May 29, 2011.

  If it was all a PLO plot Interviews with Shamir, January 1997, and Moshe Nisim, February 21, 2013.

  Rabin ordered the IDF Interview with “Sally,” September 2016.

  thwarting the plan Interview with “Elvin,” January 2013.

  the local police almost caught the Israelis Interview with “Pegasus,” February 2011.

  “Listen, history plays strange games” Interview with Galant, August 19, 2011.

  to discuss the killing of Abu Jihad The cabinet had been convened following the infiltration of a squad of three Western Sector terrorists into Israel from Egypt on March 7. They happened to run into a bus carrying civilians, many of them working mothers, to the Negev Nuclear Research Center in Dimona. They opened fire on the bus, killing two of the women, and hijacked it. “Abu Jihad sent us!” one of the hijackers yelled from the bus. Then they executed one more of the passengers. Moments later, police SWAT team snipers killed them. “As far as I was concerned,” said Lipkin-Shahak, “the attack on the ‘mothers’ bus sealed Abu Jihad’s fate.” Interviews with Tzur, May 30, 2011, and Lipkin-Shahak, April 3, 2012.

  “Shamir could have made do with his own order” Interview with Nevo, January 14, 2016.

  “My information was that Abu Jihad was a moderate” Interview with Peres, September 17, 2012.

  “for the sake of the national morale” Interview with Nisim, February 21, 2013.

  “ ‘If a man comes to kill you, rise early and kill him first’ ” Interview with Nisim, February 21, 2013.

  “but never in Tunisia” Interview with Nahum Lev, August 2000.

  “I came to know and respect the man” The Israelis monitoring al-Wazir’s telephone calls heard a sharp argument between him and his eldest son, Jihad, who was studying business administration. Jihad wanted to join in the armed struggle, but his father wouldn’t hear of it and told him to stay in school and to go on studying. “When our state is established,” he told his son, “it won’t need people like me, but rather people like you.” In 2012, I accompanied a group of senior German civil servants on a tour of the West Bank, where they met Palestinian Authority officials. One of them, the head of the Palestinian Monetary Authority, was introduced as “our most important young economist.” He made a powerful impression on me. He spoke articulately and sensibly in fluent English, and unlike some of his colleagues, refrained from blaming Israel for everything bad that had ever happened or was happening then to the Palestinian people. As he spoke I realized that this was the young business administration student. He had done what his father had told him to do, kept up his studies, and had actually become one of the builders of the economy in the embryonic Palestinian state. Dr. Jihad al-Wazir had added “Khalil” to his name after the assassination of his father. I approached him after his talk and told him about the book I was writing, and about the recording of the conversation with his father that was preserved in the archives of Israeli military intelligence. He said that
he remembered the conversation very well, and then he began sobbing. Interview with Raz, October 13, 2014.

  Rabin was satisfied Interview with “Sally,” February 2015.

  The convoy halted twenty-five miles from the Tunisian coast The entire operation was planned and managed by “Steven,” Caesarea’s intelligence officer. Interviews with Yaalon, December 21, 2016, Barak, March 8, 2013, Yiftah Reicher, November 28, 2013, Lev, August 2000, “Sally,” February 2015, Ettinger, January 21, 2015, Galant, September 4, 2014, and Ayalon, January 21, 2013.