Hunting Down Saddam

by Robin Moore

  The fifth Critical Basic Need is education. An education system must provide and staff schools in which children can learn to read and write. If this need is unmet, uneducated Iraqis will be at the mercy of their Arab neighbors. When a nation’s GNP (Gross National Product) is primarily oil based, its people are at the mercy of those who can refine it. Oil refining is a complex chemical process. Higher education will also be vital for the Iraqis if they are to keep their newfound independence.

  Novalis is hopeful for the future, however: “They have the potential, that’s for sure.”

  On top of the “Critical Basic Needs” is the umbrella of power. “It’s a power-hungry country; everybody wants power. Whether you get it through money, rank, knowledge of your position in life, all of the basic needs are under that power umbrella,” Novalis explained. “Depending on what the guy who is in power wants to do, is how those five other areas get focused.”

  The 4th BDE flies daily, with lift aircraft (transports), attack helicopters, and scout aircraft. The scout aircraft mainly fly border patrol missions. There hadn’t been a great deal of humanitarian missions, though there were some along the border early on in the war.

  The mountain paths between Iran and Iraq are traversed by pilgrims, with little more than their sandals and a bottle of water. Droves of them began migrating from Iran into Iraq as cities were liberated. Sometimes humanitarian airdrops were necessary for the starving groups of travelers.

  “The problem you have with that is that there are usually only three types of people who are coming into Iraq,” Novalis said. “You have the pilgrims, who want to go to Karbala or some place like that, and express themselves religiously; you have former Iraqis who were forced by the former regime to Iran and now they want to get back to their homeland; the third group comprises those who want to join the movement against the Americans and the Coalition forces. The question is: how do you separate the three? The terrorists know that we [the United States] don’t want to stop a pilgrimage, so they come to the border and tell us they are a pilgrim, but they could be a terrorist just as easily. So what we have done is, unless they have a valid passport, they can’t enter Iraq.”

  Novalis explained that this helped to separate the three types, but it was not such a cut-and-dry solution. All of the 9/11 hijackers had valid passports, for example.

  Pilgrims who made it over the mountains into Iraq were met with humanitarian-issued meals, or HDRs (Humanitarian Daily Rations), water, shelter, and security. The Coalition military handled this by themselves.

  “You would have thought it would be a great spot for the NGOs, but you didn’t see any of them out there,” Novalis said. “We’d love to have NGOs out there, but right now, with the security risks, NGOs are just not lining up to come out.”

  The Postwar Dream

  By the fall of 2003, pro-Saddam insurgents had gathered momentum. While regular military news conferences were designed to show success in Iraq, and stressed that the frequency of attacks on U.S. forces was falling in overall numbers, the numbers of Coalition military personnel were, in fact, slowly on the rise.

  After spending seven weeks with the 101st Airborne at the outset of the war, Dana Lewis returned to Iraq late in 2003 as a correspondent for FOX News. He found a very different Iraq, one not unfolding quite the way America had hoped.

  On October 21, 2003, Dana Lewis flew into Baghdad on a Royal Jordanian Airways twin-engine Dash 8 from Amman, Jordan. Onboard the flight, everyone was nervous about surface-to-air missiles. The aircraft first buzzed over Baghdad airport, then made a rapid descent to final approach. The worries of surface-to-air shoulder-launched weapons were legitimate.

  Several weeks later, a DHL cargo plane was hit shortly after takeoff from the same airport, and had to make an emergency landing with its wing on fire and one engine out. Royal Jordanian airlines canceled all flights. So did DHL. On December 9, word spread that a military C-17 MAC (Military Airlift Command) flight was hit and had to shut down one of its engines.

  The rhythm of attacks by insurgents, many of them former Saddam loyalists, some foreign fighters, reached a fever pitch in October and November of 2003. Dana Lewis was there to see the attacks and their aftermath firsthand. The following section is in his words, as he shares excerpts from his “bomb diary” and talks of the attacks and dangers in and around Baghdad.

  Dana Lewis’s “Bomb Diary,” October and November 2003, Baghdad

  Oct. 26—0610 hrs.: Al Rashid hotel hit by missiles launched from a trailer, the launcher hidden in a generator. I went live from near the hotel all day. Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz in hotel at time it got hit. Could have been killed. We are very worried about our hotel at Sheraton. Also a target. Numerous terror warnings out.

  Oct. 27—0800 hrs.: Bomb blast heard all over Baghdad. My room shakes. 10 blocks away Red Cross building hit by ambulance bomb. Then 4 police stations hit by suicide bombers same day. I tape my windows in my room, scared of flying glass. Start sleeping with wedding ring and watch on. Asked my bed to be moved in between two concrete pillars … away from the windows!

  Nov. 2—Chinook chopper shot down. Sixteen dead. We drive out thru Fallujah, a hot spot. Risky. Left the scene before nightfall.

  Nov. 6—Drove two hours to Iraqi airbase. Memorial for soldiers killed. Slept over as it was too dangerous to drive back.

  Nov. 8—Nighttime patrol with 1st Armored “Dirty Company” in Baghdad. In humvees. We went looking for roadside bombs. 5 minutes before we came down the road, another humvee got hit. Plastic explosive in paint can. We’re exposed. It’s very dangerous. Soldiers believe new Iraqi police may be involved in some attacks on American troops.

  Nov. 21—Awoke to the sound of crashing and flying glass. Bolted out of bed. People running toward fire exits. Missile hit our hotel on 17th floor. Elevator crashed to ground floor. Glass atrium ceiling caved in on 5th floor and crashed 60 ft to lobby below. All of this around 0720. Missiles also hit the Palestine hotel next door. And the Oil Ministry. Donkey carts—with multiple rocket launchers. 4 fired here. 11 didn’t go off. Thank God.

  Insurgents were now targeting Iraqi police, U.S. contractors, aid agencies, and civilian targets. FOX News aired a segment about former Saddam loyalists who were running several dozen cells in Baghdad, paying people to plant bombs or launch RPGs on U.S. convoys.

  “The price for killing a U.S. soldier?” I asked an American officer.

  “Up to five thousand dollars,” was the reply.

  Mosul, where the 101st had gone and trumpeted unusual success in Iraq in winning the hearts and minds of locals, began to have big troubles, too.

  A car bomb on a U.S. base outside of Mosul in the first week of December 2003 sent an estimated forty-one soldiers to the hospital. COL Anderson, who often traveled with little protection, was told by his general to start taking more gun truck escorts when he moved around, and he confided in me that a contract had been put out on a Coalition official in Mosul. When I asked the colonel who the intended target was, he said it was him.

  The daily loss of soldiers’ lives touched all of us. One loss in particular was personally devastating to the colonel and me.

  November 23, the news broke that two soldiers traveling through Mosul had been ambushed and dragged out of their vehicle. Eyewitnesses said they were robbed, beaten, and left dead in the street for over an hour. The Army later denied reports that the two had their throats slit.

  COL Anderson was the first to tell me one of the two dead soldiers was his sergeant major, Jerry Lee Wilson. I had ridden in the back of Jerry Lee’s humvee for weeks at the outset of war. I’d viewed much of the early days of the war over his shoulder. CSM Wilson had stayed in the military to look after his colonel and longtime friend, Joe Anderson. He did that, but on that day he failed to look after himself while traveling with just his driver, in what was supposedly one of the safest areas of Iraq.

  If the tide appeared to be turning on U.S. forces in Iraq, the Army continually tried
to tell reporters that the support of Iraqi resistance was “not militarily significant.”

  COL Anderson had this to say about why the 101st was originally so successful in Mosul:

  The situation in Mosul has not changed that much. The numbers of attacks are the same or actually less. What changed during November was the success that the enemy had. But if you remove the catastrophic helicopter crash, even the casualty rate is the same or less.

  We won here primarily because of the type of force that we had—light infantry and helicopters. We were able to “flood the zone” and maintain constant presence with the populace. Our compounds are in and amongst the populace, not separate. We were able to cover a large area, yet remain concentrated where we needed to be. We rapidly engaged the population and continue to do so.

  But as more attacks occurred in late November and early December, the colonel wrote this:

  Ramadan was a factor, due to the increased martyrdom period. Another factor was our success. We were ahead of the rest of the country and the insurgents attempted to disrupt that progress.

  Some would argue that we came on strong, but shifted to a heavy civil affairs focus, which allowed the FRLs [Former Regime Loyalists] to come out of hiding unscathed. We shifted back to the offensive on November 8 while still trying to win the hearts and minds of the people.

  This is a double-edged sword: we cannot afford to alienate more people through offensive ops, but we cannot afford to get attacked while trying to restore stability to the region …

  People here just don’t understand freedom, democracy, and the principles of a free-market economy. There are huge cultural differences between our nations, and some of the traditions will never change. The education system wasn’t/isn’t great and people just don’t know what they don’t know. They are not “worldly.”

  In the short term, we can provide security and improve many functional areas (water, sewer, electricity, fuel, clinics, schools, etc.). These are restoration and improvement functions, not rebuilding. It will take a large investment of resources to rebuild this country over the long term. The infrastructure needs major repairs and the economy cannot bear this burden in the short term. It will take some painful years to get over the hump. Eliminating cronyism, corruption, and ineptitude will take some time as well.

  Everyone wants something—not based on need, but on desires and equity. There are some ethnic hatreds and land/property resolution will take some time as well. Some points of reference span thousands of years.

  According to some sources, the U.S. government was planning to speed up the formation of a transitional government for next spring, turn over power as quickly as possible, train the new civilian police force and Army, and get American forces out of the center of the cities by early spring 2004.

  Another Vietnam?

  Almost daily through the end of 2004, a soldier was being killed in a roadside bomb or attack on U.S. aircraft. Four hel-icopters were shot down. Two helicopters collided over Mosul, killing seventeen soldiers and crew. In Baghdad, rocket attacks hit the former palace of Saddam, now the main Coalition Authority Compound, on an almost nightly basis.

  In reporting such events, journalists were constantly under fire from the U.S. military, who claimed that reports didn’t show enough of the progress being made in Iraq.

  1st Armored Division’s BG (Brigadier General) Mark Hertling believed U.S. forces were winning in Iraq, and downplayed the sophistication and abilities of insurgents. In an e-mail to Dana Lewis, he provided a one-day list of activities in Iraq, to show the magnitude and scale of success U.S. forces were having in a Baghdad operation called IRON HAMMER. There had been a number of explosions that day, which Mark writes about, in addition to enclosing the censored list from the 1st Armored Division. The e-mail was as follows:

  Dana:

  Most of the large explosions were our work. There was, however, one 81mm rocket (a small one) that landed near Assassin’s Gate (the north side of the green zone) at about 1953 hrs. No reports of injuries.

  Most explosions were ours. We have the operation you are going on tomorrow, and another one (brigade sized, down south) tomorrow morning a little earlier than yours. Additionally, we have a large one going out tonight, but I won’t tell you where, when, or what it is doing.

  Have enclosed a partial listing of what we have accomplished.

  Mark

  (What follows is the enclosed list—one day of operations in Baghdad on November 15, 2003.)

  15 NOV 03: Day 3 of Operation IRON HAMMER TF 1AD [Task Force 1st Armored Division] focused on capturing arms dealers and IED [Improvised Explosive Devices] makers. Using tips from local citizens, Military Police, and the Iraqi Police, captured two 107mm rockets, which were aimed at the Green Zone.

  • Based on a HUMINT [Human Intelligence], 1-36 IN conducted a cordon and search for individuals suspected in placing IEDs in 1-36 IN AOR. They captured one individual. Also confiscated were bomb-making components; a propane tank, ball bearings, wire, and explosives. The prisoner was transported to a holding cell interrogation.

  • 4-27 FA secured area and provided OPs [observation posts] for two Apache and one Kiowa helicopters to fire 200–250 rounds of 30mm at enemy mortar and rocket-launching sites in Zone [censored]. Anti-Coalition forces have used this area in the past to launch mortar attacks on U.S. forces. There were no U.S. injuries.

  • 60mm mortars impacted near the 1-13 FOB [Forward Operating Base]. 1-13 AR soldiers who were near the launch site, with the help of aerial assets, went to the site and searched a nearby residence. While searching the area, a white truck approached the patrol and fired two shots. The patrol returned fire, killing one local national and wounding another [censored] individuals were also captured. [censored] … prisoners were taken [censored] for interrogation. There were no injuries or damage.

  • Using an aerial platform, TF 1AD fired 7 × 105mm rounds and 36 × 40mm rounds into a warehouse used by anti-Coalition forces to store ammunition. There were no U.S. injuries.

  • 2ACR conducted a raid on a suspected arms dealer. The target and one other individual were captured. In addition, (1) AK-47 and (1) AN/PRC-126 were confiscated. There were no U.S. casualties.

  • 2ACR conducted another raid on another suspected arms dealer. The target was detained. In addition, (1) AK-47 was confiscated. There were no U.S. casualties.

  • Iraqi Police Service Officers found three 107mm rockets in the Al Rashid district this morning at about 0930 hrs. Neighborhood residents told police that they saw several men setting up the rockets alongside a dirt mound. Police said the rockets were aimed at the Coalition Provisional Authority headquarters. The residents told police that they saw one of the rockets fired but it traveled a short distance and did not explode. The residents shot at the attackers with small arms but they were able to escape. Police seized the rockets and transported them to the Rushafa Police Headquarters where explosive ordnance disposal teams will examine them.

  • Soldiers from the [censored] Brigade Combat Team and Iraqi Police Service Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams disarmed an improvised explosive device in the [censored] building at about 1345 hrs. A hand grenade was placed inside a soft drink can with the detonator protruding from the top.

  • Task Force 1st Armored Division artillerymen conducted a counter-fire mission against a site confirmed as the point of origin within minutes after an earlier enemy mortar attack in northwestern Baghdad at 1915 hrs. Five 105mm artillery rounds were fired into the site, silencing the attack.

  The above excerpt provides an inside glimpse of the day-to-day efforts in Iraq. Winning the “official war” isn’t enough. Coalition forces, while certainly making marked progress, are still fighting deep pockets of resistance and ever-present danger.

  Dana Lewis traveled back to Mosul over Christmas. He followed Joe Anderson on many raids … and even to his weekly radio and TV message. He found some extremely tired men, drained perhaps more by the loss of close colleagues, including th
eir CSM Jerry Lee Wilson, than by the long deployment to Iraq itself.

  Jerry Lee’s murder had left everyone in shock in the Strike Brigade. A fellow sergeant major said that he and Wilson had joked about not taking security as they drove across town.

  “Jerry Lee didn’t want to make a fuss, didn’t want to ask for gun trucks and security just to drive to another base in the same city,” he said. CSM Wilson paid for that decision with his life.

  The killing of CSM Wilson and the downing of two Black Hawks in Mosul changed the direction of what until then had been the biggest success story in Iraq. The 101st went from velvet gloves to a new offensive in November.

  In an intelligence briefing at the 101st, officers said they had arrested a handful of Al Qaeda in Mosul raids. “There is no doubt they are here,” said one officer. Why the Army brass didn’t announce this, and confirm the facts, left everyone wondering. Perhaps it was because they didn’t want to tip off Al Qaeda. Perhaps it was political. Or it may be that the 101st’s intelligence gleaned in raids wasn’t convincing enough. However, the intel unit was convinced.

  According to COL Anderson, “We couldn’t not respond to attacks. We launched a new offensive. I personally began to approve every target based on intelligence. We wouldn’t wait days to confirm and watch and wait when we got information. We moved on everything.”

  In one month, the 101st Airborne (AASLT) detained more insurgents than they previously had in four months!

  In December 2003, in a background briefing in Baghdad, Dana Lewis recorded the comments of a senior military official: “We think Al Qaeda is here. But we also now know there are others who have joined the insurgency. Syrians, Iranians, Yemenis, and now for the first time we are tracking members of the Lebanese Hezbollah.”

  The Hezbollah, or “Party of God,” which gained great experience fighting Israel in its occupation of a strip in southern Lebanon known as the Security Zone, is a group well experienced in guerrilla tactics, including explosives. Its emergence in Iraq has caused the U.S. Army great concern.