The Last Prussian

by Messenger, Charles;

  Public concern was on the increase again. On 30 March the Evening Standard carried a piece which commented on the secrecy surrounding the trial preparations. It quoted Liddell Hart that the defendants still had not received details of the charges, which, of course, was now not so. While it had been agreed that British lawyers could assist the defence, no money was offered to them for this. Reginald Paget, himself a barrister who would eventually join von Manstein’s defence team, was quoted as asking: ‘who can be expected to spend six months or so away from his practice without any pay?’ Finally, the newspaper remarked: ‘The bungling Government are giving the Germans a poor example of how justice works in democratic countries.’ The Peace Pledge Union, although not the force that it had been in the early Thirties, also expressed concern over both the delay in bringing the three to trial and the problems which the defence was experiencing.108 Further to this, Bishop Bell of Chichester, another constant critic of the morality of some aspects of British wartime strategy, announced his intention of moving a motion in the House of Lords that all war crimes trials be halted and a general amnesty granted.

  When the Cabinet considered the matter again on 28 April, it was very conscious of the resurgence of public criticism. It also had before it another medical report from 94 BMH. This warned that, while von Rundstedt was fit to plead, he was very frail and only kept going through constant medical care.109 Matters were not made easier when Shinwell stated that a court-martial was not empowered under the Army Act to decide questions of physical fitness to stand trial and argued that the decision was one which only the Cabinet should take. The Lord Chancellor, on the other hand, disagreed. King’s Regulations did not have to be applied and the decision could rest with the Commander-in-Chief BAOR. The Cabinet, however, did consider it ‘undesirable’ that ultimate responsibility should be placed on the C-in-C. Bevin was now ‘gravely embarrassed’ at the failure to bring the three to trial and argued that the medical reports were in some respects conflicting. In the end, it was agreed that the Lord Chancellor would, with the help of the Law Officers and medical ‘assessors’, obtain evidence from doctors ‘who were in a position to express an opinion’ on the medical fitness of von Rundstedt and Strauss to stand trial. Significantly, he was asked to report by 5 May, the day that the Bishop of Chichester’s motion was to be debated in the House of Lords.110

  On 4 May, the Foreign Office replied to the Peace Pledge Union letter, making it plain that Bevin was still adamant that the trials should go ahead.111 That same day, however, the Lord Chancellor recommended that von Rundstedt and Strauss were unfit to stand trial and that the Cabinet should take the decision not to try them. Foreign Office officials prepared a brief for Bevin advising him to accept the Lord Chancellor’s recommendations and to also support the immediate release of the two. ‘Any further delay will almost certainly lead to criticism in both Houses and Lord Henderson is sure to be asked in the Lords’ debate on the 5th May what instructions have been given with regard to their disposal.’112 The following morning, the Cabinet considered the matter and agreed that the two should be released forthwith. They recognised that nothing could be done to prevent either giving evidence in defence of von Manstein, who would be indicted in the near future. Nothing would be gained by making known to the public the charges against von Rundstedt and Strauss.113 That afternoon the Bishop of Chichester duly moved his motion in the House of Lords and Lord Henderson then announced the decision to release von Rundstedt and Strauss. He also stated that all further cases of crimes against humanity were to be tried by German courts under the German penal code, with the exception, of course, of von Manstein, and no further crimes-against-peace trials would be carried out by the Allied Control Commission. In exceptional circumstances, where prima facie evidence of murder existed, extradition to the country where the crimes were committed would be allowed, but otherwise not.114

  Thus, after four years in captivity, the last eight months as a war criminal, von Rundstedt was to finally be released. His ordeal, however, was by no means over.

  15

  The Twilight Years

  THE DECISION to release von Rundstedt and Strauss may have been made, but this did not mean that they were immediately freed. As the West German newspaper Die Welt noted, they remained at No 94 British Military Hospital, seemingly still under arrest.1 This was not the intention of the British authorities, but, as much as anything, because the Government’s rapid decision had taken them by surprise. There were, however, two other immediate problems. Firstly, both von Rundstedt and Strauss were still unwell and not fit enough to be discharged from hospital and also, especially in von Rundstedt’s case, there was the question of where they were going to live. Dr Grimm visited von Rundstedt at 94 BMH on 17 May:

  ‘…for the first time [I] met Fieldmarshal von Rundstedt walking in the garden without the customary watch [guard]. He had had a visit from a British Colonel who officially informed him of his release. I expect in a short time he will leave the hospital as a free man … I find Fieldmarshal von Rundstedt rather dejected … He is much worried, of course, about the fate of Fieldmarshal von Manstein. Furthermore, Generaloberst Strauss had a severe heart attack and is confined to his bed for at least four weeks and not allowed to see any visitors. And Fieldmarshal von Rundstedt has troubles of his own. His old home in Cassel has been seized and is inhabited by others. Besides there are several reaons why we wish to let him remain in the British Zone for the present time.’2

  Nevertheless, Strauss was released into Barmbeck civilian hospital in Hamburg on 19 May and formally released four days later. He wished to settle in Lübeck and had no intention of leaving the British zone. Von Rundstedt was informed on 20 May that he could remain at 94 BMH until the 26th. His plans were more complicated. He wanted to stay temporarily with his brother Udo at Ratzeburg, 20 kilometres south of Lübeck, and then return with Bila to Solz. On 26 May, he and Bila were taken by British military transport to Udo’s house. There was much German press attention over the next couple of days, with a number of photographs of the three of them taking a walk being published. The Field Marshal’s health, however, was still giving cause for concern and on the 30th the German Red Cross took him to the Nordstadt Hospital in Hannover.3 A small consolation was that Ditha, who had eventually managed to obtain a flat in Hannover, was able to make frequent visits. But the Field Marshal’s wish to move eventually to Solz was now to be frustrated and he was also to find himself severely restricted by the conditions of his release.

  The cause of these new problems was denazification. In order to eradicate Nazism and militarism in Germany forever, the Allies published Control Council Directive No 39 in October 1946. This split the German people into five categories – major offenders, offenders, lesser offenders, followers, and persons exonerated. Every adult German citizen was to be screened in this way and responsibility for this was initially given over to the four military governors. A year later, this task was largely handed over to the local German state (Land) governments, but the categorisation of former members of the German Armed Forces was retained by the military governments.4 Von Rundstedt’s reason for staying first in the British Zone was that he was waiting for the American authorities to give him denazification clearance in their zone. One of his main concerns was that his savings were in the United States Zone and these could only be unfrozen with United States agreement. The Foreign Office, worried that if von Rundstedt was put through the formal denazification process in the United States Zone it might be seen as calling into question the decision not to put him on trial for medical reaons and make him more vulnerable to extradition by the Russians, asked the British Military Government to seek American agreement for him to be excused the denazification process on health grounds.5 As far as his status in the British Zone was concerned, it was the intention of C-in-C BAOR that von Rundstedt should be given the status of a private citizen.6 This would enable him to avoid the procedures to which former prisoners-of-war were subjected.

&
nbsp; General George Hays, the United States Deputy Military Governor, replied to the British request on 2 June. He saw no reason why von Rundstedt should not avoid being put through the returning prisoner-of-war process if he was released as a private citizen in the British Zone, but denazification was more difficult. If the British were prepared to issue him with a notice of final decision, this would be recognised in the United States Zone. If this was not possible, he would have to go through the denazification process and under the German Law for Liberation from National Socialism and Militarism this was in German hands.

  ‘I can inform you that by reason of his general staff experience and his position as head of the military administration of a territory formerly occupied by Germany he is a presumptive major offender under the law and a proceeding would have to be instituted to determine his final status unless such a decision were first made in the British Zone.’

  He would also have to apply for a residence permit from the local German authorities. Hays was, however, reassuring in stating that von Rundstedt would not be allowed to be extradited if he settled in the US zone.7 The Military Government’s recommendation to the Foreign Office was that von Rundstedt and Strauss be denazified by the Military Government and placed in Category 5 (exonerated persons). This would enable their property and money to be unfrozen.8 Ten days later the Military Government began to doubt the wisdom of the recommendation. Bearing in mind that Strauss and von Rundstedt had been released solely on medical grounds:

  ‘If we declare them to be exonerated of any charges made against them, it is inevitable, I think, that our decision will be given wide publicity and may invite severe criticism. In the first place we shall probably be accused of bad faith by the Soviet [Union] who have demanded the extradition of von Rundstedt for trial on capital charges in Russia. Secondly it may be thought that we are putting ourselves in an invidious position vis a vis the forthcoming trial of von Manstein on charges similar to those made against von Rundstedt and Strauss and this may make it difficult to proceed with the trial of Manstein.’

  The only other option was to tell the two that as long as they remained in the British Zone the British would make certain that no action was taken against them by the German authorities, but if they moved to another zone it was at their own risk. This, however, would not be of much help to von Rundstedt, who was ‘penniless’. The Foreign Office was asked for guidance as ‘a matter of urgency’.9

  What was curious about this exchange of telegrams was that Poland was ignored. No official statement of the British Government’s decision was transmitted to the Polish authorities and they only learnt of it from the newspapers. They sent what was, under the circumstances, a polite message to the British Embassy in Warsaw on 17 May, stating the effort that had been put into gathering evidence against all three MARCO defendants and asking for verification and an explantion.10 In order to smooth the Poles’ ruffled feathers and enlist their continued help on the von Manstein trial, Elwyn-Jones and a team flew to Warsaw in early June. This did not mollify the Poles, who continued to complain, suggesting that even if the defendants were not medically fit to stand trial, the crimes had been committed and there were such institutions as prison hospitals in which they could be detained rather than released without any form of restraint.11 The Russian reaction was predictable. A scathing attack in the Soviet publication New Times termed the medical grounds for releasing von Rundstedt and Strauss a ‘figleaf’ and that they were ‘only two among hundreds who had been let off and accepted into Anglo-American service’. The decision to release them was ‘illegal’ and ‘their hands were stained with the blood of thousands of sons and daughters of the Soviet People’.12 This finally stirred the British Government to reply to the Soviet extradition demand of 15 February. Since von Rundstedt and Strauss had been found unfit to stand trial by the British, they could not be tried by another power. The government was committed to trying von Manstein, however, and once more requested Soviet assistance in providing evidence and witnesses.13

  Meanwhile, deliberation over what status von Rundstedt and Strauss should now be given continued, and it was not until 24 June that Sir Brian Robertson was able to issue instructions. By this time, Strauss had also been forced to return to hospital, in Hamburg, and von Rundstedt remained in the Nordstadt Hospital at Hannover. The Military Government instructed the two relevant British Regional Commissioners, for Hansestadt Hamburg and Lower Saxony, to inform the two that Robertson was not prepared to issue either with notification of final decision with regard to denazification and hence they would remain as war criminals in Category I (major offenders). At the same time, and this appeared to be a contradiction, as long as they remained in the British Zone they would not be subject to denazification or sanctions.14 J Needham, the Regional Commissioner for Lower Saxony, accordingly sent von Rundstedt a letter to this effect on 27 June. If it was hoped that this would clear the air, it did not. On 7 July von Rundstedt wrote to Needham:

  ‘… I have been categorised into Group 1 as a war criminal whilst I was expressly informed by Colonel Adams of the Control Commission in Hamburg that Group 4 [Followers] was appropriate in my case. In order to put an end to this state of affairs, which for me is untenable, and to give me the opportunity to free myself of the accusation that I am an “alleged” war criminal, an expression used in the name of the Commander-in-Chief of Rhine Army in a letter dated 26th May 45, I request that I am transferred to 94 British Hospital at Barmbeck, Hamburg, regardless of my state of health, so that I may appear before the same military court which is sitting to try Field Marshal von Manstein to answer the charge of alleged war crimes.’

  He had already asked Dr Grimm to make the necessary preparations.16 Indeed, von Rundstedt was now in a ‘Catch 22’ situation, as he explained in a letter written on the same day to Liddell Hart:

  ‘I am still here in the Hospital [Nordstadt] as an old sick man. My situation has turned very gloomy in this last time. The British Government of Hannover has designated me a “War Criminal” in Nazi-Group 1. It is impossible for me to go the American Zone at Solz where my wife lives evacuated in 2 small rooms. I ought and I wish to stay together, in the British Zone. But I cannot find a home for us; I get no pension; I have no money, because my bank account in the American Zone is blocked. It is an awful situation for me and my poor wife. I would like to end this life as soon as possible.’17

  Liddell Hart passed a copy of this letter to Reginald Paget, who in turn showed it to Lord Henderson, commenting:

  ‘It does strike me as a bit ignoble. We ought not to treat a fallen enemy like this. History will condemn us. Rundstedt was a career soldier. We ought not to deprive him of his pension and private fortune upon a political charge upon which we acknowledge that he is too old and too ill to be put on trial.’18

  Liddell Hart had replied to von Rundstedt’s letter saying that he would give any help that he could and von Rundstedt wrote back to him again on 16 July. He had been told that ‘what had been done at Hamburg was not binding for Hannover’. The whole business had got him worked up, which was not doing much for his heart. ‘I think the British Authority at Hannover were glad if I die in Hospital at Hamburg like Field-Marshal Brauchitsch!’19 Von Rundstedt’s physical and mental state was confirmed by Dr Grimm in a letter to Liddell Hart. The handling of the affair was ‘unfortunate’. Von Rundstedt considered himself ‘an honest soldier who has done nothing but serving his country. He is absolutely convinced that if the trial had taken place he would have shown that he is not a criminal. Now he will suffer under the blame of being permanently listed as a criminal and as a leading Nazi.’ Ditha had told him that her father-in-law’s health had suffered a ‘severe shock’ and Grimm had the impression that ‘this affair has upset him more than anything else before’.20

  The Foreign Office accepted that the Regional Commissioner’s letter to von Rundstedt was ‘rather unfortunately worded’ in that it implied his guilt, which his medical condition meant that he had no oppo
rtunity to disprove.21 They decided to ask the Military Government to approach the Americans once more to see if they could arrange for von Rundstedt to avoid the denazification process in the United States Zone. General Hays remained adamant, however, that this was purely a matter for the Germans and that it was most unlikely that he would be put in a low enough category, that of lesser offenders as a minimum, to enable his funds to be unfrozen.22 A possible means of at least giving von Rundstedt some source of income came on 16 July, when the three Western Military Governors agreed that maintenance grants could be paid by the German Lands to former Wehrmacht members, provided they were entitled to pensions prior to 20 August 1946 or had been serving prior to 30 September 1936. Von Rundstedt, of course, met both these conditions, but those deprived of pension rights as a result of legal action or convictions for war crimes or crimes against humanity were ineligible.23 This exception included those in Category 1. The Foreign Office, looking for a possible loophole, therefore asked the Control Commission in Germany whether von Rundstedt could be eligible on grounds of age and infirmity for this. The grant was DM160 per month, regardless of rank, but since, in June 1948, all savings in Reichsmarks had been devalued by almost 95 per cent, as part of the changeover to the new Deutschmark currency, it represented no insignificant payment. At the same time, they asked whether the local German authorities could find von Rundstedt accommodation in the British Zone.24 The matter now threatened to become the subject of another public outcry in Britain, when, on 27 July, Richard Stokes asked a question in the House of Commons on von Rundstedt’s trial application and the situation on his denazification. All the Foreign Office could do was to say that they were looking into both.