The Last Prussian

by Messenger, Charles;

  Von Rundstedt’s main concern at this time was the expansion of the Army. Hitler called for a doubling in strength during 1934 and an increase by half as much again the following year, giving an army of 21 infantry divisions. Initially this was carried out covertly, with the additional manpower being found from one year volunteers drawn largely from the ranks of the SA. In March 1935, however, Hitler announced to the world both the existence of the Luftwaffe and the introduction of conscription. He also declared that he now wanted a 36 division army. This marked the final tearing up of the Treaty of Versailles and was formally accepted by the Western democracies through the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of June of that year. Hitler also reorganised the higher command structure. The Reichswehr now formally became known as the Wehrmacht and Hitler appointed himself Supreme Commander. Directly under him came the Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht with a unified headquarters, the Wehrmachtamt, later to be renamed Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW). Below this came the three individual armed services, the Oberkommando der Marine (OKM), Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH), and Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL), with the heads of each, Raeder, von Fritsch and Goering, being styled Commanders-in-Chief. Each had a chief of staff, which in the Army’s case was Ludwig Beck. The Gruppenkommando remained as the next level of command, but by autumn 1935 they had been increased to three and were later retitled Heeresgruppen (army groups). Each now commanded a number of army corps. In von Rundstedt’s Gruppenkommando 1 there were four – I corps (HQ Königsberg – three infantry divisions under von Brauchitsch), II Corps (Stettin – two infantry divisions, two frontier commands – Blaskowitz), III Corps (Berlin – three infantry divisions – von Witzleben), VIII Corps (Breslau – two infantry divisions, two frontier commands – von Kleist). While rank and file manpower was not a problem, that of officers and non-commissioned officers was. To try and overcome this, the training period for officer cadets was reduced from four to two and a half years and, in order to fill the intermediate ranks, 2,500 officers were transferred from the police and 1,800 former officers recalled to the colours. The NCO problem was more difficult and a number of vacancies could not be filled. Another shortage was trained staff officers. In order to overcome this, the Kriegsakadamie, whose doors had been closed since 1920, was reopened on 18 October 1935.

  Because Hitler demanded that the restructuring of the Wehrmacht must be completed as soon as possible, the Army found itself in no condition to fight any form of war. Yet, as early as the end of March 1935, it was forced to consider the prospects of war with Czechoslovakia. A further scenario was added that autumn, which painted the picture of a French invasion combined with a threatened Czech attack – the classic two front war which Germany had always feared. Neither von Fritsch nor Beck were happy with this and would have preferred to conduct the expansion much more slowly, so that at least part of the Army was always combat-ready. Beck even threatened to resign, but never carried it out. Matters came to a head with Hitler’s decision to send troops into the demilitarised Rhineland in March 1936. Von Fritsch, Beck and von Blomberg protested strongly, but to no avail. After the three battalions, all that were available to carry out the task, had crossed the Rhine, the German military attaché in London, Geyr von Schweppenburg, warned von Blomberg that he thought that the British were about to take counter-action. Von Blomberg then suggested to Hitler that the troops be withdrawn, but with no success. From now on von Blomberg was to become increasingly isolated. On the one hand, Hitler viewed him with increasing suspicion, while of the other, the Army saw him as Hitler’s fawning servant who would do anything that he was told. By autumn 1935, even von Reichenau had turned against him leaving von Blomberg to replace him in the Wehrmachtamt with his son-in-law Keitel, who, at least, could be counted on to support him. Von Rundstedt himself told the IMT Commission in 1946 that all von Fritsch did, time and again, was to order the senior commanders to devote the maximum attention to unit training at the lowest level. Von Rundstedt, although he said that such training was normally the responsibility of junior commanders, agreed that this had to be done. ‘One could not take enough care over the training of our scarcely trained troops. We would not have dreamt of war’.22

  By this time, von Rundstedt was, in terms of service, the most senior officer in the Army. Only von Blomberg was senior to him in rank, having overtaken him by being promoted Colonel General in August 1933. In consequence, Gerd was being increasingly looked on within the Army as its figurehead, as the officer who stood more than any other for the traditional military values. His experience, too, was wide and his talent as bright as ever. Von Fritsch reporting on him in October 1935 described him as:

  ‘An exeptionally outstanding officer. The personality of a leader with good foresight and special understanding for large operational questions. In actual fact he will be an excellent commander, provided he sees it through health-wise.’23

  In April 1936, Hitler promoted von Blomberg General Field Marshal and the following year von Fritsch proposed that von Rundstedt, who was still ranked as General of Infantry, should also be promoted to the same rank in recognition of his seniority. Hitler turned this down because it might be seen as a slight by the Navy and Luftwaffe.24 He did, however, recognise von Rundstedt’s worth and began to make a special effort to cultivate him. Thus, on von Rundstedt’s 60th birthday, Hitler gave him a signed photograph mounted in a silver frame and in January 1936 appointed him to represent the German Army at the funeral of King George V in London. His fellow German mourners were von Blomberg, Admiral Albrecht, General Kampisch of the Luftwaffe and Foreign Minister Freiherr von Heurath. It was, of course, von Rundstedt’s first visit to Britain and one that he would remember for the rest of his life. He was made an honorary member of the prestigious Marlborough Club for the duration of his stay and attended a reception at Buckingham Palace on the eve of the funeral. Although he never openly admitted it, von Rundstedt was at heart a monarchist; his upbringing and ancestry could not have made him anything else. He must therefore have especially felt the poignancy of the occasion. It may be, too, that he met there, for the first time, Marshal Philippe Pétain of France, a fellow mourner, but would have little imagined the circumstances in which their paths would cross and become entwined in the future.

  During 1937, the position of the German Army improved, but, at the same time, Hitler’s attitude was becoming more bellicose. In June, von Blomberg issued a Wehrmacht directive laying down that the Armed Forces must be prepared ‘in case of outside attacks, to exploit, by military means, favourable political opportunities’. In addition to the French and Czech scenarios, the Wehrmacht was also to plan for an attack on Austria in the event of the Habsburg monarchy being restored, action against Republican Spain, and to take into account the possibility of Britain, Poland and Lithuania intervening in the French and Czech scenarios.25 Von Blomberg and von Fritsch were, however, deeply concerned over the possibility of war against Britain and France and warned Hitler against this at a meeting held in November over the allocation of raw materials to the Wehrmacht. Von Rundstedt, too, held strong views, especially where Britain was concerned. Addressing a gathering of staff officers in 1937, he warned them that:

  ‘A Continental power wishing to defeat England must have either Russia or the United States as an ally in order to have any chance of victory. If this constellation cannot be obtained, then England must be the ally of any power aiming at predominance on the Continent. She must not be neutral, for even as a neutral she can turn the scales of victory as may suit her convenience. The lesson to be learned from this is that land power is useless if not coupled with command of the sea. But sea-power alone can strangle a Continental power in the long run.’26

  He fully recognised Germany’s difficult geo-strategic position and firmly believed that in any future war she must remain on the defensive. He also considered that the 36 division army had not only been created too quickly, but was not strong enough to carry out an offensive either in the East or
the West. Von Rundstedt therefore hoped and believed, at least until 1938, that Hitler saw the Army as merely guaranteeing Germany’s security.27

  In the major manoeuvres of autumn 1937, von Rundstedt commanded the Blue forces. In line with previous major exercises, they were defensive in nature, with von Rundstedt commanding an army defending Pomerania against an attack from across the Polish border. Included in his forces, though, was Germany’s new Panzer arm. This had grown from nothing to three Panzer divisions in the space of three years. As with the rest of the Army, its expansion had been carried out by splitting existing units and then splitting again, which created constant instability and affected training. The latter was also not helped by the problems of matching supply of equipment with demand. The 1937 manoeuvres, although they concluded with a spectacular mass attack by all three Panzer divisions, which impressed Hitler and Mussolini, who were present, brought out the problems only too clearly, especially on the logistic side. Von Rundstedt himself later commented that it was only through wartime experience that the Panzer arm learnt its job effectively. He also bewailed the fact that the cavalry was drastically reduced in order to create light and motorised divisions, particularly because he was convinced that cavalry was vital for war in the East.28 Much of the trouble lay in a lack of clear direction on how the Panzer divisions would be employed in war. The traditionalists, like von Fritsch and von Rundstedt, believed that the tank’s prime role was infantry support, in order to help them overcome the ‘machine gun paralysis’ which had so bedevilled the infantry during 1914–18. Guderian and his fellow armoured commanders thought otherwise. He himself published his thoughts in Achtung! Panzer! in 1937. He seized on Hitler’s growing love affair with motorisation, quoting from his speech at the 1937 Motor Show: ‘This is certain: the replacement of animal power by the motor leads to the most tremendous technical and consequently economical change the world has ever experienced.’29 He also grasped Hitler’s concept of Blitzkrieg, which he had first voiced in 1935 at the Nuremberg Party Rally to foreign delegates of the League of German Girls: ‘I shouldn’t negotiate for months beforehand and make lengthy preparations, but – as I have always done throughout my life – I should suddenly, like a flash of lightning in the night, hurl myself upon the enemy.’30

  Hitler’s belief that the Panzer arm and the Luftwaffe had given him an offensive capability had manifested itself at the 5 November 1937 meeting on raw materials which has been mentioned earlier. Hitler reiterated the aim of completing the Wehrmacht’s rearmament programme by 1943, but pointed out that by then much of the equipment being currently produced would be obsolete. It was therefore essential that Germany maintain the initiative. The Wehrmacht’s role in this would be to exploit any window of opportunity that occurred in Europe. Such a window might be seen in internal problems in France or even in war between France and Italy. It was also necessary to secure Germany’s south-east flank – Austria and Czechoslovakia – and to neutralise Russia, which could be done through Japan, using the November 1936 Anti-Comintern Pact. Time was of the essence and it was important to achieve Germany’s territorial aims before the other European powers were able to react. It was this announcement that Hitler was prepared to use the Wehrmacht offensively which brought about protests from von Blomberg, von Fritsch and even von Neurath. But all these protestations did was finally to convince Hitler that the Army High Command lacked drive and determination.

  After the 5 November conference, von Fritsch departed on two months’ leave to Egypt. He had offered to postpone it in view of the seeming emergency which Hitler had painted, but Hitler told him that the situation was not that urgent. Von Fritsch asked von Rundstedt to deputise for him, but, according to von Rundstedt, did not tell him what had transpired during the 5 November meeting.31 Furthermore, the day-to-day affairs of OKH remained in Beck’s hands and he only briefed von Rundstedt every eight days.32 It is difficult to believe that von Rundstedt could not have been consulted more frequently if he had wished it. Indeed, had he been, it is possible that he might have been able to do something to forestall the crisis that was about to erupt.

  Towards the end of January 1938, von Rundstedt went to East Prussia to attend map exercises being carried out at Königsberg. On the 30th, Beck telephoned him and asked him to return to Berlin immediately as a very serious situation had arisen.33 Beck wanted von Rundstedt to take a plane back, but he declined, possibly on the grounds that he did not like flying, and took the overnight express train instead. He arrived in Berlin early the following morning and was met by Beck at the railway station.

  What Beck had to tell him came, von Rundstedt claimed, as a complete surprise. Indeed, he stated that if he had had any prior knowledge of it he would never have gone to East Prussia.34 It concerned both von Blomberg and von Fritsch. As far as the former was concerned, on 12 January he had remarried, but unsuitably it transpired, a woman who had a police record of conviction for immorality. Worse, both Hitler and Goering had been witnesses at the wedding. The Berlin police chief, Heinrich Graf von Helldorf, drew Keitel’s attention to it and, probably because he disapproved of the match strongly enough to override his natural loyalty as von Blomberg’s son-in-law, Keitel referred von Helldorf to Goering. Goering, who coveted von Blomberg’s job, and Himmler, who saw him as an obstacle to the strengthening of the SS-VT, presented the evidence to Hitler. He, delighted to have grounds for finally getting rid of von Blomberg, confronted him, dismissed him from his post and sent him and his wife on a year’s exile to Capri. At this meeting, von Blomberg recommended Goering as his successor, but Hitler turned this down, probably because it was placing too much power into his hands. Then, on 27 January, Hitler consulted Keitel. He suggested four names, Friedrich Graf von Schulenburg, a Nazi Party member and 1918 Chief of Staff to the Crown Prince’s army but now retired for some years, von Rundstedt, Otto von Stulpnagel, then serving with the Luftwaffe, and von Reichenau, but Hitler dismissed them all. On the previous day, however, Hitler had also spoken with his Army adjutant, Colonel Friedrich Hossbach, who had recommended von Schulenburg, von Rundstedt and Beck. Hitler had preferred von Schulenburg, probably because he was a Nazi, but he had immediately turned the post down on the grounds of ill health.

  Much more serious in the eyes of both Beck and von Rundstedt was the crisis surrounding von Fritsch. At the same time that Goering and Himmler informed Hitler about von Blomberg’s new wife, they also laid another dossier in front of him. This asserted that von Fritsch was a practising homosexual. Hitler immediately authorised Himmler to initiate a Gestapo investigation. They summoned von Fritsch for interrogation, although this was illegal, since he could only be investigated by the military authorities. This news deeply shocked von Rundstedt. But Beck told him that Hitler wanted to see him at the Chancellery at 11am that morning. He was to come to a back entrance in civilian clothes. Beck also asked him whether he was prepared to succeed von Fritsch as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, but von Rundstedt declined.35

  Von Rundstedt returned to Hardenbergstrasse to change and telephoned von Fritsch to assure him of his support. Ditha, now heavily pregnant with her second child Gerd, who would be born on 24 February, happened to be visiting her mother-in-law at the time and was very surprised to see von Rundstedt not in uniform. ‘He asked me to get him a taxi. To my objection that I ought rather to summon his driver he said: “No, I prefer it like this!”’36 He did not, however, tell her where he was going or why. Von Rundstedt saw Hitler alone.

  ‘He was in an awful state of excitement, such as I had never seen him in before. Something had broken in him and he had lost all confidence in people. It was certainly no “theatre”. First, I had to calm him down and then he started to tell me first about the Blomberg case. He had deceived him and put him in an awkward position. Then he railed at him and the leading generals because of their timidity during rearmament and the occupation of the Rhineland in 1936. It was he who did everything. Generals wanted slower rearmament, the strength of 36 divisions wa
s too large for them. … Thus, the abuse continued for a while.

  I then said to him that Blomberg had violated the officer’s code of honour through his behaviour and had to be put in front of a Court of Honour. He brusquely refused – as a private he just did not have any idea of the term officer’s code of honour. Finally, he conceded that Blomberg would have to be erased from the officer Rangliste in the future, whatever happened.

  Now he turned to the Fritsch case. He would have made him War Minister if it were not for the accusations of the known kind which Himmler had already reported to him years ago. I asked angrily how he could keep such vulgar defamations from a senior officer without giving him the chance to justify himself. Fritsch was, according to my opinion denigrated by “a certain corner”, by which I meant Himmler. It was the same as I being supposedly working towards the “re-establishment of the monarchy”, which was surely known to him. To this he only smiled. But in Fritsch’s case, reasons of foreign policy had been decisive in his silence. But now he had to tackle the matter because of Blomberg’s succession. During a conversation with Fritsch he had given an ice-cold and reserved impression instead of exploding. This made him (Hitler) believe in his guilt. I said that Fritsch had heard about the impending conversation from Hitler’s adjutant Hossbach and as a nobleman he was only able to display icy disdain.