The Siege of Derry 1689

by Richard Doherty

  It was only some six weeks since George Walker had formed such a high opinion of the governor, and only days since that unnamed witness had spoken so highly of him to the House of Lords’ committee. How had Lundy gone from hero to villain in such short time? It seems that his morale had shattered in recent days and that he no longer possessed the stomach for a fight. After all, he had just witnessed a numerically superior force, in defensive positions, suffer humiliating defeat and dash into headlong retreat. On his return to the city he must have re-assessed its ability to withstand attack, especially when he now believed that his troops were not reliable in battle. Remembering that Lundy had also requested that general officers be deployed to the city, it is possible that he considered himself to have insufficient experience of command for the task that faced him. Doubtless, also, the performance of the Jacobite cavalry, some of which he must have seen in action, made him change his opinion of King James’ army and he might now have considered that the Jacobites stood a good chance of taking the city. Could men who had suffered defeat after defeat - at Dromore, Coleraine, Portglenone, Moneymore, and, most recently, at the fords – really defend Londonderry? Was there any hope at all for the city?

  Remembering that Lundy was still one of the few in the city with a true appreciation of what faced them, his doubts can be understood. What chance had Derry and its garrison of holding out should a Jacobite army appear, complete with an artillery train and all the equipment needed to mount a siege? The city walls had been designed to keep out Irish clansmen rather than a modern army with siege artillery, and the men who would be defending those walls had, so far, shown little real mettle as soldiers. Another factor was Lundy’s estimate of the size of the Jacobite army, which he believed to number some 25,000 men. In his account Walker states there were 20,000 Jacobites. In fact the Jacobites could not have numbered any more than 10,000 and the true figure was probably even lower. However, commanders under attack have always been prone to exaggerate the strength of their enemies, thereby providing a better excuse for failure or to make success appear even more admirable and, perhaps, the result of military genius when obtained against superior numbers.

  All these factors probably played a part in Lundy’s loss of conviction. To the citizens of the city, who believed that they faced the prospect of annihilation, none of this would have mattered. In their eyes Lundy was a traitor: he later said that the rabble swore that he had ‘sold them and the town to King James for 1700 pound’. Many, thinking that their cause was lost, left the city; these included members of the garrison. Some of those who had taken refuge in the city and some of the merchants were so concerned about the behaviour of the rabble following the defeat at Clady bridge that they left the town and boarded ships for England, paying what rates were demanded for their passage. Some of those refugees and merchants were on board the vessels that carried Cunningham and Richards’ Regiments away from the Foyle. ‘Great droves for England now are fled and gone/And in deep despair leaves us thus forlorn’ is how Mitchelburne summed up the rush of evacuees in Ireland Preserved.

  Rumours must also have been rife about the approach of King James. The monarch had left Dublin for the city although his principal French adviser, Avaux, recommended that he remain in the capital.58 But James was bull-headed in his intentions and set off for Ulster. By 14 April the royal entourage was in the ruins of Omagh, where Avaux made another attempt to dissuade James from his plan to travel to Derry.59 Once again he was rebuffed but then came the news of the relief fleet that was approaching Lough Foyle and of the Williamite intention to give battle at the fords. There seems to have been a remarkable flow of intelligence, but there is no indication from the various contemporary accounts whether this was from spies or simply from observation; that the king knew of the intention to give battle at the fords the day before Lundy marched out of Derry suggests the presence of spies in the city. By the same token the Williamites seem often to have had good intelligence on their opponents. One conclusion must be that there were many individuals who were determined to emerge safe from the crisis no matter what its outcome.

  This new information brought about a change of heart in James who decided that he would retrace his steps, quitting Omagh for Charlemont the following day. His generals, including Conrad de Rosen, were ordered to make their way to join the Jacobites advancing on the fords. Whatever relief Avaux might have felt at James’ change of mind must surely have evaporated at Charlemont where a messenger from the Duke of Berwick, one of James’ illegitimate sons, reached him. Berwick’s man had news from the army now close to Londonderry.60 The decision by the council of war of the 16th to open secret negotiations with James led to a delegation visiting Hamilton’s camp at St Johnston where they, wrongly, believed James to be present. Learning of the discussions, Berwick sent his messenger to Charlemont where he told James that the gates of Derry would be opened should he appear in front of them. This seems to have fitted in with what James had long believed, and he also wanted to make it clear that rumours of his death in France were without foundation. So, once again, the King set his face towards Derry.61

  In the meantime, Hamilton had made an arrangement with the city’s leaders that the Jacobite army would not approach within four miles of the city while terms for the city’s surrender were being considered.62 Walker wrote of these terms that ‘There was no doubt, but upon surrender of the Town, King James would Grant a General Pardon, and Order restitution of all that had been Plunder’d from them’.63 Many, it seemed, were keen that these terms should be taken seriously. The unfortunate Lundy appears to have taken a back seat at this stage although he was still governor of the city. But now King James rode into the situation. During James’ short reign, events seem to have conspired against him, while his communications with his advisers frequently left much wanting. The king’s intentions were often misunderstood but never more so than on the April day that he appeared with his escort before Bishop’s Gate.

  James made good speed from Charlemont and arrived at Derry early on Thursday 18 April. With General Conrad de Rosen, and a small escort, he rode up to the city walls at about 10 o’clock, confidently expecting to see Berwick’s prediction come true: that the gates of the city would be open to the monarch as the citizens came to their senses and realized that the king had no ill intentions for them.64 James did not know that Hamilton had agreed a cordon sanitaire around the city while the leading townspeople considered the proposals he had made. Now the defenders on the walls and many of those who had sought refuge within the city walls saw James and his entourage approach. What they saw was not their monarch come with good intentions but a symbol of Jacobite treachery, a breaking of General Hamilton’s word and a sign of the treachery that might govern their treatment should they surrender. Those defenders believed that James had been at St Johnston with his army, and there was a great surge of anger at what was seen as duplicity. This anger came close to having fatal consequences for James.

  As the monarch and his most senior military commander rode towards the Bishop’s Gate there was apprehension within the walls.

  Upon the 18th of April [James] advances, with his Army, before our Walls, with Flying Colours.

  Orders were given, that none should dare to fire till the King’s Demands were first known, by another Messenger to be sent to His Majesty for that purpose; but our men on the Walls, wondering to see Lieut Gen. Hamilton (contrary to his Engagement, not to come within four Miles of the Town) approaching our Walls in such order, they imagining they were by some means or other betrayed, thought it reasonable to consider their own safety, and to keep the Enemy at distance, by firing their Guns upon them, which they accordingly did.65

  There is no evidence that Hamilton was with the king but the result was the same since

  In an instant a discharge of musketry and cannon from the troops stationed in the church bastion, was directed against the enemy, proclaiming defence and hostilities with the triumphant shout of ‘No Surrender’.66


  One of James’ aides-de-camp, Captain Troy, a dragoon officer, was struck by a cannonball and killed. Troy was at the king’s side. Other members of the party were also fatally injured. James chose discretion and retreated out of range of the angry defenders on the walls.67 Safe from cannon fire, he spent the rest of the day on Foyle Hill, near the modern Carmelite monastery at Termonbacca, gazing at the city and watching the Williamite gunners vent their anger and frustration on their foes. For James it was a miserable situation, made more miserable by the rain that was now falling steadily. While that rain presented an augury of James’ hopes being washed away, it also provided a foretaste of the conditions his soldiers were to endure around the city for the next 105 days.

  Towards the end of what, for him, must have been a most inauspicious day, James withdrew to the small castle at Mongavlin, some eight miles to the south in County Donegal.68 It is to his credit that he continued to maintain communication with the leaders in the city; he made four attempts to agree terms with its defenders. He must have impressed those leaders who even sent an apology to the king for opening fire on him; this was accepted by James.69 While such gentlemanly conduct might be dismissed as being expected of that period, it does suggest that hope continued, on both sides, of agreeing terms and thereby saving Derry from the trauma of a siege. But those now negotiating from within the walls were no longer representative of the bulk of opinion in the city; the more radical leaders and many of the inhabitants were determined not to negotiate with James. Their view was represented in a letter to the king.

  Sir: The cause we have undertaken, we design for ever to maintain, and question not, but that powerful providence which has hitherto been our guardian, will finish the protection of us, against all your attempts, and give a happy issue to our arms. We must let you know, that King William is as capable as rewarding our loyalty as King James; and an English parliament can be just as bountiful to our courage and suffering as an Irish one: and that in time we question not, but your lands will be forfeited rather than ours, and confiscated into our possession, as a recompense for this signal service to the crown of England and for this inexpressible toil and labour, expense of blood and treasure, pursuant to their sacred Majesties declaration to that purpose; a true copy whereof we herewith send you to convince you how little we fear your menaces.70

  The cry of ‘No Surrender’ shouted from the city’s walls that morning was echoed in that letter which made clear to James that the city would not submit to him. James now decided that matters at Derry should be left in the hands of his generals, Hamilton, Maumont, Pusignan and Pointis, while he returned to Dublin, accompanied by Rosen and Melfort.71 He left no specific orders about attacking the city, besieging it or blockading it. He did, however, decide to promote Rosen to the post of Marshal General of his armies and of his kingdom of Ireland as Rosen reported in a letter from Lifford to Louvois.72

  Not only had James angered the defenders of the city but he had also caused considerable frustration within the ranks of his own supporters, one of whom wrote:

  You observe here the return Londonderry made the king for all the paths he had taken in travelling so far, in order to gain those rebels with lenity. But ‘tis what he always gets from Protestants generally. No experience will make him behave himself towards those traitors as he should do. He spoiled his business in Ireland by his over great indulgence towards them. He was infatuated with this rotten principle – provoke not your Protestant subjects – the which hindered his majesty from drawing troops sooner out of Ireland into England for the security of his person and government; from making up a Catholic army in England; from accepting those forces the most Christian king [Louis XIV] had offered him.73

  Any military headquarters must be able effectively to command, control and communicate. James’ headquarters had been shown as sadly deficient in communications, so deficient in fact that it might well have drafted the death certificate for James’ hopes and his strategy of using Ireland as a stepping stone to Scotland. Although the Williamite narrative quoted earlier (p. 76) suggests that Richard Hamilton was included in the king’s party at Bishop’s Gate, and thus indicts Hamilton of being untrustworthy, there is no evidence that Hamilton was present. In all probability the king’s approach was planned so hastily, and by so few individuals, that Hamilton was unaware of what was happening. He would have been shrewd enough to have realized that such a venture could only destroy any hopes of a negotiated settlement.

  James’ precipitate action had delivered a blow to the morale of his own army. Now, by default, he was to choose the worst of the three options that, but days earlier, had been open to that army. The first of these was to advance rapidly on the city while its garrison and the refugees were still in shock from the defeat at the fords and storm it. Had his army done so it would almost certainly have succeeded and Derry would have fallen, leaving James free to embark for Scotland, if he could obtain sufficient transports, to continue his quest to be restored. His second, and more feasible, course of action was to mask Derry by leaving a token force there to contain the garrison while the rest of the army took the field to clear the remainder of Ulster or, again, crossed to Scotland. (The port of Derry was not essential as the boarding could have been carried out in Lough Foyle at Redcastle or farther north at Greencastle.) But James was now forced into the least desirable of options: to lay siege to the city to bring about its surrender. This seems to support the comment about James’ lack of decision made by Comte d’Avaux in his first despatch from Ireland: ‘Our chief difficulty will be the irresolution of King James, who often changes his mind, and then decides not always for the best.’74

  Why was laying siege to the city the worst option available to the Jacobite army? The answer is simple: that army had not come north with the type of organization necessary for a prolonged siege operation.6 As well as being deficient in artillery, James’ army also lacked engineering resources. When, before the army left Dublin for Ulster, the Jacobite command tried to obtain the tools and equipment needed for siege warfare, they found that ‘there was nothing at all of what was required’. Looked at in its overall structure and organization, James’ army included a weak infantry arm, lacking training and weapons and with poor leadership, while its artillery was inadequate, and the engineers even more so. All this stands in stark contrast to the cavalry, which was of high quality with good officers and which had already demonstrated its mettle. Such evidence suggests that King James and his staff had hoped for a rapid conclusion to the Ulster campaign, with a short war of movement rather than the static situation that was now emerging.

  One of the accusations levelled against Robert Lundy was that he attempted to surrender the city by entering into negotiations with the Jacobites. In fact, by so doing, Lundy probably saved the city since, by involving the Jacobites in negotiations, he bought more time for the garrison and prevented a rapid Jacobite advance after their victory at the fords. It is also possible that Richard Hamilton was happy to enter into talks with the Williamites because he believed that Cunningham’s and Richards’ regiments were now included in the city’s garrison. Equally, of course, Hamilton might simply have been unhappy about storming the city because he knew that such an operation depended on his infantry and he would have been very aware of the shortcomings of that particular arm of his army. Whatever the underlying reason, Hamilton’s failure to make an immediate advance on the city cost the Jacobites the real fruits of the victory at the fords.

  But Lundy’s time as governor was now all but over. Too many in the city not only lacked confidence in him but also blamed him for their current ills. Lundy provided a ready scapegoat: all such situations require such an individual, and the unfortunate Lundy was to become immortalized as the man who attempted to betray the city. Strangely, he found some support, even at this late juncture, from an unlikely source: George Walker. The latter claimed that he and Henry Baker tried unsuccessfully to persuade the Scot to remain as governor.75 Baker was a professiona
l soldier and was to become governor, with Walker as his deputy, on Lundy’s departure. If Walker’s version of events is accurate, then it suggests that Lundy still had supporters in the city and that these included Baker. Since Baker knew the profession of arms it is likely that he had a much better appreciation of what was happening, that he could read between the lines where others could not, and that he felt that Lundy had been doing his best. Neither Baker nor Lundy would have seen the garrison’s surrender as the final defeat of the Williamite cause in Ireland, as would most of the citizens. To them the established military protocols of siege warfare would have been coming into play. Surrendering the city did not mean surrendering the garrison since the defending troops would have been allowed to march out of the city and been accorded the honours of war. They might even have been allowed to take the field again in support of King William.

  What were these protocols of siege warfare? They had developed over a long period of time and were to remain in practice until the early-nineteenth century when Napoleon brought them to an end by threatening to treat as traitors those of his fortress commanders who followed them. The first convention to be observed was the offer of terms to the fortress or town about to be invested. At this point the defending commander could accept the terms, which were usually quite generous and allowed the defending garrison to leave the fortress with colours flying, drums beating and honour unblemished. They might also be allowed to retain their arms and might join in battle elsewhere, although to do this was not considered honourable.