Hunting Down Saddam

by Robin Moore

  COL Anderson’s new offensive had paid off. The attacks by insurgents seemed to decrease. The northern part of Iraq again seemed to be more peaceful. But postwar tactics in engaging the media were a roller coaster; Dana Lewis and his colleagues felt the pressure to keep reporting so-called “positive stories.”

  In Baghdad, BG Mark Hertling invited reporters to background briefings with his boss, CG (Commanding General) Dempsey. It was the “silver spoon” approach. Embedded reporters were offered more patrols and better access, in exchange for showing a different picture. Indeed the embeds tried to report the positive side, which showed a success in raids against insurgents, but the military seemed immensely frustrated by the fact that embeds continued to report the deaths of soldiers and the ongoing rocket and mortar attacks on not only U.S. bases, but even the former Palace of Saddam Hussein—now occupied by Paul Bremer and the new Governing Council.

  Almost every night, according to Dana Lewis, BG Hertling would write him long e-mails, either criticizing or praising his work. Hertling was incredibly informative, but also seemed demanding in his attempts to have editorial input. According to Lewis, Hertling may have done this not only with him while he was working at FOX TV, but also with other news agencies in Baghdad.

  One night, Dana reported on a demonstration outside a mosque following a raid by U.S. forces, in which they arrested the Imam, or spiritual leader, and were accused of tearing a Koran. In the same report, Lewis reported on the denials by U.S. commanders that they had done any damage to the mosque, and further, that they seized a large amount of weapons inside and called the mosque “a center for criminal and terrorist activity.”

  Despite what Dana Lewis thought was fair reporting, the curtain came down. BG Hertling sent a note to Dana’s boss in New York, and threatened to cut FOX TV off because of their reporting.

  In the previous week, Dana had asked for, and been promised, a profile on Hertling’s CG Dempsey. The idea was that Dempsey would lead the reporter and cameraman through Baghdad, talking about the Army’s successes and plans for the future. Suddenly, BG Hertling told Lewis that the granted interview was off until they (Dana’s news crew) proved themselves! Here is an excerpt of that correspondence, provided by Lewis:

  Dana, not trying to leverage one story against another, and not trying to start a “process.” Just trying to get you the things you need, within reason. And haven’t threatened to “close down” anything, just telling you it will take more work for me to convince the CG that he should do a profile with Fox. Unfortunately, those are the consequences based on what he—and I—have seen lately.… [edit]

  Not trying to shut you out … really. You must admit we have been more open with you and given you more things than any other network. But it’s still our call in what we give you [as] sanctions to cover within the division footprint. Just like it’s your call to decide what you report.

  It amazed Lewis that the Army would be so shortsighted. They were giving BG Hertling and his boss CG Dempsey an opportunity. According to Lewis, the Army shot themselves in the foot by using it to leverage news coverage.

  Lewis called his boss at FOX TV, John Moody, who supported his decision to write back to Hertling and inform him that he was removing his request for Dempsey. They needed to show the Army they could not influence news coverage by “leveraging access,” as Dana called it.

  Lewis wrote CG Dempsey to discuss the matter but didn’t get a reply.

  It needs to be said that for the most part, BG Hertling believed passionately that the 1st Armored Division was winning the war against the insurgency, even as he upped his estimates from seven to ten cells operating in Baghdad (in November), to up to fourteen cells by December. He made an unprecedented attempt to engage Lewis to report their side of the story, giving him a great amount of access, and exchanging many e-mails nightly to help FOX TV get the facts right. But even the 1st Armored Division felt that the new Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) had badly organized press briefings. The Army’s Central Command (CENTCOM) press desk was slow, and usually provided press releases on major news events twenty-four hours later, with little information.

  If the Army had won the media war during the embed proc-ess and taking of Iraq, it lost a huge amount of ground in postwar hostilities by poorly engaging the media and getting its message out. According to Lewis, BG Hertling and CG Dempsey felt that the 1st Armored Division had to sidestep the CPA (Coalition Provisional Authority) and CPIC (Coalition Provisional Information Center) in order to reach out to the media, and the 1st Armored Division attempted to do so, with some success.

  In the end, GEN (General) Dempsey did a FOX News interview. He invited Lewis to a briefing about the Army’s success, and challenges ahead. BG Hertling later wrote Lewis a letter, in which he said that he had learned from his experiences. He started to write to Lewis again on an almost-nightly basis, telling him of raids carried out, and of captured bomb makers and financiers.

  BG Hertling also praised Lewis for his coverage of the massive car bomb attack on the main Coalition compound in Baghdad on Sunday, January 18th, in which a suicide bomber detonated a thousand-pound bomb explosive outside the Assassin’s Gate of the compound, killing more than two dozen, and wounding over one hundred people. As long as the reports included the Army’s assertion that violence was on a decline, even in the midst of such a large attack, commanders felt “their side of the story” was being told.

  Task Force DAGGER

  LTC Christopher K. Haas

  When I met with him in September 2003, LTC Christopher K. Haas was the deputy commander for 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne). During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, Haas was the commander of 1st Battalion of the 5th SFG (A).

  At the start of the war, according to Haas, his battalion was about fifty vehicles strong, packed to the gills with Green Beret and Aussie commandos, ready to breach through the berm in western Iraq on the first night of the war.

  The Special Operators and their support had driven through the deserts of Jordan, down to Saudi Arabia, where there was an ideal location for them to infiltrate. Their support would be a unit from the Florida National Guard, who was there to do the actual breaching, while the SF troopers kept an eye out for signs of the enemy.

  LTC Haas said his men had trained well for taking care of the breaches, with several months of drilling and focus on their executions before the war began. This made the Western Desert breaches incredibly smooth—the soldiers had it down to a fine art. Now it was time to apply that training.

  The 5th SFG had just won their trial by combat in the deserts of Afghanistan. Their code name in Afghanistan, Task Force DAGGER, was resurrected once more, as they prepared to enter combat against a new and deadly foe.

  Task Force DAGGER

  CJSOTF-W, or Task Force DAGGER, was comprised of the 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne). They infiltrated into western Iraq through two berms along the Saudi Arabian–Iraqi borders, and moved into western Iraq to two locations, Ar Rutbah and Ar Ramadi. Some locations have been changed at the request of Special Operations Security. Courtesy: CIA World Factbook 2003

  The Breach

  5th SFG (A)’s Bravo and Charlie Companies were poised in their vehicles, ready to hear the presidential orders that would give them the green light to simultaneously invade Iraq. A Florida National Guard Infantry Company was with them; the Guardsmen carried pickaxes and entrenching tools. By hand they would have to transform an impasse of dirt and stone marking the boundary into Iraq. They would do it, according to operators on the ground that night, in an inhumanly rapid time of two hours and fifteen minutes.

  Picking the ideal spots for Task Force DAGGER to breach Saddam’s barricades was not an easy task, however. Reconnaissance efforts were critical and Special Forces recon teams mapped out the best sites weeks in advance. The U.S. Air Force’s Operation SOUTHERN WATCH flew sorties on Iraqi guard posts and ADA (Air Defense Artillery) nets or ground systems below the 38th parallel. Key enemy guard posts that c
ould spot the breach and tip off Saddam were blown up ahead of time.

  According to U.S. intelligence sources, Saddam’s Iraqi border guards were “the weakest force they had in their inventory.” Losing the element of surprise was more of a concern than the fight they might put up, so SOUTHERN WATCH took flight and punched a few holes in Saddam’s security belt, guided in by the SF recon teams.

  Bravo Company had a caravan of seventy-five vehicles for their detachment alone, which included their Australian SAS (Special Air Service) counterparts. The humvees and Pinkies (Land Rovers) were loaded down with rucksacks and gear, strapped to the bumpers and sides of the vehicle. Antennae and satellite uplinks bristled along the tops, and machine guns and belt-fed grenade launchers were mounted everywhere. It was a scene from out of a Mad Max movie, and viewing it through the green light of NVGs (Night Vision Goggles) added to the weirdness.

  Here and there an SF sharpshooter stood atop the berm, facing the wind, and scanning the black horizon for signs of trouble. Through the green filter of the NVGs, the darkness of the desert took on an alien-like quality, looking like a scene from the surface of the moon. Bleak, flat, rocky soil spread out in all directions, making this giant berm the only geographic feature in what seemed like a hundred square miles.

  The breach spot was twenty miles northwest of Judaiat al Hamir. Charlie Company would cross there, and enter a system of sha’ibs and wadis. Bravo Company would cross at a point north of there. These dry riverbeds would hopefully conceal the Green Berets and their vehicles as they raced northeast.

  A recall plan was put into place in the event that Saddam Hussein decided to “play ball” with President Bush at the last second and the invasion was to be called off.

  Radio silence was the SOP, except for code words to the HQ when necessary; these were limited to their codes for “Commencing the breach,” “First breach is complete,” “Second breach commenced,” “Second breach complete,” and “First vehicle into Iraq.” Also, there were code words for the companies when they hit their first phase lines or made contact with the enemy.

  It was a clear and windy night; the moonlight was bright enough for some of the soldiers to keep their NVGs flipped up on top of their Kevlar helmets.

  The operation was a “go.” Stone by stone, they pounded and tore away at the berm; one rock at a time it began to take the shape of a ramp instead of an obstacle.

  The 160th SOAR (Special Operations Aviation Regiment) was on standby with Little Birds and Black Hawks, as well as a flight of USAF fighters. If the Iraqis got wind of these breaches, there would be gunships and fast-movers all over them. As the men dug the breach, the helicopters were in the air, choppers loosing rockets and chain guns at several guard towers south of Bravo Company.

  As the choppers “lit up” the Iraqi towers, the SF commanders monitored the enemy radio transmissions; if they weren’t wiped out, and called in for a QRF, the Coalition would know about it ahead of time.

  Planning in this operation covered every variable the Green Berets could imagine. There was no room for errors, and they had warmed up for this with an unconventional war against the Taliban only a year earlier.

  The vehicles topped the berm and crossed into Iraqi territory single file. In the military, this is called “ducks in a row.”

  An American flag was raised at the breach spot. The flag blew wildly in the windy night as the Green Berets and Australian SAS drove into enemy territory, racing across the flat sands toward their first objective: several areas in Iraq’s Western Desert that were designated as being “primary launch sites” for missile attacks against Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, or Kuwait.

  SCUD Hunters

  The Special Forces went as deep as they could into Iraq. They drove through the night and into the day, trying to get as far as possible.

  Haas and his men were to “deny” the Iraqis the capability to launch a SCUD missile attack on anyone: that was their mission.

  The Australians with the 5th SFG (A) infiltrated by vehicle at the breach sites, and were also airlifted by the 160th, but their mission was different: find and secure potential landing strips in the desert, so that more forces could be brought in.

  COL Mulholland’s intent was to be “omnipresent” in western Iraq within the first few hours, flood the west with as many Special Operations “bubbas” as he could, so that the Iraqis couldn’t really figure out “Where are they not?” and could launch something.

  By going in simultaneously close and deep, the Special Forces would have the Iraqis totally overwhelmed.

  The seeming battlefield omnipresence of the Special Forces was achieved within eighteen hours. At dawn the following morning, the fight started against the Iraqi Army’s counter-recon units, with a few minor contacts.

  The morning of March 21 brought more counter-recon units to face the Green Berets. They came from the built-up areas in southwestern Iraq, and from the H-3 airfield in northwestern Iraq, just southeast of Ar Rutbah.

  The area that the SF infiltrated was described as a “bowling alley,” with terrain that certainly favored the Iraqi defenders in their counter-recon positions.

  Over the next three days, Haas’s men on the ground fought a mounted battle against the Iraqi counter-recon units—the Green Berets came out of it clearly on top of the enemy, with better weapons systems, better technology, better vehicles, and better shots.

  The Iraqis attacked in pickup trucks with Soviet DHSK “Dishka” mounted anti-aircraft machine guns and five to ten soldiers in the back. Groups of ten or so pickup trucks came out at first. This number dwindled down to four or five pickups after the first few engagements against the four-vehicle Special Forces teams.

  According to LTC Haas, “Every team saw combat, and I had ten from my battalion, and three from 3rd Battalion; every team saw combat within the first four or five days.”

  When Haas saw the Iraqi tactic of trying to outnumber the SF team’s vehicles with their own, he switched his tactics and combined the teams into two-team, eight-vehicle patrols instead. The next time the Iraqis came out with ten vehicles, now it was ten on eight instead of ten on four.

  The ability of the SF teams to utterly destroy the Iraqi opposition and not have to retrograde or go into a defense gave LTC Haas a feeling of confidence. “It lessened my anxiety. We weren’t running, we were destroying stuff,” Haas recalled.

  Within the first four days, SF teams under Haas’s command destroyed over forty vehicles and killed more than one hundred Iraqi soldiers, just in the north, near Ar Rutbah. Charlie Company to the south had an equal damage assessment.

  The Florida Army Reserve National Guard (FLARNG) Infantry Company attached to the 5th SFG (A) freed up SF to do what was most important: conduct the counter-recon fight. They had been working with 5th Group for over a month prior to the invasion and training full-time with the Special Forces.

  Two of the FLARNG platoons were set up on strip alert as QRFs in case the Green Berets got in over their heads. They also guarded the H-1 Airfield inside Iraq and set up security on the resupply bundles when they came in.

  Unfortunately, one of the Florida soldiers lost his life in a rollover crash at H-1 Airfield, but none fell on the battlefield.

  A Company from the 10th Mountain Division eventually replaced the Guardsmen who supported 5th SFG (A). The Florida Guard unit was handed back over to Task Force SEMINOLE, responsible for taking care of detainees at H-1 that the SF teams picked up, as well as having a forward logistics site into the west to help out the British and Australians, who were deep inside Iraq.

  Haas’s battalion had the most ground to cover in the west of Iraq, so he set up his men along the major, high-speed avenues of approach.

  TF DAGGER shared a center sector with the Australians, while the British SAS moved along the north. The way that the sectors were divided up was based on history—the launch sites that Iraqis had used during the first Gulf War, good terrain analysis, and new intelligence from NRO (National Reconnais
sance Office) imaging satellites.

  Underpasses on highways were favored hiding spots for Saddam’s ballistic missiles, where they would hopefully be shielded from America’s big eyes in the sky.

  Unfortunately, this tactic was outdated, so the Special Forces knew that they might have something new up their sleeves. Saddam’s most trusted intelligence lay within his Rocket Artillery Corps (the SCUD missile units), and they might try new techniques.

  Previously, the SCUD units would lay in wait under a bridge or overpass and briefly emerge when a launch command was given. The missile would be raised and after the launch the vehicle would then retreat to its hide spot under the overpass. Civilian vehicles were used to transport missiles, parts, and supplies to the Iraqi soldiers manning the SCUDs, in an effort to keep a lower profile and keep satellite attention away.

  This was Saddam’s “Ace in the Hole,” and he wanted to protect it as best he could.

  Little did Saddam know that he would literally be an “ace in the hole” as well, when he was captured on December 13, 2003.

  Based on the known ranges of SCUD missiles and the new locations of potential hide spots, the men of TF DAGGER knew they would have to go deep into Iraq to locate and destroy them. If they were to get to them in time, the Green Berets would have to go directly down Iraq’s major highway systems. Forces were arrayed along the highways to prevent Saddam from ordering his missiles to be moved to a new location.

  GEN Mosley of the JFACC (Joint Forces Air Component Command) located at PSAB (Prince Sultan Air Base) in Saudi Arabia was the “big boss” of the western Iraq SF mission.

  Mosley put together an incredible “air package” available twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, which provided “superb” air support for the western fight.

  A-10 Warthogs, F-16 Eagles, E-3 AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) command and control planes, British Tornados—somewhere between sixteen to twenty aircraft were flying CAS missions for Mulholland’s Green Berets and their SAS counterparts.