The Last Prussian

by Messenger, Charles;

  ‘The Rumanian divisions were not bad then, although they were afterwards. The mountain divisions in particular were good and the cavalry brigades. But the leadership was beyond description. The officers and NCOs …!

  I had Hungarians too. I had an absolute League of Nations “Armee”. I had Rumanians, Italians, Hungarians, Slovaks, Croats, Germans. All that was lacking was the [Spanish] “Blue Division” and the French, otherwise I had everything. I had Finns, too. With the Hungarians it was like this; they were represented by a motorised corps. They were good actually, but only wanted to get home again quickly and had no proper enthusiasm, even before the winter began. The Slovaks were very good, first-rate, very unassuming, always there. They only formed one “Division” [actually two divisions and a motorised brigade]. The Croats were a band of robbers, there was only one “Regiment”; they were brave fellows, but undisciplined in the extreme. As for the Italians – let’s keep silence; terrible people!’28

  By the time that Hitler arrived at Berdichev, the Russian resistance in the Uman pocket was almost at an end. When it finally ceased on 8 August, the pocket yielded 103,000 prisoners, 300 tanks and 800 guns. Apart from congratulating von Rundstedt on his success, Hitler wanted to impress his future strategy on him. During the previous weeks, in spite of the spectacular progress made by Army Group Centre, he remained set against the idea of Moscow as the primary objective, despite continued urgings by Halder and others. His eyes were firmly fixed on Leningrad in the north, the overrunning of the Crimea, which he viewed as an aircraft carrier posting a direct threat to the Ploesti oilfields, and the Caucasus. In other words, his objectives were now firmly economic rather than military. Halder was visiting Army Group Centre that day and sent Paulus to represent him at Berdichev. Von Rundstedt raised the question of Moscow (Halder claimed that it was at his prompting), but Hitler, as Paulus reported to Halder, dismissed it out of hand. Instead, Army Group Centre was to lose its two Panzer groups, Hoth to the Leningrad operation and Guderian to assist von Rundstedt in overrunning the remainder of the Ukraine. Hitler then departed, having spent four hours at Berdichev. ‘Everything went very harmoniously’ and Hitler told him that he would be bringing Mussolini to visit him in ten days time, von Rundstedt wrote to Bila.29 His letters during subsequent days do, however, indicate a growing gloom over the situation, especially Hitler’s grandiose plans for Army Group South. ‘I have a horror of winter in this country. Who knows where we will be sitting then’ (10 August). ‘Two years ago, my staff assembled in Neuhammer. How much longer? I have no great hopes that it will be over soon. The vastness of Russia devours us. …’ (12 August). The poor troops, for eight weeks almost daily fighting, and what kind of fighting’ (16 August). The problem was that he was being given too many divergent tasks. Besides destroying the Russian armies in his area, overrunning the Caucasus and capturing the Crimea, Hitler had also got a bee in his bonnet about Odessa, which the Russians were determined to defend to the last.

  On 27 August Hitler, accompanied by Mussolini, duly made his second visit to von Rundstedt, now at Uman. The purpose was to inspect Messe’s corps. Mussolini was not pleased. He later complained to Dino Alfieri, his Press minister, that he was left talking to ‘that old Rundstedt’ while Hitler harangued the troops.30 Bila later sent her husband press clippings of the visit and he remarked: ‘Musso looks terribly stupid.’31 The two men clearly had little regard for one another. In the meantime, the fighting continued without relaxation in its intensity. The Rumanians had been given the task of taking Odessa and put it under siege on 17 August, while the German Eleventh Army pressed on to the Crimea. Guderian had received his orders to drive south and link up with von Kleist east of the Dnieper and Kiev, but was not enthused by the prospect of being diverted from Moscow and doubted whether he would get back in time to continue the drive to the capital before winter set in. Von Brauchitsch and Halder, who had been lambasted by Hitler for objecting to his fixation over the importance of the flanks, seized on Guderian as their last card to persuade Hitler that Moscow must be taken above all else. Guderian flew to Rastenburg to see Hitler on 23 August, an interview arranged by Halder. He got nowhere, Hitler apparently commenting crushingly: ‘My generals know nothing about the economic aspects of war.’32 Guderian returned to an expectant OKH, but dashed Halder’s hopes by now stating that he was willing to drive south. This made Halder very bitter.33 While this had been going on, von Reichenau and von Kleist were battling for crossings over the Dnieper north and south of Kiev in the face of continued furious counter-attacks by the Russians.

  The weather, however, continued to be a dominant factor. By 4 September, von Rundstedt was writing to Bila: ‘Today a cold mean autumn day with rain … things are not going fast enough, and patience is not one of my virtues.’ Worse, the Field Post was suffering and ‘even the couriers are not operating regularly’.34 This was of special significance since the Field Marshal tried to write to Bila daily, usually a postcard affixed with a six pfennig stamp, supplies of which Bila used to send him from time to time. He would use air couriers going back to Germany to post them once they arrived, thus beating the normal Field Post system. Bila, on the other hand, had to rely on the latter, but knowing that she was frequently receiving his news gave him much strength. Von Rundstedt, like Montgomery, was not one to involve himself in the minutiae of staff work, but operated entirely through his chief of staff. It was the ‘big picture’ that concerned him. He also took pains to relax whenever he could. His daily walk, unarmed and usually accompanied just by von Salviati,35 was very important to him, as it had been from the beginning of the war. He continued to read crime novels and enjoyed crosswords, with which Bila kept him supplied. He also liked a drink and, as we shall see, became increasingly dependent on alcohol as the war went on.

  On 5 September, Hitler had yet another change of heart. Moscow was to be the primary objective after all. Even though von Leeb had not yet reached Leningrad, he was to hand the bulk of his armour over to von Bock by the end of the month. Likewise, von Rundstedt was to return Guderian’s Panzer group. First, though, the great pocket east of Kiev must be sealed. Guderian, followed by von Weichs’ Second Army, made good progress, brushing off a counter-attack by the Bryansk Front. Von Kleist was turning north to meet Guderian and by 9 September von Stülpnagel’s Seventeenth Army was across the Dnieper. Budenny, and Nikita Krushchev, his political commissar, now realised the danger that faced them. On the 11th they asked Stalin for permission to withdraw from the Kiev bend, but Stalin was adamant and the result was that two days later Budenny was replaced by Timoshenko. Not until 17 September did Stalin relent, but by then it was too late. Twenty-four hours earlier, the two Panzer groups had linked up at Lokhvitsa. They had created a pocket with a diameter of some 130 miles. During the next ten days it was reduced by Second and Sixth Armies and yielded 450,000 prisoners, representing four Soviet armies and parts of two others. Kirponos himself was trapped in the pocket, but did not get out alive. Kiev fell on the 19th and an SS Einsatzgruppe was soon busy. During 27–28 September over 33,000 Jews were taken to Babi Yar, a ravine just outside the city, and murdered. On this, as on many other occasions, Ukrainian nationalists assisted the SS. What von Rundstedt knew of this at the time or afterwards is not clear. Certainly, in 1946, even when confronted by a number of affadavits to the contrary, he was to tell the IMT Commission that the Einsatzgruppen were answerable only to Himmler and was emphatic on his lack of knowledge of Jewish atrocities, apart from what was probably the Berdichev incident.36 As far as the fighting was concerned, von Rundstedt was writing to Bila on the 12th that the operation ‘could become a really big thing’. On 22 September he was estimating a bag of 300,000 prisoners, and was pleased with the amount of fresh food which his headquarters had, although ‘unfortunately our wine stocks get scarce’. On the 30th, writing from Alexandria, another ‘pigs quarters’, the weather had made him gloomy once more: ‘Weather cloudy and cold. The central heating can’t cope…. Furthermore one has
many different worries about how it is supposed to continue. … We all have a horror of the winter.’37

  Part of his gloom was probably because of the Rumanians, who were making heavy weather of the capture of Odessa, which would not finally fall until 16 October. He was, too, very likely saddened by death of the commander of the Eleventh Army, von Schobert, killed when his aircraft landed on a minefield. His place, however, was taken by von Manstein, who was now proceeding to seize the Crimea. At bottom, though, was the concern over Hitler’s increasing demands to drive his increasingly fatigued troops further and further east. Replacements were not keeping pace with casualties, which were mounting, although more through sickness brought about by the endless daily marches of 25 miles or more in the driving autumn rains. Worse, von Rundstedt was forced to give up no less than nine divisions, including two Panzer and two motorised, for the drive on Moscow, Operation TYPHOON. The further east the war took him, the more von Rundstedt pined for his wife. He was also worried over her safety because of the raids by British bombers. Indeed, Kassel was attacked for the first time on the night 8/9 September, although it would not suffer another major raid for almost a year. Thus, on 2 October he wrote to her: ‘How might you be my most beloved one? How is your sleep when there is no alarm? My longing for you gets greater and greater.’ Next day: ‘I am worried and almost melting through longing for you.’38 He did, however, now have one consolation. From time to time he was able to have long distance telephone conversations with her.39

  In the meantime, having tidied up the Dnieper, von Rundstedt’s armies were pushing on. Von Kleist, his command now entitled First Panzer Army, was driving south-east towards Maruipol on the northern shore of the Sea of Azov. Von Reichenau was advancing east on Kharkov, while between them von Stülpnagel was aiming for the River Donets south of Kharkov. Von Manstein was clearing the Crimea and securing Melitopol, also on the Sea of Azov. Odessa, too, was finally about to fall. The fact, too, that all eyes were now concentrated on TYPHOON, which had been launched on 30 September, and was developing well, with large pockets being formed around Vyazma and Bryansk, also kept OKH and OKW off von Rundstedt’s back. Even so, the weather continued to frustrate him. By mid-October his headquarters had moved to Poltava, east of the Dnieper, and he was already considering this as a suitable spot to remain during the winter.40 Indeed, he was becoming ever more concerned about the onset of winter and that his troops were becoming increasingly exhausted. The situation was aggravated by the autumn rains, which arrived in the northern part of von Rundstedt’s area of operations on 11 October. Sixth and Seventeenth Armies were quickly brought to a halt. Three days later von Kleist, who, in conjunction with Eleventh Army, had trapped two Soviet armies with their backs to the Sea of Azov at the beginning of the month and was now approaching Taganrog, suffered the same experience. As von Rundstedt wrote ruefully to Bila, ‘the weather frustrates all plans’.41 The supply system was also beginning to come apart again. The railway bridges across the Dnieper had been blown by the retreating Russians and consequently the railheads could not be advanced east of the river. Less than half the motor transport was functioning and the forward troops were forced increasingly to live off the land. Even more frustrating was the fact that the Russians decided to cut their losses by falling back to a shorter front in order to be able to create a reserve. This left the Donets Basin, with its rich coal, iron and steel industries, for the taking. Such was the effect of the weather and the lack of supplies that von Kleist was unable to secure the area before the Russians had largely dismantled the industrial equipment and evacuated it behind the Urals. He did, however, take Taganrog on the 17th, while Kharkov fell to von Reichenau on the 24th. After that, von Rundstedt’s armies could go no further. Hitler, however, remained determined that the advance was to continue once the frosts had arrived to harden up the ground. This was not greeted with much enthusiasm. Halder commented in his diary on 3 November that ‘… the difficulties of supply and movement have so reduced the fighting spirit that even Hq. AGp. South has caught that pessimism. Some energetic “persuading” would be in order to kick them’.42 Perhaps he was referring to von Rundstedt himself. For, on the same day he had proposed to von Brauchitsch, who was visiting him, that a halt be called and the offensive continued in the spring, citing the increasing supply problems. Von Brauchitsch answered that these were well understood, but it was vital that Voronezh, Stalingrad and Maikop, just north of the Caucasus Mountains, be reached. These objectives represented a distance of up to 300 miles from Army Group South’s present positions and von Rundstedt later recalled ‘we laughed aloud when we heard that’.43 The situation was not helped by von Rundstedt suffering a heart attack at the same time while in the street at Poltava. It was presumably not serious, though, since he remained at duty, but nevertheless a warning that he needed to take more care of himself. 44 A few days later von Brauchitsch, too, had a heart attack.

  On 13 November, winter arrived in the Ukraine. The temperature dropped to –20 degrees celsius and the ground hardened overnight. This brought home even more forcibly the problems facing the supply system. The fact was that hardly any winter clothing had been issued to the troops. According to von Rundstedt, ‘it is not entirely true that preparations for a winter campaign were not made. The famous winter clothing was there, but it didn’t arrive, owing to rail difficulties and road transport.’ What angered him was the campaign then launched by Goebbels among the German people at home for collecting winter clothing to send to the troops, which von Rundstedt called ‘revolting propaganda’ on the grounds that it gave the impression that the Army had done nothing about it.45 Be that as it may, on 17 November, amid driving snow, von Kleist launched a thrust on Rostov-on-Don, gateway to the Caucasus. It was spearheaded by von Mackensen’s III Corps, which comprised Sepp Dietrich’s SS Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, now a motorised division, and 13th and 14th Panzer Divisions. Three days later, the Leibstandarte and supporting tanks broke into the city, securing it by the end of the 21st. III Corps captured 10,000 men, guns, tanks and even two armoured trains. The Russians, though, had not only fought fiercely around Rostov, but now launched a major counter-stroke. The South Front collected 31 divisions and five tank brigades and struck First Panzer Army in its now long and exposed flank. Seventeenth Army to the north could do little to relieve the pressure and von Kleist, fearful of being cut off, issued orders for a withdrawal to the River Mius. At that moment the Russians paused and von Kleist countermanded his order, but on the 25th the attacks resumed, not just on the flank, but also against Rostov. The situation grew desperate and on the 28th von Rundstedt ordered von Kleist to fall back behind the Mius. The Leibstandarte, its men suffering from frostbite, including Dietrich himself, withdrew from Rostov.

  It was not until 30 November that the seriousness of the situation was fully realised at OKH and OKW. At 1300 hours von Brauchitsch was summoned by Hitler and treated to a tirade of abuse for having not countermanded von Rundstedt’s order. He seems to have made no effort to defend himself and then, on Hitler’s command, issued an order to von Rundstedt for von Kleist to withdraw to an intermediary line still east of the Mius. Halder’s comment was: ‘These people have no conception of the condition of our troops, and keep grinding out ideas in a vacuum.’46 When von Rundstedt received the OKH order he asked that it be cancelled and, in von Sodenstern’s words, went further:

  ‘… Rundstedt with his own hand entered in the daily report … a sentence to the following effect: “Should confidence in my leadership no longer exist, I beg to request someone be substituted who enjoys the necessary confidence of the Supreme Command.”… When in my anxiety I suggested that, with the existing tension, it was possible that Hitler might agree to the request, the Field-Marshal still held to his decision that the passage he had inserted must stand.’47

  When this report was shown to von Brauchitsch he appears not to have bothered to discuss it with von Rundstedt, but merely passed it up to Hitler as it stood. At 0400 hours the f
ollowing morning OKH received three signals from Hitler. One was to von Rundstedt, relieving him of his command; the second to von Reichenau, appointing him in the Field Marshal’s place and ordering him to halt von Kleist’s withdrawal, while Seventeenth Army was to mount an attack towards Voroshilovgrad in order to help relieve the pressure on First Panzer Army. The third ordered tank reinforcements to be delivered to von Kleist. At 1100 hours that same morning, 1 December, Halder was having a telephone conversation with von Sodenstern when von Reichenau cut in to confirm that he was implementing Hitler’s order in spite of von Kleist’s objections that he could not hold the intermediary line. Indeed, in some places this line was no more than six miles from the Mius and von Kleist, now under considerable Russian pressure, could not understand why he was not allowed to withdraw this short additional distance to what was a clearly more defendable line. Von Sodenstern could not budge his new commander and so Halder persuaded Jodl to present the facts to Hitler. Ninety minutes later, at 1530 hours, von Reichenau telephoned Halder to say that enemy forces had broken through the Leibstandarte’s positions on the intermediate line and asked for Hitler’s agreement to a withdrawal behind the Mius that night. This was forthcoming, but Halder commented: ‘Now we are where we could have been last night, it was a senseless waste of time, and to top it, we lost von Rundstedt also.’48