Aftermath

by Nir Rosen

  A NEWSWEEK ISSUE in March 2010 declared U.S. victory in Iraq. But for Iraqis there was no victory. Since the occupation began in 2003, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis had been killed. Many more had been injured. There were millions of widows and orphans. Millions had fled their homes. Tens of thousands of Iraqi men had spent years in American prisons. The new Iraqi state was among the most corrupt in the world. It was often brutal. It failed to provide adequate services to its people, millions of whom were barely able to survive. Iraqis were traumatized. This upheaval did not spare Iraq’s neighbors, either. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees languished in exile. Sectarianism increased in the region. Weapons, tactics, and veterans of the jihad made their way into neighboring countries. And now the American “victory” in Iraq was being imposed on the people of Afghanistan.

  Seven years after the disastrous American invasion, the cruelest irony in Iraq is that, in a perverse way, the neoconservative dream of creating a moderate, democratic ally in the region to counterbalance Iran and Saudi Arabia had come to fruition. But even if violence in Iraq continues to decline and the government becomes a model of democracy, Iraq will never be a model to be emulated by its neighbors. People in the region remember, even if those in the West have forgotten, the seven years of chaos, violence, and terror, and to them this is what Iraq symbolizes. Thanks to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and other failed U.S. policies in the Middle East, the U.S. had lost most of its influence on Arab people, if not the Muslim world—even if it could still exert pressure on Arab regimes. At first some Arab elites thought they could benefit from Bush and the neoconservatives, but now reformists and the elite want nothing to do with the U.S., which can only harm their credibility. Every day there are assassinations with silenced pistols and the small magnetic car bombs known as sticky bombs; every day men still disappear and secret prisons are still discovered. In Sunni villages Awakening men are being found beheaded. And although some militiamen have been absorbed into the security forces, others have turned to a life of crime, and brazen daylight robberies are common. But despite this, the worst might be over for Iraqis. On my trips to Iraq in years past, I had made a habit of scanning the walls of Baghdad neighborhoods for bits of sectarian graffiti, spray-painted slogans that were pro-Mahdi Army, pro-Saddam, anti-Shiite, or pro-insurgency. This time, however, there were almost none to be found. The exhortations to sectarian struggle had been replaced with the enthusiasms of youthful football fans: now the walls say, “Long Live Barcelona.”

  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

  This book would not be possible without the strong support of the New York University Center on Law and Security. I am very grateful to its generous director, Karen Greenberg, as well as Steve Holmes and David, Nicole, Jeff, Fransesca, Sarvenaz, and the rest of the family I have made there. They have given me a place to feel at home, the freedom to do my work, and the confidence of knowing I have their backing. My editor at Nation Books, Carl Bromley, was supernaturally patient with me and believed in my vision. Without him it would not have come to reality. Thanks to Mark Sorkin for his excellent copy editing and suggestions. I am also very grateful to my agent, Denise Shannon, for her enthusiasm and support.

  I also acknowledge the Investigative Fund of The Nation Institute—particularly Joe Conason and Esther Kaplan—who have supported my work.

  Many Iraqis welcomed me as a brother into their families. Meitham, Ali, Osama, Abbas, Hassanein, Aws, Wisam, the Hamdi family, Omar Salih, Omer Awchi, Rana al-Aiouby, and others made this book possible, and took great risks to care for me and share their lives with me. In Lebanon my close friends Mohamad Ali Nayel, Naim Assaker, Bissane el Cheikh, Amer Mohsen, Michel Samaha, and Patrick Haenni taught me all I needed to know. Thanks also to Ambassador Imad Moustapha, Toufic Alloush, Mirvat Abu Khalil, Seyid Nawaf al-Musawi, Haj Osama Hamdan, Wisam, Hamelkart Ataya, Mansour Aziz, Walid Abou Khashbee, Abdo Saad, Omar Nashabi, the brave members of Samidoun, Rami Kanan, Sharif Bibi, and Najat Sharafeddine.

  Jon Sawyer and Nathalie Applewhite of the Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting supported my work in Afghanistan. Deb Chasman and Josh Cohen at the Boston Review gave me the opportunity and the space to write important chapter-length articles. Likewise, Monika Bauerlein of Mother Jones. Betsy Reed gave this manuscript a vigorous read, which I thank her for. I owe a big debt to Jonathan Shainin, my good friend who runs the best weekend review section in the English language at the National in Abu Dhabi.

  Ghaith Abdul Ahad, Hannah Allam, Tom Bigley, Leila Fadel, Seymour Hersh, Bob Bateman, and Andrew Exum are friends and colleagues who helped, advised, challenged, and inspired me. In Afghanistan, Shahir and Melek gave me friendship, help, and also saved my life. Thanks to Qais for helping out with that too. Thanks to Aziz Hakimi, Aners Fange, Andrew Wilder and Peter Jouvenal, Fazel Rabie Haqbeen, Mullah Tariq Osman, Josh Foust, Professor Tom Johnson, Tom Stanworth, John Moore, Matt Bruggmann, Steve Clemons, As’ad Abu Khalil, Kristele Younes, Peter Bergen, Elizabeth Campbell, Joel Charney, Scott Armstrong, the Theros family, Ahmad, Marika, Nick, the Zivkovic family, the Lombardi family, and my editor at Rolling Stone, Eric Bates.

  Numerous Iraqis, Lebanese, Egyptians, Syrians, Palestinians and Jordanians, as well as American soldiers, officers, and officials, trusted me with their knowledge and experience anonymously—I thank them all.

  Lastly, to my parents, my brothers, my wife, Tiffany, and Dakota (for not totally destroying my laptop while I wrote this book), I love you and I thank you.

  A NOTE ON SOURCES

  In writing this book I relied on very few secondary sources; the bulk of it is based on the seven years I have spent reporting in the Muslim world, from Somalia to Afghanistan. I cannot thank the many hundreds of people who welcomed me, helped me, educated me, and shared pieces of their lives with me, but it is thanks to their trust and generosity that this book is possible. I tried to avoid senior officials on any side to avoid propaganda and simplistic generalizations, and instead I tried to find out what was really transpiring myself. I was helped by local and international academics, journalists, historians, soldiers, policemen, militiamen, and aid workers. My colleagues at the Warlord Loop listserv were very helpful and stimulating. When it comes to secondary sources, I did, however, learn a lot from Military Review and the Small Wars Journal, which informed my thinking for the chapters on the surge in Iraq and Afghanistan. Articles in McClatchy’s, the Washington Post, and even some in the New York Times were also important. The reports of the International Crisis Group are essential for background, as are the articles in the Middle East Research and Information Project (merip.org) and the Middle East Journal.

  INDEX

  A

  Abbas Mosque

  Abbas (son of Ali), tomb of

  Abdel Mahdi, Adil

  Abdillah, Mullah

  Abdul-Ahad, Ghaith

  Abdullah, King (of Jordan)

  Abed, Abul

  Abed, Dhari Muhamad

  Abizaid, John

  Ablawi, Salih (Abu Jaafar)

  al-Absi, Shaker

  Abu Abdallah. See bin Laden, Osama

  Abu Anas

  Abu Bakr

  Abu Bilal

  Abu Dira

  Abu Dshir

  Abu Ghraib prison

  Abu Hanifa

  Abu Hanifa Mosque

  Abu Hatem (Karim Mahud al-Muhammadawi)

  Abu Hudheifa (Marwarn Yassin)

  Abu Hureira

  Abu Jaafar (Salih Ablawi)

  Abu Jaafar (Sheikh Ali)

  Abu Jaber

  Abu Karar

  Abu Khalel family

  Abu Khalid

  Abu Khalil, As’ad

  Abu Lahab

  Abu Laith

  Abu Midyan

  Abu Muhamad/Abu Shahid (Mustafa Ramadan)

  Abu Muhamad (in Jordan)

  Abu Muhammad, Sheikh

  Abu Musa

  Abu Muthana

  Abu Nidal Organization

  Abu Obeida (Abdallah Khalaq)
<
br />   Abu Omar (Firas Yamin)

  Abu Omar (Khalil Ibrahim)

  Abu Qutaiba

  Abu Risha, Ahmad

  Abu Risha, Sheikh Sattar

  Abu Rumman, Mohammad

  Abu Teiba

  Abu Yasser

  Accountability and Justice Commission

  Adesnik, Ariel David

  al-Adhami, Sheikh Muayad

  Adhamiya

  al-Adib, Ali

  Adnan, Adil

  Afghan Ministry of Interior

  Afghan Ministry of Justice

  Afghan National Army (ANA)

  Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)

  Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS)

  Afghan National Police (ANP)

  Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)

  Afghan Regional Security Integration Command

  Afghanistan

  assumptions about

  attacks on NGOs in

  civilian death toll

  civilian surge in, call for

  COIN theorists’ failure to question the U.S. invasion of

  context of, in-depth knowledge of, lack of

  and defensive jihad

  drug trade in

  failure of U.S. COIN operations in

  fighting picking up in

  jihadis in

  loss of U.S. influence due to war in

  new U.S. strategy for

  oppression in, continuation of, by U.S. military

  population of, characteristics of

  prisons in

  Rumsfeld’s view of U.S. troops in

  situation in, and the resurgence of U.S. troops, aspects of

  Soviet invasion and occupation of

  and the surge in Iraq

  U.S. initial invasion of

  withdrawal of Soviets from, American neglect following

  Aflaq, Michel

  Ahad, Ghaith Abdul

  al-Ahdab, Musbah

  Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud

  al-Ajami, Mukhtar Shaaban

  Akef, Mahdi

  Akhundzada, Sher Muhamad (SMA)

  Akkawi, Khalil

  Al Akhbar newspaper

  Al Aqsa Mosque

  Al Arab al-Yawm newspaper

  Al Arabiya television

  Al Ashur al-Hurm period

  Al Azhar University

  Al Basa’ir newspaper

  Al Furat television

  Al Hawza newspaper

  Al Hayat newspaper

  Al Iraqiya television

  Al I’tisam newspaper

  Al Jazeera television

  Al Manar television

  Al Mustafa Mosque

  Al Mutaibeen alliance

  Al Qaeda

  accusation of Syria helping

  and Afghanistan

  and Fatah al-Islam

  groups/people inspired by

  and Lebanon

  major reason for the growth of

  new U.S. strategy for targeting

  sources of funding

  worldview of

  Zarqawi’s rejection of

  See also Tawhid and Jihad group

  Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)

  in Amriya

  and the Awakening groups

  and the banks of the Tigris River

  believed to be lying dormant

  creation of

  and implementation of COIN

  initial Sunni support for

  jihad conditions breached by

  and Lebanon

  local resistance against

  and the Mahdi Army

  remnants of, targeting

  Sunni opponents of

  and the surge

  and tribal leaders

  Al Qaeda paradigm

  Al Qaqa Battalions

  Al Rai newspaper

  Al Rusufa prison

  Al Sabah newspaper

  Al Sahwa (the Awakening)

  See also Awakening program/groups; Sons of Iraq (SOI)

  Al Sajjad Mosque

  Al Tanf refugee camp

  Al Wathba (The Leap) movement

  Al Zawra TV

  Alawites

  Algeria

  Ali (cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad)

  Ali, Jamal Jaafir Mohammed (Abu Mahdi al-Muhandes)

  Allawi, Ayad

  Allush, Mustafa

  al-Alousi, Mithal

  Amal Movement

  Amawi, Mohammad Zaki

  America/Americans. See United States

  American Enterprise Institute

  American proxies

  Amir, General Abdul

  al-Amiri, Hadi

  al-Amli, Abu Khalid

  Amman

  Amriya

  Amriya Freedom Fighters (AFF). See Fursan (Amriya Freedom Fighters/Thurwar)

  Anbar Awakening

  Anbar province

  See also Falluja

  Annadawi, Muhamad Fawad Latufi

  Ansar al-Islam group

  Ansar al-Sunna group

  Ansar al-Tawhid wa al-Sunna group

  al-Ansari, Sheikh Haitham

  Anti-Saddam militias, Iranian-sponsored

  See also Shiite militias

  Aoun, Michel

  Arab Current

  Arab League

  Arab University of Beirut

  Arabiya television

  Arabsat network

  Arafat, Yasser

  al-Araji, Baha

  al-Araji, Hazim

  Arbaeen ceremonies

  al-Aridi, Ghazi

  Armed Forces Journal

  Army of Muhammad

  Army of the Mujahideen

  Ash Sharq radio

  Ashura holiday

  Asia Foundation

  al-Askari, Sami

  Askari Shrine

  See also Samarra shrine attack

  al-Assad, Bashar

  al-Assad, Hafiz

  Association of Free Prisoners

  Association of Muslim Scholars

  Assumptions, underlying, about Iraq and Afghanistan

  al-Aswad, Muhamad

  Atiyyah, Ghassan

  Australia

  Awakening Council

  Awakening phenomenon

  Awakening program/groups See also Iraqi Security Volunteers (ISVs); Sons of Iraq (SOI)

  al-Awamli family

  al-Awar, Hossam

  Ayn al-Hilweh refugee camp

  Azzam, Abdallah

  Azzam, Hudheifa

  B

  Baath Party/Baathists See also Hussein, Saddam

  Bab al-Tabbaneh area

  Badr Brigade

  Badr Organization (formerly the Badr Brigade)

  Baghdad

  American devolving their authority in

  battle for

  as a city of decay

  concentration of attacks against the coalition in

  continued escalation of violence in

  economic center of

  improved security in, reason for

  main no-go zone of

  major coordinated terrorist attacks in

  media coverage of inside and outside of, issue with

  number of refugees from

  sectarian cleansing in

  and the shifts in sectarianism

  six years after the fall of, changes that were apparent

  surge efforts in and around, aspects of the

  See also specific districts, neighborhoods, and sites

  Baghdad Brigade

  Baghdad International Airport

  Baghdad Operation Center (BOC)

  Baghdad Security Plan

  Baghdad TV station

  al-Baghdadi, Abu Omar

  al-Baghdadi, Ayatollah Ali

  Baghdadiya television

  Bahrain

  Bakri, Nada

  Balkans

  al-Banna, Hassan

  Baquba

  Barack, Obama

  Baradar, Mullah

  Baram, Amatzia

  al-Barrak,
Abdul Rahman bin Nasser

  Barudi, Sheikh Bilal

  Barzani, Massoud

  Basair (The Mind’s Eye) newspaper

  Basra

  Batal al-Tahrir (Heroes of Liberation) section

  al-Bawi, Ghassan Adnan

  Bayat al-Imam (Oath of Loyalty to the Leader)

  Bazzaz, Hassan

  Bedawi refugee camp

  Beirut See also specific districts and neighborhoods

  Beirut International Airport

  al-Beit, Ahl

  Beri, Nabih

  al-Berjawi, Shaqer

  “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency” (Sepp)

  Biden, Joe

  bin Aqil, Muslim

  bin Jabrin, Sheikh Abdallah

  bin Laden, Osama See also Al Qaeda

  bin Sultan, Bandar

  Bishara, Azmi

  Black September (Palestinian uprising)

  Blair, Tony

  Bodine, Barbara

  al-Bolani, Jawad

  Bonn conference

  Bosnia

  Bremer, Paul

  Britain

  and Afghanistan

  and Basra

  British colonizers

  British Mandate authority

  Brookings Institution

  Brown, Gordon

  Buratha Mosque

  Burj al-Barajneh refugee camps

  al-Burqawi, Isam Taher al-Oteibbi

  Bush administration

  Bush, George W.

  C

  Cairo

  Campbell, John

  Canada

  Carter, Phil

  Casey, George

  Celebrity pundits

  Center for New American Security (CNAS)

  Center for Strategic International Studies

  Central Command

  Chadarchi, Naseer

  Chalabi, Ahmad

  Chamberlin, Robert

  Charge of the Knights campaign

  Chechnya

  Chesney, Ed

  Chiarelli, General

  Children

  art from Palestinan

  fear in

  fights between Sunni and Shiite

  and IEDs

  as orphans

  view of Americans

  Christian Lebanese Forces

  Christian militias

  Christians

  in Baghdad areas

  in Lebanon

  relocation of