The Siege of Derry 1689
Page 10
Morale depends on a number of factors, among them good training and discipline. Lundy’s army lacked both. It had been cobbled together in reaction to a crisis with no time for training. Contemporary military practice was for new recruits to be assigned to the regiment with which they would serve and be trained by that unit; there were no dedicated training establishments nor any system of regimental depots as would be developed in later centuries.26 Thus training was the responsibility of individual commanding officers who needed a core of experienced officers and NCOs to discharge that task.27 This was difficult enough at the best of times, but became almost impossible if training was to be carried out on campaign; and it was made even more difficult, if not close to impossible, if there was no strong core of experienced training staff.
Even though he had complained of lack of discipline, perhaps this had not troubled Lundy too much since he knew that the Jacobite army was afflicted in like manner. Some three-quarters of a century later Maurice de Saxe was to describe discipline as ‘the soul of armies,’28 and Lundy seems to have considered that both armies were short on soul. Certainly he appeared quite confident of success when he deployed his troops about Long Causeway, through Lifford and thence to Clady. His men were fighting for their survival, a major spur to the morale of any military organization, and would have the benefit of choosing the ground and holding defensive positions; these two latter points gave a distinct advantage to the Williamites. But Lundy made one fundamental error in his assessment of the enemy army, and this was to be his undoing, and the undoing of his force at the fords. The Jacobite cavalry, as we have already seen, was of a much higher standard than Lundy believed. He considered the entire Jacobite army to be a rag-tag organization, with inadequate equipment, few weapons, no training and indifferent leadership.
None of these was true of the Jacobite cavalry. James’ mounted troops were excellent and were probably the equal of any contemporaries in Europe.29 It was this same Jacobite cavalry force that was to inflict a humiliating defeat on the Williamites in this encounter and that force would remain formidable throughout the war of the kings, causing especial distress to William’s troops at the Boyne in 1690. At the fords the Jacobite cavalry had the additional benefit of being commanded by highly-experienced French officers: Rosen recorded that Maumont was the first to enter the river.30 The accounts written by George Walker and John Mackenzie both blame Lundy for the débâcle that followed, one of the few points on which these two men agreed. Walker and Mackenzie point out the numerical superiority enjoyed by Lundy at Cladyford, where the Jacobites chose to launch an opposed crossing, and in this observation they are accurate.31 Of the rout at the fords Lord Blaney told the House of Commons that ‘the Protestants all run in great confusion; no order was either given or observed’.32
Other than Blaney, none of these commentators was a military man and their analysis of the situation at the fords cannot be taken as a serious dissection of the battle. To begin with, Lundy had deployed troops to cover several crossing places as a result of which his men were spread out over a line that extended almost eight miles. In such circumstances it was not possible for the commander to exercise full control over all his forces, and he was compelled to rely on the competence of those who acted in his stead at the various points of contact between the two sides. It is invidious to try to place all the blame for this defeat at Lundy’s door.
Some of Lundy’s units acquitted themselves admirably: Colonel Skeffington’s Regiment, now under command of Mitchelburne, stopped a Jacobite party that tried to ford the river near Castlefinn, some miles beyond Clady, driving them back with many casualties. About thirty dragoons of Stewart’s Regiment, commanded by Captain Adam Murray, a local man of whom we shall see more shortly, fought valiantly at Clady, holding back the foe until their ammunition was spent.33 But there was an inevitability about the Williamite defeat. Infantry might hold back infantry, while dragoons, who were really mounted infantry and dismounted from their horses to fight, might do likewise, but the entry of heavy cavalry into the equation meant that there could be but one outcome.
Heavy cavalry, known as ‘horse’ at this time, provided the shock troops of a seventeenth-century army, the ‘shock and awe’ of a more recent American definition. Even a troop of horse at the charge was an impressive and frightening sight, especially for an infantryman who was asked to stand and face it. A squadron was even more impressive, and frightening, while a complete regiment would have been terrifying. Since the river was in flood the Williamites might also have expected this to be a protection against enemy attack and the psychological effect of the cavalry charge must have been heightened as a result. How strong was the Jacobite cavalry at the fords? Rosen later wrote an account of the battle for Louvois in which he indicated that Hamilton had three squadrons of cavalry and two of dragoons which were reinforced by additional cavalry from James’ escort, deployed from Omagh, plus additional cavalry and dragoons under Lieutenant-General Pusignan.34 Thus the Jacobites were able to deploy a sizeable body of cavalry, perhaps over 450 men, against the Williamite positions; this equates to a regiment. Furthermore, Rosen, Maumont and Lery took the time to make a detailed reconnaissance of the Williamite defences before launching their assault.35 The adage that ‘time spent on reconnaissance is seldom wasted’ was obviously one in which these men believed. Accordingly, they were able to identify their opponents’ weaknesses and use the speed of cavalry to exploit them.
The development of the infantry square to meet a cavalry charge was a relatively recent innovation from the Dutch, although its origins can be seen in the Spanish tercio, and the drill evolutions needed to move a battalion into square took a long time to learn and practise.36 There can be no doubt that the Williamites at the fords had no idea of how to form a square. Had they been able to do so they might still have been performing a pointless exercise. The deterrent effect of the square lay not so much in its appearance to the cavalry trooper but in its appearance to that trooper’s mount. A properly-formed square presented a hedge of steel to the horses prompting them to veer away from it, since the pikemen, normally placed behind the musketeers, would have taken their places in the square’s front ranks.
But the Williamites could present no hedges of steel since they lacked the basic element of that hedge, the pike. A standard infantry battalion at the time had a balanced proportion of musketeers and pikemen, normally one pike to every five muskets. Pikemen carried sixteen-foot-long ash staves tipped with steel points which were driven into the ground at an angle of about forty-five degrees to create the hedge. Even before learning how to form square, the pikeman had to learn basic foot drill and then ‘the postures’ that governed his use of his weapon. Of these there were thirty-six separate drill evolutions.37 It was small wonder that the few Williamite pikemen at the fords proved of little value. The introduction of the bayonet eventually rendered the pikeman obsolete since the musket-equipped infantryman could simply fix his bayonet to his weapon to produce the effect of a short pike.4 But although the bayonet had already been introduced into English regiments, it had then been withdrawn, and no Williamite unit at the fords would have been equipped with bayonets. Thus most of the Williamite infantry had only its basic firepower to deter the Jacobite cavalry; Skeffington’s Regiment was an exception and seems to have had a strong proportion of pikemen. This regiment marched back to Derry ‘with flying colours and drums beating a march’, and although attacked three times by Jacobite cavalry under Colonel Dominic Sheldon it beat off each attack, perhaps by deploying the pikemen to perform their tactical role or by good use of the musketeers.39 The author of Ireland Preserved puts these words in Sheldon’s mouth:
I charged their rear three times, and each time the Commander drew off his shot, fired upon us, and put our men in disorder, we could do no good with him, whosoever he is, he has not his trade to learn.40
Another Jacobite commander, Dorrington, comments:
This is the third time he brought up the rear
of their flying army. He has his men in as good discipline as any of us; he marches with flying colours and cares not a pin for the government, regards not the Lord Tirconnel’s proclamation a farthing. There’s a spark for you.41
Although some Williamite foot soldiers were entrenched along the river banks by the fords, they could do little to repel an attacking cavalry force. Even the accusation that Lundy had failed to resupply his troops with ammunition is almost irrelevant: the speed of a cavalry charge across what was, and is, a narrow waterway, allowed no time for reloading; the task of reloading a matchlock, or the more modern flintlock, musket was a lengthy one, and raw soldiers could not have fired any more than one round per minute, and that is probably a generous estimate. Thus, as the Williamite soldiers watched the cavalry on their huge horses charge into the water on the opposite bank they would have been terrified. The noise of the charge alone was terrific, not to mention the fact that each individual – and these men would still have thinking as individuals rather than reacting as a disciplined and trained unit – saw several very large horses powering towards him as three ranks of cavalry, swords drawn, splashed into the river. Their reaction would have been the most natural of all: to survive; and to do so meant running for their lives. It was the effect of the Irish cavalry, more than any other factor, which led to the rout of the Williamites at the fords. Once the cavalry had made a successful crossing, the Williamite situation was bleak, since untrained infantry could do nothing to stop cavalry rolling up their positions from the flanks as well as hitting them in frontal attacks.
We have already seen that some individuals in the city were losing confidence in Lundy and were even regarding him as a traitor. The flight of the field force from the fords added to the strength of their accusations. It was claimed that Lundy was the first member of that force to reach the city’s gates, thus further detracting from his reputation as a soldier. Even if this accusation was true, the fact remains that Lundy was still conscious of his duties for he added a further postscript to his despatch to Cunningham.
Since writing this, Major Tiffin is come here, and I have given him my opinion fully, which, I believe, when you hear, and see the place, you will both join me, that without an immediate supply of money and provisions, this place must fall very soon into the enemy’s hands. If you do not send your men here some time to-morrow, it will not be in your power to bring ’em at all.42
Lundy also told Tiffin to let Cunningham know that the city had no more than ten days’ provisions for 3,000 men, although all unnecessary personnel had been told to leave and private supplies had been gathered into public stores.43 (In contrast to these figures, Mitchelburne suggests that there was sufficient for 10,000 men for three months.44) Furthermore, he asked both Cunningham and Richards to come to the city with some of their officers, leaving their men on board, to ‘resolve on what was best to be done’.45
Both men arrived in Derry the following day, the 16th, with some of their officers and learned that King James, with some 2,500 men, was approaching. Another council of war was decided upon. This seems to have been an entirely military affair from which local civilians, including George Walker, were excluded, thus giving further ammunition to Lundy’s enemies. Even some soldiers were excluded: these were Colonels Chicester and Hamilton as well as Major Henry Baker. The council issued a declaration that read:
Upon inquiry, it appears, there is not provision in the garrison of Londonderry for the present garrison and the two regiments on board, for a week or ten days, at most; and it appearing that the place is not tenable against a well appointed army, therefore, it is concluded upon and resolved, that it is not convenient for his Majesty’s service, but the contrary, to land the two regiments under Colonel Cunningham and Colonel Richards, their command, now on board in the river of Lough Foyle; that considering the present circumstances of affairs, and the likelihood the enemy will soon possess themselves of this place, it is thought most convenient that the principal officers shall privately withdraw themselves, as well for their own preservation, as in hopes that the inhabitants, by a timely capitulation, may make terms the better with the enemy; and this we judge most convenient for his Majesty’s service, as the present state of affairs now is.46
Following this declaration, the two commanding officers returned to their ship which set sail two days later, ‘leaving the citizens to sink or swim’.47 Strangely, Lundy had been issuing orders for quarters to be provided for the soldiers of the two regiments from the ships, but, while doing so, found himself surrounded by angry civilians and was unable to proceed further. He was also unable to leave the city and sent a despatch to Richards telling the latter to leave without him. To some, his being seen to issue orders for the quartering of fresh troops was a contrivance to cover his own treachery.48
Although it is often assumed that the ships sailed off with the provisions intended for the city still on board, Lundy was told by Cunningham that there were neither provisions nor money on the vessels. The story of the ships’ cargo was to become a scandal and the agent responsible for providing and victualling the ships, as well as the cargo of provisions for the city and money for the garrison, Mathew Anderton, the collector of customs at Chester, was later accused of inefficiency. Although ordered to appear before the House of Commons to answer the charges laid against him, Anderton did not do so, pleading medical grounds, although his two sons did appear in his place and defended their father with some vigour.49
Among the charges made against Anderton were that he did not provide enough shipping; that the biscuit, on which the soldiers were to live, was ‘very bad’, as was the beer, which led some men to drink salt water instead and others their own urine. It was claimed that the beer, as well as being poor, was also about twelve to fourteen inches from full in each barrel. However, it seems that the cheese provided was good, although this can have been little consolation to the soldiers, some of whom died on the voyage from Hoylake to the Foyle while many others were sick.50 That voyage took six days, and to the soldiers’ complaints about the food and drink were added others about comfort. Not that soldiers expected to be comfortable on a sea voyage, but this seemed to be a situation worse than normal without any of the customary sleeping platforms on which to repose. Needless to say, all these problems were laid at the door of Mathew Anderton.51
Anderton was also suspected of the much more serious offence of peculation: he had been instructed to hand £2,000 to Cunningham for the subsistence of the soldiers and the defence of Londonderry. This was later increased to £4,000, of which £500 was to be paid to Colonel Lundy. The latter sum was intended as a reward to Lundy for his faithful services. It will also be remembered that James Hamilton was to have brought £1,000 to Lundy from Anderton in March but had received less than £600. In defence of their father, his sons told the House of Commons’ committee that he had handed over to Colonel Cunningham every penny of public money that had been in his possession at the time. Cunningham’s comment to Lundy that there was no money on the ships suggests that what Anderton had handed over had been far short of the £4,000 expected. Since there is no record of any further action being taken against Anderton, it would seem that his sons were giving accurate evidence and that the collector had had no public funds in addition to those monies he gave Cunningham.52
That same Cunningham was not impressed by the city although it was said in England ‘to be one of the strongest places in the world’. Instead he considered it a town that could not keep out an army that had cannon. Neither did the garrison impress him ‘for he had heard of all their cowardice’. Cunningham knew Derry well since he had been at school there and had visited it several times as an adult; he had never considered it ‘to be a place of any strength’. At the time of his visit to Lundy, Cunningham had a brother still living in the city and may be presumed to have had information from him.5 Who the brother was we do not know although there were several Cunninghams among the defenders; it is possible that his brother was Captain Michael
Cunningham of Prehen, an officer in Skeffington’s Regiment, but Captain John Cunningham who was killed at the battle of Windmill Hill on 6 May is another possibility as are Archibald, a signatory to the corporation commission of 1690, James, who was later to ‘invent’ a starch/tallow mix that allowed the garrison to eke out their supplies, and Alexander, one of the apprentice boys.53
Thomas Cunningham and Solomon Richards were later dismissed from the army, but it is significant that this did not happen until the siege had ended and the city had been relieved. Richards, who had been under Cunningham’s command, was granted bail in July following a ruling by the House of Commons that there ‘does not appear to be any evidence that [he] . . . was guilty of any miscarriage’.54 Had the city fallen immediately to the Jacobites, it is quite possible that neither man would have suffered the disgrace of being cashiered, although command of their regiments was given to other officers soon after their return to England. The effects on these regiments were almost non-existent: in 1751 they became the 9th and 17th Regiments and, later, the Royal Norfolk and Royal Leicestershire Regiments; both are now subsumed in the Royal Anglian Regiment.
But while the relief fleet sailed off back to England there was further debate in the city. The council of war attended by Cunningham and Richards had also resolved to send messengers privately to King James, offering to surrender the city the following day.55 When this plan became known to some of those excluded from the council’s deliberations, there was much anger, with Sir Arthur Rawdon and others averring that ‘deserting Derry would, in their opinion, be deserting the kingdom and the Protestant interest’. Not everyone shared this anger as some of the citizens recommended ‘yielding to necessity’. On the other hand, many felt that those who would betray them should be shot.56 And Lundy was the prime target for this communal anger. ‘There is great notice taken of his dilatory proceedings; he does not at all answer the character most people give him.’57