Rise and Kill First

by Ronen Bergman

  called Sayeret commander Moshe Yaalon on the radio A recording of the conversation was first aired on Channel 2’s Uvda program on May 27, 2013.

  The technicians played crowd noises The previous day, the Shin Bet had indeed arrested Faiz Abu-Rahma, a lawyer and Abu Jihad’s cousin. He’d been arrested before, but always for questioning after a terror attack. This time, it was merely a pretext for the call that followed hours later.

  the family’s Tunisian gardener The question whether it was necessary or permissible to kill the gardener remained open and was a subject for argument in the Sayeret even after the operation was over. Sayeret Matkal operatives were permitted by their commanders to kill civilians who might report their presence inside enemy territory—a modified license to kill. Earlier on, in late 1978, a Sayeret force under the command of an officer named Shai Avital embarked on a mission deep inside a very hostile Arab country. They came across a shepherd tending his flock. The squad stopped moving and tied up the shepherd, effectively neutralizing him. But then an argument broke out between Avital and his superiors in the rear command post. Chief of staff Eitan ordered Avital to kill the shepherd, while Avital insisted he be spared. “How can I kill him?” pleaded Avital, who was born in a farming community and had studied at an agricultural college. “He’s a farmer, like us.” Eitan insisted. Eventually, one of the soldiers got up and shot the shepherd in the head, dumped his body into a nearby well, and told the stunned Avital: “That’s it. The argument is over. We can get on with the mission.” Doron Avital, a soldier and officer in the Sayeret, with a doctorate in philosophy, made Shai Avital’s plea into a doctrinal tenet. In 1994, when he was commanding the Sayeret, while plans were being developed to abduct a Hezbollah man named Mustafa Dirani, he decreed, “If we take the lives of Lebanese civilians in this operation we will have lost the moral justification for carrying it out.” Interviews with “Lenin,” December 2016, Avital, December 29, 2010, and Halevi, October 12, 2010. Bergman, By Any Means Necessary, 381 (Hebrew).

  They shot him, too Interview with Lev, August 2000.

  Then Lev fired a long burst Interviews with Lev, August 2000, Reicher, November 28, 2013, “Sally,” February 2015, and Yaalon, December 21, 2016. According to some testimonies, Lev did not fire at Abu Jihad but stayed outside the house during the operation, securing it. Uvda, Channel 2, May 27, 2013.

  He called the operation “the perfect hit” Interview with Yaalon, December 21, 2016.

  All of the Israelis escaped Tunisia unharmed In the submarine that escorted the force to and from Tunisia, the Gal, relations between the crew and the deputy commander were not particularly friendly. On the way home someone posted the following anonymous message on the notice board: “Top Secret / To: Yasser Arafat / Dear Sir, / We have killed your deputy! Now you kill our deputy! / Greetings, The crew of the Israel Navy Vessel Gal.”

  “I heard about it…on the radio” That official silence continued for decades. In 2012, while writing this book, after I threatened to bring a Supreme Court petition against military censors, the Censor permitted me to publish some of the details about the assassination in Yedioth Ahronoth (http://www.theguardian.com/​world/​2012/​nov/​01/​israel-acknowledges-killing-palestinian-deputy). Following the publication, the commander of Sayeret Matkal wrote a letter to all the veterans of the unit, demanding that “The cloak of secrecy around the classified operational activity of the unit be restored, and that unit be left outside of the doings of the media.” WallaNews, December 2, 2012, https://news.walla.co.il/​item/​2592534.

  “What joy it has brought to the nation!” Interview with Nisim, February 21, 2013.

  “He could have made a significant contribution” Interview with Lipkin-Shahak, April 3, 2012.

  CHAPTER 19: INTIFADA

  “to ascertain who authorized such an action” Interviews with Uri Bar-Lev, December 17, 2015, Avital, December 2010, Nevo, January 5, 2016, and Avraham Pazner, March 19, 2016. “Israel Mounts Inquiry into a Charge by ABC,” New York Times, July 7, 1988.

  a highly secretive unit, Duvdevan Interviews with Barak, August 26, 2015, and Dagan, July 20, 2013.

  The nucleus of Duvdevan Interview with Galant, July 7, 2011.

  the ABC News ruse Interviews with Uri Bar-Lev, December 17, 2015, and Nevo, January 5, 2016.

  “to carry out low-signature killings” Interview with Koren, December 22, 2013.

  to perform “dead checking” Interview with “Santa,” May 2016.

  An IDF Criminal Investigation Division probe Final Report of Military Police Investigation (CID) 92/0450/06 of MP Central Unit, July, 9 1992 (author’s archive, received from “Bell”).

  and suddenly drawn a concealed weapon The large numbers of dogs, which would bark at the slightest provocation, were a serious problem for Cherry fighters trying to silently approach Arab villages at night. Many solutions were tried, including instruments that produced sounds at wavelengths audible only to canines and were supposed to calm them down. In the end, they found that bags of lion dung, collected at the Safari Park in Ramat Gan, worked best. When the dogs smelled the odor given off by the king of beasts, they would quiet down and slink off.

  “put the members of the terror cells into absolute uncertainty” Interview with Uri Bar-Lev, December 17, 2015.

  eliminate former members of Black September The Mossad failed to kill the remaining terrorists implicated in the Munich operation. Only two of them, Yusuf al-Najar and Ali Salameh, were eliminated during Harari’s time. Especially painful was the failure of the hunt for the commander of the Munich attack, Mohammad Oudeh (Abu Daoud). In 1985 the Mossad obtained information on the whereabouts of Jamal al-Gashey, one of three Palestinians who actually killed Israelis in Munich. He had left Libya, where he settled after the Germans released him, and had taken refuge in Spain, under a false identity. He was suffering from cancer and receiving chemotherapy. Inside the Mossad a debate arose as to whether resources should be devoted to taking him out or he should be left for the cancer to kill him. In the end, Shavit decided that if al-Gashey could be reached, he should be killed. A lethal dose was slipped by a Caesarea operative into a cup of coffee he was drinking at a restaurant near his home. The poison didn’t kill him, apparently because the dosage was incorrect, or because of the effects of the heavy chemotherapy he was undergoing at that time. Indeed, shortly after swallowing the poison, al-Gashey recovered and returned to his pleasant previous life. In 2000, he was interviewed for Arthur Cohn’s Academy Award–winning documentary on the Munich massacre, One Day in September. Interviews with Harari, March 10, 2014, and “Sally,” January 2015.

  “We are talking about innumerable delicate nuances” Interviews with “Oktoberfest,” February 2013, and “Alfred,” February 2013. Mossad director Shavit would say only, “It was a very nice operation, wasn’t it?”

  The plan was to kill Yitzhak Shamir and Ariel Sharon Interview with “Oktoberfest,” February 2013.

  “Just got off the plane and hop! He was captured” Interview with Jibril Rajoub, August 23, 2002.

  Mossad leaked the scandalous news of his visit The affair led to the resignations of high-ranking officials in the Foreign Ministry and the Interior Ministry and of the director of the French Red Cross, who was also a key adviser to President François Mitterrand. Los Angeles Times, February 4, 1992. Interview with Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière, May 2000. Miscellaneous correspondence between Foreign Ministry and the Israeli embassy in Paris (author’s archive, received from “Paul”).

  “the Red Pages were open-ended” Interview with “Polly,” March 2016.

  Shamir re-endorsed the Red Page for Bseiso Interview with “the Pilot,” November 2015.

  “I arrived in Paris on that day” Interview with Robert Baer (in the presence of Seymour Hersh), August 2001. Email from Robert Baer, February 1, 2016.

  According to a number of sources
Interviews with “Polly,” March 2016, and “the Pilot,” November 2015.

  A judicial inquiry into the murder remains open Interview with Judge Jean-Louis Bruguière, May 2000.

  The targeted killing…badly weakened the PLO Bergman, Authority Granted, 178–79 (Hebrew).

  they refused to join an Arab League resolution Agence France-Presse, February 26, 1991.

  make genuine efforts to achieve peace with the Palestinians Interviews with Dalia Rabin, October 2005, Amos Eran, February 11, 2009, Haber, June 21, 2009, and Shimon Sheves, August 25, 2010.

  his tried and tested survival technique Interview with Yezid Sayigh, October 2001.

  Arafat permitted his people to open a secret back channel Interviews with Peres, September 17, 2012, Yossi Beilin, October 14, 2002, Ron Pundak, August 2002, and Alpher, May 18, 2015.

  When Peres informed Rabin about the contact Pundak, Secret Channel, 100–105, 122, 146–49, 172 (Hebrew).

  The negotiations, however, were kept secret Interviews with “Noah,” January 2016, and “Polly,” March 2016.

  the country’s intelligence agencies continued fighting a covert war Interviews with Haber, June 21, 2009, and “Polly,” March 2016.

  Shavit realized what an achievement this was One thing that came up often was Abbas’s burning hatred for Arafat. Sometimes he called him “that bastard,” sometimes “the little whore.”

  conducting advanced negotiations with the PLO behind his back Interviews with “Oktoberfest,” December 2015, “Polly,” March 2016, and “Jango,” October 2016.

  “We couldn’t understand…how it was possible” Interview with “Oktoberfest,” February 2013.

  “This aroused the suspicion of eavesdropping” Interview with Rajoub, August 23, 2002.

  He was undeniably a traitor “Top PLO Security Official Accused of Being Mossad Spy: Arafat Orders Inquiry,” Independent, November 4, 1993.

  a series of agreements that became known as the Oslo Accords Interview with Ron Pundak, August 2002. Beilin, Touching Peace, 61–164 (Hebrew). Pundak, Secret Channel, 129–90.

  The Oslo Accords engendered security coordination committees Interviews with David Meidan, August 2, 2015, Dichter, June 2012, and Hasson, November 17, 2010.

  to request clemency for Yassin Interview with “Oktoberfest,” February 2013.

  CHAPTER 20: NEBUCHADNEZZAR

  The hangar belonged to the CNIM Group Interview with Raphael Ofek, January 24, 2016.

  five Bayonet operatives hustled over the fence Interviews with “April,” November 2016, Harari, March 29, 2014, and Benny Zeevi, February 12, 1999. A partially similar account appears in Victor Ostrovsky, By Way of Deception: The Making of a Mossad Officer, 19–20.

  the enemy of my enemy is my friend As part of the Periphery doctrine, the Mossad extended aid to liberation movements and underground militias in a number of hostile nations, including, for example, the Anyanya, Christian separatist rebels in southern Sudan. Interviews with Alpher, May 18, 2015, and Amit, July 12, 2005. Alpher, Periphery, 57–71 (Hebrew). Ben Uziel, On a Mossad Mission to South Sudan, 9–36 (Hebrew). Ronen Bergman, “Israel and Africa,” 234–46.

  “the Butcher of Baghdad” Interview with Rotberg, March 5, 2012.

  Meir refused to sign the Red Page But as the booby-trapped Koran was ready for use, “They [the Kurds] sent it to some governor who had abused them, and he was killed along with his entire staff,” Rothenberg recalls.

  Saddam thought that Jews were “a mixture of the garbage” He went to the trouble of publishing a luxurious edition of his admired Uncle Tulpah’s thoughts, including the contention that “There are three things Allah should not have created: The Persians, the Jews, and flies.” Karsh Efraim and Rautsi Inari, Saddam Hussein, 19 (Hebrew).

  “budgets of billions, practically unlimited” Interview with Amatzia Baram, October 28, 2015.

  “The Franco-Iraqi agreement is the first Arab step” Nakdimon, Tammuz in Flames, 50 (Hebrew).

  The Iraqis paid very generously Ibid., 75–76 (Hebrew).

  “to zero in on Iraq’s intention to obtain nuclear weapons” Interview with Admoni, May 29, 2011, and Gazit, September 12, 2016.

  might potentially become informants Interview with Yehuda Gil, May 15, 2011. Koren Yehuda, “My Shadow and I,” Yedioth Ahronoth, July 6, 2001.

  “It was a terrifying tape” Interview with Dr. Khidir Hamza by Hoda Kotb, NBC Dateline research material transcript, “Iraq 1981,” (author’s archive, courtesy of Shachar Bar-On).

  the Mossad obtained the “project book” Interview with “Elmo,” August 2010. “Oktoberfest,” January 2013.

  “From that book…we learned a lot” Interview with Ofek, January 24, 2016.

  the security cabinet authorized the prime minister “Decision of the Cabinet Security Committee,” November 4, 1978, shown to author by “Paul.”

  the Israelis believed they’d set back Saddam’s nuclear ambitions Interviews with Harari, February 12, 2014, and “Black,” September 2016.

  “the brains of the project” Interview with Ofek, January 17, 2016.

  He was a graduate of Birmingham University A detailed biography of Jafar Jafar appears in Windrom, Critical Mass, 35–40.

  Mashad traveled frequently Interview with “April,” December 2016.

  Hotel security found Mashad’s body Interview with “Black,” June 2015. A partly similar description appears in Ostrovsky, By Way of Deception, 22–25.

  “I thought we were all targeted” Interview with Dr. Khidir Hamza by Hoda Kotb, NBC Dateline research material.

  The Mossad had poisoned him Interviews with “Black,” June 2015, and “Amir,” February 2016. Claire, Raid on the Sun, 76–77.

  he came down with what seemed to be food poisoning For obvious reasons—the use of toxins and the fact that explosions and assassinations were carried out on French soil—Israel maintained tight secrecy about its acts. In 1990, there was a serious leak. A Mossad washout named Victor Ostrovsky announced that he would publish By Way of Deception: The Making of a Mossad Officer, his memoirs, in Canada, a major violation of Mossad rules and Israeli Security. The agency tried to persuade Ostrovsky to withdraw his book. He refused. Agents broke into his publisher’s office and stole the galleys, which turned out to contain a huge amount of information about the agency, some of it accurate, including many pages about the actions taken against Iraq’s nuclear project and Iraqi scientists. The galleys raised no small panic within the Mossad. “I was called to the director’s office and shown the pages referring to me,” said Ami Yaar, who had Ostrovsky as a trainee for some time and is mentioned in the book. “It was very unpleasant.” Yossi Cohen, who was a young officer and a rising star in the Mossad, and met Ostrovsky when they were both trainees, submitted a detailed plan to Mossad chief Shavit for the elimination of Ostrovsky. Shavit liked it and went to Prime Minister Shamir, who vetoed the idea, under the “We don’t kill Jews” rule. Instead, the Mossad asked the courts in Canada and the United States to bar publication of the book based on the confidentiality oath taken by Ostrovsky when he joined the organization. The courts ruled against it, and the entire exercise only gave the book credibility and boosted its sales. Interviews with Ami Yaar, December 3, 2012, “Advantage,” April 2017, “Toblerone,” May 2014, and “Lexicon,” January 2017.

  received a letter containing a blunt warning Nakdimon, Tammuz in Flames, 309 (Hebrew).

  received training in personal security and self-defense The East German Stasi and the KGB, who were in touch with Saddam’s secret services, had learned lessons from the way Wadie Haddad had been eliminated. Interview with “Ilay,” June 2010.

  “The only way still open is bombing from the air” Interview with Hofi, Begin Center, January 11, 2002.

  There was so much tension Interview with Eilam, December 2, 2009.


  leaked the plan for the anticipated attack Interview with Uzi Even, December 2, 2009.

  wrote a memo in his own handwriting to Begin There was great alarm in the defense establishment in the wake of the leak to Peres and his memo to Begin. The attack was postponed and the code names were changed. CoS Eitan ordered a large-scale wiretap of the General Staff and other senior officers who had security clearance for the operation. But the actual whistleblower, Prof. Even, was not identified, and he confessed his role for the first time in an interview with me in 1996. Interview with Even, May 1996. Ronen Bergman, “The First Iraqi Bomb,” Haaretz, May 31, 1996.

  The pilots flew very low By chance, the planes flew right above King Hussein, who was aboard his royal yacht in the Gulf of Aqaba. He must have seen the planes and grasped the direction they were flying, but any warning to the Saudis and Iraqis either got stuck on the way or wasn’t transmitted at all. Nakdimon, Tammuz in Flames, 15–16 (Hebrew).

  The planes reached the target toward sundown Interview with Aviem Sella, May 31, 2011. Nakdimon, Tammuz in Flames, 188–203.

  “the reactor has been totally destroyed” Interview with Ofek, January 24, 2016.

  “This country and its people would have been annihilated” International press conference with Menachem Begin, June 9, 1981. The Israeli action evoked admiration for its execution, but also harsh international political condemnation. It seems that only The Wall Street Journal supported the raid, in an editorial that to this day hangs proudly in that paper’s meeting room.

  Saddam delivered a speech of his own Recordings of Baath Party Supreme Council, Pentagon Archives, CRRC SH.SHTP.A.001.039, courtesy of Prof. Amatzia Baram.

  the bottom of the list of intelligence priorities Interview with Gilad, July 31, 2012.

  a joint Iraqi, Egyptian, and Argentinean effort to develop missiles Interview with “Gauguin,” the agent the Mossad ran in the scientific section of the Condor project in Argentina, June 2016. Director of Central Intelligence, Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case, October 30, 1987, 39.