The Last Prussian

by Messenger, Charles;

  On this same day, however, it became clear from von Bock’s reports that the Allied forces which had entered Belgium on the 10th were now in retreat. As a result, that evening Halder gave Hitler a situation report and requested permission for the armoured wedge to thrust for Arras and the coast so that these forces could be cut off. Hitler agreed, but it left a sour taste in Halder’s mouth: ‘So the right thing is being done after all, but in the atmosphere of bad feeling and in a form calculated to give the outside world the impression that it is a plan conceived by OKW’.48

  The thrust for Arras was to be the responsibility of Hermann Hoth’s corps, since the town lay on its axis of advance. To Hoth’s south, Reinhardt and Guderian were to take a wider sweep aiming for the Channel. Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division had seized Cambrai by the evening of the 18th and had then halted in order to get supplies up and give his men their first rest for almost ten days. His next objective was the high ground south-east of Arras and he intended to make an advance by night. On the afternoon of the 19th Hoth visited him and initially objected to his plan, on the grounds that Rommel’s troops were not sufficiently recovered. Rommel’s retort was that they had had twenty hours in the same place and a thrust by night would save casualties. Hoth relented and at 0140 hours on the 20th Rommel was on his way once more.49 Guderian, on the other hand, had not halted at all and on the 20th made his longest daily advance of the campaign – 56 miles from the Canal du Nord to Abbeville and the Channel coast. Even so, he had to drive 2nd Panzer Division hard in order to do it since they were very tired and pleaded for a halt on the grounds of shortage of fuel.50 Rommel’s drive through the night went well, except his motorised infantry had not followed the tanks as closely as they should have done, and he himself had to drive back in order to hurry them forward. The armour itself reached Beauvais and its objective by 0600 hours, but Rommel was unable to take any immediate advantage of this because French elements had infiltrated his lines of communication and it was only after an infantry regiment, supported by artillery, had been moved up to protect his flank south of Arras that he was able to proceed. By this time it was the afternoon of 21 May and intelligence had been received that strong British and French forces were in the Arras area. Hoth’s plan was for Rommel to sweep round the south of Arras while 5th Panzer Division advanced across its eastern side. Both divisions would then continue north-west. To protect his left flank, Hoth gave Rommel Eicke’s SS Totenkopf Division. At 1500 hours Rommel set his Panzer regiment going, although he admitted that it was by now much reduced in strength because of breakdowns and casualties.51

  It was now that the British launched a counter-stroke, which became known as the Arras counter-attack. This was carried out by the 1st Army Tank Brigade, with two battalions of infantry tanks. An infantry division was also supposed to have taken part, but got left behind by the tanks. These initially hit the SS Totenkopf, now converted to a combat role after its infamous involvement in the Polish campaign. 7th Panzer Division also became heavily involved and, for a short time, there were signs that the British were causing considerable panic and that Hoth’s renewed thrust was being knocked totally off balance. Unsupported, however, the British tanks were unable to sustain the attack and by evening had been forced to withdraw, having inflicted just over 100 casualties on the SS Totenkopf and almost 400 on 7 th Panzer.

  A determined Allied counter-stroke into the flank of the armoured wedge was what, of course, the German high command had increasingly feared as it advanced ever deeper west. That this attack had been carried out with more determination than the French attempts in the south meant that the momentary reverberations it caused up the chain of command were out of all proportion to the numbers which took part. Von Rundstedt immediately halted the advance of the remainder of his forces until the situation was resolved. Later he said that it was the critical moment of the entire campaign.52 By midday on the 22nd, however, the situation was looking promising once more. That night OKH issued a fresh order to von Rundstedt. His immediate task was to ‘complete the encirclement of the enemy in northern Belgium and France’ by narrowing the pocket in which they were already trapped. His armoured forces were to drive north-east from the line Bethune – St Omer – Calais to Armentières – Ypres – Ostend, while his infantry seized the high ground Lens – St Omer.53 In other words, the infantry was to provide a firm shoulder in the south while the Panzer divisions swept up the coast driving the Allied forces towards Army Group B. This was set in train on the 23rd and Halder expressed himself pleased with initial progress. He did, however, note that Fourth Army, on von Rundstedt’s right wing, was thin on the ground. Later in the day, however, he commented: ‘The developments of the past few days show that AGp.A is indeed experiencing considerable difficulties in managing this unwieldy mass of seventy-one divisions. I have a good idea that its staff has not been energetic or active enough.’ The answer, which he immediately implemented, was for OKH to place its own liaison officers with ‘the several armies’ to ensure that its orders were being executed.54 Given the speed at which events were taking place, the many different directions that Army Group A was having to look, and that von Rundstedt’s span of command encompassed four armies, it is not surprising that command and control were becoming very stretched. Liaison officers would certainly help, but the danger in this was that OKH would be tempted to bypass Army Group HQ and deal with the armies direct.

  The young Gerd (left) with his father and brothers, Joachim (on father’s knee) and Udo.

  The Cadets – left to right – Udo, Gerd, Joachim and Eberhard (on Gerd’s shoulders) at Oranienstein. Today, the castle is the headquarters of 5th Panzer Division

  Lieutenant and Regimental Adjutant.

  Gerd and Bila on their wedding day.

  Hans Gerd and Bila, Kassel 1911.

  German artillery passing through Brussels, August 1914.

  The Narew battlefield, July 1915.

  Gerd’s health broke down again during the fighting here.

  A cavalryman at heart – Gerd (left) while umpiring the 5th and 7th Infantry Divisions’ manoeuvres, Bavaria 1926.

  Reviewing 2nd Cavalry Division, Breslau 1929.

  Gerd, Bila and Hans Gerd on the steps of Hardenbergstrasse 32, Berlin, Spring 1932.

  Von Rundstedt, von Hammerstein-Equord and von Hindenburg, 1933.

  Von Rundstedt (extreme left), von Fritsch (centre) and von Kluge (behind and to the right of von Fritsch), 1935.

  Left to right: Raeder, von Blomberg, Hitler, Goering and von Rundstedt on Hitler’s 47th birthday.

  Von Rundstedt (left) with Hitler during the Gruppenkommando 2 autumn manoeuvres, 1936.

  A grim-faced von Rundstedt takes the salute of his troops as they leave Breslau for the occupation of the Sudetenland, 28 September 1938.

  They do not yet know it, but their fate will be grim.

  Polish Jews being questioned by an SS officer, 5 September 1939.

  France, May 1940. Elements of Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division.

  Reduction of the Dunkirk pocket – British and French prisoners, 27 May 1940.

  Preparations for SEALION. A PzKpfw III undergoing deep wading trials.

  A happier moment – von Rundstedt visiting 18th Infantry Regiment during the winter of 1940–41. (It will be noted that he is dressed as Honorary Colonel of the Regiment. This form of dress was his favourite uniform and in many of the images in this book he may be seen wearing it rather than that of a Field Marshal).

  Russia – the first snows. Vehicles waiting to cross the Dnieper by ferry. The Russians had destroyed all the bridges.

  German troops fight their way into Rostov-on-Don, November 1941. Their withdrawal before the end of the month would result in von Rundstedt’s removal from command.

  ‘Very Impressive’. Dieppe after the disastrous raid of August 1942.

  Von Rundstedt visiting Seyss-Inquart, Reichs Commissioner for the Netherlands, July 1943. Seyss-Inquart was executed for war crimes in 1946.

 
Inspecting the Atlantic defences in the La Rochelle area, August 1943.

  Von Rundstedt in April 1944. He is holding his treasured Interimstab.

  Tea with Guderian at St. Germain, 1 May 1944.

  A visit to Marshal Petain. Laval is behind the doorway.

  It was on this day, 23 May, that a series of events began to unfold which would lead to the major controversy of the campaign, the so-called Halt Order. At 1730 hours, the OKH Liaison Officer to von Kleist, von Gyldenfeldt, spoke to Halder and expressed von Kleist’s concern over the situation. There was still heavy fighting around Arras and his tank losses as a whole were now ‘as high as 50 per cent’. In the light of this, he felt unequal to tackling the assault on the Allied pocket in the north. Halder reassured him by saying that the ‘crisis will be over in 48 hours’ and that he must carry on.55 At much the same time, von Kluge was voicing similar concerns to von Rundstedt and proposed that his motorised elements be allowed to halt next day so that the situation around Arras could be tidied up and the infantry given the opportunity to catch up. This von Rundstedt agreed to and gave orders for Fourth Army to halt for the following day.56

  MAP 6. The Drive to the Channel, May 1940.

  Less than two hours after this, new orders came from OKH at the instigation of von Brauchitsch. He now wanted von Bock to take over control of operations against the Allied pocket. To this end, Fourth Army was now to revert to his operational control. Halder strongly disapproved of this, rightly believing, since there were two army groups involved, that only von Brauchitsch could exercise unified command at this juncture. To express his disapproval, he refused to sign the order.57

  But he was not the only one who was unhappy. When von Sodenstern received the order he objected to von Greiffenberg, Chief of the OKH Operations Section, and said that he could not view ‘the prospective change in the command organisation at this time as a happy one’. He also put his estimate of the situation at this time in writing so that it could be used as ammunition when complaining in the morning to von Brauchitsch and Halder, who, since it was now midnight, had presumably gone to bed.58

  Another seed had also been sown on the 23rd. Major Engel, Hitler’s Army Adjutant, noted in his diary: ‘Führer has telephone conversation with Goering. Field Marshal believes Luftwaffe would face great task: annihilation of British in Northern France. Army can merely occupy. We are angry. Führer enthusiastic. Jodl says: “That bloke’s [Goering] talking pretty big again.”’59

  Next morning Hitler, Jodl and Schmundt, Hitler’s Wehrmacht Adjutant, flew to see von Rundstedt, whose headquarters was now at Charleville. Von Rundstedt explained the situation in the light of the OKH order of the previous evening, complaining about the sudden transfer of the bulk of his armour to von Bock. Hitler and Albert Jodl (Chief of Operations at OKW) apparently expressed surprise, having not been informed of the OKH order. Hitler told von Rundstedt that the transfer of von Kluge was to be suspended until he had talked to von Brauchitsch. As for von Rundstedt’s intention to halt everything for the day to give the armour a chance to refurbish and for the infantry to catch up, Jodl noted that Hitler was in complete agreement. Hitler went on to remind von Rundstedt that it was necessary to look ahead to the next phase of the campaign, Case Red, the defeat of the Allied forces south of the River Somme, and that it was important to husband the armour for this. Furthermore, if the northern pocket was made too tight, the operations of the Luftwaffe would be severely restricted.60 Accordingly, von Rundstedt immediately issued an order stating that Hitler had decreed that the general line Lens – Bethune – Arras – Aire –

  St Orner – Gravelines was not to be crossed north-west of Arras and that the Panzer divisions were to close up to the Aa Canal and use the day for repairs and maintenance.61

  As it happened, von Kleist’s Panzer divisions had already been on the move on the morning of the 24th. Guderian’s 1st Panzer Division had even secured a crossing over the Aa Canal just south of Gravelines, while Reinhardt had one at St Omer. This indicates that, because of the OKH order transferring him to von Bock’s command, von Kluge may not have put the temporary halt order agreed with von Rundstedt the previous evening into effect. Guderian says that he was ‘speechless’ when he heard of it, but did not initially know of the reasons for it.62 What seems clear, though, was that von Rundstedt viewed it merely as a temporary measure, primarily designed to give the armour a chance to draw a quick breath before its final assault on the pocket. It is probable, too, that he did not take Hitler’s remarks about the Luftwaffe particularly seriously, although, of course, it was the Luftwaffe which had been decisive in the destruction of the Kutno pocket in Poland.

  The question remains as to whether von Rundstedt was being overcautious in halting the armour at this stage. Guderian clearly thought so, and von Gyldenfeldt considered that von Kleist’s gloomy estimate of his tank casualties was unfounded, since he did not realise ‘that large numbers of tanks were returning to their units after a short repair time. This is a fact, but at the time it was perhaps inexperience.’63 Yet, Reinhardt’s XLI Corps war diary for 23 May states that the Panzer divisions had each suffered some 2,000 casualties and 30 per cent of the tanks, and that losses in other weapons systems had been heavy.64 We have also seen Rommel’s acknowledgement that his tank losses were high prior to his drive on Arras, and 1st Panzer Division’s plea to Guderian during the thrust to the coast. In addition, von Rundstedt, in a postwar interview, stated that the mobile workshops responsible for repairing tanks had fallen a long way behind and roads congested by infantry moving to guard the southern flank delayed the moving up of replacement tanks.65 There were thus justifiable grounds for a temporary halt, especially since there was no evidence to suggest that the enemy, especially the British, would not do everything possible to avert their threatened annihilation.

  Hitler, on his return from Charleville, summoned von Brauchitsch to see him at OKW. Halder saw von Brauchitsch back at OKH after the interview, which was apparently ‘very unpleasant’. The OKH order of the previous evening was to be cancelled and the halt order confirmed. Hitler also told the Commander-in-Chief that the Luftwaffe would now complete the destruction of the Allied forces in north-eastern France.66 Indeed, he had already confirmed this with his Directive No 13 issued the previous day. Halder, however, was not prepared to let matters rest and seems to have persuaded von Brauchitsch to tackle Hitler again on the subject, which he did on the morning of the 25th. It proved to be a ‘painful wrangle’. Halder’s thinking was that, since the enemy’s attention had been drawn by Army Group A, giving von Bock the bulk of the armour would enable him to cut into the enemy’s rear and ‘deliver the decisive blow’, while von Rundstedt kept him occupied with ‘heavy frontal attacks. It now seemed that political considerations dictated that the final battle be fought in northern France, rather than Flanders. Although Halder did not specify what these were, it appears that Hitler viewed the Flemish as being close to the Germans in their racial characteristics and hoped that they would be willing to become part of the Greater Reich after the end of the hostilities. Having already violated their neutrality, he had no wish to antagonise them further by inflicting added damage on their country. In Halder’s view, Hitler had camouflaged this political argument by asserting that Flanders, because of its many water obstacles, was unsuitable for armour. As it now was, von Bock was to be the ‘hammer’ and von Rundstedt the ‘anvil’. But, with Army Group A being held strictly on the defensive, the enemy could turn his attention once more to dealing with von Bock, whose ‘progress will be slow and casualties high’. Furthermore, the Luftwaffe, ‘on which all hopes are pinned’ was dependent on the weather.67 Von Brauchitsch, according to Jodl, asked Hitler for permission for the armour ‘to push forward from the high terrain Vimy – St Omer – Gravelines toward the West [sic – East] into the level terrain. Fuehrer is against it, but leaves decision to Army Group A.’68 It now seems that Halder took this as a ‘green light’. He told Army Group A that the advanc
e could be resumed once more. Von Rundstedt acknowledged this, but, as Blumentritt noted in the War Diary, instructed that this must not be passed to von Kluge because he wanted to get the motorised infantry divisions up with the armour.69 This may well seem to reflect von Rundstedt’s caution once more, but bearing in mind the terrain and the likely enemy resistance, it made sound tactical sense for the Panzer divisions to have additional infantry available to assist them. Indeed, this is supported by von Sodenstern, who said that his commander, remembering his time in Flanders in 1914, which presumably meant his tour with the military government of Antwerp, was worried about committing tanks on their own across the Canal.70 On the other hand, the last entry in the Army Group War Diary on that date states: ‘The task of the army group can be considered, in the main, to be completed.’71 Thus, probably in view of Hitler’s comments to him, von Rundstedt was now turning his attention to Case Red and saw no reason to incur seemingly unnecessary casualties, with the Luftwaffe so confident of being able to complete the work in the north. Even so, von Kluge did get to hear of the order and his exclusion from it and, according to General Brennecke, his Chief of Staff, they lodged a protest with Hitler via Engel.72 This certainly represented a change of heart from the von Kluge of 48 hours before and indicates, probably as a result of pressure from the Panzer commanders, that his armour was ready to drive forward once more.