Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War

by Andrew Stewart

  This was the position when, in January 1941 Menzies set out on a journey to London to carry out a 'chancy undertaking' for which he had been long planning.36 The month before, Clement Attlee, the leader of the Labour party but also Churchill's deputy in the wartime national unity government, had told the House of Commons no Dominions' representative would be joining the War Cabinet but this did not deter the Australian.37 The continuing difficulties he faced at home, his own political ambitions, a genuine sense of personal unease over the nature of the relationship Australia enjoyed with Britain and more general fears among his countrymen about future security in both the Mediterranean and Pacific regions all led him to make his decision to travel. Although he had assured his parliamentary colleagues that his absence would be brief, his decision to travel via Singapore and the Middle East to examine the strategic position at each of these key Imperial bastions meant that it would be nearly four months before he returned home. Menzies arrived in London in late February and was welcomed by a sympathetic press campaign, support he continued to enjoy throughout his stay.38 Within days he had a meeting with Churchill, the first between the two men, although the visit to Chequers did not augur well for the future. The Australian politician found his host a 'tempestuous creature' whose attire and general demeanour apparently shocked him, the haranguing of the 'holy terror' eventually sending him to bed a tired man.39 Nonetheless he chose to report back to Canberra in overwhelmingly positive tones, his host's qualities being 'much greater than we thought'. Menzies had also quickly formed the view that there was no doubt that Australia was 'Dominion Number One'.40 Throughout the next two months he experienced events in Britain first-hand, attending War Cabinet meetings whenever possible and generally trying to place himself at the heart of the policy- and decision-making processes. By the time of his final meeting with Churchill, the night prior to his return to Australia, he was convinced that all was not well at the heart of the Empire.

  His Damascene moment was yet to come; in the meantime there was war business to consider. As has been seen, Australian and New Zealand troops had become central to the war being fought in the deserts of North Africa in so much as they formed a sizeable part of the army assembled in the region. Initially their experiences had been victorious as British Commonwealth troops triumphed against the Italians, invaders of Egypt the summer before but now in full retreat. In East Africa, British, Indian and South African troops emulated the rout and the Abyssinian capital of Addis Ababa was captured in early April. The problem came with the subsequent decision to intervene in Greece and defend Crete. Although very upset at being told by a senior British general, during his brief visit to the Middle East, that the Australian troops were 'terribly badly disciplined and caused a great deal of trouble', Menzies had agreed that his country's forces could be used.41 The coalition now found itself facing the military might of Germany and not its more inferior Italian ally and defeat brought with it great political strains as Anzac troops suffered heavy losses of men and equipment.42

  As it became clear that British Commonwealth forces were poised to suffer a tragic defeat on the Peloponnesian peninsula, so Menzies' attitude towards the Empire's leader changed. Despite his later description of him as a 'great warrior-statesman [and] an unrivalled benefactor to posterity', privately he was now more scathing about 'the greatest asset and greatest danger' the Empire faced.43 There were others who agreed and as Churchill sank deeper into a growing political storm, Menzies was to be found at the heart of the intrigues complicit in the conspirators' meetings and discussions. In the final hours of his stay, he made his plans clear to Lord Hankey who had been demoted by the prime minister in May 1940 and was now centrally embroiled in the campaign opposing him. It was argued that there was only one possible course of action to be followed; an Imperial War Cabinet had to be summoned after which one of the Dominion leaders would have to stay behind. Elibank had stood again in the House of Lords in early April 1941 to raise the matter, but his peers had still generally doubted whether such a move would actually improve the conduct of the war and they were also unsure about how it might operate.44 Menzies' cabal had the answers: there would be a similar role to that played by Smuts in the last war, 'not as a guest but as a full member' and the Australian clearly thought he was the man for the job.45 Having discussed this with Sir John Simon, another whose loyalties to Churchill were doubtful, Hankey urged his Australian accomplice to seek one final meeting with the British leader. This was arranged but he could get 'no change' out of his host and he departed for North America and the long trip home where political crisis awaited him.46

  His departure did not, however, mean an end to the intrigues and, in Menzies' absence, the anti-Churchill campaign soon reached its climax. During the first week of May 1941 a confidence debate was called in the House of Commons but despite the best efforts of such senior figures as Lloyd George and Hore-Belisha, the vote was won handsomely by the prime minister.47 The following day, Cranborne felt it prudent to warn Churchill of the true nature behind Menzies recent visit, advising him that he should 'have the background, in case you have not already got it'. The simple answer that came back to the DO was 'I have got it'.48 This was something of a rare written communication between the two. In March Cranborne had sought approval to send to the Dominion governments an appreciation made by the British military authorities of the likely chances of invasion but Churchill still would not cooperate, arguing that such 'questionable stuff' was not needed to frighten the Dominions into doing their duty. Secret intelligence, despite the department's continuing reservations, was still not to be sent to the Dominion governments.49

  It was at this stage that the British leader signalled a pronounced change in policy. He had been told by Mackenzie King that Menzies, who had just left Ottawa on his way home, had argued passionately for a meeting of Dominion leaders later in the year. Churchill now replied back to Mackenzie King that some form of meeting in August or September might be in order.50 This was perhaps a reaction to the press campaign by Lord Beaverbrook's Daily Express championing a role for Menzies and the associated public support for a conference that now existed.51 Reminding Churchill that even basic discussion of the idea had previously created problems, Cranborne was adamant that such a meeting would be difficult to organize. The Canadian leader's views remained critical and he was not interested. Within a matter of days, as the German attack began on the Imperial forces holding Crete, the Dominions secretary received a personal letter from Ottawa carrying exactly the same message, but Churchill remained apparently interested in the idea of an inter-Allied council throughout that summer.52 Cranborne urged, in response, that serious thought was required as Mackenzie King was 'still clearly very wobbly about coming'.53 He had discussed this question privately with Malcolm MacDonald who, in April 1941, had been sent out to Ottawa as the new British high commissioner.54 The former Minister for Health was able to tell him that Menzies had formed the lowest opinion of the War Cabinet and Cranborne himself. Writing back to him, the Dominions secretary agreed with some of his arguments, especially that there should be some kind of a 'watchdog' to champion their interests although he felt Menzies might not 'have ability of the very highest kind'. The more obvious logistical difficulties involved in quickly assembling the various Dominion leaders in London were also noted as was the potential danger that calling an unexpected meeting could lead to a popular belief that there was 'some new and spectacular development' to discuss.

  Churchill's interest in the idea was still, however, undimmed and he requested that the DO produce for the War Cabinet a case 'stating forth the pros and cons' about holding a meeting. Cranborne used this to once again press forcefully his argument that the suggestion should be deferred. At the head of his list of reasons for not issuing 'embarrassing' invitations, he placed Mackenzie King's reluctance as the most powerful and by the end of the first week of June he was able to inform Churchill that the foreign secretary agreed with him. Eden, with his own bitter personal
experience of working with the Canadian leader, had been persuaded that postponement would be best.55 With reports reaching Whitehall that Australian and New Zealand troops in the Middle East were growing unhappy, Menzies had meanwhile resumed his campaign as soon as he was back at home.56 And in London there continued to be a considerable clamour from figures within both the political and military spectrums that he should be asked to return. Hankey remained convinced that both Menzies and Lloyd George needed to be brought into the government, 'two wise old elephants to tame the rogue elephant'. In response to the continuing intrigues Cranborne broadened his arguments and suggested that Smuts be called upon to come to London. This was a sensible proposal and one likely to find favour with the prime minister as the friendship between the two was well known. The year before one of Churchill's assistants had even proposed that were the British leader to die, his 'remarkable' South African counterpart would make an ideal replacement.57

  With the South African leader now officially asked if he could help, his own high commissioner in London also began to try and draw him more prominently into the debate. Throughout 1941 neither Waterson nor Bruce had shown any indication of stopping their campaign to enhance their position.58 In July they had not been given any advance warning that Iceland was to be garrisoned by American troops, a source of particular anger to them; as a result the Australian had even threatened to ignore the Secretary of State in future and make his own 'representations in highest quarters'.59 But with the mounting calls for an Imperial presence in the War Cabinet, the two men's approach now differed. Bruce had gone on record, on more than one occasion, as doubting the wisdom of the 'impracticable' idea and he remained firm in his view that the only sensible option was to give the high commissioners a far greater role. Consequently he appeared to make every effort to keep himself close to the centre of events from where he could counter any proposals that could see his position threatened.60 South Africa's representative had a similar agenda in regard to promoting his own role but he used a different method. With the DO asking Smuts to visit London, Waterson told his prime minister that there were continuing deficiencies in the system and it would be useful to have at least one Dominion leader present at all times sitting in the War Cabinet. He was told in response that while he shared his concerns, Smuts was mindful about any proposal that could be seen as forming an Imperial War Cabinet. He further warned his high commissioner about becoming too closely connected to Bruce and potentially embarrassing suggestions.61 These comments were repeated to the Dominions secretary leaving Cranborne in a position to now ask Churchill formally whether there should be a conference or not at this stage.62 Every indication had been that the prime minister had followed this course knowing that he could count on Canadian and South African reservations. He certainly had no desire for a permanent representative in the War Cabinet as he had confirmed during a dinner at Chequers. As his secretary recorded, '"Well", said the PM, "you can easily turn the War Cabinet into a museum of Imperial celebrities, but then you have to have another body to manage it"'.63 Smuts' rejection left him free to 'regretfully' agree to a delay and reject any idea of extending an invitation to Menzies to return alone to London.64

  There was, however, still one potential problem threatening what had proven to be an otherwise masterly strategy. Cranborne advised Churchill that the discussions with Smuts and the Canadian leader had been of a private character and, as such, there were fears about the effect of 'a blunt announcement' saying they could not attend. A telegram was duly despatched to Ottawa and the other Dominion capitals. This informed the various prime ministers that, in light of the public interest which the issue had aroused, there was an urgent need to make a statement on the matter at Westminster. It went on to advise them of what it was intended to say in light of what had been received from certain of them.65 Faced by growing domestic hostility about what was perceived as an apparent lack of enthusiasm for travelling to London, the proposed message now upset Mackenzie King.66 Canada's apparent tardiness in terms of mobilizing her resources during the early stages of the war had drawn the attention of the FO where, from within the American section, it was put down to 'a disingenuous—in fact dishonest -desire' which would best benefit the Canadian government and not its British counterpart. Strong stuff indeed, but it reflected a feeling within sections of Whitehall that Mackenzie King was not a great supporter of the alliance. This particular observer even felt that whatever the outcome of the war, at its end, the British government would retain no status of any kind in Canada.67 So concerned was the Canadian leader with Churchill's suggested message that he requested mention be made that the current war was entirely different to the last and a conference was unnecessary. Churchill preferred not to give too many details beyond the inability of the Dominion leaders to attend, and largely ignored the request. Going into too many details might have kept the domestic debate going and, as it stood, he had neatly placed elsewhere the onus of responsibility for the decision not to proceed. In the last week of June 1941 he therefore stood before the House of Commons and explained how, having been invited, 'the exigencies of their work in their respective countries' made it impossible for the various Dominion leaders to visit London.68

  This announcement was not well received in Ottawa. MacDonald sent three private notes to the DO at the beginning of August in which he detailed the events of the last few weeks. So sensitive did he feel these to be that he attached a strong plea to Cranborne not to pass on anything that might upset Churchill and lead to a serious quarrel 'between him and one or more of the Dominion prime ministers'.69 This was a necessary warning in light of what he had to say; despite the high commissioner's reassurances that Mackenzie King admired his British counterpart enormously, there were apparently those in his cabinet who had described Churchill as a 'cad' for what he had said.70 More significantly there had also been further proposals from Menzies for a London meeting, this time in a private telegram sent in mid-July 1941 to both the Canadian and Smuts. In this the Australian had outlined his concerns about how the war was being run from London, and reiterated the need for some form of permanent Dominion representation in the British War Cabinet. MacDonald thought the Canadian leader should attend but his host disliked what he saw as an attempt by Menzies to drag him into 'his personal ambitions'. The continuing intrigues left Cranborne angry for as he explained to MacDonald, they confirmed his own conversations with Menzies back in May. During these he had freely told the Dominions secretary, even though he knew him to be one of Churchill's ministers and friends, that he was prepared to give up the Australian leadership if necessary and enter British politics after the war with the aim of one day becoming the leader of the Conservative Party. The infuriated secretary of state roundly condemned Menzies for a 'not very pretty role' motivated 'to a considerable extent by personal motives'.71 The Australian was increasingly desperate to be invited back to London, so much so that he asked Bruce to 'have a confidential chat with [Max] Beaverbrook' to assess his prospects.72 Although appearing reluctant to tell Churchill the extent of Menzies' intrigues, the Dominions secretary at the same time discussed the scheming that had been taking place with Eden, one of the so-called 'Yes-Men' whom Menzies had so indiscreetly referred to on numerous occasions. The foreign secretary was asked for his comments on the potential constitutional problems that any move to include Menzies in the War Cabinet might entail. He was clearly concerned by what he heard, his secretary Oliver Harvey noting his particular worries about Menzies' potential return to London and a likely attempt 'to [try and] get into English politics via the War Cabinet'.73

  With events in the Australian capital moving towards their conclusion, Mackenzie King arrived in London a victim of domestic public pressure that he should make such a trip. Initially scheduled for late August he had wavered to the last moment, Churchill's conference with President Roosevelt, held off the coast of Newfoundland, ultimately proving decisive.74 Not wishing Mackenzie King to be involved, the British prime minister had de
liberately kept details of his mission vague, only telling him he was going after pleas from within the Cabinet Office in London. The Canadian had been embarrassed and now needed to save face by being seen to be briefed in person by Churchill. As MacDonald again took the opportunity to point out to Cranborne, the Canadian had been consistently critical of Menzies' schemes and he hoped that this loyalty would be highlighted to Churchill if the opportunity arose.75 Mackenzie King, meanwhile, saw in his visit an opportunity to discuss Menzies' proposals in person with one of his Dominion colleagues. The New Zealand leader, Peter Fraser, had also been in London to meet the British government, and remained purposely to see his counterpart. Speaking privately to him he made it quite clear that he felt it would be inappropriate 'to give the impression that people here can't do the job'. He had sat in a number of War Cabinet meetings and he told Mackenzie King that he had found them to involve 'the freest and frankest discussion and expression of view'.76 Not only did he therefore disagree with Menzies' arguments, he was adamant that there was 'no need for an Imperial Conference'. Smuts, who had recently been in Cairo, had contacted Churchill to again offer an entirely similar view, providing confirmation that three of the four Dominion leaders agreed there was no justification for calling a conference at this stage.77