James A. Hessler
Page 19
The road on which we moved [Millerstown] was perpendicular to the enemy’s line, but it was supposed that their left did not extend to this point of intersection to which we were moving. My instructions were, if we gained this point, we would be on the enemy’s left flank, and that I must form line on the left, and attempt to rake their line. [emphasis added] When we arrived within a few hundred yards of the cross-roads mentioned above, we discovered that the enemy held it with a large force of infantry and artillery, [emphasis added] which opened upon us immediately.47
History can not record how Longstreet’s attack would have developed if Sickles’ Third Corps had remained several hundred yards farther east on Cemetery Ridge. But when Sickles refused his line at an angle from the Peach Orchard toward Devil’s Den, McLaws’ division was not able to drive the Federal line up the Emmitsburg Road (toward Cemetery Hill) from the Peach Orchard vicinity, as he was ordered to do. Had Sickles ended his line on the Emmitsburg Road (as Lee and Longstreet apparently believed), the Confederates would have had an opportunity to drive up the road and sweep him out of position. The unexpected Union deployment around the Peach Orchard forced the Confederate generals to make major on-the-spot modifications to the attack. As Longstreet reported, once it became apparent that Sickles’ line stretched well past the orchard, Hood’s division was “moved on farther to our right” in order to locate the true end of Meade’s line, and to “partially envelope” it.48
Not only did Lee and Longstreet erroneously plan on using the Peach Orchard to drive in Meade’s left flank, but continued occupation of the orchard itself was also a significant objective in their plan. This second point is often lost in the post-battle criticism directed at Sickles. Both Sickles and his officers had been worried all morning that the Confederates would see the value in using the Emmitsburg Road ridge as an artillery platform to pummel Union positions on Cemetery Ridge. If Lee’s reports accurately reflect his strategy, then Sickles accurately out-guessed General Lee.
To reiterate this point, as noted previously, Lee’s report of July 31 stated: “In front of General Longstreet the enemy held a position from which, if he could be driven, it was thought our artillery could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of the ridge [emphasis added].” Lee desired an elevated artillery platform in advance of Cemetery Ridge, and on Longstreet’s front, to support an assault on the ridge itself. Lee confirmed that he was describing the Peach Orchard when he further reported: “After a severe struggle, Longstreet succeeded in getting possession of and holding the desired ground.” The only position that fits this description is the Peach Orchard. Lee’s report of January 1864 confirmed again that Longstreet was directed to obtain an artillery platform on the Emmitsburg Road from which Federal forces were ultimately driven.49
Commenting from the Federal perspective, Henry Hunt knew that the Peach Orchard ridge was vital to Lee’s plans. Hunt thought that Lee apparently “mistook the few troops on the Peach Orchard ridge in the morning for our main line, and that by taking it and sweeping up the Emmitsburg road under cover of his batteries, he expected to ‘roll up’ our lines to Cemetery Hill.”50
Some historians have argued that Sickles exaggerated the importance of the Peach Orchard in Lee’s objectives during his post-battle attempts to justify his advance to that point. As historian Richard Sauers wrote, “many historians have fallen into the same trap and have repeated the same error of reasoning.” However, the theory that Lee intended to turn the Federal left at or near the Peach Orchard, and then use the orchard as an artillery platform, is supported by several contemporary Confederate accounts. It was not an invention of postwar posturing. The fact that Lee was later unable to convert the Peach Orchard to his benefit does not diminish the fact that Lee (as stated in his own reports) considered it a potentially valuable position at the time he launched his attack. In fact, the Confederates’ ultimate inability to use the Peach Orchard to their advantage confirms only that Lee and Longstreet both joined Sickles in overestimating its military value. The Peach Orchard might not have been as strong of a position as expected, but it certainly influenced movements on both sides.51
Whether Lee and Longstreet thought that the Federal left rested on the Emmitsburg Road, or that they were now in position to simply roll up the Cemetery Ridge line, or believed they could easily occupy the Peach Orchard, they were wrong on every count. The Confederate attack was being initiated under a misapprehension of the strength, length, shape, and position of Meade’s left flank. Sickles’ move forward, for better or worse, forced the Confederates to modify their plans. Sickles’ advance, more than any individual action, dictated the flow of fighting on Gettysburg’s second day and would also significantly impact the third day.52
Longstreet’s postwar Battles and Leaders account, if accurate, essentially acknowledges that he and Lee modified their plan to the best circumstances available:
…as the line was deployed I rode along from left to right, examining the Federal position and putting my troops in the best position we could find. General Lee at the same time gave orders for the attack to be made by my right—following up the direction of the Emmitsburg road [emphasis added] toward the Cemetery Ridge, holding Hood’s left as well as could be toward the Emmitsburg road, McLaws to follow the movements of Hood, attacking at the Peach Orchard the Federal Third Corps, with a part of R. H. Anderson’s following the movements of McLaws to guard his left flanks.53
When he reached Warfield Ridge, McLaws deployed his division with two brigades in front: Joseph Kershaw on the right (south of the Millerstown Road) and William Barksdale on the left (north of the road). His second pair of brigades under Semmes and Wofford were placed in the rear as reserves. When Longstreet sent McLaws a series of impatient messages inquiring why he had not yet charged, the division commander replied that careful preparation was required. Just when McLaws was ready to move out, another courier arrived from Longstreet with orders for him to “wait until Hood got into position.”54
Longstreet had decided to delay the attack until Hood’s division was moved to McLaws’ right and placed in position to drive in Sickles’ extended Federal left. According to Kershaw, “Hood’s division was then moving in our rear toward our right, to gain the enemy’s left flank, and I was directed to commence the attack so soon as General Hood became engaged, swinging around toward the peach orchard, and at the same time establishing connection with Hood, on my right, and co-operating with him. It was understood he was to sweep down the enemy’s line in a direction perpendicular to our then line of battle.” But in yet another Confederate breakdown, Hood’s division neither advanced promptly nor up the Emmitsburg Road, “perpendicular” to Kershaw’s line. Like Longstreet, McLaws, and Kershaw, when Hood finally got into position, he did not like what he saw in front of him.55
Chapter 8
Isn’t Your Line Too Much Extended?
At 3:00 p.m., with the Union Sixth Corps having finally arrived, and still unaware that his left flank was moving out of position, Meade called a meeting with his corps commanders. “The commanding general desires to see you at headquarters,” Butterfield related to Sickles, Sedgwick, Sykes, Newton, Slocum, Howard, and Hancock.1 At the same hour, Meade sent the following dispatch to General-in-Chief Henry Halleck in Washington:
I have concentrated my army at this place today. The Sixth Corps is just coming in, very much worn out, having been marching since 9 p.m. last night. The army is fatigued. I have today, up to this hour, awaited the attack of the enemy, I having a strong position for defensive. I am not determined, as yet, on attacking him till his position is more developed. He has been moving on both my flanks, apparently, but it is difficult to tell exactly his movements. I have delayed attacking, to allow the Sixth Corps and parts of other corps to reach this place and to rest the men. Expecting a battle, I ordered all my trains to the rear. If not attacked, and I can get any positive information of the position of the enemy
which will justify me in so doing, I shall attack. If I find it hazardous to do so, or am satisfied the enemy is endeavoring to move to my rear and interpose between me and Washington, I shall fall back to my supplies at Westminster.…I feel fully the responsibility resting upon me, but will endeavor to act with caution.2
Following the battle, Meade’s enemies (specifically Sickles and Dan Butterfield) attempted to prove that Meade was planning to retreat from Gettysburg. Butterfield later testified before the Congressional Committee that “General Meade [during the morning of July 2] directed me to prepare an order to withdraw the army from that position.” Earlier that morning, Meade had asked Butterfield to familiarize himself with the local roads and prepare an order as a contingency in case the army was compelled to fall back. Butterfield interpreted this, or so he said, as proof of Meade’s intention to retreat. Butterfield testified that he spent the majority of the morning and early afternoon preparing this draft. “After finishing it, I presented it to General Meade, and it met with his approval.” Butterfield also managed to show his draft to John Gibbon, who exclaimed, “Great God! General Meade does not intend to leave his position?” The draft was neither published nor retained by the army, and Meade claimed to not even remember the episode until months later when confronted by Congress’ Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War.3
The mid-afternoon meeting was also an opportunity for Meade’s critics to further portray him as indecisive and befuddled by his new responsibilities. His need to call “councils of war,” they said, was proof of his indecisive nature. Sickles and his allies claimed Meade intended to discuss a retreat at this 3:00 p.m. meeting. We will never know what would have been discussed at this meeting, because events intervened to prevent its occurrence. Fortunately for Meade’s reputation, the dispatch to Halleck survives as a clear indication of his intentions. Meade knew his position was strong defensively, and he was going to allow the Sixth Corps (which had marched more than thirty miles) to rest before deciding on any offensive operations. But the desire to wait on the Sixth Corps was also based on the inaccurate premise that Lee’s army greatly outnumbered his own. Meade’s dispatch also allowed for the possibility that he might be forced to fall back toward his supplies at Westminster. This can be interpreted two ways. Meade’s supporters argue that it demonstrates his prudent flexibility in planning for every contingency. His enemies, however, argued that it proved Meade was looking for the first opportunity to retire without battle.4
Henry Hunt understood the proper necessity of contingency planning. He argued that Meade’s actions and dispatches throughout the day proved that a retreat was never seriously considered. Hunt noted that he never received an order to withdraw the army’s Artillery Reserve, which surely would have been necessary if Meade intended to abandon Gettysburg. Hunt also argued that Meade exhibited boldness in staying—he had risked an attack in the morning before the entire Union army had concentrated.5
At this late hour of the afternoon Meade was also unsure which flank (if any) would be attacked. Sickles and some of his officers had definite opinions of their own. They were convinced the attack would fall on their front. Sickles would be proven correct by events, but as he embellished in one of his many postwar speeches, “at the supreme moment—3 P.M. July 2— when the enemy was advancing to attack, we had no plan of action, no order of battle. For Meade the battle of July 2 is a surprise, like the battle of July 1.”6
The particulars that led to the proposed 3:00 p.m. meeting are surprisingly muddied. Neither Meade nor supporters such as Warren or James Biddle mentioned it in their reports or later in Congressional testimony. As the Army of the Potomac’s corps commanders began arriving at headquarters for Meade’s 3:00 p.m. council, Chief Engineer Warren rode up with startling news. “There seemed to be some doubt about whether he [Sickles] should occupy a line in front, or the one on the ridge in the rear,” Warren later testified, “and I am not sure but a report had come in from some of our officers that that position was not occupied. I know I had sent an officer there to ascertain and report.” The suggestion has also been made that Warren (or another officer) had been sent to check on Little Round Top due to the signal station’s reports of advancing Confederates. Warren finally confirmed what had been brewing all morning: Sickles’ corps was out of position and there were no infantry on Little Round Top. Meade ordered General Sykes to move his Fifth Corps to the left flank, and told him he would meet him there. Meade was mounting his horse when Sickles arrived at headquarters.7
Sickles later testified before the Joint Committee:
While I was making my disposition on this line I received a communication from headquarters to attend a consultation of corps commanders. I sent word verbally by the officer who brought me the communication, begging, if possible, to be excused, stating that the enemy were in great force in my front, and intimating that I would very soon be engaged, and that I was making my dispositions to meet the attack. I hastened forward the movements of my troops as rapidly as possible, and had got my batteries in position, when I received another and peremptory order to report at once in person at headquarters, to meet the corps commanders. I turned over the command temporarily to General Birney in my absence, feeling assured that before I could return the engagement would open.8
“I hastened to headquarters with all speed,” Sickles continued, “but before I got there the sound of the cannon announced the battle had opened. However, I was quite near headquarters at the time and pushed on, but found that the consultation had been broken up by the opening of the battle.” Sickles later added that Meade greeted him with, “You need not dismount, General. I hear the sound of cannon on your front. Return to your command. I will join you there at once.” Captain Meade’s version essentially agrees with this account.9
As Sickles rode “rapidly” back to his corps, Meade followed a short distance behind. According to Tremain, “the battle was thoroughly opened,” likely a reference to artillery (perhaps Judson Clark’s battery) rather than large-scale infantry fire. Sickles later told Congress, “On my way [back] I found that the enemy were moving up to the attack in great force, in two lines of battle, supported by three columns. Fortunately, my left had succeeded in getting into position on Round Top and along the commanding ridge to which I have referred; and those positions were firmly held by the Third Corps.” This statement, taken under oath, was perhaps Sickles’ most blatant lie. The Third Corps never occupied either Big Round Top or Little Round Top at any time during the battle, and at that particular moment neither did any other Union infantry corps.10
When Meade passed the left of Winfield Hancock’s Second Corps, he was, as he later explained, “wholly unprepared to find it [Sickles’ corps] advanced far beyond…the line of the Second Corps. Its lines were over half a mile out to the front, to the Emmitsburg Road, entirely disconnected with the rest of the army, and beyond supporting distance.” Meade was initially accompanied by Warren. As the pair rode south along Cemetery Ridge and Meade began to turn toward the Peach Orchard, he reportedly pointed toward Little Round Top and told Warren to “ride over and if anything serious is going on, attend to it.” Warren departed Meade and galloped toward the hill accompanied by orderlies and two lieutenants.11
“I rode out to the extreme left, to await the arrival of the Fifth Corps and to post it, when I found that Major-General Sickles, commanding the Third Corps, not fully apprehending the instructions in regard to the position to be occupied, had advanced, or rather was in the act of advancing, his corps some half a mile or three-quarters of a mile in front of the line of the Second Corps, on the prolongation of which it was designed his corps should rest,” Meade later reported. “Having found Major-General Sickles, I was explaining to him that he was too far in advance, and discussing with him the propriety of withdrawing, when the enemy opened on him with several batteries in his front and on his flank, and immediately brought forward columns of infantry and made a most vigorous assault.12
Meade and Lee�
��s positions after Dan Sickles moved forward. The lightly shaded troops on the southern end of Cemetery Ridge represent the line that Meade wanted Sickles to occupy.
Meade told the Congressional Committee that he arrived on Sickles’ front a few minutes before 4:00 p.m. Finding Sickles’ “position very much in advance of what it had been my intention that he should take,” Meade asked Sickles to indicate his new line:
When he had done so I told him it was not the position I had expected him to take; that he had advanced his line beyond the support of my army, and that I was very fearful he would be attacked and would lose the artillery, which he had put so far in front, before I could support it, or that if I undertook to support it I would have to abandon all the rest of the line which I had adopted—that is, I would have to fight the battle out there where he was. General Sickles expressed regret that he should have occupied a position which did not meet with my approval, and he very promptly said that he would withdraw his forces to the line which I had intended him to take.…But I told him I was fearful that the enemy would not permit him to withdraw, and that there was no time for any further change or movement. And before I had finished that remark, or that sentence, the enemy’s batteries opened upon him and the action commenced.13
Captain Meade’s recollections added that General Meade declared that the new position was beyond supporting distance of the remainder of the army and was also neutral ground—neither side could occupy it to advantage. Meade warned that Sickles would either lose his artillery or be forced to abandon the entire line. Sickles offered to withdraw his troops when, according to Captain Meade, his father responded, “Yes, you may as well, at once. The enemy will not let you withdraw without taking advantage of your position, but you have to come back, and you may as well do it at once as at any other time.” Sickles was about to implement the order when “the batteries opened with a terrific cannonade in front and to the left of the Peach Orchard.” Meade told Sickles “it was too late to retire, and ordered him to hold on and do the best he could, telling him that he would be supported.” Captain Meade’s claim that his father initially ordered Sickles to fall back appears a trivial detail at first glance, and is missing from many other accounts. The detail is significant because during the long post-battle controversy, Sickles frequently claimed that Meade did not order him to pull back and therefore must have approved of the new position. Perhaps Captain Meade added this statement to his own version as a defense against Sickles’ charge.14