From SAS to Blood Diamond Wars

by Ross, Hamish

Well, that was it, really. The situation was calmed down. I didn’t speak to Norman, Chief Norman at that time, because Gen Khobe wanted to take me to another area of fighting. And apart from that occasion and the final conference, I suppose would be the right –

  [Responding to request for clarity]

  Yes, I saw the prisoners being marched away and the situation was definitely calming down.

  [Responding to question]

  Well, in my judgment, Chief Hinga Norman calmed it down. Because if he hadn’t gone across the bridge, what might have happened, I don’t know. So I say, in my judgment, it was him that calmed the situation. I then went with Gen Khobe to the barracks near the presidential lodge – I forgot the name of the barracks – which is where ECOMOG were based. Wilberforce Barracks. And from there I went round the town, making a judgment on what was happening. But I didn’t see any more close-quarter fighting in my time there. Not at 200 yards. Maybe a half a mile away, but no more than that.

  [Asked if he had anything else to tell the Court]

  Well, two things if I may. First of all, as far as the nature of the fighting was concerned, I think it was a very chaotic situation. There were groups of armed men – as I’ve said, ECOMOG, some ex-SLA and CDF – working to a sort of common plan, which was to push the RUF out of the city, and they were successful in that. By the time I left I think they had been evicted from the city completely. But they had – there was a lot of destruction, particularly in the east [of] Freetown. I would say it was a – and this, I do not mean to be rude about some very brave people. But as a professional soldier, it was not a well-organized operation. It was quite, as I said, chaotic. There were groups that were often doing as they wished, as far as I could see, but working to a common plan, which was to push them out.

  And, if I may, there’s one other thing which I think is pertinent. That is I was sent here to make a judgment on whether the British government should provide material assistance to ECOMOG and to the government and, specifically to the Sierra Leone army. And my judgment, which was fully accepted in London, was that the country merited support, logistic and other support, from the UK and they agreed a package of approximately, and I can’t remember the exact amount, but approximately £10 million, to be matched by another £10 million from other international donors. One of the reasons the government accepted my advice − beyond a natural desire to help the country that is held in high affection in London −, beyond that [was] because they had confidence in President Kabbah, the Deputy Minister of Defence, Chief Norman, and in ECOMOG’s determination with them to defend the country and to bring the RUF to some sort of peace process.

  I came back in February because my government gave me the privilege of coming to report to President Kabbah that this aid package had been agreed and, because I had established good relations with him and with some people here, they let me come back, and also to help co-ordinate how that money would be used. …I also brought back in the British High Commissioner, because by then I was able to say it was safe enough for him to return to the country. I stayed on board another ship for most of that, but I seem to remember spending one night with Mr Penfold to prove with him it was safe enough for him to live here.

  [Question: any encounter with other leaders in Sierra Leone on second visit]

  Yes. Obviously with the President, primarily. He was running the country and it was to him I was reporting. But I had a team of about seven or eight staff officers with me who did the detailed work of how the money should be spent. Most of that work I led personally with Brig Gen Khobe and with Chief Hinga Norman. So they were the two people I dealt with mostly on what they would need, weapons, lorries, all the sort of things that make an army effective; radios, for example.

  No decisions were taken without me being there to confirm the staff advice, although I do know that the staff dealt particularly with Brig Khobe who had tactical control of the government forces, whereas Chief Norman was the Deputy Minister of Defence. So he might establish policy, but how it was spent in detail, how the forces were organized, that was all Gen Khobe’s job.

  1[Question: did he observe participation of Chief Norman in those transactions]

  Yes. We must have had two or three meetings. [I met] with him in a collegiate atmosphere. But one of our concerns was that the equipment we provided would leave this country when ECOMOG left, whereas we wanted it to remain behind for the Sierra Leone army. So we had to build in safeguards in our negotiations to ensure that ECOMOG understood that, while the equipment could be used collectively for as long as necessary, ultimately it was for the Sierra Leone army. And Chief Norman was robust in making sure that ECOMOG knew that it was for the Sierra Leoneans, not for ECOMOG. So he was fully involved in the policy. The detail, i.e. how many radios, how many lorries, that was something we dealt with primarily with Brig Gen Khobe over.

  [Question: his assessment of effectiveness of Chief Norman in those discussions]

  He had military acumen. He was very determined. Kept talking about this was for everybody, not just for ECOMOG. And did have a view on some of the detail. But I suppose I had already formed the opinion on my first visit that he was a very effective minister. He was dynamic. He took decisions and had the courage of his convictions, if you like. What’s very difficult for a soldier is when people keep changing their mind. And although that’s something we get used to, in Chief Norman there was a minister who understood not to get involved in the tactical issues, but to keep at the right level for him, and he let the military get on and run their own affairs in line with the policy that had been agreed by the government. So it was refreshing.

  [Question: did he observe children under age of 15 on the side of any fighting]

  To be certain they were under 15 would be difficult. I saw some at the fighting at the bridge that I told you about. There were certainly some very young people, young men on the other side, on the RUF side of the bridge, and the group – amongst the group of prisoners that I mentioned, who Chief Norman intervened over, there were some there who were young. How old, I don’t know. I never saw them at that time. I never saw anybody on the government forces that would be – I could say was that young.

  [Question: whether he had any problem about child soldiers]

  Yes. Even in February of ’99, there were strings attached to the aid package. One of them was an absolute no acceptance of child soldiers and any suggestion of child soldiers in the government forces would put the aid package at risk. I came back in May of 2000 and two occasions spring to mind where the subject of child soldiers came up. One was when I went to the CDF headquarters here in Freetown, very near here, in an old hotel, I think it was. Brookfields Hotel, which the CDF were using as a temporary headquarters. I went down there for a meeting to talk to the CDF who, in May, were again fighting on behalf of the government under our overall coordination. And Chief Norman gave a talk to a group of CDF there, quite a large group, who I had gone along to meet to thank, actually, for all they were doing; fighting the RUF. And in his speech to them he emphasized how, colloquially, what an own goal any use of child soldiers would be, because international support would be put severely at risk. He said, ‘This must not happen.’ I remember physically then reinforcing that point from my perspective. So irrespective of any ethical issues, there was a very clear practical issue also at stake. The only other time I was involved practically with child soldiers was when we went to a home to visit a centre where there were a number from upcountry and we talked to them and Chief Norman talked to them and, you know, they were a very sad group of people.

  [Responding to whether this was April or May/June 2000]

  No, April I only stayed for a week, less than a week and went back to England. It was a routine visit which I conducted to a number of trouble spots. But I went back and said, ‘There’s trouble brewing in Sierra Leone again.’ But I then came back in May. When things got very bad, they sent me back.

  Would it help if I explained roughly what we did in that
period to set it in context? The UN had a number of units up in the country and the RUF had taken a lot of them hostage. Again, things looked very difficult here, because the force that the UN, that had been sent to protect the government and to further the pursuit of peace had themselves been – was starting to be captured by the RUF. Therefore, the UN had become a neutered organization in military terms. They weren’t capable at that time of doing their job. Mr Kofi Annan had asked a number of nations if they would go to Sierra Leone to see if they could help. The UK said they wouldn’t act as part of the UN operation, but they would send a team to find out what was happening and to see how they might help unilaterally. I commanded that team and I arrived here I think on May 6th, Saturday, May 6th May. And we found again a very troubled country.

  The RUF had not disarmed after the Lomé Accord of the previous year, whereas the government forces, the Sierra Leone army and the CDF had disarmed, give or take, and that would have been fine if the UN had filled the vacuum, but for a number of military reasons, the UN were not able to do that and, as I said, a number had been taken hostage.

  So I arrived in May: one to be prepared to evacuate British nationals and others that might want to flee the country, but also to try and stabilize the situation for sufficiently long to allow the United Nations to recover, reinforce themselves and to become more focused on what they were doing. So the British government felt that they were acting in line with Mr Annan, Kofi Annan’s request, albeit not as part of a single UN operation. Over the next five or so weeks we conducted an evacuation because on, I think it was Monday 8th May, there was a riot, is the best description, up near Foday Sankoh’s house. There was a riot and it was sufficiently serious for the British High Commissioner to request me formally to initiate an evacuation. There were a lot of excited people running around the town, some armed, mainly with clubs and things and machetes. But it was a very frightening atmosphere and I agreed with the High Commissioner it was appropriate to start an evacuation. Over the week-end the 6th, 7th and again on the 8th, I had a lot of British troops arrive to enable me to conduct the evacuation. And four Chinook helicopters, without which we couldn’t have done it. Because we had to secure a point on this side of the estuary and Lungi airport on the far side because we were flying them out. So we did that. It became clear to me with the full support of my government that we could do more than just do an evacuation. We could actually stabilize the situation and I then got permission to go ahead and do that. We moved British troops into key places to the east of Freetown and to the east of Lungi airport. And along with the SLA, a small number who were still prepared to come back in, really, because they were being reformed at that time, the CDF and largely Nigerian troops who had remained behind from ECOMOG to become part of the UN, we conducted an offensive operation the RUF. That allowed the UN time to focus on what they were doing to reorganize and to be reinforced. I left, as I said, in mid-June, having bought enough time for the UN to start again, effectively.

  [Question: whether, in his encounters with Chief Hinga Norman, he had been able to assess his attitude to the civilian government.]

  Well, it never occurred to me to have to assess it, in that he was clearly absolutely devoted to what he was doing, which was defending the government and defending the country’s rather fledgling democratic process. I never even – I mean, it just didn’t occur to me to question it. He was very often at some personal risk. He was defending the country against the country’s enemies, and would always defer to the President when he – sometimes he’d say, ‘That’s an issue for the President,’ or whatever. So it rather surprises me, your question.

  [Counsel for the accused explains context was allegation in some quarters that Chief Hinga Norman and some CDF were inclined to overthrow the government.]

  Okay. Well, all I can tell you in my professional judgment is that both in ‘99 and in 2000, if that is what they had wanted to do, they could very easily have done it.

  [Judge asking for a direct answer.]

  Okay. They clearly didn’t.

  [Legal argument follows: was the question designed to elicit opinion.]

  Yes, I’m very clear. So far as my direct observations are concerned, at no stage did Chief Norman say anything that suggested he was anything but completely loyal to the President in my hearing. Or any actions… If I may, picking up Your Lordship’s point, I infer from the 18 months or so of observing Chief Norman over those five visits that he lacked intent from my perspective. Because, in my professional judgment, over an 18-month period, he could have done what was being suggested a minute ago. He had the military power to do it. That is, I hope, the answer that you were seeking. But specifically, in terms of fact, I also can confirm that at no stage did he say anything that would even hint of anything but loyalty to the government of which he was a part and specifically to the President.

  I mean, it was well understood that Chief Norman, as Deputy Minister of Defence, was playing a key role in the defence of the country. But why I said I’m rather surprised, from my narrow perspective, that you even asked the question. It wasn’t a topic of conversation at all. He was absolutely a key partner in what we were all doing.

  [Question: what was his observation of the CDF.]

  Brave, sometimes almost stupidly brave. They had a belief in their own invincibility, which made them very brave fighters, but they were not very well disciplined and there were groups that seemed to me to be on the periphery, if you like, of the main CDF who fought very bravely, but tended to do what they wanted to do rather than what they were broadly being told to do. They were more like a militia. I would characterize them as a militia.

  Appendix IV

  Observations on the Autopsy of Chief Hinga

  Norman, Dr Albert Joe Demby, Former Vice

  President of Sierra Leone

  Dr Albert Joe Demby, former Vice President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, attended the autopsy of Sam Hinga Norman on 5 March 2007. He was later invited by Justice Renate Winter to write a report of his observations of the autopsy. An edited version, omitting list of those present.

  Observations on Autopsy of Sam Hinga Norman

  To Hon Justice Renate Winter

  Vice-President of the Special Court for Sierra Leone

  I write in respect of your request for my written report concerning my observations of Mr Norman’s autopsy.

  I travelled to Dakar (Senegal) on Friday 2nd March, 2007. Mr Sam Hinga Norman Jr., son of the late Mr Sam Hinga Norman, joined me in Dakar on Saturday the 3rd March, 2007. On Sunday the 4th March, 2007, Mr Norman Jr. and I were invited to go to the hospital to see the hospital and the room where the late Mr Hinga Norman was admitted and died.

  [A list of those present then follows]

  External Examination

  The body had very pale lips, tongue, conjunctiva, soles of the feet and palms of the hands − signifying signs of severe anaemia.

  Large blood-stained areas on the dressing over the operated right hip − signifying bleeding up to the time of his death.

  The tongue was slightly protruded and being held between the teeth − signifying that the patient died while he was in severe pain.

  Internal Examination

  Two ante-mortem broken ribs on the left side of the chest −anterior arches of the forth and fifth ribs. Which is consistent with injuries sustained during the forceful cardiac massage.

  Ante-mortem blood was found in the left thoracic cavity (hemothorax) which was moderately large.

  Heart − alarming observations as stated in the autopsy report.

  Operation area − bright red spots and tissues; signifying that they continued to bleed up to the time of the patient’s death.

  Comments and Observation

  The Hospital:- The hospital where Mr Sam Hinga Norman was admitted and died was described by the president of Sierra Leone as: ‘One of the most renowned hospitals in Senegal, where most of the Ministers and other prominent people go for medical check-ups.’r />
  The letter from Mr Ray Cardinal, Chief of the detention at the Special Court, to the family of Mr Norman stated that Mr Norman was hospitalised at the Military Hospital known as De La Dantec in Dakar. This is a modern and well-equipped hospital. In my opinion this is not true, for he was admitted at the hospital called Aristide Le Dantec, which is a short distance away from hospital De La Dantec.

  This Aristide Le Dantec hospital is in my opinion, an old colonial teaching hospital. And where Mr Norman was admitted was [and] is a prison house within this hospital compound. It is not a hospital ward, but a cubicle (cell) as there are ten such cubicles. There is no semblance of a ward as no emergency medical facilities were seen around the cubicle. In fact no nurses’ room or place for them to sit and administer drugs to the patient. They do come to these cubicles, examine and change the dressings of the patient and leave. There are no emergency facilities around and if needed, one has to rush to the nearest ward, about 50 yards or so, crossing at least 3 Security Guard posts. This prison house lacks the basic medical amenities like oxygen, emergency drugs, emergency equipment etc. no wonder by the time the nurse went and brought the old outdated respirator, Mr Sam Hinga Norman had died. The lack of facilities necessitated the forceful cardiac massage and hence the broken ribs. Mr Norman died on his cubicle bed made of wood without the standard beds which can be raised or tilted etc when needed.

  Patient Condition

  From the condition of the patient’s heart at autopsy, it gives me the impression that the patient was not examined and prepared for the operation. That such serious condition seen at autopsy would have given the cardiologist after thorough examination, to ascertain whether he was fit for such operation or not. If he was in fact examined and found fit for such operation, then what other precaution was taken? According to Dr Harding, the patient was examined by the cardiologist and the intensive care unit specialist when he collapsed on Tuesday 20th February 2007, i.e. 12 days after operation. The laboratory examination, I understand, was not even done at this hospital. It was reliably reported by Jawara, a family representative present at the bedside of Mr Norman, that he was still bleeding after the operation and that he regularly reported this unusual bleeding to Dr Harding, who usually told him not to worry. Was this continuous severe bleeding, as seen in his dresses [sic] even after laundry, which is still in the custody of the Special Court, and heavy blood-stained dressing found at the operation site during autopsy, not have been responsible for his collapse on those two occasions, i.e. 20th and 22nd February 2007 respectively? After the two pints of blood on the 20th, he came round and again collapsed on 22nd February and died.