The Reluctant Taoiseach

by David McCullagh

  On St Patrick’s Day, after Mass in Washington, Costello travelled to New York to review the parade. Heavy snow had fallen the night before, although the sun made an appearance during the parade itself. It remained bitterly cold, however, which reduced the estimated size of the crowd to below one million. Even still, 110,000 people took part in the parade, described as “heartwarming if not foot-warming” by the New York Times. Costello told the newspaper that St Patrick’s Day at home was more of a religious occasion, with small and quiet parades, and “not such a big day in Ireland as it is here”.83 But he was suitably impressed by the event (the first to be viewed by a Taoiseach). “To stand as I did on the Reviewing Stand at the New York parade and to watch contingent after contingent of Irish groups pass the Stand in the most bitterly cold New York weather is to receive an immense fillip to National self confidence.”84 As historian Joseph Morrison Skelly has pointed out, Costello’s impression of Irish-American support for the old country was overblown, the result of being in New York on St Patrick’s Day. “Costello erred in assuming that Irish Americans sustained this high level of interest in Ireland all year long. They did not.”85

  Even before the parade had ended, Costello was on his way again, to Philadelphia for the dinner of the Friendly Sons of St Patrick. The following day, Sunday 18 March, he finally arrived at New Haven for his visit to Yale. College President Whitney Griswold met him at the station. As they were escorted through the traffic by police motorcycles with sirens screaming, Costello dryly observed, “We’d only have to try this once at home and we’d be out of office the next morning!”86 That evening he addressed the annual dinner of the Knights of St Patrick, which was held, for the first time, in the University. It was, according to Costello’s memorandum on his trip, a “friendly gesture by an important and predominantly Protestant University to a Catholic Irish-American Society” and “evidence of the goodwill towards Ireland created by the visit”.87 The Irish had entered the heart of “American Protestantism and Yankeeism” described by Hearne. Costello told the Knights that while Ireland did not have the “big divisions” spoken of by Stalin, the Irish “have created somewhat of a stir not to say noise in the world … It is true that the nation is small in size and lacks material wealth but we have abundant recompense.”88 It was a theme he mentioned frequently during this trip, particularly in the context of Ireland’s new membership of the United Nations—“while we cannot muster big battalions our moral influence is, or at least could be, considerable”.89

  On Monday he got down to the reason for his visit, the Chubb Fellowship. This was designed to bring “distinguished men in public life to the campus for three or four days to talk informally with groups of undergraduates, graduate students, and members of the faculty”. There were up to six fellows a year. Costello’s predecessors included Connecticut Governor Abe Ribicoff, ACLU co-founder Roger Baldwin, writer Arthur Koestler, and former Secretary of State Dean Acheson.90 Later fellows included Presidents Harry Truman, Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush; Israeli Prime Ministers Shimon Peres and Moshe Dayan; authors Toni Morrison and Norman Mailer; and actor Robert Redford.91

  Acheson advised that Costello’s Chubb lecture should be “very informal” and that it should concentrate on life at the Irish Bar. “He said that he could not imagine a more fascinating story for American law students … The theme would be the contribution of the legal profession in Ireland to building modern Irish national institutions.”92 The students had other ideas, though—Costello later reported that on every occasion he was expected to speak on Irish foreign policy. “In Yale University the students and faculty did not desire to hear anything of an academic character but insisted on … matters relating to Ireland.” Even his Sherrill Lecture to the Law Faculty, which he was prepared to devote to “natural law and social justice with particular reference to the provisions of our own Constitution and the decisions of our courts on those topics”, was changed to a discussion on foreign policy.93 The tone of his memorandum suggests he was rather disappointed.

  Costello’s stay coincided with the heaviest snowfall of the year, disrupting some of the planned events, but Yale’s Alumni Magazine reported that the visit was a success. It said Costello had been “an attentive listener as well as a vigorous talker, and his full and candid expositions of Irish foreign and domestic policy held the enthralled attention of all who heard him”.94 This was, no doubt, something of an overstatement—although Costello was never short of vigour in his conversation, and could usually be relied upon for a “full exposition” of issues. In keeping with the informality of the fellowship, he stayed for a couple of nights in one of the student residential houses, having dinner with the undergraduates, after which he had a question-and-answer session with 20 students in the sitting room. Postgraduate student Robert Quinlan, who was appointed as a guide for the Taoiseach during his stay, told the Evening Press that he had made “a real impression on the student body, not only because of his academic background, but also because he succeeded in selling Ireland to the students without apparently trying to do so”. He added that Costello “had maintained a very definite point of view on subjects of Irish policy, while being, at the same time, objective in his explanations of that policy”.95

  As we saw above, Costello believed the American Government had been impressed that he had been awarded the Chubb Fellowship, and attributed Eisenhower’s friendly reception partly to this factor. His record of the trip for his Cabinet went on to claim that “it would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the effect of the visit to Yale … Apart from the personal honour bestowed on the Taoiseach, the visit had the effect of evoking in Yale a lively interest in Ireland.”96 This was undoubtedly hyperbole. The Fellowship may have been something of a personal honour, but it was mainly due to Lefty Lewis, with whom Costello spent two days after his time at Yale, most of it no doubt devoted to discussion of Horace Walpole.

  Another outcome of Costello’s Yale excursion was the creation of a fellowship for an Irish postgraduate student to spend a year at the University. The funds for this were donated by the Lewises (or, to be more accurate, by Mrs Lewis) and the recipient was to be chosen by Costello. The fellowship was worth $2,500, from which the tuition fee of $600 had to be deducted. In May, Costello wrote to UCD, UCC, UCG and Trinity seeking nominations, stating that the fellowship “should be awarded for a course in Economics with, possibly, Public Finance and Public Administration included”. After an interview with the Taoiseach, the first fellowship was awarded to Noel J. Farley of UCD. The relationship which began in the warm glow following Costello’s visit to Yale (President Griswold told him he wished “that in your case the Chubb Fellowship were a permanent appointment”) did not endure. By 1965, Costello found that Yale was “tending to disregard” his role in choosing the recipient, and he had to write reminding them of the terms of the original arrangement.97

  The official part of the visit resumed on Friday 23 March in New York, where the Taoiseach toured the nuclear research centre at Brookhaven National Laboratory and had lunch with officials of the Atomic Energy Commission. The Americans had offered co-operation on the use of atomic energy the year before, and the Irish had indicated that they considered nuclear energy as “a likely and feasible electric power source”. While Costello was in Washington, an Atoms for Peace Agreement was signed, under which the United States was to supply enough enriched uranium to fuel a research reactor. Back in Ireland, an Atomic Energy Committee was set up “as the first step in introducing Ireland to the atomic age”. After describing his visit to Brookhaven, the Taoiseach told the first meeting of the committee that atomic power presented a challenge and an opportunity. As native energy resources in water and turf became fully developed, and demand increased, “it appears nuclear energy must come into consideration and may offer many advantages … [but] the technology of nuclear energy is complicated and difficult, and … will require a substantial programme of education and training”.98

  In New Yo
rk City, Costello again stayed in the Waldorf-Astoria. On the night of his arrival, a dinner in his honour was given by Horace Flanigan, the President of Manufacturers Trust bank. According to Hearne, he was a friend of Eisenhower and outgoing Secretary of State Dulles, as well as being “of our own Faith, of Irish descent (Limerick) … his wife is a convert”.99 He was entertained to lunch by Cardinal Spellman, and received an Honorary Doctorate of Law from St John’s University of New York. Just before his departure, the Taoiseach also met General Douglas MacArthur. According to the Irish record of their informal conversation, the general “commented favourably on Ireland’s neutrality in the last World War”, and foresaw a “gradual rapprochement between the USA and Russia—the one becoming more Socialistic, the other more Capitalistic—and thought that neutral countries like Ireland might help to bridge the gap”.100 But his most important business in New York related to the United Nations.

  On Saturday 24 March he toured the UN headquarters, where the General Secretary, Dag Hammarskjold, entertained him to lunch. That evening, the United States representative to the un, Henry Cabot Lodge, gave a dinner for him. Costello also addressed the United Nations Correspondents’ Association. He told the journalists that Ireland was not neutral in the war of ideas, despite military neutrality. She would take a “militantly anti-Communist” line at the un. And while the Irish would raise partition if a favourable opportunity presented itself, Soviet support on this question would be rejected. The Taoiseach added that “we are not going to be a sore thumb. We are not going to raise it at every opportunity.”101 This may have come as a relief to the correspondents, who presumably were all too familiar with member states using the United Nations to air their pet grievances.

  Costello’s comments were later criticised in the Dáil by Independent Jack McQuillan, who claimed they were at variance with an earlier statement in the Dáil in 1948, when Costello said that if Ireland became a member of the un, the Government would “miss no opportunity of seeking to undo the unnatural division of our country”. The Taoiseach denied that there was any conflict between his two statements. While no opportunity to undo partition would be missed, “this does not mean that our purpose would be advanced by raising the issue at inopportune times or on inappropriate occasions or by giving the impression that we are blind to all issues of international policy save that of Partition alone”. He added that Ireland’s influence at the UN “may be far from negligible”, and that the best way of enhancing national prestige and serving the cause of national reunion was to make as useful a contribution as possible to the work of the United Nations.102

  Costello had made plain his pro-American sentiments—as well as stressing that partition still trumped anti-communism when it came to NATO. He believed the United Nations provided Ireland “with a new stage upon which to exert our influence and impress ourselves as a force for good … In existing circumstances we cannot have formal alliances. Because we cannot have alliances we must have friends.”103

  The same thought had occurred to the Americans, who were anxious to test the limits of Costello’s friendship. Scattered through the papers relating to his trip are intriguing references to an approach from Ambassador Taft on a highly confidential matter. Frustratingly, the subject of the approach was never committed to writing—on the Irish side. But the Americans were less cautious, and a letter from the State Department to the White House spells out exactly what was involved. According to this document, the Americans were anxious to get wartime transit rights at Shannon for military transport. Taft, therefore, had “made a very secret and informal approach to the Irish Prime Minister with a view to obtaining permission for a United States civil air carrier to expand certain facilities at Shannon and to handle the transit of transport aircraft under military control in the event of the United States being involved in hostilities”. The Americans noted that Costello had agreed to “think it over”, but urged the strictest secrecy about the matter because “publicity of any kind would damage whatever slight chance we may have of obtaining the desired rights”. The State Department didn’t expect Costello to mention the matter when he met Eisenhower, and advised the President not to raise it himself.104

  Here, then, was a test of Costello’s sincerity, on an issue which had been politically sensitive for more than a decade. In 1944, while still a neutral in a world at war, Ireland had been invited to join the International Civil Aviation Organisation by the Americans, who were looking for alternatives to Britain as points of entry to Europe for postwar aviation.105 The British were annoyed they hadn’t been consulted, and even more annoyed that the Americans approached the Irish delegation at a conference in Chicago seeking unlimited landing rights at Shannon. They were aware of the approach because they were intercepting and decoding Irish diplomatic telegrams—this one was seen by Churchill.106 Early in 1945, the British Prime Minister found out that the Americans were asking Dublin to sign a bilateral Civil Aviation Agreement. Churchill sent a petulant complaint to Roosevelt, pointing out that the Irish had been excluded from Commonwealth aviation talks “because of their behaviour in the war”, and that he had already complained to Roosevelt in person about the previous approaches. “The War Cabinet have very strong feelings on this episode and we all earnestly hope as good friends that you will consider the matter personally yourself.”107

  Roosevelt sent a soothing reply, saying Washington’s attitude to Ireland hadn’t been changed by the agreement, any more than a similar agreement with Spain had indicated a change in attitude towards Franco.108 But the Americans pressed ahead with the agreement—so anxious were they, in fact, that they agreed to the inclusion of the Shannon stop-over, which required aircraft to land there rather than flying straight to Dublin. Within a couple of years, by the time of Costello’s first term as Taoiseach, the US airlines were lobbying for the removal of the stop-over, and protracted negotiations ensued over direct flights to Dublin. At the same time, there were informal indications that Shannon might be available for use by the American military in the event of war with Russia. The US Consul in Limerick reported to Washington that “high Irish airport officials as well as local political leaders have said … that if the United States wishes to use the airport or any other facilities for military purposes they may as well feel free to do so”. The Consul, William Moreland, admitted that these comments “border on the extravagant and are not entirely authoritative”, but felt they were worth reporting.109

  There was a less co-operative attitude evident at the talks on the stop-over, but the tension between the Irish and the Americans was nothing to that between the staff of the US legation in Dublin and the Washington-based officials who made up the delegation to the talks. The two groups quickly fell out, with George Garrett complaining of the “high pressure tactics” being used by the negotiators, including press leaks.110 Garrett reported to Washington, with some evident satisfaction, that the talks over the Shannon stop-over had descended into farce when the head of the American delegation, J. Paul Barringer, “unfortunately got tight [drunk] at a dinner given by MacBride”. In the course of a speech “his gratuitous remarks were insulting to the Irish and embarrassing to us … Barringer continued at table to pay his respects in similar vein, mostly to John Leydon [the Secretary of the Department of Industry and Commerce] … the following morning … Leydon terminated this conference after a one-hour session.”111

  One of the press leaks Garrett complained of appeared in the New York Times in September 1949. It suggested that Marshall Aid funds were to be used to extend the runway at Dublin to allow for the landing of the largest transport planes—as well as bombers. The story suggested that Ireland would not be able to remain even formally neutral in another world war, so Dublin Airport could be used by the US military. When the story was reprinted in the Irish Press a fortnight later, it was immediately denied by MacBride,112 but it was significant in that it linked the questions of civil and military aviation—precisely the question to be presented to Costello in 1956.


  Given the political sensitivities involved, Costello’s response to Taft was cautious, telling the American he would think it over. When the Taoiseach discussed the approach with John Hearne and Alexis FitzGerald in New York, his son-in-law advised against taking on any commitments, and Hearne agreed. The Ambassador told Costello he could “easily put the matter on the long finger” rather than turning Taft down abruptly. The Irish were getting “splendid official co-operation” with their investment programme, and “we should avoid any risk of word being sent down the line to go slow on investment in Irish industry”. Hearne thought there was a prospect later on of agreeing “a clear-cut arrangement between the two Governments to be ratified after approval by Dáil Éireann. That would be the safest course, should you then decide that such an arrangement should be made.”113

  Characteristically, Costello continued to put the approach on “the long finger”. Taft apparently pursued the matter in writing later in 1956. His letter does not survive, but Costello replied that he would be happy to have a further discussion about its (unspecified) subject. “I have mentioned the matter very confidentially to Mr Norton and I would like that the three of us should have a further talk.”114 There the initiative seems to have run into the sand, as there was a change of government shortly afterwards. The Americans can’t have been too surprised—despite Costello’s pro-American leanings, the State Department had accepted that there was only a “slight chance” of agreement. However, it could be argued that Costello missed an opportunity. After all, his first government had sought bilateral defence arrangements with the Americans, outside the NATO framework, but had been rebuffed. And an agreement with Washington on the use of Shannon by the US military in 1956 would hardly have led to the type of controversy seen in recent years. On the other hand, such an agreement would surely have led to Ireland rising on the list of Soviet nuclear targets.