Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions and the Second World War

by Andrew Stewart

  After concluding his meeting with Roosevelt and returning home, one of Churchill's first acts had been to despatch a telegram to Canberra.78 This made it unmistakably clear to Menzies that, were he to decide to visit London once again, he would only be permitted to attend the War Cabinet in the same manner as with his earlier visit and only so long as he remained Australia's leader. This final point perhaps reflected the degree to which Menzies' increasingly tenuous hold over his political position in Canberra had become common knowledge.79 Now a subject of widespread debate in Whitehall, common agreement among some of the 'Yes-Men' held that he only had himself to blame. The Australian had, however, left himself with little option other than to press forward and, against the backdrop of a marked deterioration in relations with Japan, he had secured the support of his cabinet colleagues that he should return to London to try and secure a permanent Dominion seat at the highest political table.80 While he was securing this backing, Mackenzie King and Churchill were proving to be as one in their outlook, the Canadian reassuring his host that it was the British view and not that of Australia which was viewed more favourably in his mind. So good were relations between the two leaders that Mackenzie King felt he 'would [not] be betraying any trust but rather doing my duty' in sharing the private memorandum that had been sent privately to him some five weeks before. Only later would he ask that his part not be recorded formally as he did not want Menzies 'to think I had not been square with him'. Massey, who during recent months had somewhat assiduously kept himself at a distance from the conspiracies of certain of his fellow high commissioners, felt his prime minister had pursued an excellent line.81

  With the Australian leader's London plans thwarted, his future seemed hopeless. Although he had the backing of his cabinet, the influential Advisory War Council was less enamoured with his plans and with an even division in the House of Representatives, his detractors were effectively able to silence his pleas. According to Ronnie Cross, who had only recently arrived in Canberra as high commissioner, the desire to be rid of him had various grounds and included 'bitter personal enmities, ambitions of would be successors, Menzies' alleged lack of capacity for decision and action, and his lack of popular appeal'.82 When he had been sworn into office in April 1939 the Australian prime minister had initially expected his government would last for only six weeks; that he was only now finally being forced to resign was therefore surely something of a success. Although he remained privately 'quite outspoken' about the degree to which Menzies had tried to get to London 'instead of staying with his own people', in front of his colleagues, Churchill appeared more forgiving, contacting him to offer his thanks for his 'courage' and 'help' during 'two terrible years'. About the Australian high commissioner on the other hand, whose fellow South African agitator was already preparing to recant some of his previous errors to Smuts, he was less generous.83 There were few doubts though about the heartfelt thanks that Mackenzie King received from Churchill for his assistance upon his eventual return to Ottawa.84 Massey felt that his visit to London had been a very great success and was once again glad that it was his prime minister who had 'given the quietus to the ill-thought out proposal'.85

  The Canadian was not the only person to emerge from the episode with his reputation enhanced. From early May onwards, when he had first learnt of the full extent of Menzies' sometimes nefarious ambitions, Cranborne had maintained a scrupulously supportive stance of Churchill. Irrespective of whether this had actually improved the somewhat damaged relationship or not, he had not viewed this episode as an opportunity to 'mend fences' but, instead, an opportunity to support the prime minister and frustrate the Westminster conspirators. He was just glad to see an end to the Australian-inspired foibles, writing to a close Whitehall friend on the last day of August that it was better for all that the threat from Menzies had been removed. The Australian had made 'more of a hash of things than one would have thought possible' and throughout the summer months his 'intriguing [had been] a constant danger'.86

  What he cannot have anticipated, however, was the degree to which the strains on the alliance were about to increase out of all proportion. A change in leadership in Canberra did not mean a change of view and the pressure on the British government to better recognize and appreciate the growing significance of the Dominions was already all but guaranteed.

  Pacific Test

  With Menzies' fall, his political challenge to Britain's leader was no more, but this did not signal an end to the tensions that had increasingly dominated relations between the two countries throughout the year. It would be down to his successor to finally secure an agreement that an Australian ministerial representative be allowed to attend the War Cabinet. Arthur Fadden had been appointed leader of the Country Party in October 1940 as a compromise candidate.1 As Treasurer in Menzies' coalition government, during his London visit he served as acting prime minister. Many of his political colleagues viewed him as a natural choice for leader, much safer and a more popular individual than his predecessor. There is even some suggestion that he might have encouraged this view, working at the head of the Canberra-based conspiracy which helped bring about Menzies' downfall. His new position was not the strongest, parliament refused to form a 'national' government and was clearly restless for further change and he remained still entirely dependent on the support of two Independent MPs for a majority. Many observers saw the new administration as, at best, a stopgap measure and few thought it would be long before power moved into the hands of the Labour leader, John Curtin.2 The pending Budget debate, which had to be concluded in September 1941, seemed to offer every opportunity for the opposition to mount a serious challenge but despite his weak position he lost little time in tackling the British authorities.3 Ronnie Cross reported back that the new leader was likeable on a social level, 'you couldn't meet a better chap in a bar' where there would be 'streams of rollicking smut', and he found him to be 'good-natured' and 'shrewd'. Despite such sentiments he also warned Whitehall, although only much later, that Fadden was, professionally, suspect and had 'hardly any real thoughts of his own'.4

  From London Bruce advised that the British leader was opposed to anybody being admitted into the War Cabinet other than a prime minister. He repeated his view that such proposals should be dropped.5 This recommendation was ignored, Fadden telling the local press that he would soon be in a position to give them an actual name of the appointee; only a last-minute intervention from Cross, given in 'blunt terms', prevented him from going further. He could not, however, be dissuaded from contacting Churchill and telling him that an Australian minister would be sent to London on a special mission.6 This development had been anticipated within Whitehall and the preparation of a detailed response had been begun well in advance of the news being received.7 The new Australian leader was congratulated on his appointment before being told exactly what had been said to Menzies.8 Each of the Dominions had been asked previously to register their views on representation and, aside from Australia, each had rejected the idea. The rest of the alliance was 'well content with present arrangements'. So far as Churchill was concerned, Fadden could send anybody he wished, they would be treated with 'utmost consideration and honour' but they would have no special access to the War Cabinet. Even Waterson felt this was the right line to have adopted as this was 'an obviously impossible proposition'. Previously an agitator for a permanent Dominion role, the South African high commissioner had come to believe that anybody other than a prime minister would prove to be 'not only useless but embarrassing' as they would be joining an executive body which could not 'wait whilst a member refers things to another body for instructions'. He doubted the long-term merits of 'the British PM telling the Australian PM where to get off' and what this might mean for the coalition, but he hoped that Fadden would take Churchill's comments in the 'right spirit'. Privately he urged Smuts to consider making 'tactful representations' to his new Australian counterpart to stop 'rocking the boat'.9 The South African leader in turn was reluctant to int
ervene at this point, believing that Mackenzie King, who was still visiting London, would be far better placed to 'forestall the trouble' of potentially 'awkward constitutional questions'.

  Churchill had followed up on his earlier stiffly worded telegram to Fadden with a much more restrained message.10 There were reassurances and the promise that Britain 'would never let you down if real danger comes'. Fadden responded in turn with the barest suggestion of an apology. The earlier messages, he explained, were unavoidable as the threat to Australia became more obvious, making security the 'predominant thought in people's minds'.11 The following day though he returned to his earlier position, now referring to discussions held during the 1937 Imperial Conference and, in the process, effectively issuing the British government with an ultimatum.12 The Australian delegates at the meeting four years before apparently thought they had secured a firm commitment from the CID that in time of war, Dominion representation in London would be expanded to offer them a greater say. Although appreciative of the efforts made by the Dominions secretary, the authorities in Canberra now believed that the time had come for 'direct consultation' as opposed to relying on Cranborne who, they still noted, remained largely excluded from the War Cabinet. This had been noted elsewhere in the pages of The Times which had followed closely the summertime clamour for an Imperial War Cabinet. Allowing him access would actually make no huge difference other than 'recognize the prestige attached to the office'. But, as an editorial at the end of August stated bluntly, his role needed to be fortified and making him a permanent member of the War Cabinet would surely suffice to meet 'the very reasonable desire' of the Dominions for a closer level of participation.13 While he would have obviously been aware of such suggestions with his relations with Churchill still uncertain, Bobbety was too discreet to be associated with them.

  The secretary of state's views on what to do about Australia remained much the same as they had been throughout Menzies' summer intrigues. Fadden's first telegram had led him to suggest that the new government in Canberra should be encouraged to limit themselves to an announcement that they were sending an envoy 'on a visit of exploration and enquiry'.14 He hoped not to have to issue any more formal, definite invitation and, although he chose not to share this view with Churchill, this remained entirely in keeping with his recent discussions with his departmental colleagues. Fadden's formal request for a larger role forced another review upon him and the DO produced a detailed assessment. This noted that it would have been better if the authorities in Canberra had maintained the same attitude as the other Dominion governments but they had not and the British War Cabinet now had to face a potentially far-reaching problem. Simply put this asked whether 'constitutional niceties or considerations of political convenience' could be cited as reasons to reject the Australian claim when to do so would 'leave a sense of rankling injustice'. This, Cranborne warned, might affect the Australian war effort and, worse, could endure and 'poison the relations between the two countries' long after the war had been won.15 Adding to his difficulties was the British high commissioner in Canberra who had tackled Fadden and his complaints had leaked to the Australian press. Although this incident had been kept from the British tabloids, the Dominions secretary was worried about possible future 'unpleasant reactions'.16 Reluctantly, and with the acknowledgement that successive Australian leaders had deliberately pushed Whitehall into a corner, Cranborne could only recommend that Fadden's proposal be accepted.

  Churchill's response was predictable and he was left both angry and even, on this occasion, a little flustered. But irate as he was, the prime minister still recognized the wider issues at hand. 'These people', he wrote to Cranborne, 'are politically embarrassed' but they had put a 'splendid army into the field' and it was this that would dictate what happened next. He therefore authorized that the necessary arrangements be made to receive Page, the former leader of the Country Party, who had already unanimously been selected by the Australian cabinet to be sent to London. It was clearly stipulated, however, that his involvement in discussions in the War Cabinet would be restricted solely to those matters which concerned Australian interests.17 Within the DO this decision was greeted with much apparent relief and was thought to be the best course to follow but neither Bruce at Australia House nor Cross in Canberra were to be told the department's exact position. The relevant documents dating from 1937 had been examined as part of an internal review of Fadden's argument and these made it clear that the discussions held then had in fact done no more than raise the possibility of the 'reconsideration' of the arrangements adopted during the First World War. Australia's case was obviously based on an entirely inaccurate premise but, with a solution apparently found, it was felt it would be best simply to welcome Page and keep Australian opinion satisfied.18

  Fadden had secured his first objective but a second still remained.19 When Menzies had arrived back in Canberra in late May 1941 the worsening military situation in the Middle East had left him facing immense pressures; following the news of Crete's fall he was described as looking 'about as happy as a sailor on a horse'.20 His mood was not helped by local media reports that insufficient logistics support had been provided to Commonwealth forces as they retreated through Greece and speculation that this had significantly contributed to the operation's eventual defeat.21 With the 9th Australian Division, the 18th Brigade of the 7th Australian Division and assorted other coalition forces surrounded in the North African port of Tobruk, it was hardly surprising that, following the completion of the Syrian campaign in late July, his government requested that its remaining troops in the Middle East be brought together to operate as one force. Churchill had been quick to say that he would be content to see this done so long as the position of the garrison at Tobruk was not affected; apart from the much smaller facilities at Benghazi, this was the best port along a thousand miles of North African coastline.22 With Menzies' focus elsewhere, the garrison duly remained besieged throughout the summer despite the best efforts of General Thomas Blamey, commanding the Australian Imperial Forces (AIF) and principal advocate of the argument that Australian forces should be formed into a single force.23 Fadden's appointment signalled much greater levels of political resolve and the new Australian leader quickly told his colleagues that he intended to resolve the matter. Pointing to Menzies' earlier comments, he informed Churchill that he wished to announce the withdrawal had been completed by mid-September. He also warned of the consequences of any further inaction and what might happen should 'any catastrophe' occur in the interim but the leadership in London remained firm in believing that 'Australia would not tolerate anything shabby' and would 'play the game' if the facts of the military situation were put to them.24

  Churchill agreed to the move but with the condition that any withdrawal would first require confirmation from the British commander on the ground that this would not hamper his overall operations. The report back from General Sir Claude Auchinleck who, in July 1941, had succeeded General Sir Archibald Wavell as Commander-in-Chief Middle East, was far from favourable, a relief of the Tobruk garrison would not be justified.25 Aside from Blamey there was agreement from all of the other commanders in theatre, including the other Dominion generals present, that such a withdrawal was the wrong decision. Oliver Lyttelton, who had been Minister of State in the Middle East since the end of June 1941, was even more forthright, telling the War Cabinet that no British commander would have considered the idea.26 The reason for Australian insistence was the anxiety of the government 'to take out a political insurance policy'.27 Similar sentiments were held by other leading political figures in London including both Eden and his private secretary.28 Somewhat wary of 'the miserable Australians', Cranborne also appeared to concur although he warned his colleagues of a growing feeling in Canberra that the AIF was bearing the brunt of the fighting in North Africa.29

  Drawing upon the military assessments and various other technical arguments, Churchill therefore approached Fadden again. He confirmed that if still insisted up
on, the garrison would be withdrawn 'irrespective of the cost entailed and the injury to future prospects'. He had nonetheless hoped that Australia would consider a delay but Fadden could not be swayed and, despite Churchill's 'flowery phrases', his cabinet found London's case against withdrawal 'unconvincing'.30 The British leader was willing to make allowances, recognizing the weakness of the Australian government's position, but, privately, he was 'astounded' by the refusal to offer more support. Auchinleck appears to have been even more disillusioned by Blamey's attitude and the subsequent decision by London to bow to Australian demands. So much so in fact that it was only with some apparent difficulty that he was persuaded not to resign, Churchill pointing out to him that 'any public controversy would injure the foundations of Empire'.31 He did, however, use his commander's bitterness as an opportunity to contact Fadden one last time and ask that the two brigades that had yet to be evacuated from Tobruk be allowed to remain but he was again unsuccessful.32 Cranborne meanwhile had contacted Cross and advised him to refuse any discussion of the matter and avoid any personal reproaches but events in the Western Desert had caused considerable bitterness in Whitehall. According to an official within the DO, writing near the war's end, the episode caused 'a great deal of fuss' and left many Australians 'feeling rather ashamed', although there is little firm evidence to support the latter argument.33

  At the time the focus of attention in Canberra was actually Fadden's future political prospects and, following his failure to gain support for his Budget proposals, his decision to resign, a mere six weeks after he had taken power, was no real surprise.34 The governor-general now looked to the Labour Party, which had won by far the most seats in the September 1940 general election, inviting Curtin to form a new government. Despite not having been in power for ten years, it had taken an active role on the opposition benches and retained a considerable voice in Australian politics. How it had conducted itself since the outbreak of war, however, meant that the DO had some concerns about the new government's calibre.35 Cranborne himself lamented, earlier in 1941, that these were 'men who were entirely isolationist in their view and thought of nothing but the protection of Australia'.36 Curtin, the former journalist and trade union organizer, who had been jailed briefly for anti-conscription activity during the First World War, had been quoted in the British press back in August 1939 as being entirely opposed to Australia's involvement in another European war.37 By the time he took power, he had been Australia's opposition leader for five years but he had never held any high office and only two of his ministers had had any previous government experience. Cross found him very watchful and a British military visitor to Canberra reported back to London earlier in 1941 that, as a parliamentarian, Curtin 'didn't have the brains of Menzies'.38 His earliest act as leader was to deal with yet another request from his British counterpart to postpone the final withdrawal from Tobruk.39 Churchill pointed to the coalition's need for all available resources to support the imminent Allied operations in North Africa but Curtin was adamant that his remaining forces should be brought together. The Labour Party appeared to have entered office with few new ideas, adopting broadly similar policies to those of its predecessors.