James A. Hessler
Page 20
Sickles’ 1864 testimony before the Joint Committee claimed he admitted to Meade that “I could not, with one corps, hold so extended a line against the rebel army; but that, if supported, the line could be held; and in my judgment, it was a strong one, and the best one.” This outlandish claim leads to the obvious question as to why Sickles would have advanced in the first place if he knew he could not hold his new position without additional support.15Sickles also told Congress:
I stated, however, that if he [Meade] disapproved of it was not too late to take any position he might indicate. He said ‘No’; that it would be better to hold that line, and he would send up the Fifth Corps to support me. I expressed my belief in my ability to hold that line until supports could arrive. He said he would send up the Fifth Corps on my left, and that on my right I could look to General Hancock for support on my right flank. I added that I should want considerable artillery; that the enemy were developing a strong force of artillery. He authorized me to send to General Hunt who commanded the reserve of the artillery, for as much artillery as I wanted. I then assured him of my entire confidence in my ability to hold the position; which I did.16
For a man so talented at stretching the truth, Sickles was at least able to keep one aspect of his story relatively consistent as the years passed. A longstanding postwar contention of Sickles and his partisans was their insistence that Meade agreed to fully support Sickles by placing additional infantry (Meade allegedly telling Sickles: “I’ll send up the Fifth Corps, and Hancock will give any other supports you may require”) and artillery reserves (“send to Hunt for what you want”) under Sickles’ command. Given the mutual animosity between Meade and Sickles, and the fact that Sickles had seriously misinterpreted Meade’s orders, it seems improbable that Meade would have entrusted Sickles with anything more than the Third Corps infantry. Nevertheless, Tremain wrote to his family on July 10 that “just after the ball opened General Meade agreed with [Sickles] and promised him support.” Unfortunately “the supports were not placed under his command and were not handled as intelligently as they would have been by one who knew the surroundings more perfectly.”17
Later recollections of events make it obvious that partisans of both Sickles and Meade were willing to bend the historical record to suit their own versions of accuracy. Regardless of how the move was spun, Sickles was in the wrong. Still, General Meade and his staff share at least some responsibility for the fiasco. It was assumed that Sickles, Captain Meade later stated,
…fully understood where he was to go. The character of the messages sent by him [Sickles] to the commanding general left no impression on the mind of the latter [Meade], that there was any misunderstanding. Later in the day, when it was discovered that in what an extraordinary position General Sickles had placed his corps, General Meade deemed it barely possible he had misconstrued his orders. Not until nine months after the battle, when the remarkable proceedings before the committee on the conduct of the war had developed themselves did he come to the conclusion that his orders had been willfully disregarded.18
That Meade had “no impression” that Sickles harbored any confusion about his intended position challenges credibility. Sickles, for whatever mistakes he was guilty of, had made several attempts to clarify the matter. There had been ample warnings before 3:00 p.m. that Meade’s left flank required more personal attention: Sickles had told Captain Meade he did not know where to go; Sickles’ 11:00 a.m. visit to headquarters echoed this; the signal station on Little Round Top spotted Confederate activity in Pitzer’s Woods; Berdan had collided with the enemy opposite Sickles’ new position; and Buford’s cavalry had been removed from the left flank. Meade also failed to heed Hunt’s suggestion that he inspect the line. Various reasons have been given for Meade’s failure to maintain better control over Sickles, including a more urgent focus on his right flank, exhaustion, the unfamiliarity of his new role, poor staff work, and a real belief that Sickles knew where to place his corps. Meade may have simply dismissed Sickles’ concerns as those of an amateur. Whatever the reason, while Sickles bears the blame for ultimately acting independent of his orders, the commanding general must share some responsibility for not ensuring that those orders were executed in accordance with his wishes.
Lt. Col. Thomas Rafferty of the 71st New York supported Sickles’ decision, but he didn’t necessarily blame Meade for the breakdown. “As yet unaccustomed to the handling and disposing of a large army, and diffident of his own powers and capacity to do so,” explained Rafferty, “it is no wonder that he did not at that time prove himself as equal to the exigencies of the occasion as he so successfully did at subsequent periods of his command of that army.” Rafferty blamed much of the problem on sloppy staff work. “They [Meade’s staff] should have known all about our line of battle; have made themselves familiar with its salient points, its capabilities for defense or its facilities for offensive operations. They should have directed and controlled the positions of the various corps; should have been the eyes of General Meade, the brains to plan, and under his direction, the hands to execute.…But they did none of these things. They knew absolutely nothing of the position of affairs on the left flank; hardly knew whether there was any left flank.”19
It was up to Warren to “accidentally stumble” onto the true state of affairs. While Meade and Sickles squabbled, Warren arrived at Little Round Top. “[F]rom that point I could see the enemy’s lines of battle,” recalled the army’s chief engineer. Warren’s worst fears were confirmed when he discovered the hill was occupied by only two or three signal corps officers. Standing near the summit, he spotted Longstreet’s long battle line stretching far enough south to overlap Sickles’ left flank at Devil’s Den. Warren sent messages to both Meade and Sickles requesting “that we would at once have to occupy that place very strongly.” Meade had already ordered the entire Fifth Corps to the left, but now fearful it would not arrive in time, he also ordered General Humphreys’ Third Corps division to move toward Little Round Top.20
Meade sent one of his aides, Major Benjamin Ludlow, to locate Humphreys. Ludlow rode from the direction of the Peach Orchard, giving Humphreys the distinct impression that Meade was still personally in the grove. The order Humphreys received was “to move at once toward Round Top and occupy the ground there, which was vacant. Some reference was made at this time also I think, to the intended occupation of that ground by the Fifth Corps.” Humphreys promptly began to move his division, but told Ludlow he didn’t like the idea of vacating his position because it would increase the gap between Sickles’ right and Hancock’s left. Once Ludlow departed, Humphreys set off to locate Meade himself. The division leader rode “at full speed” toward the Peach Orchard and quickly met another of Meade’s aides along the way “who informed me General Meade recalled his order and that I should occupy the position General Sickles had directed me to take.” Meade had by this time received confirmation that the Fifth Corps reinforcements were approaching Little Round Top and so Humphreys’ division was no longer needed.21
A Sickles aide found a frustrated Humphreys counter-marching his division back toward the Emmitsburg Road and instructed him to resume the position originally ordered by the corps commander. The whole incident probably took no more than five minutes, and despite the accolades that were later showered on the precision of the movements, Humphreys admitted that he did not consider it worth mentioning in his official report. Following the battle, Sickles claimed his Third Corps received no orders from Meade following their Peach Orchard conference. Because aides from both Meade and Sickles had approached Humphreys from the vicinity of the Peach Orchard, however, it is almost certain that Sickles was aware of Meade’s orders to Humphreys. In the larger scheme of things, Sickles’ advance was causing chaos within the Army of the Potomac’s command structure, and it would not be the only time that troops would be marched and counter-marched along Sickles’ wing.22
The opening of the Confederate artillery bombardment removed any lingering
doubts about where the main Confederate attack would land, and provided an excellent opportunity to exploit some of the weaknesses inherent in Sickles’ new position. The massive cannonade that ushered in “Pickett’s Charge” on July 3 has cast a long shadow over most artillery studies of Gettysburg, with the result that the spectacular duel preceding Longstreet’s July 2 assault has been largely overlooked. Colonel Edward Porter Alexander, who was given tactical control of Longstreet’s artillery, compared the second day’s artillery action to the fighting at Sharpsburg (Antietam), which was referred to by some participants as “Artillery Hell.” Despite Sharpsburg’s fearsome reputation, “I don’t think there was ever in our war a hotter, harder, sharper artillery afternoon” than the second day at Gettysburg, concluded Alexander.23
Earlier that morning, Alexander had been ordered by Lee and Longstreet to place his guns in position opposite the Federal left. In addition to his own reserve artillery battalion (temporarily commanded by Major Frank Huger), Alexander had been given tactical control of McLaws’ artillery battalion (commanded by Colonel Henry Cabell), and Hood’s artillery battalion (commanded by Major Mathias Henry). By Alexander’s own estimate, he had fifty-four guns at his disposal. The exact time Alexander opened fire is unclear. He later wrote that the guns opened about 3:45 p.m. Regardless of the precise time, the Confederates enjoyed a distinct advantage over their Union counterparts: their guns were in position when the first shots were fired, while the majority of the Union batteries were not.24
Sickles’ line was now much closer to Alexander’s artillery than it otherwise would have been had it remained on Cemetery Ridge. Two of Henry’s batteries, supporting Hood’s division on the southern end of the line, could hit Devil’s Den and the Wheatfield, while guns near the Emmitsburg Road could fire up the road and hit Third Corps targets in and near the Peach Orchard at distances between 1,100 to 1,400 yards. Henry’s other two batteries (eight guns) were not deployed, supposedly because there wasn’t enough room on their front. Colonel Cabell’s battalion of four batteries dropped trail south of the Millerstown Road. Of these, at least two guns from Captain Edward McCarthy’s battery also appear to have not been deployed. Alexander would fail to deploy (or delay deploying) several Confederate guns that afternoon, a mistake that would rob the Confederates of potential numeric superiority when Federal resistance later proved “obstinate.” Alexander also initially failed to exploit the advantages of his exterior lines. He did not place any guns directly west of the Peach Orchard until well after the action was underway, depriving his batteries of the ability to converge their fire against Sickles’ bulging salient and the weakest part of his extended line.25
On the Federal side, Judson Clark’s battery had been posted earlier that morning on “the rise of ground midway between Sickles’ headquarters and the peach orchard.” Clark spotted Hood’s division “passing in column across the Emmitsburg road to our left and front, and distant about 1,400 yards, and, by direction of General Sickles, I placed my battery in position, and opened fire upon their position.” When Captain George Randolph, Sickles’ Third Corps artillery chief, spotted a Confederate battery unlimbering near the intersection of the Millerstown and Emmitsburg roads, he ordered Clark to move his battery forward closer to the Peach Orchard. Graham’s brigade was nearby and Colonel Henry Madill, commander of the 141st Pennsylvania, said the infantry was “ordered to lie down. At this point we sustained a severe fire from artillery for some time, the enemy having a good range.” Randolph piloted Captain James Smith’s 4th New York Independent Battery to Houck’s Ridge and placed Captain George Winslow’s Battery D, First New York Light Artillery, into an open wheatfield supporting Regis de Trobriand’s brigade. The fighting had opened in earnest.26
Henry Hunt, meanwhile, had determined that the Confederate artillery fire opposite Cemetery Hill “would lead to nothing serious,” and sometime after 3:00 p.m. returned “to the Peach Orchard, knowing that its occupation would require large reinforcements of artillery.” Hunt noted that Sickles’ infantry was already posted and he was met by Captain Randolph, “who informed me that he had been ordered to place his batteries on the new line.” Hunt could see “Generals Meade and Sickles, not far off, in conversation” and erroneously supposed that Meade had consented to Sickles’ movement. Hunt immediately requested more guns from General Robert O. Tyler’s Artillery Reserve and “authorized other general officers to draw on the same force.” Since Randolph had already posted Smith and Winslow’s batteries on the far left, Hunt assisted in the posting of additional batteries on the right of Sickles’ line.27
Near the Peach Orchard, Captain Nelson Ames’ First New York Light, Battery G, was the first from Tyler’s reserve to arrive on the field. In fact, Ames had received his orders to report to Sickles at 11:00 a.m., before Hunt had sent in the call for more batteries. (Despite Sickles’ later claims, this suggests the left flank was not being completely ignored by headquarters.) Captain Randolph ordered Ames to “take position in a thick peach orchard, and engage the enemy’s batteries at a distance of 850 yards.” Since the opposing Confederates had already unlimbered, Ames was one of several Union batteries that had to run the gauntlet under fire. The pounding he took while heading toward the orchard’s rising ground convinced Ames that he was the target of no fewer than three enemy batteries. “I was obliged to halt in plain sight of the enemy,” he reported, “to clear away two fences which the supporting infantry had failed to throw down as they had been ordered to do.”28
Ames placed his six guns in the orchard fronting southwest toward Cabell’s battalion and opened with spherical case and shell. The smoke draping over the orchard’s foliage quickly reduced visibility. Despite the many problems with Sickles’ position, the orchard’s elevation offered Ames some advantage. The slight knoll caused many of the Confederate shots to land in front of his guns and rebound overhead. This may explain why Ames’ battery reported only seven casualties, all wounded, during the long afternoon. The orchard’s elevation also allowed Ames to keep his ammunition caissons closer to the guns than normal and “sheltered in the rear just where the ground began to descend.” This close proximity provided for easier re-supply but also increased the danger of an ammunition chest being hit by an enemy projectile.29
At Sickles’ Trostle farm headquarters, Chaplain Joe Twichell took cover behind the large barn. He recalled the duel as “the most terrific artillery fire I ever witnessed.…It was awful. For half an hour it raged incessantly. Grape, canister, solid shot, and shell whizzed and shrieked and tore past us.” Twichell watched as nearby trees and animals were torn apart by shell fragments. “Every moment I expected to be struck.” Eventually the wounded started to come in. “One of our boys was brought to us with both legs gone.”30
When General Tyler received Hunt’s orders to send artillery to the Third Corps front, he ordered Lieutenant Colonel Freeman McGilvery (commander of the 1st Volunteer Artillery Brigade) to report to Sickles with a pair of batteries. McGilvery chose Captain John Bigelow’s 9th Massachusetts and Captain Charles Phillips’ 5th Massachusetts and reported to Sickles, who told him to inspect the ground and place his guns. Accompanied by Bigelow, McGilvery made a brief reconnaissance under fire and decided to deploy the pair of batteries to cover the open ground between the Peach Orchard and the Wheatfield. This gap was the result of Sickles’ insufficient manpower to cover his new front. In addition to the gap, Captain Bigelow spotted other defects in Sickles’ line. “The angle at the Peach Orchard was most difficult to defend, circled as it was (on both sides) by commanding ridges” that allowed Confederate guns to concentrate “their fire and enfiladed the two lines of the angle, with destructive effect.”31
Bigelow moved his battery into action via the farm lane that ran past Sickles’ headquarters at the Trostle farm. During a brief halt at the farm, Bigelow remembered that “a spirited military spectacle lay before us; General Sickles was standing beneath a tree close by, staff officers and orderlies coming and going in
all directions.” Approximately 500 yards away, near the Peach Orchard, Bigelow noted “white smoke was curling up from the rapid and crashing volleys” of artillery “while the enemy’s shells were flying over or breaking around us.” Bigelow ran his battery from the Trostle farm south into position along the Wheatfield Road. Even as he was on the move, Bigelow was already under fire, since Confederate batteries to the southwest probably had a view of his approach. Not only was Bigelow unable to return fire while crossing the field, but the amount of time needed to unlimber and get in position increased his vulnerability. Bigelow started taking casualties “before we could fire a single gun.”32
Captain Charles Phillips’ 5th Massachusetts battery moved into position on Bigelow’s right and fronted roughly southwest. Bigelow was already “engaged briskly” when Phillips arrived. Phillips quickly returned fire and silenced the batteries to his front after a short exchange. The Confederate batteries, partially hidden by a stone wall and tree line on Warfield Ridge, were not completely visible to Phillips, but “the smoke of the enemy’s guns could be seen over a rolling, open country.”33