Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War

by Andrew Stewart

  With the high commissioners stamping outside the door of the Dominions secretary if they were kept waiting for meetings, the apparently fraught alliance was a constant source of strain within Whitehall throughout the summer months. Eric Machtig, the DO's deputy-head, recorded that his colleagues had been left 'feeling rather tired', and this was not helped by them all having to run for the air-raid shelters on several occasions. Added to this were fire-watching duties organized on a rota basis and the continuing planning for how the department would function in the event of an invasion. There was consequently a sense of relief when in August Churchill ordered that the Administrative Grade of the Civil Service should take a fortnight's leave; the sight of a pen and paper was making one of the department feel 'physically sick'. The greatest problem, even worse than the demands of the Dominions, was the serious shortage of trained personnel available to carry out the mounting range of jobs. It was hoped that the pool of those unfit for military service would provide some help, but nothing was guaranteed.

  Despite these pressures, those working for him found Caldecote 'a delightful chief, completely imperturbable and cheerful in the most desperate moments and crisis', but Churchill had decided it was time he should go and Eden and David Margesson, the chief whip, met secretly with him to discuss possible replace-ments.67 For some months the weary secretary of state had complained that he was little more than 'postman and correspondent', noting with some apparent regret that it had taken until mid-August before Churchill had sent him his first personal minute.68 The announcement, at the very beginning of October 1940, that he would be taking the Lord Chief Justice's chair as part of a major reconstruction of the government following Neville Chamberlain's resignation on health grounds, was well received within the ranks of the Dominion representatives.69 Sitting next to the Minister for Food, Lord Woolton, at a lunch, Waterson told him how Caldecote had gathered the high commissioners together to tell them in great secrecy that he would be leaving that evening. As the South African high commissioner put it, the group was 'so embarrassed that there was complete silence: they could not honestly say that they were sorry, because he had been quite useless in this as in every other Government office that he has achieved'.70 Duncan, the governor-general in South Africa, was also pleased at the move but could not understand why Churchill had not felt sufficiently confident to have gone even further and removed 'some of those whose only claim to remain in high office is that they were once fortunate enough to get there'.71

  He was delighted, however, in the selection as new secretary of state, Robert Gascoyne-Cecil who, as Lord Cranborne, had resigned from Chamberlain's Cabinet in 1938 alongside Anthony Eden in protest at the government's foreign policy.72 The new appointee had been a popular figure within Whitehall to everybody aside from arch-Chamberlain supporters, such as Kingsley Wood, to whom he was one of the 'glamour boys'.73 The connection between Churchill and his newly appointed Dominions secretary was a long-standing one. Ever since Robert Cecil had acted as an adviser to Queen Elizabeth I, his family had enjoyed a significant role in British political affairs. The Third Marquess of Salisbury, Cranborne's grandfather, held the distinction of having been prime minister on three occasions.74 He had also been the man who had finally destroyed the career of Lord Randolph Churchill. For this reason, according to one who knew him well during the wartime period, the son 'could never quite make up his mind whether to admire the House of Cecil or resent it on his father's posthumous behalf'.75 Even before Cranborne's February 1938 speech to the Commons, following his resignation as the FO's under-secretary to the Foreign Office, the next generation of Cecils was among his closest acquaintances. On that occasion Churchill had in fact been one of the first to offer his congratulations.76

  To close observers, what would prove perhaps more significant in terms of their wartime relationship, was their ability to put 'political quarrels in a compartment entirely separate from personal friendship'.77 This was clearly not always the case, Churchill confiding to his son towards the war's end of the difficulties of working with Cranborne who 'might easily be ill one fortnight and very obstinate the next'.78 The prime minister had presumably assumed that his new Downing Street neighbour could be counted on not to make too many waves. In July 1940 Cranborne had been offered the position of Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Aliens but had declined citing ill health as the reason. Churchill had commented at the time that if he could not take on this job because of his poor health 'there is not much in burdening him with the duties of serving as a member [of the Cabinet]'.79 Yet now he asked him to become a minister whose responsibilities called for him to handle what already appeared to be an extremely uncertain alliance. After the fall of France in July 1940, Punch had published a cartoon showing two soldiers looking out to sea. One of them says, 'So our poor old Empire is alone in the world', and the other replies 'Aye, yes we are—the whole five hundred million of us'.80 There must have been times when it was felt within Whitehall and in the British High Commissions overseas that this could not be further from the truth.

  Coalition United

  The appointment of the Fifth Marquess of Salisbury in October 1940 carried with it a significance for Anglo-Dominion relations that cannot be overstated.1 Although it was only his second Cabinet position, and still acknowledged as being very much a junior one, 'Bobbety', as he was known to his peers, brought with him an enormous sense of enthusiasm and determination. As one of those who knew him well said of him, although 'frail in body'—the result of having been gassed in the trenches during the last war—he made up for it with 'the robustness of his spirit'.2 One of his DO staff detected 'an unusual range of gifts and accomplishments' with a 'subtlety' to his intelligence, 'a strong sense of pride', 'a natural courtesy towards all' and 'a lively and amusing mind, with a keen sense of humour'. This left him well suited for the demands of working in the department.3 Despite being a long-standing friend, he was not afraid to tackle Churchill on the need to provide more information to the Dominions and give them a greater say in coalition management. Cranborne was not suggesting any greater permanent presence; indeed he was particularly dismissive of the idea that a second London-based Imperial War Cabinet should be established. What he instead argued was that, if for no other reason than the progressively greater contributions of manpower and material they were providing, the British government needed to be more open with the Dominions and its leaders.

  He was quick to show his resolve to resist measures which he believed might harm his new department. Both of his wartime predecessors had tried to do the same but their efforts had generally been frustrated. Cranborne was quick to try and offer reassurance, not least to the Union of South Africa and Australia, telling them that he recognized the amount of information they received was still far from adequate.4 Shortly after his appointment he had written to Waterson apologizing that he had not been told before Eden's October 1940 visit to Egypt, a slip which had embarrassed and angered the South African.5 This appeared to gain him little in the eyes of a high commissioner who had been critical of both of his predecessors and was uncertain about the new man, 'the usual inbred perfect gentleman, full of good qualities but really not tough enough for our purposes'. Bruce would reserve judgement, but only because he had been told that the new minister had 'ability and guts' and just needed the opportunity to prove himself.

  Massey was alone in thinking him to be 'an admirable choice'.6 Waterson's view seemed harsh indeed as the early suggestions were that a more dogmatic and pugnacious attitude now prevailed within the DO with a Dominions secretary not afraid to disagree with his Whitehall colleagues.7

  His greatest clashes would be reserved for Churchill. This was particularly unfortunate as the rapid deterioration in relations between the two that resulted coincided with a growing political challenge based in part around the actions of one of the Dominion's leaders. During the inter-war years Australia had been alone in arguing that greater cooperation was needed, and by the late 1930s it was being s
aid in Canberra that the level of consultation was insufficient to meet the requirements of the worsening European situation. Following the 1938 Munich Crisis, Menzies, the then Australian Attorney General, placed himself at the head of a campaign for a united British Empire foreign policy, but his proposals for a 'permanent Imperial Secretariat' were rejected by a majority of the other senior figures in Dominion political circles.8 His appointment as the country's leader following Joe Lyons's death in March 1939 only strengthened the fervour of this self-avowed imperialist. Despite a precarious domestic political position, he had been the one Dominion leader constantly prepared to visit London during France's slow and painful collapse.9 A telegram he sent to London in mid-June talked of the great comfort he would gain if there could be a Dominion prime ministers' conference to discuss 'empire defence'. Churchill politely declined the request but it did little to deter his counterpart in Canberra.10

  The Dakar incident seems to have been taken by Menzies as the perfect excuse to push for improvements to be made.11 From the war's outset he had complained that the supply of information was very meagre and that there were events happening which 'vitally concerned Australia but about which nothing was known until afterwards'.12 Now a year later, although he was apparently dismissive of the need for an actual, enlarged Imperial War Cabinet, he still wanted a formal meeting. At this he wanted to know why Britain was 'keeping the Dominions a bit at arm's length' when it came to the war's progress.13 His position at home looked tenuous; as one of his colleagues bemoaned to a friend in London, most of Menzies' colleagues were now 'eager for his blood'. A meeting demonstrating his statesmanlike qualities at the heart of the Empire would have been attractive; the problem that he faced was finding supporters.14 Even the DO believed that a London conference was unfeasible and had done since earlier in the year. Half-hearted plans had been made for something, probably in July or early August 1940, but these were curtailed by the German Blitzkrieg.15 A detailed summary of the various proposals that had been put forward had been prepared within the DO and, following Chamberlain's resignation, a copy had been submitted to Churchill that same month.16 Both then and now it was felt there was no possibility of Smuts or Mackenzie King being willing to attend, but discouraging Menzies outright would have 'a chilling effect'; the War Cabinet was told that the idea might be welcomed but not the proposed timing.17

  There were a number of political considerations to be borne in mind in Whitehall. A recent warning given to Churchill by an old political colleague had spoken of the growing parliamentary campaign to get a Dominion representative into the War Cabinet.18 That this proposal had its backers had been made abundantly clear in the House of Lords. Gideon Oliphant-Murray, the 2nd Viscount Elibank, was a Scottish aristocrat and staunch imperialist and he was certainly the most vocal proponent of the creation of an Imperial War Cabinet. Variations on a similar theme had been referred to earlier in the summer of 1940 in both Houses but his would be the most sustained. He had told his peers that the Dominions were playing a sizeable role and asked that a 'greater unification of war direction on the part of the Empire' be considered. He proposed that the Dominions be included in the Cabinet and suggested that Bruce could prove an excellent addition. As the former Liberal chief whip reassured the prime minister, his appeal was in fact an attempt 'to induce the Dominions [to] do more'.19 Aside from this irritation there was also the British leader's desire to demonstrate that there remained a continued resolve amongst the Allied combatants to continue the war against Germany. U-boat attacks against British shipping in the Atlantic were worsening, the Luftwaffe's aerial campaign against London showed little sign of ending, while Italy's invasion of Greece, which had begun in October 1940, further threatened Britain's Mediterranean interests.20 Churchill wished to hold a Supreme War Council meeting to send a message to the neutrals, particularly the United States. He therefore proposed that the now Occupied Powers and Dominion governments be asked to send representatives but Mackenzie King found the idea 'distasteful'.21 The prime minister was unmoved and warned he would press ahead regardless and when Cranborne attempted to explain possible reasons behind the Canadian leader's mood, Churchill responded angrily.22 He now argued that it was the use of the term 'Supreme War Council' instead of the Cabinet-agreed 'Conference of Allied Representatives' which had created the problem and given Mackenzie King 'a puddle at which he was sure to shy'.23 The Dominions secretary had in fact first sought the FO's advice before he had contacted Ottawa and it was only when Churchill was told this by a third party that he calmed down.24

  It might have been politically expedient or a residual effect of this incident, but it was only a few weeks later, in early December 1940, that the Dominions secretary was summoned to Chequers and informed that it was now proposed to move him. Various diaries speak of his name being put forward as ambassador in Washington or even viceroy of India. He was actually asked to become the secretary of state for India and take his hereditary seat in the House of Lords where he could then also answer FO questions. This provoked a long and emotional response:

  As you know I was in the first doubtful about it, and the more I think, the more reluctant I feel, from many points of view. For one thing I am quite certain the Dominions themselves would greatly resent such frequent changes in the DO. They have already had three secretaries of state in little more than a year. If now they are asked to accept a fourth, they will draw the conclusion that they are regarded as of no account, and that the Office is treated merely as a receptacle for odd men out. They are exceedingly sensitive and the effect on them, especially at this moment when they are making so great an effort, might only too probably be deplorable.25

  Adding to tensions was the growing anger within the DO over the question of information. During the summer Caldecote had presented the War Cabinet with a paper asking that the fullest possible account of wartime developments be given to the Dominions.26 Now Colonel William Bishop, the department's military liaison officer, attacked the continuing official reluctance to allow 'secret' information to be sent out, in a lengthy and often bitterly critical internal minute.27 This had been sparked by a letter from Churchill to the recently re-elected President Roosevelt outlining the war situation and the British position. Bishop thought it an outstanding review and wanted it sent to the Dominions but the proposal was rejected by the Service Departments who cited the prime minister's directive.28 The military officer believed that the time had come when Churchill needed to be tackled directly on his policy and Cranborne agreed, confiding to his deputy his fear that the country's leader had decided on a policy of communicating 'as little information' as he could get away with and even then 'only in reply to specific requests'.29 On one occasion it had even been suggested that a proposed telegram to his Dominion counterparts outlining the real figures for captured German U-boats should be delayed, it being better 'to let sleeping statistics lie'.30 He was not alone with his concerns, during the preceding month the Dominions secretary had received a number of similar complaints from Whitehall colleagues. He therefore wrote to Churchill just two days before Christmas reminding him that sharing information with the other Dominion leaders helped gain their confidence and ensured their practical cooperation.31 The oft-quoted response sent on Christmas Day 1940 took the form of a stern rebuke. There was 'a danger that the Dominions Office staff get into the habit of running a kind of newspaper full of deadly secrets' and the prime minister wanted anything 'of a very secret nature' to be approved by him in future before it was sent.32

  Churchill was clearly angered by events, even telling Bruce that the DO was ineffectual, although he did not refer to Cranborne by name.33 The Dominions secretary was, however, the obvious target as was clear from him being told not to attend the Tuesday meetings of the War Cabinet, the point being emphasized to him that these were reserved for those within government who made policy. He was not one of these people and his presence was therefore deemed to be surplus to requirements.34 Bobbety could do little but accept the
new arrangements despite the obvious restrictions it would place on his ability to discuss future war strategy with the alliance members. He did, however, try to offer some further explanation to Churchill as to why he had protested. The Dominions were not complaining about the lack of prior consultation about the Dakar operation—although they were privately angry—it was the fact that they had not even been informed that it was taking place and had to learn this from the Press that was the cause of their concern. They were also not claiming 'any right to supervise the work of the War Cabinet'; they just wanted to feel that they were in the full confidence of the British leadership. Few within the DO believed the prime minister would change his mind and although he soon seemed a little more receptive to requests from the department, it was nonetheless clear that the Dominions secretary was out in the cold.35