The Last Prussian

by Messenger, Charles;

  Once again, von Rundstedt’s reputation shone. On 1 October 1932 he was promoted General of Infantry and given command of Gruppenkommando I. This meant that he would remain in Berlin with responsibility for the three Eastern Wehrkreise, with four infantry and two cavalry divisions.

  Shortly after he took over his new command, and at the beginning of November 1932, further Reichstag elections were held. Although Hitler’s National Socialists lost seats – a reflection of a slightly improved enonomic situation and the German withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference until she was allowed equality in armaments – von Papen failed to gain support. He then offered his resignation to von Hindenburg, but also proposed that martial law should be implemented and that he should rule by decree until a more authoritarian constitution could be drawn up. Von Schleicher schemed against him, however, and told von Hindenburg that the Reichswehr would not support this. He also believed that he could wean some of those on the left of the Nazi Party away from Hitler and, with support from the Centre and Socialist parties, form a progressive socialist administration within the existing constitution. Consequently, he was appointed Chancellor on 2 December in von Papen’s place. The Weimar Republic was about to breathe its last gasp.

  4

  Enter Hitler

  VON SCHLEICHER’S hopes of forming a broad-based government were quickly dashed. Neither the left wing of the National Socialists, nor the centrist and socialist parties were prepared to work with him and he was forced to ask von Hindenburg for the right to rule by decree as von Papen had tried to do before him. The President, having turned down von Papen’s request for this, was not prepared to grant the same to von Schleicher. Hence, by now totally isolated, the latter resigned on 28 January 1933. In the meantime, von Papen had opened negotiations with Hitler, believing that with his support he could gain his revenge on von Schleicher and control Hitler by placing Nationalists in his cabinet. Consequently, the two were able to inform von Hindenburg that they had the necessary support in the Reichstag to form a government. Accordingly, on 30 January von Hindenburg appointed Hitler as Chancellor. The Weimar Republic was dead and the Third Reich was born.

  Hitler’s first cabinet significantly contained just two National Socialists – Interior Minister Wilhelm Frick and Hermann Goering, who was Minister Without Portfolio. Von Papen, as Vice-Chancellor, therefore believed that he could control Hitler and regain the reins of power for himself. Hitler, however, called for fresh Reichstag elections for 5 March. In so doing, he took full advantage of the mysterious circumstances of the destruction of the Reichstag by fire on the night of 27 February, responsibility for which he immediately laid at the door of the Communists. This enabled him to persuade von Hindenburg that there was a danger of a communist uprising. The President therefore issued a decree severely restricting civil and political liberties. Thus, even though the National Socialists did not gain an overall majority and were forced to continue their alliance with von Papen’s Nationalists, Hitler now had the means to consolidate his hold on government and by the end of summer 1933 had forced the dissolution of all parties except the National Socialists.

  One important ally Hitler had at this time was General Werner von Blomberg, the Minister of Defence, who had been appointed to 29 January 1933 amid fear that von Schleicher might try to use the Army to subvert von Hindenburg’s position. Von Blomberg, whom Berliners, with their very individual brand of humour, nicknamed ‘Rubber Lion’,1 had first met Hitler in 1931 when he was commanding Wehrkreis I in East Prussia and had quickly succumbed to his influence. Determined that Hitler should have the support of the generals, he organised a dinner for him on 2 February at von Hammerstein-Equord’s house, just three days after he had been made Chancellor. Von Rundstedt was present and recalled that Hitler made a speech, but was very ill at ease.2 Von Rundstedt himself had little time for von Blomberg, probably because he did not understand him. As he was later to tell the court at Nuremberg: ‘He always remained a bit distant. He seemed to live in a different sphere. He was a pupil of the Steiner school of theosophy and no one really liked him.’3 Von Blomberg’s slavish support for Hitler was also difficult for von Rundstedt to accept. On the other hand, in von Rundstedt’s eyes Hitler had obtained power legally, and unpalatable though his policies might be, it was not in the Army’s gift to oppose them. Fabian von Schlabrendorff, a brilliant young lawyer, who was deeply involved in the opposition to Hitler and even used his honeymoon as cover to visit Churchill in England in order to warn him of Hitler’s designs on Czechoslovakia, recalled a conversation that he had with von Rundstedt some months after Hitler had come to power: ‘He had a reputation of being a non-Nazi. Our talk revealed that he was quite ready to use strong words against the Nazis, but he was equally determined to take no action against them.’4 Furthermore, von Rundstedt was probably, like many others of his ilk, somewhat reassured by Hitler’s determination, which he voiced at the 2 February dinner, to create a strong army once more and his assurance, given a week later to members of the defence ministry, that the Army would never again be used to subdue internal conflict since Hitler had ‘other means at his disposal’.5

  Von Rundstedt’s superior, the Army chief von Hammerstein-Equord, thought highly of him, describing him as an ‘excellent Commander-in-Chief.6 Unlike von Rundstedt, who was prepared to endure the new régime, von Hammerstein-Equord, did his best to dissuade von Hindenburg from giving Hitler his backing. It was, however, to no avail since von Hindenburg distrusted von Hammerstein-Equord as being a von Schleicher man. Worse, von Blomberg had imported his own chief of staff, Walther von Reichenau, into the Defence Ministry. Von Reichenau was also an officer of National Socialist sympathies, as much if not more so than von Blomberg, and the two conspired to bypass von Hammerstein-Equord, often dealing directly with the branches of the Army Office. Von Rundstedt himself was scathing about von Reichenau, describing him as a ‘right roughneck (Rakauke) who used to run around half naked when taking physical exercise’.7 He also strongly disapproved of the fact that von Reichenau and von Blomberg both wore the Nazi party badge in uniform. Increasingly isolated, it became clear that von Hammerstein-Equord’s days were numbered and eventually, on 1 February 1934, he was dismissed. Both Hitler and von Blomberg pressed von Hindenburg to appoint von Reichenau in his place, but the President refused and nominated Werner Freiherr von Fritsch instead. It has been asserted that von Rundstedt and others voiced their objections to von Reichenau being appointed on the grounds of his comparative youth and lack of command experience and it is possible that von Hindenburg took note of this.8 Blumentritt also stated that von Rundstedt offered his resignation at the time that von Hammerstein-Equord was retired, but was told by both von Hindenburg and von Schleicher that he must stay on.9 As it was, von Fritsch was much more to von Rundstedt’s liking. An artilleryman, but well known to von Rundstedt since he was commanding Wehrkreis III in Berlin and thus was Gerd’s subordinate when selected for the post, von Fritsch made no secret of his distaste for the Nazis but, like von Rundstedt, was a firm believer that the soldier should not become involved in politics. As he declared in 1937: ‘I have made it a guiding principle to confine myself to the military domain and to keep aloof from all political activity. I lack all talent for it.’10

  Von Fritsch could not, however, hide his head in the sand. No sooner had he taken over his new post than a growing crisis began to come to a head. Ernst Roehm, the leader of the Nazi Party’s shock troops, the SA (Sturmabteilungen), was becoming increasingly vociferous in his belief that, if the National Socialist revolution was to be completed, the SA must be given prime responsibility for the defence of the Reich, with the Reichswehr being made subservient to it. Initially, von Blomberg was prepared to humour Roehm. He instructed soldiers to exchange salutes with SA men when they met and where there were joint parades the SA were allowed to head them. Von Blomberg also did not object to the SA’s demand to carry out pre-military training of potential soldiers. On 1 February 1934, however, at a Reich De
fence Council meeting, Roehm confirmed to von Blomberg that he intended to relieve the Army of prime responsibility for defence. Alarmed, von Blomberg ordered the Wehrkreis commanders to cease co-operation with the SA, but Roehm now went even further. He sent von Blomberg a letter saying that he regarded the Reichswehr as no more than a training organisation and that henceforth the SA would be responsible for mobilisation and the conduct of war. Deeply disturbed by this, von Blomberg took the letter to Hitler. At the same time, in order to demonstrate Reichswehr’s loyalty to the régime, he ordered all members to wear the Hoheitsabzeichen, the new national emblem of eagle and swastika, above the right breast procket of their uniforms. Further, he ordered the Reichswehr to implement the first of Hitler’s anti-Jewish measures, the banning of officials not of Aryan descent. Even though war veterans were exempted and only fifty all ranks in the Army and Navy were affected by this, it was a rash step to take, since it showed that the Reichswehr was prepared to acquiesce to even the most extreme and distasteful of the Nazi policies. No wonder that von Blomberg became known by the Army, according to von Rundstedt, as ‘Hitler Youth Quex’ after the 1933 Nazi propaganda feature film of that name about the Hitler Youth who was murdered by communists.11 Eventually, all members of the Reichswehr, like everyone else employed by the State, had to complete forms tracing back their ancestry to prove that it was untainted by Jewish blood. Von Rundstedt scrawled ‘Aryan shit’ across the file in which he kept his personal papers pertaining to this.12

  Von Blomberg’s actions drove Hitler to call a meeting of SA and Reichswehr leaders for 28 February. Von Rundstedt was one of those present and heard Hitler reaffirm the primacy of the Reichswehr and tell the SA that it must concentrate on political matters, although it would still be allowed to carry out pre-military training and be involved in the protection of Germany’s Eastern frontiers. Hitler then ordered von Blomberg and Roehm to sign an agreement to this effect. After the meeting Roehm invited the Generals to his house for lunch, a sumptuous but frosty affair. The Generals then returned to their commands, highly satisfied that the SA’s wings had been clipped, once and for all. What none of them appear to have realised, however, was the price which the Reichswehr would have to pay for this. Furthermore, Roehm immediately told his confrères that he was not prepared to observe the agreement and if necessary would have to go against Hitler. One of the SA leaders, Viktor Lutze, who would succeed Roehm after his murder, was horrified at this and went first to Hitler’s deputy, Rudolf Hess, and then to Hitler himself, who realised that something more drastic would have to be done. This was further reinforced by a fierce altercation which he had with Roehm at the beginning of June. The result was what came to be known as the Night of the Long Knives, which took place on the night 30 June/1 July, when the SS were unleashed on the heirarchy of the SA.

  There is no doubt that the Army knew that something was in the wind. Von Blomberg had shown his son-in-law, General Wilhelm Keitel, a list of people to be arrested and also advised von Fritsch to put his men on the alert. This von Fritsch did, without knowing the real reason, although he suspected that it was in case Roehm mounted a putsch. In von Rundstedt’s case, he apparently merely armed his batman and driver and, like his fellow senior commanders, awaited events.13 What he certainly did not do, as wartime Allied propagandists asserted, was to offer his men as firing squads or sit on a drumhead court-martial of victims of the purge.14 As it happened, matters got out of control, with Himmler, Goering and Heydrich using the operation to settle personal scores. Thus it was not just the SA members gathered for a conference called by Roehm at Bad Weissee near Munich, nor those still in Berlin, who were liquidated, but others elsewhere in the country. For von Blomberg and von Reichenau the Night of the Long Knives was good in that it had finally removed the threat of the SA without the Reichswehr having to dirty its hands. Accordingly, on the next morning, von Blomberg issued an order of the day praising Hitler for his courage in dealing with the SA. But the affair had left something of a sour taste in the Army’s mouth. Among the victims were Kurt von Schleicher and his former assistant in the Defence Ministry and von Reichenau’s predecessor, Kurt von Bredow. Many soldiers found it hard to swallow that two of their kind should have been put on the same level as the SA thugs whatever their political dabblings. Some, notably Erwin von Witzleben, now commanding Wehrkreis III in Berlin, Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, von Rundstedt’s fellow Group Commander, and even von Reichenau went to see von Blomberg to demand that von Fritsch institute court-martial proceedings against those responsible.15 Other sources assert that von Rundstedt also joined in these demands,16 but in the witness box at Nuremberg he implied that he did no such thing: ‘In the first place, Reich President von Hindenburg was still at the Head of the State. In the second place, I was not the senior officer. We had a Commander-in-Chief of the Army [von Fritsch] and a Minister of War [von Blomberg] for a purpose of that sort.’17

  But now came the penalty which the Army had to pay for the final removal of the SA threat. On 2 August, the venerable von Hindenburg passed away, thus severing the last link with the old régime. On the same day, all members of the Reichswehr were ordered to swear a new oath of allegiance. During the Weimar era the troops had sworn loyalty ‘to the Reich constitution, the Reich and its lawful institutions’. In December 1933, Hitler had amended the oath to reflect allegiance to just ‘the people and Fatherland’. Now, however, all members of the armed forces were required to swear fealty to Hitler himself as ‘the Führer of the German Reich and Commander-in-Chief of the Wehr-macht’. This was drawn up by Hitler with the connivance of von Blomberg and von Reichenau. Yet, no one in the Reichswehr publicly objected to the oath and all meekly took it. Von Rundstedt himself told the International Military Tribunal (IMT) Commission at Nuremberg in 1946 that, as a soldier, he swore his oath ‘no matter who was at the head of the state’, but ‘no other oath in my whole life was such a heavy burden as the one I had to swear to Hitler’.18 Yet he swore it, probably on the grounds that Befehl ist Befehl (orders are orders), and personally administered it to some of the troops under his command.

  But von Blomberg had not finished offering concessions to Hitler in exchange for securing the primacy of the Reichswehr. In that same month, August 1934, he proposed that the Armed Forces address Hitler as Mein Führer, and the Nazi raised arm salute and the Heil Hitler! greeting, although not mandatory at this time, became increasingly common. Furthermore, superiors were no longer to be addressed in the third person. Von Rundstedt said that ‘apart from a very few exceptions, we were all very angry about the increasing Nazification’,19 but none took any action. In return, Hitler wrote to von Blomberg on 20 August assuring him that he saw his ‘highest duty to defend the existence and inviolability of the Wehrmacht and ensure that the Army would form the bedrock of the nation as the sole bearer of arms’.20 This proved to be an empty pledge. In September, a formal announcement was made of the formation of the SS-Verfügungstruppe (SS Special Purpose Troops or SS-VT) as the military wing of the SS. In order to help organise it a number of retired and serving officers joined, including Paul Hausser, Felix Steiner and Willi Bittrich, who would all attain high SS rank during the war. Even though Hitler stressed, in a secret order dated 2 February 1935, that in time of war the SS-VT would be incorporated in the Army, he did little to prevent growing tension between the two organisations. Significantly, too, when the Saarland was reincorporated into Germany, as a result of the January 1935 plebiscite, Hitler sent his own bodyguard, the SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, now part of the SS-VT, and not the Army to formally welcome the province back into the Reich.

  While von Rundstedt regarded the increasing dead hand of Hitler on the Army with gloom, life on the domestic front had some compensation. He and Bila lived in a large twelve room apartment on the fashionable Hardenbergstrasse by the Tiergarten Station in Berlin-Charlottenburg. Hans Gerd, who was still working as an archivist at the University of Berlin, continued to live at home. He had, too, met a girl, Editha vo
n Oppen, sister of an army officer friend and they were married in September 1935. Ditha, as she was always known, was just over a year older than Hans Gerd, had a doctorate in economics and was working at a high-powered job in the Labour Ministry, organising the modernisation of rural housing in order to attract people from the cities to the countryside, a major National Socialist policy. For the first few months after their marriage, Hans Gerd and Ditha lived with his parents while they hunted for a suitable apartment. Ditha quickly became pregnant and, in August 1936, bore a daughter, Barbara. Once she became pregnant, von Rundstedt was very keen that she should give up her job, but since she earned much more than Hans Gerd she was loath to do so. Accordingly, her father-in-law insisted on making up the difference in earnings. Nevertheless, he and Bila continued to live modestly, but did not begrudge expensive tastes in others and were very generous in their presents to their son and daughter-in-law.

  Even so, von Rundstedt was unable to avoid Berlin’s ‘high life’. His two superiors, von Blomberg and von Fritsch, were a widower and bachelor respectively and protocol dictated that without wives they could not give official hospitality. Hence von Rundstedt found himself deputising for them. While he enjoyed the good food and wine, even though he often said that his favourite food was pea soup from a field kitchen, he had little in common with the Nazi Party functionaries and tried to avoid going to official parties whenever he could. The one exception to this was the French Ambassador, André François-Poncet, with whom von Rundstedt became very good friends and especially welcomed his gifts of cognac and cigars. If he knew that François-Poncet would be at a function then he would attend.21