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The Last Prussian

Page 20

by Messenger, Charles;


  On 22 June itself, von Reichenau’s artillery opened with a short, sharp, but accurate bombardment of Soviet strongpoints. Sixth and Seventeenth Armies got across the River Bug, although von Stülpnagel’s men did have some problems. But then it became a question of working their way through the lines of incomplete Russian defences. Von Kleist’s tanks managed to identify the boundary between the two northern Soviet armies, Fifth and Sixth, and made this their Schwerpunkt. Hopes that they would quickly break out and head for Kiev were, however, to be quickly dashed. Kirponos, apart from quickly deploying his rifle divisions, also began to move his armour forward, which consisted of six mechanised corps. They were, however, short of fuel and ammunition, lacked artillery, and the adverse air situation meant that it was impossible to provide them with the necessary air cover. Nevertheless, he deployed the nearest as early as the second day of BARBAROSSA. It had problems with the boggy ground and poor roads and only part of one division actually made contact with First Panzer Group. During the next few days, however, the remaining mechanised corps were committed and the result was four days’ worth of concentrated tank battles in the area of Lvov. It was during these the Germans came up against the new Soviet tanks, the KV-1 and the T-34, for the first time and their 37 mm anti-tank guns proved powerless against them.

  On 25 June, Halder commented in his diary: ‘The stubborn resistance of individual Russian units is remarkable.’1 Von Rundstedt, too, in his first line to Bila since the opening of the offensive, wrote: ‘The Russians are fighting very stubbornly; things will not be as easy as we hoped and as they used to be.’2 Slowly, von Kleist struggled forward, forcing the Soviet Fifth Army northwards into the Pripet marshes and the Sixth south-eastwards. This pressure was sufficient to prevent the divisions facing the Hungarian border from interfering with the southern flank of the German thrust since they, too, were forced to withdraw. Radio deception had also helped by posing the threat of an attack across the Hungarian border. By 30 June, von Kleist had secured Lvov, but still Kirponos kept throwing in armour. The net result of all this was that Army Group South was now falling well behind schedule. This was in contrast to the other two army groups. Von Bock’s spearheads had created a sizeable pocket around Bialystok, which yielded 290,000 prisoners, together with 2,500 tanks and 1,500 guns, when it was eventually reduced on 3 July, and had raced on to the Beresina. Likewise, Army Group North overran Latvia by 2 July. On the same day, von Rundstedt’s troops had made enough progress for him to move his headquarters from Tarnow, 50 miles east of Cracow, to Zamosch, the same distance south-east of Lublin. It was not, however, a move that filled him with much enthusiasm. He called Zamosch ‘a dirty Jewish hole’, perhaps remembering it from over twenty years before.3

  Because of the delays, von Schobert’s Eleventh Army and the Rumanians did not begin their attack until 1 July. It fell on the junction between the Soviet Ninth and Eighteenth Armies. Bridgeheads were quickly secured over the River Prut. Tyulenev, commanding the South Front, had three mechanised corps and ordered them to destroy these bridgeheads, but to no avail. By the end of the first week, von Schobert had a bridgehead across the Dniester, but Tyulenev was able to do little about it since he was ordered to pass troops across to Kirponos, who in turn had lost two armies to the Western Front north of the Pripet marshes. Nevertheless, the Stavka, the Soviet High Command in Moscow, was still urging Kirponos to deal a decisive counter-blow. To this end, Zhukov was sent to encourage him and the veteran cavalryman Semyon Budenny, who had been appointed to take charge of both the South-West and South Fronts. By this time, von Kleist had captured Berdichev and was advancing towards Kiev. On the 9th, however, the weather broke – ‘terrific thunderstorms, the like of which I have seldom seen’, as von Rundstedt wrote. ‘The poor troops suffer from the bottomless roads on this black Ukrainian soil which the frequent storms turn to mud.’4 On the 10th, von Brauchitsch visited von Rundstedt, who was now established at Brody, another ‘hole … incredibly neglected and dirty’5 and 100 miles south-east of Zamosch. The reason for this was Hitler’s first intervention over the conduct of Army Group South’s operations. He now considered that Kiev was no longer a feasible objective for von Rundstedt’s armour, the reason being, it would seem, that the population of the city was 35 per cent Jewish and not worth sacrificing tanks for.6 Von Rundstedt’s intention was for von Kleist’s northern group to seize Kiev, while the remainder headed for Belaya Tserkov to the south and then south-east. Hitler, however, wanted the whole of First Panzer Group to make Vinnitsa its objective, a much shallower hook, in order to link up with von Schobert. Halder reckoned that this lacked potential, while the deeper thrust that OKH and von Rundstedt envisaged could trap South-West Front in entirety.7 Von Rundstedt’s view, which he discussed with von Brauchitsch, was that the only way to overtake and trap an enemy in a pursuit operation was to strike far ahead of him and that, in any event, the South-West Front seemed to be retreating on Kiev. Even if this proved not to be so, von Kleist could still swing southeast or south-west of the Dnieper or cross it at Kiev and then advance further eastwards. Von Rundstedt persuaded von Brauchitsch to stick to the original plan and Hitler subsequently agreed to this. He wrote to Bila, ‘we settled an important point by telegram with “him” [Hitler]’.8 In fact, it was Halder who had to make the approach to OKW. ‘ObdH [von Brauchitsch] will make no decision that would not have the Fuehrer’s approval. It is now up to me to get the Fuehrer to agree.’ It was 2330 hours by this time, but Halder was unable to speak to him because, unlike Hitler’s normal schedule, he had gone to bed. He managed, however, to speak to Keitel, who obtained Hitler’s agreement within the hour.9

  MAP 7. Russia, 1941.

  On that same day, 10 July, Potapov’s Fifth Russian Army, supported by elements of three mechanised corps, issued out of the Pripet marshes once more. It struck the rear of von Kleist’s panzer group and cut his main supply route. Von Reichenau had to be called in to clear up the mess. Von Rundstedt described the fighting as hard and noted that ‘the Russians are attacking everywhere with tanks as though they are crazy.’10 Potapov was eventually driven back, but from then on von Reichenau was forced to deploy more strength to guard von Kleist’s left flank than to give him direct support. On the 16th, von Kleist’s tanks reached Belaya Tserkov, south-west of Kiev. Eleventh Army was making good progress to the south and the prospects of finally creating a sizeable pocket began to look good. The weather, however, continued bad and, as von Rundstedt wrote to Bila, ‘our movements slow in the mud. The Russians, who are withdrawing can cope better with it. Slowly one turns into a pig.’11 Things had reached such a stage that when Halder visited HQ Army Group South, now housed in a Russian military school at Stara Konstantinov, on 20 July, he noted that 11th Panzer Division had been forced to leave all its wheeled transport in the rear, because of the state of the roads, and was advancing with just tracked vehicles and peasant carts. Indeed, by now half von Rundstedt’s motor transport was out of action and there was a serious ammunition shortage. The situation was also aggravated by the fact that the allied contingents had very little motor transport of their own and leant heavily on the Germans for it. Von Rundstedt himself recalled just after the war:

  ‘Transport difficulties were the most serious, even in the summer, or at any rate where I was, owing to the mud. I remember one thing, how a “Panzerdivision” covered 7 km in 12 hours one day. If it begins raining, then that’s the end, you simply can[not] get out.’

  Another problem:

  ‘The maps we got were wrong. There was not one road marked nice and red and thick on the map. There were railways on the map which simply didn’t exist. Then the map showed: “There is nothing here”, and you were suddenly confronted with an American type town, with factory buildings and all the rest of it.’12

  Worse, only 11th and 16th Panzer Divisions were forward, the main body being tied up in repulsing attacks in its flank by the Russian Twenty-Sixth Army south of Kiev. Von Kleist’s objective was Kirovograd, near
the Dnieper, so that he could place himself between the river and the Russian armies withdrawing in front of Eleventh Army. He was already behind schedule and Halder was doubtful if he would arrive in time to catch the bulk of the Russian forces. He was also gloomy about von Reichenau’s progress. Having continued to battle with the Russian Fifth Army he was now driving it back north of Kiev towards the Dnieper with the intention of then swinging south and taking the city from the east. This was no good in the eyes of Halder, who was visiting Headquarters Army Group South at the time. Von Reichenau, he said, was to push the Russians away from the Dnieper, and von Kleist must do the same with Twenty-Sixth Army. His spearhead must also be quickly built up so that he could get to Kirovograd in time. With this he departed.13 Von Rundstedt was clearly somewhat irritated by his visit. He wrote to Bila that evening: ‘Today Halder was here with far-reaching plans, but one does not dare to think beyond the next’. Nevertheless, Halder’s advice was hearkened. Two days later, von Reichenau was beginning to steer Potapov away from the Dnieper, but von Kleist was still under pressure. Even so, on 2 August von Kleist took Pervomaysk and some twenty Russian divisions were cut off in a pocket based on Uman, a thunderstorm the day before notwithstanding.

  By this time, von Rundstedt had moved his headquarters from Stara-Konstantinov to Berdichev, seventy miles to the east and south of Zhitomir. The journey there was ‘long and troublesome’ and the Field Marshal’s humour was not helped by what he found on his arrival. ‘B is a fantastically dirty hole.’ In spite of this the Red Army battle school which had been earmarked for his headquarters was ‘still bearable’.14 Berdichev, during this last week in July 1941, however, created its own small part in the history of the Holocaust. A weekly report by an SS Einsatzgruppe operating in Army Group South’s area and dated 30 July noted that 148 Jews had been killed in Berdichev, as well as others at Vinnitsa, Smolensk and Proskurov.15 This was corroborated by a diary entry made by the diplomat Walther Hewel, who accompanied Hitler on his visit to von Rundstedt’s headquarters at Berdichev on 6 August: ‘Ruined monastery church. Opened coffins, execution [Author’s italics], ghastly town. Many Jews, ancient cottages, fertile soil. Very hot.’16 Von Rundstedt would later testify before the IMT Commission in 1946 that he had been aware of just one atrocity committed by the Einsatzgruppen in his area of operations (see page 248) and was probably referring to this incident.

  This raises the question of how much knowledge of and control over the SS Einsatzgruppen in his area of responsibility von Rundstedt had. As in Poland, it soon became clear that their priority was the eradication of the Jews, but with the additional specific responsibility of identifying and executing the commissars. That the Army had no direct control over them is clear. They were answerable to Heydrich in his capacity as Head of the Reich Security Head Office (RSHA). Indeed, the Army did not even have disciplinary powers over Waffen-SS units operating under its command. That von Rundstedt and his fellow senior commanders had little or no knowledge of their activities is more difficult to justify. Many soldiers witnessed Jewish massacres and some even became directly involved. This was widespread enough for Army Group South to issue a general order on 10 August drawing attention to the fact that soldiers were participating in executions in such an ‘undesirable manner’ that ‘drastic measures’ had to be taken. Abwehr officers attached to the armies were to confiscate all photographs taken during ‘Jewish operations’.17 Von Rundstedt told the IMT Commission that he actually prohibited soldiers from watching these hideous events.18 Certainly, on 24 September 1941, he issued an order forbidding soldiers from actively participating or taking photographs, but this was not quite the same.19 He also told the IMT Commission that these atrocities only took place in the rear areas, which had been handed over to Alfred Rosenberg’s civil administration.20 This, however, is difficult to reconcile with the Berdichev killings, since it is most unlikely that the site of von Rundstedt’s own headquarters would have been under civil administration. Indeed, it was not until 1 September that the Ukraine west of the River Sluch, which runs through Tarnopol and is well to the west of Berdichev, was handed over to the Reichs-komissar Ukraine.21 There is also much primary evidence in the form of orders and reports that troops apprehending Jews and other suspicious or undesirable elements should hand them over to the Einsatzgruppen.22

  The justification for detaining members of the local population was often on the grounds of suspected partisan activity. During the early months of the war in the East, partisan activity was uncoordinated and relatively ineffectual. Nevertheless, there were attacks, usually on communications targets like railways and bridges. In Army Group South’s area these were especially on the fringes of the Pripet marshes and the Carpathian foothills. Many of the partisans were Russian soldiers who had been cut off from their units during the advance. Army Group South set up a number of security units, often made up of Ukrainian nationalists, in early August, but they were too few for the expanse of captured territory. During July, in order to try and bring some sense to the growing confusion over who constituted a partisan and who a genuine Red Army straggler, OKH issued a series of directives. In essence they stated that soldiers in uniform, with or without arms, were to be considered as prisoners-of-war and treated as such, as were those in civilian clothes who appeared the right age to be conscripts, whether bearing arms or not. Civilians, whether in part uniform or wholly civilian clothes and bearing arms, were to be considered guerrillas, as were those who aided them. Furthermore, those who gave themselves up by a certain date would be assured POW status. Thus Army Group South ordered all stragglers to give themselves up by 18 August or be considered as partisans.23

  OKW, however, took a very different view of the whole problem of rear area security. A supplement to Hitler’s Directive No 33 dated 23 July 1941 laid down:

  ‘The troops available for securing the conquered eastern areas will, considering the vast expanse of these stretches, suffice only if the occupying power meets all resistance, not by legally punishing the guilty, but rather by spreading that type of terror which is the only means of taking from the population any desire for opposition.

  The respective commanders are to be held responsible, together with the troops at their disposal, for quiet in their areas. The commanders must find the means to keep their districts in order by employing suitably draconian measures, not by requesting more security forces.’

  A further OKW order, dated 16 September, also decreed that for every German soldier murdered behind the front line ‘the death penalty for 50–100 Communists should generally be regarded in these cases as suitable atonement’.24 Thus, while OKH tried to observe the Geneva Convention and Hague Rules of Land Warfare, Hitler and OKW would have none of it, arguing that they did not apply since the Soviet Union no longer existed as a state in German eyes. OKW had its way, and this is reflected in an order issued by von Reichenau on 10 October 1941:

  ‘The primary aim of the campaign against the Jewish Bolshevik system is the complete annihilation of the means of power and the eradication of the Asiatic influence on European culture.

  This situation brings forth tasks also for the troops which go beyond the traditional one-sided soldierdom. In the Eastern Territories the soldier is not only a fighter in accordance with the rules of warfare. He also is the bearer of a merciless national ideology and the avenger of all bestial acts inflicted on German related peoples.

  That is why the soldier must fully understand the necessity for hard but just retaliation against Jewish sub-humanity. It has the additional aim to choke off incipient revolts in the rear of the Armed Forces which on the basis of experience are always instigated by Jews.’

  He went on to criticise slackness in security matters and said that is was ‘mistaken human kindness’ to make gifts of food and cigarettes to the local population. Those members of the indigenous population not actively pro-German must be regarded as pro-Bolshevik. Finally,

  ‘The soldier must accomplish two things far removed
from all political considerations:

  1.) Complete annihilation of Bolshevik false teachings, of the Soviet State and of its Armed Forces.

  2.) The pitiless eradication of alien treachery and cruelty thus securing the life of the German Armed Forces in Russia.’

  Von Rundstedt was clearly impressed by this. Two days later he circulated the order to other formations under his command. The covering letter, personally signed by him, commented:

  ‘… I thoroughly concur with its contents. I suggest for your consideration the issue of analogous orders unless this has not been done already. Considering the impending winter season and the weak forces in the rear areas, the frequently encountered carelessness and softness after the actual fighting should not be tolerated.’25

  Thus, he appears to have been quite happy to use the partisan threat as an excuse for persecuting the Jews, providing that the dirty work was largely left to the SS Einsatzgruppen.

  Hitler, however, did not come to Berdichev at the beginning of August to admire the handiwork of the Einsatzgruppen. His reasons were diplomatic and military. In the former case, he wanted to thank Antonescu personally for the active support that his country had already given to BARBAROSSA and to decorate him with the Knight’s Cross. That the support was so, was in no small measure due to the personal relationship between Antonescu and von Rundstedt. As the Field Marshal wrote to Bila: ‘For political reasons Anton [sic] appears as an independent commander although I am responsible for operations and he very nicely agrees to everything.’26 It was the same with the other allied formations under von Rundstedt’s command, especially the Hungarians, who frequently brought gifts to von Rundstedt’s headquarters.27 Nevertheless, having this polygot collection under command was not easy:

 

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