The Reluctant Taoiseach

by David McCullagh

  Despite his reluctance to offer the Americans facilities for military use, Costello was enthused after his visit, and anxious to build on the good relationship he felt he had developed with Eisenhower. He sent a telegram to the President just before he left New York, thanking him for the “gracious and warm hearted welcome” he had received, and stressing that the Irish people “appreciate the efforts and sacrifices which the American nation is making in the cause of world peace”.115 Eisenhower’s reply said Costello’s visit had “certainly increased the depth of affection held by my countrymen for the Irish”.116

  How to build on this apparent diplomatic triumph? In a memorandum to Government, he proposed the appointment of a separate full ambassador to the United Nations, as well as the promotion of Irish consuls in Boston, Chicago and San Francisco to the status of consul general. The Minister for Finance was, predictably, not impressed, and responded to Costello’s suggestions in terms that were little short of insulting. Sweetman began by casting doubt on the Taoiseach’s belief about future Irish influence, saying his warm official reception “was due to the fact that this is election year” (he was almost certainly right). He then dissected the failure of the Government, and more particularly Fine Gael, to develop a proper foreign policy since 1948, having another cut at Costello on the way. “The public were not sufficiently prepared for the announcement of the repeal of the External Relations Act; there was no prior build up … the establishment of the Republic of Ireland was, without question, of inestimable value … but without a clear and positive external policy it appears to lack logical effect. The action of India accentuated this apparent void.”

  Having skilfully denigrated Costello’s proudest diplomatic achievement, Sweetman then rubbished his latest grand plan. “I do not believe we can play such an important role [in the UN] as that which seems to emerge from the Taoiseach’s memorandum, but I do feel we can play a dignified role which will add to the nation’s prestige.” That dignified role, however, would have to be done on the cheap. The country could not “possibly hope to afford” widespread diplomatic and consular representation, and could hardly achieve Civil Service economies at home if the reach of External Affairs was to be greatly expanded.117 The fact that Sweetman was by and large right can’t have made his words easier for Costello to read. It is little wonder relations between the two men were frosty by this stage.

  However, when the matter came before Government, Costello got much of what he wanted. The Cabinet agreed that Ireland should “play a prominent role in the United Nations Organisation and that everything must be done to ensure that our contribution is effective and likely to bring credit and distinction to the country”. Specifically, there was to be an ambassador accredited solely to the UN, with “appropriate staff (including a Press Officer) and a suitable residence”. Cosgrave was to formulate “the principles and, so far as possible, the details” of Irish foreign policy. The question of upgrading consuls to consuls general was referred to the Cabinet Estimates Committee, while Cosgrave was to consult with Sweetman over increasing the allowances of diplomats in the United States. Cosgrave was to consider further Costello’s proposals on strengthening links with Irish-Americans and increasing public interest in foreign affairs. And Norton was to prepare a plan for attracting more American investment in Irish industry. Finally, in an indication that the Taoiseach had been impressed by the pomp surrounding his official reception, Seán MacEoin, the Minister for Defence, was to look into “the question of Army ceremonial and of an improved and more extended use of the National Flag and the National Anthem”.118

  It was a comprehensive and fairly well thought out plan for capitalising on the good feeling evident towards Ireland in the United States. Perhaps the most important part of his report to Government dealt with future policy at the United Nations. In a draft of his memorandum, Costello suggested Irish influence should be “wielded so as to strengthen the Christian civilization of which Ireland is a part … it is an important duty of Ireland not to take any action which by subtracting from the power of America and Britain would relatively strengthen the power of Russia”. As a concrete example, he suggested that rather than instinctively supporting the Cypriot claim to independence, Ireland should act “in a responsible manner based on and informed by the fullest details available so that we should not take or recommend any action merely because it was politically easy for us to do so”. For a small and practically undefended nation world peace was “of ultimate and vital importance. In the absence of world peace the defeat or containment of Russia is paramount. I am personally completely convinced that the United States has no aggressive aims and is sincerely anxious for peace.”119

  Costello’s son-in-law Alexis FitzGerald pointed out that a public interest in foreign policy “won’t come about by breaking a wishbone but by action”. He suggested that if the Taoiseach himself wouldn’t make a series of speeches to educate public opinion, he should get Cosgrave to do so. “Not merely would this be useful for its own purpose but be politically good, showing the people he was doing his job.”120 This Cosgrave did in a speech to the Dáil in June 1956, in which he outlined the three principles of his foreign policy. The first was adherence to the principles of the UN Charter, the second independence and non-alignment with any of the main power blocs. In case anyone could misinterpret the second point, the third made it clear once again where Ireland stood in the Cold War: “to do whatever we can as a member of the UN to preserve the Christian civilisation of which we are a part and with that end in view to support whenever possible those powers principally responsible for the defence of the free world in their resistance to the spread of communist power and influence”.121 The third guideline was “the foundation upon which the inter-party government built its United Nations posture”, and it mirrored Costello’s memorandum.122 Just as Ireland had been neutral in favour of the Allies during the Second World War, she was now “non-aligned” in favour of the Americans.

  During the Dáil debate on the External Affairs Estimate, Costello spoke at length on the threat of “atheistic Communism”, a speech which drew favourable comment from Archbishop McQuaid. This was welcome to the Taoiseach, as there had been criticism of Irish entry into the UN from what he described as “ultra-Catholic sources”.123 He was able to tell one such critic, who referred to his “lame apologia” for Ireland’s entry to the United Nations, that the Papal Nuncio had called on him “to convey to me the gratification of the Holy See” with his speech on the External Affairs Estimate.124

  Costello, then, had set the ground rules for Irish foreign policy, being the real author of the three principles outlined by Cosgrave. But in matters of detail, as was his practice, he left the Minister to get on with running his own Department. “Mr Costello never interfered in any way … He left the decisions to me but I kept him and the Government fully informed of all major matters.”125 This was obviously sensible when the Minister attended his and Ireland’s first UN General Assembly in November 1956. The Taoiseach assured the American Ambassador that the Cabinet received regular updates from the delegation in New York, although he appeared “a bit vague from a lack of knowledge on several points”. Taft would have been more reassured by Costello’s statement that “he had urged Mr Cosgrave to ascertain closely the US view on all difficult points”.126 When Cosgrave was asked by the Americans to support them on refusing to debate the admission of communist China, he readily agreed.127

  The indications from New York were that Cosgrave had made a success of his first outing on the world stage. Freddie Boland reported to Iveagh House that no other speech had received such a positive response. “The volume of applause at its conclusion was really remarkable and delegates crowded round the Minister from all sides to congratulate him and express approval of his speech.”128

  The Cosgrave/Costello approach was in stark contrast to that pursued in later years by Fianna Fáil’s Frank Aiken, who aroused considerable controversy by supporting calls for a debate on the ad
mission of communist China to the UN (he stressed he wasn’t supporting the admission, only a debate about it, but was lambasted by anti-communists for his trouble). Declan Costello put down a Dáil motion condemning Aiken’s actions; his father said the Minister had contravened “one of the fundamental principles that we laid down” to direct policy in the United Nations. “We object to the policy advocated and to the action taken because it gave comfort to our enemies, the enemies of peace, and disturbed our friends who are the bulwarks of peace and the bulwarks against war.”129

  Costello clearly enjoyed his visit to the United States, and was greatly impressed by the courtesy shown him by Eisenhower and Nixon—and by his experiences at Yale University. But on his return to Ireland, he was to be engulfed by a sea of troubles—economic, political, but most importantly, personal.

  Chapter 13

  SOMETHING IS WRONG WITH THE COUNTRY

  “My children and I have suffered a grievous loss … a wife who gave me a lifetime of devotion and love.”1

  JOHN A. COSTELLO, APRIL 1956

  “There has emerged a feeling of malaise, a feeling that something is wrong with the country …”2

  JOHN A. COSTELLO, SUMMER 1956

  The most important and distressing problem facing Costello on his return to Ireland was the illness of his wife, Ida. He told Archbishop McQuaid that “unfortunately, I do not find my wife at all well on my return”.3 The Archbishop expressed his sympathy, and promised to “get very many prayers for her”.4 The Taoiseach also had spiritual support from his Labour colleague Jim Everett, who lent him a relic of Saint Pius x.5

  Ida Costello, who was 65, had suffered from high blood pressure for some time, but while her husband was in the United States she was diagnosed with chronic bacterial endocarditis, an inflammation of the lining of the heart. She was admitted to Saint Vincent’s Private Nursing Home in Leeson Street in Dublin.6 On 19 April, Costello wrote to Eisenhower, once again thanking him for the reception he had received in the United States, and saying it had been “a very great pleasure to me to describe to my wife the generous cordiality which you extended to me”.7 The following morning, Ida Costello suffered acute heart failure and died.8

  She was, Costello sadly wrote to McQuaid, “a wife who gave me a lifetime of devotion and love”, and her death was “a grievous loss” to him and to their children. He told the Archbishop that the family had “been greatly comforted by the kindness of so many friends, by the many Masses that have been offered for the repose of her soul and by the conviction of our Faith that God has her now in His kind hands”.9

  The Taoiseach received a huge number of sympathy cards and messages of support, including a personal message from President Eisenhower, which he greatly appreciated.10 There was also a massive turnout for the removal and funeral. As the coffin was being brought out of the nursing home followed by Costello and his family, out of the crowd stepped Patrick J. Burke, a Fianna Fáil TD for North Dublin, popularly known as The Bishop because of his frequent attendance at funerals. He pushed himself forward to shake hands with the Taoiseach, in full view of the press cameras. “A groan from the watching crowd indicated what was thought of this lapse of good taste.”11

  The loss of his wife of almost 37 years was, naturally, a terrible blow for the Taoiseach, then just two months short of his sixty-fifth birthday. He had always been a devoted family man, always anxious to get home rather than attend parties or official functions,12 and he and Ida had enjoyed a “very affectionate” married life together.13 A moving tribute was paid to Ida by James O’Brien, a friend who was then aide to the Mayor of New York. He wrote to Costello that “she left a legacy of sweetness and understanding to all who met her”.14

  During his period of mourning, Costello avoided formal parties, and declined an invitation from the Irish Ambassador to the Vatican, Con Cremin, to return that summer to the Villa Spada in Rome, where he and Ida had spent time in 1955. “I have very precious memories of our stay with you last year. I have, however, decided not to go away anywhere at all this year, and I am sure that Patsy and you will understand this.”15 He was still refusing social invitations by the following February.16

  His family rallied round, particularly his eldest daughter, Grace, married to Alexis FitzGerald. As he told one correspondent, he took “refuge in my daughter’s house on Sundays”17—her house on Nutley Road was not just a source of family comfort, but a place to escape the burdens of office. His other children also offered support. Eavan and her husband, Ralph Sutton, came up from Cork to spend Christmas with him. “Between them all they made it, if not a happy one, at least a peaceful and untroubled one.”18 In an effort to help fill his evenings, the family presented him with a television set that Christmas.19 He was to become a keen television watcher in later life—and, just as he used to work with the radio on in the background, was able to combine his viewing with work on his legal briefs.20 As might be expected of someone of his conservative social views, he would criticise anything which he regarded as vulgar, but kept the set on anyway for the company.21

  Ida Costello’s death was a bitter blow to her husband—but he seemed to deal with it as well as could be expected. Just how shattered he was became a matter of some political debate. James Dillon suggested in his memoir that “his heart was no longer in the business after that”. In fact, he suggested that the Taoiseach had “become weary of the business of governing”, and that his wife’s death was a factor in his decision to call a general election early in 1957.22 Not surprisingly, Declan Costello rejected such suggestions, which also surfaced when his father was removed as leader of the Opposition in 1959. Declan said his father carried on “absolutely normally”, and that he did not become moody or depressed.23 However, it is difficult to believe such a deep personal loss didn’t have a profound effect on him. Another witness who saw the Taoiseach at close range at the time perhaps put it best, saying Costello “lost a bit of his bounce” after his wife died.24

  And as Taoiseach, he needed every bit of bounce he could manage, as the economic situation turned from difficult to desperate. His wife’s death also came as two by-elections were being fought—Fine Gael suspended its campaign as a mark of respect.25 The inter-party candidates were facing an uphill battle in any event. Partly this was due to Sweetman’s introduction of import levies in March to try to choke consumer demand in an effort to address continuing balance of payments problems. The levies covered a wide range of goods, from cutlery to musical instruments and from tinned fruit to umbrellas,26 and were widely unpopular. They did what they were designed to do—the current account deficit was reduced in 1956 and turned into a surplus in 1957, while the net foreign assets of the banking system also began to turn around. But they had a devastating effect on the economy, reducing employment and increasing emigration to an unprecedented figure during 1957 of 1.8 per cent of the entire population.27

  Sweetman’s austere approach was enthusiastically encouraged by the Governor of the Central Bank (and former Secretary of the Department of Finance), J.J. McElligott. He had written to the Minister at the start of the year, arguing that Ireland was “suffering from a prolonged and deep-rooted excess of demand in relation to home produced supply … Unless something positive is done to relieve materially this constant pressure of excessive demand which has permeated the whole economy, we are bound soon to receive a rude shock.” The public must have the facts placed before them, so they could consider “the full implication of living on capital, a way of life we have been indulging in for eight years”. He suggested the situation could be retrieved with “judicious adjustments” in economic and monetary policy—but the room for manoeuvre was now so limited that action must be taken soon, as it “may be about our last chance”. Increased production was, in the long term, the answer; but in the short term there must be a reduction in demand, through the control of non-productive capital spending. This was traditional Central Bank policy. McElligott also added a new criticism: the Government’s policy of kee
ping interest rates lower than in Britain, “which regrettably was much publicised as an achievement along the road of an independent monetary policy has done a lot of damage in boosting the feeling of prosperity which we have artificially built around ourselves”.28

  Whatever about the economic effects (see Chapter 11), lower interest rates were a positive for the Government from a political point of view. About the only good thing the import levies did politically was to help persuade the banks not to follow an increase in British interest rates, at least temporarily, at the start of 1956. Just before he left for the United States, Costello met the bankers along with Sweetman, and persuaded them to hold rates steady.29 A few days before the by-elections, he wrote to thank the chairman of the Irish Banks’ Standing Committee, saying he hoped that “the national interest will continue to have the benefit of co-operation between the Government and the Banks in matters of common concern, based on mutual confidence and candid exchanges of opinion”.30 This was only putting off the inevitable—the banks were to increase in interest rates a couple of months later. But would the decision have any impact on the two by-elections?

  The short answer was no, as both contests showed a swing towards the Opposition. In Dublin North-East, Independent Patrick Byrne took 57 per cent of the vote and retained the seat of his late father, Alfie, while Fianna Fáil’s Charles J. Haughey received 43 per cent. But this was a large increase over the Fianna Fáil vote in the constituency in 1954—then, the party had only managed to win 32 per cent of the vote, while the Inter-party candidates between them took 59 per cent (other Independent candidates took 9 per cent). In Laois-Offaly, Labour’s William Davin had won just 11.3 per cent of the vote in 1954, compared to 43 per cent for Fianna Fáil and 45.6 per cent for Fine Gael (boosted by Oliver J. Flanagan’s huge personal popularity). When Davin died, Labour had the right to nominate the inter-party candidate, choosing the late Deputy’s son Michael. He boosted the Labour, but not the inter-party, vote, winning 44 per cent, and losing to the Fianna Fáil candidate, Kieran Egan.