The Last Prussian

by Messenger, Charles;

  ‘The War Office knew when these generals were captured that they were already on the list of war criminals and I think that, immediately after the judgement of the Nuremberg Tribunal in October 1946, when they were put on enquiry, they should have taken steps to ascertain what evidence was available at Nuremberg.’81

  Shawcross clearly felt that the War Office was still dragging its feet when, on 6 October, he wrote to Shinwell stressing the need for speed in preparing for the trial.82 Nine days later Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick was complaining to Bevin that ‘no one at the War Office comprehends the domestic political implications of the question or is resolved to get a grip of it’.83 The truth was that no professional soldier wanted to become involved with the politics of the business and considered it distasteful that high ranking officers, whom they admired professionally, should be degraded with the status of war criminals and that the responsibility for doing this should be placed on the shoulders of the British Army.

  If the British Government now hoped that the preparation for the trials could continue without further public outcry it was mistaken. On the evening of 18 October, von Brauchitsch died of a heart attack. He had been unwell now for a long time, and it is surprising that, considering both the War Office and Home Office medical boards had found him unfit to stand trial, the Government had continued to proceed with his case. Von Rundstedt, von Manstein and Strauss wanted to pay their last respects to their old comrade by marching behind his coffin, but this had to be refused. Instead, a military chaplain conducted a military burial service for them in the hospital while the funeral was taking place. This showed sensitivity on the part of the authorities which was lacking in the treatment of von Brauchitsch’s family. According to Frau von Brauchitsch, in a letter she wrote to Liddell Hart, she was taken ill at Munsterlager in early September and was moved to Hamburg at the end of the month. To begin with, her husband was not allowed to visit her and it was only after a Protestant Aid Society worker had obtained an interview with the British Regional Commissioner that the authorities relented. The Field Marshal was able to visit his wife twice, the last time on the day of his death. That afternoon, while walking in the hospital garden, von Brauchitsch began to suffer from heart pains. His wife was brought to see him at 5.30 pm, but was refused permission to bring a German doctor with her, which her husband had asked for. She was also not allowed to get their eldest son, who lived one hour’s drive away at Neumunster, to come to the hospital and was not permitted to telephone their second son, who was in the United States Zone. The Field Marshal died at 7.15pm. After the funeral, Frau von Brauchitsch asked for a vehicle to transport the urn containing her husband’s ashes to Hohenrode, an hour’s drive south of Hamburg. She recalled the kindness of the British authorities in getting her across to England the previous autumn to nurse her sick husband. ‘Therefore the greater the contrast since my husband’s return to Germany on July 16.’84 Von Brauchitsch’s death triggered off another attack in the House of Commons on the Government’s handling of the Field Marshals. Richard Stokes considered it ‘astonishing’ that the three had still had no charges preferred against them and other MPs, both Labour and Conservative, continued to complain of the delays and treatment of the three. All Michael Stewart, the Financial Secretary to the War Office, could do was to repeat the history of the affair and stress the complexities of the case.85

  Be that as it may, von Brauchitsch’s death simplified the task somewhat in that there was one less case to prepare. Even so, since each defendant was to be tried separately and the trial of von Rundstedt, which was to be the first, was estimated to be likely to last for six months to a year, the task, which was codenamed Operation MARCO, was still huge. At the end of October, the Americans completed the last of their trials, Case No 12, of Field Marshal von Leeb and other former high ranking officers, which had opened in February. Of the fourteen defendants, one, Blaskowitz, had committed suicide, two were acquitted, including Hugo Sperrle, and the remainder found guilty on one or more counts. They were sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment, von Leeb getting three years and Warlimont life. On 2 November, the Marquess of Reading moved a motion in the House of Lords that, in view of the long delays, proceedings against von Rundstedt, von Manstein and Strauss should be stopped. Replying for the Government, the Lord Chancellor produced a photostat copy of von Rundstedt’s 21 July 1942 Commando Order to demonstrate the fresh evidence that had come to light since August 1947. He also stated that it was hoped to begin the trials in March 1949. Next day, The Times carried a leader commenting both on the motion and the Case No 12 findings. The evidence produced ‘must, by its gruesome exactness and detail for ever destroy the claim that Hitler’s commanders had no responsibility’. In Germany there were signs ‘of the belief that the Army can be separated from the guilt of the Nazi system’ and the evidence ‘will need reiteration if the Germans as a whole are made to understand what it means’. In other words, The Times now clearly supported proceeding with MARCO. This brought about another attack from Liddell Hart, Gilbert Murray, Victor Gollancz, and Richard Stokes. In a joint letter to The Times, they criticised Jowitt for producing a document in an attempt to prove the case against von Rundstedt while it was still sub judice. As for the document itself, no attempt was made to prove its authenticity and, in any event, even given the ‘iniquitous record of the Gestapo’, they were ‘the official security police of the German State’. Thus, if enemy saboteurs had been dropped by parachute on Britain, would it have been a crime if ‘the British Commander-in-Chief had given an order that such parachutists had been handed over to [Police] Special Branch, MI5, or any other special body that might have been created for the security of the realm’? The authors were not attempting to prejudge the guilt of the MARCO defendants, but it was ‘indecent for conquerors to try the conquered, whatever they may have done, many years after the termination of hostilities, and after years of imprisonment without trial’.86

  Meanwhile the collation of evidence continued. Requests were made of both the Soviet Union and Poland for documentary evidence, but whereas the latter was prepared to assist, nothing was heard from the Russians. Shortly after the end of the American trials at Nuremberg, literally plane loads of photostat documents were flown to Britain, and vast quantities of relevant captured German files were located in the Pentagon, Washington DC. The only place that they could be stored was in the coal cellars of the War Office, and the job of examining and analysing them was awesome, especially given the lack of German documents experts still in service. There was, too, the question of witnesses. In order to gain evidence against von Rundstedt during his time as C-in-C West in occupied France, the former German Ambassador to Vichy France, Otto Abetz, was flown across to London from Paris, where he was awaiting trial for war crimes. He refused to testify against von Rundstedt unless the British interceded on his behalf with the French. The British refused to do this and instead, bribed with a packet of cigarettes, he was persuaded to write an account of the July 1944 Bomb Plot as experienced in Paris. This was later to provide the basis of a chapter in John Wheeler-Bennett’s best selling Nemesis of Power.87 Abetz himself was then returned to Paris, where in July 1949 he was sentenced to twenty years’ hard labour.

  More crucial to the prosecution’s case against all three MARCO defendants was seen to be the testimony of Otto Ohlendorff and six other former Einsatzgruppe members. They had been tried and sentenced to death by the Americans in Case No 9, the Einsatzgruppen Case, and were now languishing at the American war criminal camp at Landsberg in Bavaria awaiting the results of a review of their case. They had been used as witnesses in the trial against von Leeb et al and had been interrogated by the Americans on behalf of the British. Brigadier Shapcott asked the Foreign Office if an application could be made to the American authorities for a stay of execution so that they could appear as prosecution witnesses in the MARCO trials.88 Lord Henderson, the Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, and Shawcross considered this repugnant. Instead, Robe
rtson was asked to approach the Americans to see if they would allow affidavits to be taken in the presence of the three defence counsels.89 The defence counsels themselves were having a difficult time, as Dr Walter Grimm of Hamburg, who was representing von Rundstedt, indicated to a friend in Britain (probably Liddell Hart, with whom he was having a lengthy correspondence at this time over aspects of English Law):90 ‘With the exception of a small scrap of paper containing some generalising remarks, my client has up until now not been acquainted with any charges’.91 It is thus not surprising that all three defendants wanted to also be present when Ohlendorff and his confrères gave their evidence and the JAG’s department agreed that they could do so. The Americans were asked, in view of the fact that there was no suitable accommodation in Landsberg and that the daily journey from Nuremberg ‘would kill von Rundstedt, with the consequent public outcry in this country that his death was caused by British mal-administration’, whether it would be possible to bring Ohlendorff and the others to Nuremberg, but Clay rejected this. Consequently, in January the prosecution team, led by Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Draper and Otto John, and the three defence counsels, went to Landsberg without the defendants.92 While there they had the macabre experience of hearing the sounds of executions taking place in the courtyard overlooked by the room in which they were interviewing the Einsatzgruppen men. Invited by the Americans to witness one of these, they declined.

  Liddell Hart did his best to try and keep up von Rundstedt’s morale, trying to get cigarettes through to him via the International Red Cross and sending him a Christmas card and photograph of himself. In his note of thanks for the latter von Rundstedt wrote: ‘I am now 5 months here as a war criminal and always waiting for the trial. It is very hard [sic] time. …’93 Yet Liddell Hart’s efforts were being appreciated by other German generals. Heinz Guderian wrote to him:

  ‘You, dear Captain Liddell Hart, give proof that you have learned from history by your gentle help you grant to the three [sic] German field marshals, and so does Mr Churchill and the Members of Parliament who spoke in favour of their former enemies. For it seems to be essential to efface former enemies and to establish a long lasting peace …’94

  One German general, Hans von Donat, a transport expert who had served under von Rundstedt in Poland and France 1940, went even further. He wrote to the British Military Government in Hamburg asking to be confined in von Rundstedt’s place, or at least share his imprisonment and to suffer any punishment, including death, on his behalf.

  ‘My action is prompted by the fact that from many years of personal contacts with Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt I have found him to be a gentleman of the highest integrity and of sterling worth. I believe him to be one of the finest examples of manhood in Germany and I am firmly convinced that he is not guilty of any crime, because his proven qualities as a peace-loving Christian and a chivalrous soldier would make it impossible for him to violate the laws of humanity and decency.’

  He did, however, lay down conditions. Firstly, von Rundstedt was to be released as soon as von Donat’s offer was accepted and placed ‘under the protection of a foreign power’, with his family’s pension rights restored. Von Donat’s own family was not to be penalised in any way or exposed to any form of hardship. Finally, he appointed Victor Gollancz, ‘known the world over as a philanthropist and valiant supporter of the cause of peace and humanity’, to act as a trustee to ensure that these conditions were carried out. If he received no response, von Donat would approach the Americans for the release of a general (unnamed) as ‘righteous and irreproachable’ as von Rundstedt.95 Needless to say, he did not receive any answer.

  The wheels were now, however, beginning to turn a little more quickly. On 1 January 1949 von Rundstedt, von Manstein and Strauss were finally formally charged. The indictments were read out to each in turn by Otto John, their defending counsels and Draper being present. Yet, even after all this time, they were merely holding charges and the counsels were little the wiser. John recalled that von Rundstedt’s reaction was to lose his temper, bang his cane on the arm of a chair and say: ‘This trial and everything else here is only possible because of the occuping authority which lays down the law here. Such a thing would not happen in England.’96 Not until the end of January were the detailed charges made known to the defendants. Von Rundstedt faced twenty of these. The first three related to three Commando Orders issued while he was C-in-C West. Two others reflected the treatment of Russian prisoners-of-war and captured Resistance members in France. Ten covered Russia and included the Commissar Order and treatment of Russian civilians, partisans and prisoners-of-war. Two of these dwelt specifically with Einsatzgruppen activities in Army Group South’s area of operations. One charge dealt with the killing of Polish civilians in autumn 1939 and the remaining four covered the maltreatment and killing of Dutch, Belgian and French civilians, and deportations from France and the Low Countries.97 Significantly, all the charges except three closely reflected the Taylor memorandum. The exceptions were the killing of Polish civilians and the killing and maltreatment of Dutch and Belgian citizens. Since von Rundstedt’s case was the first to be tried and it was still hoped to begin this in early April, the defence had little time to prepare. Admittedly, Grimm had succeeded in bringing in the most experienced of the German war crimes defence counsels, Dr Hugo Laternser, who, it will be remembered, had appeared as the defence counsel in the General Staff trial before the International Military Tribunal, to assist him and was also trying to arrange through Liddell Hart for a British lawyer to join the defence team. Even so, the material covered by the twenty charges was ‘vast’ and most of the defence witnesses were likely to be German general’s, many of whom were not conversant with English.98

  The prosecution, even though it had a considerable lead time over the defence, was also continuing to struggle. Elwyn-Jones was dealing with the Poles and had established a good rapport with the Polish Vice-Minister of Justice, Lean Chajn, who invited him and Draper to come to Warsaw. He did, however, warn Elwyn-Jones that it would take three months to assemble all the evidence, since it was scattered all round the country. It would thus not be in British hands before the end of March. Elwyn-Jones decided to delay his visit to Warsaw until the evidence had been collected and asked if this could be done by mid-March.99 With the Russians it was a different matter. The Cold War was now at its height and repeated requests by the British Embassy in Moscow for Russian evidence brought no response. More sinister was an article by A Dymov in the Literary Gazette and entitled ‘Letters from Berlin-Hitlerites in American Uniforms’. Dymov accused the Americans of refusing to hand over von Rundstedt to the French after the end of the war, but giving him to the British instead. They, in turn, had allowed him to advertise himself through Liddell Hart and had then installed him in their zone of Germany. Here ‘the Hitlerite wolf Rundstedt continues to work on Anglo-American tasks’. Furthermore, all three MARCO defendants had been installed in villas with their families.100 A week later, on 16 February, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs handed a note to the British Embassy in Moscow demanding the extradition of von Rundstedt, von Manstein and Strauss. In support of the demand, the Russians quoted the Three Power Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 and a United Nations General Assembly resolution of 13 February 1946 that war criminals would be sent back to the scene of their crimes for trial. Should the British have evidence relating to war crimes committed by the three on British territory or that of other countries, then this would be taken into consideration during the examination of the case.101 The initial reaction of the British Government was that it was not reasonable to expect those accused of charges in several different countries to be tried by each in turn, but on reflection it was realised that this was a dangerous argument to use since half the charges against von Rundstedt applied to Soviet territory, as did nine-tenths of those against the other two defendants. Eventually, in April, it was decided that the response should be that the British were grateful for the evidence subm
itted in the Soviet demand and that the Russians be invited to send witnesses to Hamburg to give oral evidence at the trials.102

  In the meantime, Shinwell was becoming concerned once more over the health of the defendants, although the Foreign Office was inclined to think that this was merely more War Office foot dragging.103 Certainly von Rundstedt was unwell again. As early as the previous 30 August, a medical board at Munsterlager had warned that his heart was in danger of giving out. Then, at the end of October, Brigadier F.J.O’Meara, Consultant Physician BAOR, had noted that the Field Marshal’s feet and legs were swollen up to the knees and considered him unfit for trial by court-martial. This finding was reiterated by a further board at the end of December 1948. But a medical check-up by HQ BAOR at the beginning of March 1949 indicated that, although still unfit, he was improving. Both von Manstein and Strauss remained fit, although the latter did have a heart condition.104 Shinwell, however, was clearly still worried. He arranged for another medical board, composed of Army and prison service doctors. This reported that, while von Manstein continued fit, the other two were considered unfit to stand trial. The Board noted that von Rundstedt arose at 11am and remained up until 9 pm, spending his day reading and talking to Bila, who had at last managed to join him.105 On 31 March the matter was brought before the Cabinet, who agreed that von Manstein should be tried as soon as possible. With regard to von Rundstedt and Strauss there was some debate. The Cabinet itself was unwilling to take a decision since if it did decide not to go ahead with the trials of the two, the Poles and Russians might take this to mean that the British were unwilling to try them. It was therefore agreed that the Secretary of State for War should find out whether it was acceptable for the court itself to take the decision. Should the court rule in favour of medical discharge, the Cabinet agreed that neither would be handed over to another country for trial and that they would be set free. If, in this event, von Rundstedt appeared as a witness in the von Manstein trial, the evidence he gave would be viewed in the light of the grounds on which the decision not to try him was made.106 The view within the War Office, however, was that only the Cabinet could make the decision as to whether the trials of von Rundstedt and Strauss should go ahead, and there was a feeling that it was ducking the issue.107