Alexander the Great Failure

by John D Grainger

  The other victim of Alexander’s career was his own kingdom, Macedon, to

  which we ought to add Greece. Alexander’s expedition left Macedon substantially weakened, and its geographical position left it vulnerable to invasion from the north. It had suffered this repeatedly during the previous two centuries, and it was only in Philip II’s reign that the kingdom became organized and led in such a way that its resistance to invasion was invariably successful. But the price of importing Greek military skills, as Philip did, was also to import Greek ideas and prejudices. Philip adopted the Greek concept of revenge for the Persian invasions, even though those invasions had greatly benefi ted Macedon. His acceptance of

  the idea implies a distortion of his kingdom’s history and a wholesale acceptance of the Greek view of the past.

  Philip’s intentions in invading the Akhaimenid empire cannot be known,

  but Alexander aimed to conquer the world. Inevitably he failed. He also failed to give a proper thought to his kingdom, his primary responsibility. His failure to provide an heir was compounded by draining the kingdom of its manpower;

  both were made worse by his carelessness in dying young; he had doctors who

  knew what was wrong with him and he refused their ministrations. Perhaps he

  really did think he was a god.

  He died in the midst of attempts to impose his authority on his empire,

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  another task he ignored for too long. Even in this he was irresponsible, planning to sail off on a new expedition before the administrative work was properly

  done. He was incapable of delegating work and responsibility, even though the

  history of the next 40 years demonstrates that he commanded a group of offi cers of outstanding ability. He seems to have known he was out of his depth and was fl eeing the problem. It is unlikely that his empire would have survived his absence in Arabia; it survived only a few years after his death.

  Macedon reverted to its old preoccupations. The kingdom’s rulers abandoned

  any attempts to dominate the Balkans. They intervened in Greece brutally, where both Philip and Alexander had used fi nesse and minimum force. The incipient

  unifi cation of Greece represented by the League of Corinth was abandoned

  in place of Macedonian military domination, a condition not wholly beyond

  Macedon’s powers, but one requiring repeated warfare.

  For Greece, the result was as unpleasant as the same domination had been

  for Persia. Greek cities were repeatedly attacked, besieged, conquered, sacked

  – Thebes, Athens, Corinth, Sparta, Argos. They were garrisoned by Macedonian

  and mercenary soldiers, and much of their energy went into paying for their

  conquerors, and in fi nding ways to get rid of them. The constant struggle

  absorbed and wasted the energies of everyone, Greek and Macedonian alike.

  The end came with the Galatians, who broke into and overran Macedon

  with appalling ease. The rural kingdom ceased to exist except as groups of

  scat tered resisters living in cities. Royal authority only revived when Antigonus Gonatas recruited pirates and Galatians to drive other Galatians out. A warrior kingdom such as Macedon could not sink lower. It was the ultimate result of

  Alexander’s expedition, which had meant that his homeland was unable to defend itself.

  I have chosen to emphasize the negative aspects of the great expedition because it is often described as a time of excitement and achievement, with Alexander as hero. This is a view based on the interpretation adopted by the ancient sources, but other points of view are available. Moving away from Alexander shifts one’s angle of vision, and paradoxically emphasizes the role of specifi c individuals.

  The absence of Antipater and Antigonos (and Demetrios) from the campaigns

  Alexander waged in Baktria and India was clearly important for their view of

  the empire. This was the hardest, most costly and nastiest fi ghting of Alexander’s wars, and none of the men involved was unaffected by the experience. The

  Greek garrison/colonists whom Alexander left in Baktria twice attempted to

  escape from the country where he had marooned them; the succeeding Indian

  campaigns revealed Greco-Macedonian warfare at its worst, partly as a result of the hardships of the Baktrian fi ghting. Yet many of the participants were also inspired. India long remained a land of infi nite attraction to the Greeks for its very exoticism, and Baktria exercised a great attraction, becoming the home of

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  192

  many thousands of Greek colonists, who transformed it into a land of cities; the

  ‘thousand cities of Baktria’ became proverbial.

  Of the Macedonian lords who succeeded Alexander, several showed the same

  appreciation of the prospects of these eastern lands. The obvious one is Seleukos, but note also Stasanor, the satrap of Baktria, Peithon, the satrap of Media, who aimed to exercise a supervisory role over the easterners, and the satraps of the east who tended to be long in offi ce. In Baktria, the only satrapy with anything approaching a viable list of governors, Stasanor was satrap from 320 until after 315 (having been satrap of Areia-Drangiana from 329 to 320); Seleukos’ son

  Antiochos ruled it from 294 to 281; Diodotos and his son were successive satraps over a period of perhaps 40 years, beginning under Antiochus I, and eventually led the land into independence. These long periods of rule will have promoted

  stability, and were part of the reason for the Greek migration.

  So, of the three men whose policies were directed at retaining or reviving the unity of the empire of Alexander, only Seleukos had direct experience of the east.

  This allowed him to recruit the cavalry and the elephants with which the Ipsos battle was won. From that time, 301, he also controlled the whole route to the east from the coast of Syria to Baktria along which the emigrants had to travel. He founded or enlarged ten cities in Syria and half a dozen in Iran, not to mention the great Seleukeia-on-the-Tigris. Colonization of these cities and lands by

  Greeks and Macedonians was a major part of his general policy. Of course, it was done for his own reasons, to develop a reliable and sizeable Greco-Macedonian

  population from which he could recruit an army and a civil service, but to do so he had to found cities, provide land, help with seeds, provide tax breaks, and so on. The law of unintended consequences then ensured that other results fl owed from that policy.

  The restoration of the unity of the empire after Antipater’s death therefore

  required that one man be determined to take up the task, that he commanded a

  sizeable army, and that he controlled substantial wealth, but that he should also have experience and support from all parts of the empire. This meant the east as well as the centre (Baktria, Babylonia and Asia Minor) and Macedon. Of these,

  Macedon was crucial, because of its manpower, and because of the psychological charge still contained in the title ‘King of the Macedonians’, but the east was also necessary. Control of eastern manpower sources gave Seleukos his great

  strength. But neither Antipater nor Antigonos showed any interest. Antipater

  simply ignored the area. Antigonos could have tapped into that power source,

  and, if he had, Seleukos would never have had his chance, but he was content to have beaten Eumenes.

  The real obstacle to the unity of the empire was therefore fi rst of all the family of Antipater, the man himself, uninterested in anything outside Macedon, and

  Kassander, who took after his father in this as in much else; and secondly the

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  193

  family of Antigonos, none of whom saw the potential of the east. The potential of Macedon, even after Alexander, was shown by Demetrios’ mobilization, though
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  he characteristically threatened everyone, so that they all combined against him, even the people of Macedon. Even so, even if he had retained Macedon’s support, he would have failed in the face of all the manpower of Asia and the east.

  Antipater and Kassander reflected, in their policies, the prejudices and

  preferences of the Macedonians. Their reaction to Demetrios’ plans, and their

  earlier antipathy towards Antigonos, showed their general antipathy to overseas adventures. They had no ideological imperative to restore the empire their

  king had conquered. Kassander’s policy of resistance to the imperialism of

  Antigonos was thus a well-calculated articulation of what his subjects required.

  Seleukos appeared to have the capability to reunite the empire in 282–281, but his slowness in moving into Macedon rather suggests he knew he would have

  diffi culty there.

  The decisive factor in preventing reunification was partly the obdurate

  resistance of Ptolemy of Egypt, and partly the unwillingness of the Macedonians to exert themselves in the cause, but the major problem was that of the royal succes sion in Macedon. It bears repeating that the accession to power of Alexander on the killing of his father in 336 was the fi rst time in two centuries that a royal succession in Macedon did not see a civil war or a collapse of the state, or both.

  Even then, Alexander had to drive off invaders and indulge in several murders

  to ensure peace. It is scarcely surprising that Alexander’s own death resulted in civil war and political collapse. The problem was repeated on the deaths

  of Antipater, Kassander, Kassander’s sons, Demetrios and Seleukos. Only the

  horrifying experience of the Galatian invasions and the careful manipulations

  and innovations of Antigonos Gonatas ensured that his dynasty succeeded in

  overcoming the problem for the next century.

  The danger was clearly recognized by everyone else: Seleukos and Ptolemy

  organized their successions carefully, well in advance of their deaths. Antigonos the One-Eyed appointed his son king as soon as he took the title himself, and

  Antigonos Gonatas became king on his father’s death as a matter of course.

  Lysimachos’ dynastic disaster was an object lesson to all. The problem lay with the Macedonians. Kassander tried to appoint his successor, but his widow

  then interfered. The Macedonians whom Kassander ruled were those who had

  not gone overseas, the traditionalists who disliked any innovation. Only their experience of the Galatian invasion – another drastic winnowing process – fi nally compelled the abandonment of their indulgence in succession disputes. In the

  meantime they had, by their self-centredness and obduracy, effectively wrecked their own empire.

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  Notes

  Notes to Introduction

  1 See Cartledge (2004), 295–316.

  2 The sources for Alexander are Diodoros, bk 17, Curtius, Plutarch, Alexander, Arrian and Justin.

  3 Toynbee (1969), 421–86.

  Notes to Chapter 1: Macedon 370–359 bc: a failing state

  1 Hammond,

  Griffi th and Walbank (1972), A History of Macedonia vol. 1, covers matters to 550 bc; also Borza (1990), chs 1 to 4.

  2 Ibid., vol. 1; Hammond (1989), chs 1 and 2.

  3 Boardman (1964), 236–39; Isaac (1986).

  4 Knowledge of the Macedonian army before Philip is sparse, but judging by the innovations and improvements he made, it was as described here; Borza (1990), 125–6.

  5 For Upper Macedon, cf. Borza (1990), 31–8.

  6 Hammond

  in

  Macedonia 2.58–60 (on Amyntas; the basic source is Herodotos, Histories, 5.17–20),; and 2.98–102 (on Alexander I); also Errington (1990), 8–13; Borza (1990), 98–115.

  7 Herodotos 5.22; Roos (1985), 162–8.

  8 Strabo 7.326 and 9.434, based on Hekataios (sixth century bc), describes the area as Epirotis; Thucydides, late in the fi fth century, calls it Macedonian.

  9 Hammond

  in

  Macedonia 1.436–39.

  10 Thucydides 2.99.2–4.

  11 On the social ‘structure’ of Macedon, see Hammond in Macedonia 2.150; Errington (1990), 1–8.

  12 Thucydides 1.98.1; Herodotos 7.107; Plutarch, Kimon 7.2–8.3; Isaac (1986), 19–26.

  13 Meiggs (1972); Hammond in Macedonia 2.102–3 and 115–19; Errington (1990), 13–15.

  14 There is no sign whatsoever at any time of a ‘constitution’ for Macedon; the kingdom was ruled by custom and personality; a body of law developed on the basis of precedent.

  15 Thucydides 1.57.3; Aelian, Varia Historia 2.41; Plato, Gorgias 471 a–b; Hammond in Macedonia 2.115.

  16 On the Assembly see Hammond in Macedonia, 2.160–2 and Hatzopoulos (1996).

  196

  N O T E S T O PA G E S 6 – 1 4

  17 Thucydides 2.99.2–100.3; I.G. I(3), 89; Hammond in Macedonia 2.115; Borza (1990), 135.

  18 Hammond in Macedonia 2.115–36.

  19 Hammond in Macedonia 2.137–41; Borza (1990), 161–6.

  20 Hammond in Macedonia 2.146–7.

  21 Borza (1990), 166–71.

  22 Diodoros 14.7.6 (a hunting accident); Aristotle, Politics 1311b 8–35 (assassination by the king’s lover).

  23 Hammond in Macedonia 2.167–72; Errington (1990), 28–30; Borza (1990), 177–9.

  24 Diodoros 14.92.3.

  25 Hammond in Macedonia 2.172–6; Borza (1990), 182 and 296–7.

  26 Ellis (1969), 1–8.

  27 Xenophon, Hellenica 5.2.12–14.

  28 Hammond in Macedonia 2.144–50.

  29 Pausanias 7.25.6.

  30 Thucydides, 1.114.3; Theopompos, FGrH 115, F 384.

  31 Diodoros 15.9.2–3; this is sometimes condemned as a ‘doublet’ of the invasion of ten years earlier, but this time Amyntas is said to have recovered his kingship by his own efforts, a crucial difference from 393/391; Hammond in Macedonia 2.174–6.

  32 Diodoros 15.19.2–5; Xenophon, Hellenica 5.2.12–22.

  33 Diodoros 15.20.3–23.3; Xenophon, Hellenica 5.2.37–3.9 and 3.14–3.26.

  34 Tod, GHI 129, an alliance dated to the mid-370s; Xenophon, Hellenica 6.1.11, noting Athenian reliance on Macedonian shipbuilding timber; Borza (1987), 32–52.

  35 Errington (1990), 222–3 for a summary, with references.

  36 Xenophon, Hellenica 5.3.1., 5.2.15; Diodoros 15.19.3.

  37 Thucydides 2.100.

  38 Tod, GHI 129.

  39 Diodoros 16.2.2; Justin 7.9.1.

  40 Diodoros 16.61.3–5.

  41 Diodoros 15.67; Plutarch, Pelopidas 26.

  42 Diodoros 15.71.1.

  43 Hammond in Macedonia 2.192.

  44 Aeschines 2.26–9; Diodoros 16.2.6; Nepos, Iphikrates 3.2.

  45 Plutarch, Pelopidas 27.2–4.

  46 Hammond in Macedonia 2.178.

  47 Diodoros 15.77.5 and 16.2.4.

  48 Justin 7.5.3, stating that Philip was hostage for three years; Borza (1987); Roesch (1984), 45–60; see also Hatzopoulos (1985), 247–57.

  49 Diodoros 15.81.6; Demosthenes, First Philippic 4.4–5; Tod, GHI 149.

  50 Demosthenes 2.14; Polyainos, 3.10.7 and 14.

  51 Aeschines 2.30; Polyainos, 3.10.8.

  52 Pseudo-Aristotle, Oeconomicus 2.22.

  53 Polyainos 4.10.1.

  54 Frontinus 2.5.19.

  55 Diodoros 16.2.4–5.

  N O T E S T O PA G E S 1 5 – 2 5

  197

  56 Diodoros 16.2.4–6; Griffi th in Macedonia 2.207–8.

  57 Justin 7.4.5 and 8.3.10; Theopompos, FGrH 115, F 27.

  58 Griffi th in Macedonia, appendix 2.

  59 Justin 7.5.6–9; IG II.3055; a statement by Satyros that Philip reigned for 22 years (he actually held power for 24), may suggest that he was regent for Amyntas for two years; Ellis (1971), 15–25; Griffi th in Mac
edonia 2.702–4.

  Notes to World View I: 360 bc

  1 Ryder

  (1965).

  2 Caven (1990); Sanders (1987).

  3 Warmington (1964); Picard (1987).

  4 Cunliffe (1988), chs 2 and 3.

  5 Huergon (1973); Toynbee (1965); Cornell (1995).

  6 Huergon (1973), 176–86; Cornell (1995), ch. 13.

  7 Diodoros 16.69.1; Livy, per. 13 – the treaty is dated to 348 bc or thereabouts.

  8 Livy

  7.23–6.

  9 Herakleides Pontikos, in Plutarch, Camillus 22.

  10 Cook (1983); Weisehofer (1996), part I; Olmstead (1948).

  11 It may have remained as overlord, as Macedon between 513 and 478: Vogelsang (1990), 93–110.

  12 Cawkwell (2005), ch. 8.

  13 Ibid, 1–29.

  14 Cook (1983), 220–3; Weiskopf (1989); Moysey (1991).

  15 Thapar (1966), ch. 3; Raychaudhuri (1996), part II, ch. 2.

  16 Loewe and Shaughnessy (1999), 967–1032.

  Notes to Chapter 2: The security of Macedon, 359–354 bc

  1 Biographies of Philip: Cloche (1955), Cawkwell (1978), Ellis (1976) and Hammond (1994); Griffi th in Macedonia, 2.203–721.

  2 Justin 7.5.1; this item is universally ignored, except by Griffi th in Macedonia 2.181; also Diodoros 16.2.2, though garbled.

  3 Plutarch,

  Pelopidas 26; Diodoros 15.67; Aymard (1954), 15–36.

  4 Athenaios 11.506f (a letter of Karystos of Pergamon).

  5 Diodoros

  16.3.3–4.

  6 Diodoros 16.3.5–4.1; Heskel (1996), 37–56.

  7 Diodoros 16.2.6; Griffi th, Macedonia 211.

  8 Diodoros

  16.3.4.

  9 Griffi th in Macedonia 2.210 note, calls it an ‘impossibility’ that Philip had suffi cient cash for these expenses, but he always spent freely, and was quite capable of emptying his treasury in a good cause; possibly Perdikkas had left it full.

  198

  N O T E S T O PA G E S 2 5 – 3 4

  10 Diodoros 16.4.3.

  11 Diodoros 17.17.4–5; Milns (1966), 167–9.

  12 Griffi th in Macedonia 2.404–14; Hammond (1994), ch. 3; Cawkwell (1978), 30–5.

  13 See discussion by Griffi th in Macedonia 2, appendix 1.

  14 e.g. Diodoros 16.4.3.

  15 Andronicos (1970), 91–107.

  16 The best discussion on this is Griffi th in Macedonia 2.404–31.