The Last Prussian

by Messenger, Charles;

  Guderian had another opportunity to raise the matter of the Sedan thrust on 7 February. This was at a map exercise organised by von Manstein at Koblenz and attended by Halder. Guderian now had a motorised corps, von Wietersheim’s XIV Corps, following in his wake, although it did not set off until some time after the armour. Guderian expected to reach the Meuse in three days and wanted to force a crossing 48 hours later with the assistance of von Wietersheim alone. Halder conceded his demand for an additional Panzer division and agreed that von Wietersheim must follow closely behind him, but considered forcing the Meuse so early to be over-ambitious. He believed that it would not be possible to mount a ‘concerted’ crossing of the river before the ninth or tenth day of the offensive. He noted that von Rundstedt and von Manstein agreed with this.24 Both, however, used this as an argument for the army group to be given an additional army. Significantly, though, von Rundstedt forgave Guderian for his outburst of three weeks earlier. Guderian noted: ‘Apparently von R himself has the feeling that I was right to defend myself recently. At the meeting [map exercise] he was kindness itself …’25

  This exercise was von Manstein’s swan song at HQ Army Group A. He had just been notified that he was to be given command of an infantry corps. The official reason for this was that it was time that he held another field command, but it is certain that von Brauchitsch and Halder had become increasingly fed up with the waves that he was creating and had decided to shift him to a post where he was unable to continue to make a nuisance of himself. Von Manstein recalled that at the end of the map exercise ‘v. Rundstedt thanked me in front of everyone present for all I had done as his Chief-of-Staff. His choice of words on this occasion reflected all the kindness and chivalry of that great commander.’26 Two days later he left Koblenz for some leave prior to assuming command of XXXVIII Corps. But he still had one more trump card to play.

  Von Manstein’s successor as Chief of Staff Army Group A was Georg von Sodenstern, a protégé of Halder’s and probably selected by him as being less likely to rock the OKH boat. Guderian rather disparagingly described him as rather ‘prosaic’27, but Blumentritt considered him ‘calm’ and ‘clever’.28 Certainly, though, he was to serve von Rundstedt well and would remain at his side for almost two years.

  It was Hitler himself who took the next step towards modifying Case Yellow. On 13 February, he queried the sense of using so much armour amid the Belgian fortifications and wondered whether it would not be better to concentrate it against Sedan, where the Allies would be unlikely to expect an attack, particularly as they were probably aware of the details of the existing plan, thanks to the Mechelen incident. He ordered the OKH Operations Section to study this. Next day, another map exercise took place, this time at Mayen, List’s headquarters. Once again Halder was present. He was not impressed with the deployment of Guderian’s corps in line. It indicated that there were insufficient infantry divisions forward and confirmed his belief that a major attack over the Meuse could not take place until the tenth day. He also recorded Guderian’s and von Wietersheim’s pessimism over the plan as it stood.29

  On the evening of 17 February von Manstein, four other newly appointed corps commanders and Erwin Rommel, who was leaving Hitler’s personal staff to take command of 7th Panzer Division, had dinner with Hitler. After the meal, von Manstein expounded his plan once more and Hitler indicated his complete agreement. Events now moved quickly. On the following day, Hitler announced a change of plan to OKW and OKH and on the 24th the details were given to the army group and army commanders.

  The new plan, however, not only switched the Schwerpunkt to von Rundstedt but also gave him not just one but two additional armies. Von Bock was to pass across both von Kluge’s Fourth Army and von Weichs’ Second Army. Furthermore, von Rundstedt now had seven Panzer and three motorised divisions, as opposed to von Bock’s three and one. The redeployment was to be completed by 7 March. Yet, having now got even more than he had been demanding for the past few months, von Rundstedt seems to have suffered from an attack of ‘cold feet’. At the conference on 24 February, he expressed scepticism about the effectiveness of the armoured wedge, fearing that the follow-up forces would not be able to keep up with it.30 At the same time, von Sodenstern and Blumentritt expressed doubts in the opposite direction. They thought that the closeness of the terrain in the Ardennes and the defences being constructed in Luxembourg and Southern Belgium might prevent the armour from breaking out and wondered whether it might not be better for the infantry to lead initially. Von Sodenstern sent Halder a letter on the subject in early March but was told to discard his 1914–18 mentality and be prepared to take risks.31

  This appears to have settled the issue and after von Brauchitsch and Halder had attended a conference at Koblenz on 13 March, and the Army Group A commanders had presented their plans to Hitler on the 15th, Hitler expressed his satisfaction that all was well. The only question left to be answered was what the armour was to do if it managed to break through at Sedan. Hitler posed this question to Guderian on the 15th and was told that he intended to push westwards. All that he required from the High Command was an objective, either Amiens or Paris, although he himself favoured Amiens and the coast. Busch, according to Guderian, then interjected that he did not think that Guderian would be able to get across the Meuse, to which Guderian replied that Busch need not worry as his army would not have to force a crossing.32 Significantly, Hitler announced on the 17th that he was reserving any decision as to what would happen once the Meuse was crossed.33 By now, though, he was increasingly turning his attention to Scandinavia and the pressure came off the Western Front for the next few weeks.

  A major problem that continued to worry commanders at all levels was how to maintain the offensive spirit in their troops during this long period of Sitzkrieg. One method was the use of the Third Reich’s extensive propaganda machine. To this end, a number of senior commanders were encouraged to write uplifting articles in the newspapers. Thus von Brauchitsch contributed an article on the soldiers of Frederick the Great in the leading Nazi party newspaper, the Völkischer Beobachter in January, and one under von Rundstedt’s name appeared in early March in the same publication. Entitled To Heroes Memorial Day 1940: Sacrifice for Germany, it exhorted the German soldier to emulate his forbears of 1914–1918, and reminded him that ‘the heroic death of a German soldier is not something to be forgotten. Instead it should inspire everyone who remembers it to die in the same way, to be as strong, unswerving, and obedient, to go happily and as a matter of course to his death.’ Furthermore, the present war had been forced on Germany and it was a struggle for justice and freedom.34 It is highly unlikely that von Rundstedt himself wrote this. It has the hallmarks of a professional propagandist and all that von Rundstedt was probably asked to do was to lend his name to it. Hans Gerd, too, was now involved in this field. He had been conscripted into the Army and was working in the OKH Historical Section in Berlin, mainly compiling biographies of the leading commanders, including his father.35

  On 9 April, German forces invaded Denmark and Norway. This meant that, because sizeable Luftwaffe assets had to be transferred to that theatre, Case Yellow would have to be delayed until a successful outcome was certain. Not until 30 April did Hitler pronounce that the forces in the West had to be ready to execute Case Yellow any time after 5 May. Unsettled weather, as had so often been the case during the winter, now intervened and caused some postponement. Eventually, on the morning of the 9th, Hitler resolved on action the following day. That night, the codeword ‘Danzig’ was promulgated. The long months of waiting were about to end.

  Von Rundstedt later recalled: ‘I can still see us in Koblenz, drinking coffee in the hotel at 4 o’clock in the afternoon; the order: “it will start early tomorrow morning” came through at 2 o’clock in the afternoon.’36 That evening, he left Koblenz and set up his forward headquarters at Bitburg, 80 kilometres west-south-west of Koblenz and just 20 kilometres from the Belgian border. No record exists of what he actua
lly felt now that the moment of truth had arrived, but probably it was relief that the months of inactivity were at an end.

  Von Rundstedt’s spearhead, his Panzer divisions, had been organised into three corps under a Panzer Group headquarters commanded by Ewald von Kleist, his successor in command of 2nd Cavalry Division. The corps themselves were commanded by Guderian (XIX Corps), Reinhardt (XLI) and Hoth (XV). Sedan remained as Guderian’s intitial objective, while Hoth was to reach the Meuse north of Dinant and Reinhardt, in the centre, at Monthermé. This represented an armoured thrust with a frontage of some 40 miles. Behind the Panzer corps came von Wietersheim’s motorised corps. Von Kleist himself was initially placed under Twelfth Army which, in conjunction with Fourth Army, was to advance on the line Namur-Sedan. Sixteenth Army’s initial task was to swing south to cover von Rundstedt’s southern flank and keep contact with Army Group C. Second Army would initially be in reserve.

  At 0300 hours on the 10th the Luftwaffe went into action, attacking Allied airfields in order to win the air superiority battle. Just under two hours later, the German armies crossed the borders of Holland, Belgium and Luxembourg. During that day the Panzer divisions swept westwards through the Ardennes, meeting hardly any opposition. However, that night the first sign appeared of nerves on the part of the higher command. Von Kleist was a cavalryman, with little experience of armour and he now became nervous of a French cavalry threat to Guderian’s left flank. He wanted a Panzer division diverted to counter it. This Guderian considered totally unnecessary since cavalry could do little to stop tanks and it might delay his main thrust to the Meuse. He made some alteration to the axis of advance of his left-hand division, pulling it in closer to his centre line, but this only served to interfere with the advance of the other divisions, which cannoned into one another, causing stalls.

  On the 11th, resistance began to stiffen a little. Demolitions on the narrow winding roads of the Ardennes became more frequent, causing temporary halts while they were overcome. These were aggravated by List’s belief that the close country needed infantry to assist the tanks and caused Halder to note that the armour should be accompanied by mechanised infantry.37 Even so, the tanks did reach the Meuse on schedule. By the evening of the 13th, both Guderian and Hoth had established footholds across it, assisted by the Luftwaffe. During the night, bridges were built and the tanks began to cross next morning, while Allied aircraft, with little success, sacrificed themselves in trying to take out the bridges. At the height of this von Rundstedt went to Sedan to see for himself. Guderian recorded the ‘general delight’ with which his appearance was greeted, especially since an air attack was in progress. Guderian:

  ‘I reported our position to him in the very middle of the bridge. … He asked drily: “Is it always like this here?” I could reply with a clear conscience that it was. He then spoke a few deeply felt words in appreciation of the achievements of our gallant soldiers.’38

  Von Rundstedt had not lost his coolness under fire.

  But now the decision, left unresolved during the revision of Case Yellow, had to be made. What was the armoured wedge to do once across the Meuse? With the best of Allied forces, the French First and Seventh Armies and the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) drawn into Belgium, as prearranged in the Anglo-French Plan D, the answer could only be that it must drive for the English Channel. Halder sent orders to this effect by teleprinter on the afternoon of the 14th. As for the infantry armies following up behind, Fourth Army would sweep west along the Franco-Belgian border towards the coast, with Second Army to be inserted on its left flank. Twelfth Army was to swing south-west towards the Oise and Sixteenth would turn south in order to cover the army group’s open left flank. Von Rundstedt and von Sodenstern were not totally happy about this. They wanted Second Army inserted between the Twelfth and the Sixteenth, but this was rejected by OKH. Von Rundstedt then spoke to von Brauchitsch, saying that he could not accept any responsibility for the resultant chaos if Twelfth Army was made to change direction southwards. His objection was sustained.39

  By the close of 15 May, the Panzer divisions had broken out of their bridgeheads and were racing west, brushing aside all opposition, including half-hearted efforts by French armour to launch counter-strokes against them. On the 16th, however, fears over the army group’s increasingly exposed southern flank began to surface again. While von Kleist and his corps commanders were keen to get across the Oise as soon as possible, so as not to allow Allied resistance to congeal, von Rundstedt, as the army group war diary noted, considered it a risk which ‘does not seem justified’ and a temporary halting of the armour would enable ‘a certain stiffening of the threatened flank’.40 In fact, he later stated that he expected the overall Allied commander, Gamelin, whom he had met at King George V’s funeral and by whom he had been much impressed, to make a flank attack from the direction of Verdun.41 The upshot was that von Kleist ordered Guderian to halt by last light on the 16th. By this stage he had reached the River Serre and Reinhardt, to his north, the Oise. Guderian, determined not to be stopped, issued orders for a resumption of the advance the following morning. Unfortunately, Panzer Group Headquarters was monitoring his radio nets and overheard this. The next thing that Guderian knew was an order from von Kleist ordering him to remain where he was and to meet the Panzer Group commander early the following morning. Von Kleist expressed his displeasure in no uncertain terms. Guderian, displaying his usual impetuosity, then said that he would resign his command, to which von Kleist retorted that he was to hand it over forthwith. Guderian now informed Army Group Headquarters of his resignation, but was ordered to stay where he was until an emissary arrived. This turned out to be no less than the Army Commander, List, who told Guderian that, on von Rundstedt’s personal instructions, he was to remain in command, but, while his headquarters was to stay where it was, he could conduct reconnaissance in force forward. This last was on order of OKH, List said.42 This was indeed so to an extent, since Halder had spoken to von Sodenstern and ordered him not to halt on the Oise but push on in the direction Valenciennes – Cambrai – Saint Quentin and seize canal crossings there. The southern flank was merely to be guarded by echelonned forces.43 This axis of advance, however, referred more to Hoth and Reinhardt than it did Guderian and the inference was that XIX Corps should merely cover the southern flank.

  In this way von Rundstedt was able, through his quick diplomacy, to smooth the ruffled feathers of both von Kleist and his subordinate and prevent Guderian from taking a step which might have had a very detrimental effect on operations at this critical stage. It did not, however, mean that von Rundstedt was now any less concerned over his southern flank. Neither were others. In the afternoon of that same day Hitler came to Headquarters Army Group A, now at Bastogne (a town that would be of particular significance to von Rundstedt four and a half years later), to assure himself that the army group C-in-C was implementing the necessary measures. He approved of what von Rundstedt had done, but emphasised the need to guard the flank with infantry divisions, even if they were on their feet, which, of course, all but von Wietersheim’s corps were. He then went on, as von Sodenstern recorded in the war diary, to underline especially

  … the significance the southern flank has, not only for the operations of the whole Army, but also politically and psychologically. Under no circumstances must a set-back occur at this moment anywhere, a set-back that would give a fateful rise [in spirit] to our adversaries, not alone to the military, but above all to their political leadership. Thus the decision, for the moment, rests not so much in the rapid forward push to the Channel, but much more … in the speediest establishment of absolutely defensive [sic] readiness on the Aisne … and later on the Somme. … Toward this purpose all measures are directed even if time is lost temporarily in the push toward the West [and the Channel].’44

  While Hitler was conferring with von Rundstedt, Halder told von Sodenstern that he was to receive Hoepner’s XVI Panzer Corps (two Panzer and one motorised division) under comm
and, as well as an additional infantry corps, the Waffen-SS Motorised Division, 9th Panzer Division and the SS Leibstandarte. All these formations were to be placed under Fourth Army. That night, though, von Brauchitsch, who, together with Halder, did not see the threat in the south in the same light as Hitler or even von Rundstedt, telephoned the latter to tell him to continue to advance to the Line Le Cateau – St. Quentin. He was presumably worried that von Rundstedt had been unduly swayed by Hitler’s afternoon visit. It was, in Halder’s words, ‘an unpleasant day. The Führer is terribly nervous. Frightened by his own success, he is afraid to take any chance and so would rather pull the reins on us.’45

  As it happened, the French did begin to mount an operation against the southern flank on the 17th. It was a thrust by the just formed 4th French Armoured Division under Charles de Gaulle. His spearhead, one battalion of heavy and two of light tanks, struck Guderian’s 1st Panzer Division at about 1600 hours, just at the time that he was having his audience with List. The flank screen was brushed aside and de Gaulle’s tanks entered Montcornet, through which ran 1st Panzer’s main supply route. But, lacking infantry, artillery and fuel, they were forced to withdraw, harried by the Luftwaffe. This was regarded as of such little significance that even von Kleist, who was told about it, did not bother to report it upwards.

  Even so, next day, with the Panzer divisions entering St Quentin and Cambrai by mid-morning, Hitler continued to fret, demanding that the armoured spearhead must thrust north-west instead of west, thus reducing to the minumum the exposed right flank. As Halder put it: ‘He rages and screams that we are on the best way to ruin the whole campaign and that we are leading up to a defeat.’46 He sent an emissary to von Rundstedt in the shape of the Chief of Staff of OKW, Wilhelm Keitel, to reinforce his concern for the southern flank. It was to be the first of many visits. Commenting on them, Keitel wrote: ‘General von Rundstedt also wisely recognised the difficulties of my position at the time and listened with great understanding to the tactfully moderate “hints” I gave him, hints that had, in fact, originated from Hitler.’47 By this time, though, von Rundstedt was well aware that Keitel was a mere cipher and message carrier, and that it was not worth being anything but courteous to him. Keitel, on the other hand, a commoner and a Hannoverian, who, in terms of service, was many years von Rundstedt’s junior and was below him in rank seniority, was bound to be obsequious to the doyen of the Prussian officer corps.