Latino America: How America's Most Dynamic Population is Poised to Transform the Politics of the Nation
Page 23
7. DeSipio (1996).
8. Pantoja, Ramírez, and Segura (2001).
9. Bowler and Segura (2011).
10. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993/2003), 227.
11. Break points were selected to create an approximately normal distribution using quartiles and natural break points in the data.
CHAPTER 5
1. Bartels (1988) and Abramson, Aldrich, Paolino, and Rohde (1992).
2. US Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2009.
3. Norrander (2000).
4. On the seriousness of both the Clinton and Obama campaigns, see Heilman (2008). On the Latino campaign staffs, see Langley (2007). On the endorsements sought from Latino public figures, see Zeleny (2008) and Barreto and Ramírez (2008). On efforts to maximize Latino outreach, see Teinowitz (2008).
5. These estimates are taken from entrance and exit polls, conducted during the 2008 primary contests, that reported the percentage of Democratic voters in each state who were Latino. See “ElectionCenter2008: Results,” CNNPolitics.com, August 20, 2008, available at: http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/primaries/results/scorecard/#D.
6. NBC News (2008). The Texas outcome was determined by the number of pledged delegates, based on both a primary and a caucus. Clinton won the primary with 51% of the vote, and Obama won the caucus portion with 56%. In total, Obama narrowly won Texas, with ninety-nine delegates (New York Times 2008); Clinton picked up ninety-four. Caucus results were not known until a few days after the election, however, and so Clinton’s win at the polls became the prevailing media and campaign narrative (Malcom 2008).
7. Bartels (1988), Abramowitz (1989), and Abramson et al. (1992).
8. Gurian and Haynes (1993) and Mutz (1995).
9. Smith, “Clinton ‘Nuestra Amiga’” (2008).
10. Norrander (1993) and Stone, Rapoport, and Atkeson (1995).
11. Nuño (2007) and Barreto, DeFrancesco, and Merolla (2011).
12. Nagourney and Steinhauer (2008), Goldstein (2008), and Judis (2007).
13. Smith, “McAuliffe: Obama Has Latino ‘Problem’” (2008).
14. Contreras (2008).
15. Hero and Preuhs (2009).
16. Gay (2006), McClain et al. (2007), and Vaca (2004).
17. McClain et al. (2007) and Kaufmann (2006).
18. Barreto (2007) and Segura and Rodrigues (2006).
19. Segura and Valenzuela (2010).
20. Latino Decisions interviewed a total of 7,500 Latino voters over the course of the entire primary season, the general election, and the president’s first 100 days in office. This sample included Latinos who voted in Republican or Democratic primaries and general election voters who may have skipped their state primary.
21. Segal (2008).
22. Smith, “Clinton ‘Nuestra Amiga’” (2008).
23. On Clinton’s voter registration work in Mexican American neighborhoods, see Washington Post (2008). On her familiarity with Hispanic culture, see Nagourney and Steinhauer (2008).
24. Heilman (2008).
25. Pierson (1975); Basinger and Lavine (2005).
26. Nuño and Guerra (2008).
27. Nevada’s caucus was held January 19, California’s primary was on February 5, and Texas went to the polls on March 4. The Nevada and California surveys were administered six months prior to the election. The Texas survey was conducted a week prior to election day.
28. Clinton won even larger shares of the Latino vote in all three of these races because the “other” and “undecided” share largely broke her way on election day.
29. On driver’s licenses for undocumented immigrants, see Elmore (2009).
30. Pew Research Hispanic Trends Project (2003, 2004).
CHAPTER 6
1. All of the results presented here are the result of statistical analysis performed on the 2008 American National Election Study. For both Latinos and whites, we examined the factors that were positively or negatively associated with voting for Obama in 2008. In doing so, we used conventional social science regression and maximum likelihood estimation models in which we could account for many important and relevant factors at the same time, such as party affiliation, religiosity, and socioeconomic status. With respect to Latinos, we were also interested in demographics such as place of birth, country of ancestry, language preference, and degree of shared ethnic identity and how each of these related to vote choice in 2008. We also employed three different measures of racial sentiment.
2. Leal (2005).
3. Leal (2003).
4. Amaya (2007).
5. Reyes (2007).
6. Pew Research Hispanic Trends Project (2005).
7. Barreto and Leal (2007).
8. Pew Hispanic Center (2007).
9. Latino Decisions, “November 2008 Presidential Election Poll of Latino Voters” (2008).
10. Latino Decisions, “New Poll Suggests Latino Voters May Make the Difference in Four Key States” (2008).
11. Lopez, Livingston, and Kochhar (2009).
12. Hajnal and Lee (2010).
13. On Republican partisanship among Cubans, see Barreto, de la Garza, Lee, Ryu, and Pachon (2002).
14. Dawson (1994).
15. Segura and Rodrigues (2006).
16. Beltran (2011).
17. Fraga et al. (2010).
18. Sanchez, “The Role of Group Consciousness in Latino Public Opinion” (2006), and “The Role of Group Consciousness in Political Participation among Latinos in the US” (2006); Segura (2009).
19. McClain et al. (2006), Lopez and Pantoja (2004), and Pantoja, “More Alike than Different” (2005).
20. Stereotyped beliefs included: whites are lazier and less intelligent than blacks (-2); whites are lazier or less intelligent than blacks (-1); whites and blacks are equal on work ethic and intelligence, or one group is superior to the other on one dimension each (0); blacks are lazier or less intelligent than whites (1); and blacks are lazier and less intelligent than whites (2). Using a simple dichotomous measure rather than the index has no appreciable effect on our findings.
21. Respondents were asked how strongly they agreed or disagreed with the following: (1) “Irish, Italians, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors” (“special favors”); (2) “It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder, they could be just as well off as whites” (“try harder”); (3) “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way out of the lower class” (“generations of slavery” [reverse]); and (4) “Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve” (“less than deserve” [reverse]). Two antagonistic questions, “special favors” and “try harder,” were coded 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (agree strongly) on degree of symbolic racism. Two sympathetic questions, “generations of slavery” and “less than deserve,” were reverse-coded 0 (agree strongly) to 4 (strongly disagree) on degree of symbolic racism. The two antagonistic measures were summed to form a single “negatively valenced RR [racial resentment]” scale (two-item alpha = 0.69), and the two sympathetic measures were summed to form a single “positively valenced RR” scale (two-item alpha = 0.73).
22. The computer-based AMP implicitly primes affective responses by momentarily flashing images of black or white faces on the computer screen. The brief facial image is followed by a display of unrelated Chinese characters that respondents are asked to evaluate as either pleasant or unpleasant. To the extent that individuals rate Chinese characters negatively following the display of a black face we can infer a negative reaction to blacks. Negative assessments of ostensibly random symbols represent a kind of affective misattribution that has been amply documented in psychological studies (see, for example, Payne et al. [2005]).
23. Nicholson, Pantoja, and Segura (2006).
24. Yanez (2008).
25. De la Garza and DeSipio (1992, 1996, 1999, 2005)
.
26. Burden (2006) and Kaufmann (2006).
27. Leal et al. (2005) and Guth et al. (2006).
28. Leal et al. (2005).
29. Barreto, Manzano, and Sanchez (2009) and Barreto et al. (2008).
30. Franklin (2004).
31. New York Times/TNS Media (2009).
32. Ceci and Kain (1982) and McAllister and Studlar (1991).
33. Green and Gerber (2004).
34. DeFrancesco-Soto and Merolla (2006), Ramírez (2005, 2007), and Nuño (2007).
35. García-Castañon and Collingwood (2009).
36. De la Garza and DeSipio (1992, 1996, 1999, 2005).
CHAPTER 7
1. Barreto and Segura (2011).
2. Judis (2010).
3. Ibid.
4. Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura (2006).
5. Berman (2010).
CHAPTER 8
1. This estimate is from the Latino Decisions election eve poll. It differs from the NEP exit poll estimates of 71%. Elsewhere, we have demonstrated the significantly superior estimate quality of the Latino Decisions approach (see Barreto and Segura 2011).
2. Foley (2012).
3. ImpreMedia/Latino Decisions, “National Dataset Crosstabs: ImpreMedia–Latino Decisions Election Eve Poll 2012,” available at: http://www.latinodecisions.com/files/9313/5233/8455/Latino_Election_Eve_Poll_-_Crosstabs.pdf.
4. Latino Decisions/NALEO/ImpreMedia, “National Post-Election Survey—November 2008,” available at: http://www.latinodecisions.com/files/2913/3749/5067/NALEO.Nov08.pdf.
5. Ross (2012) and Quinton (2012).
6. Bennett (2011).
7. Uhlaner and Garcia (2005), Alvarez and Garcia-Bedolla (2003), Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura (2006), Hero and Tolbert (2001), and Pantoja, Ramírez, and Segura (2001).
8. Verba and Nie (1972) and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993/2003).
9. Garofoli (2012).
10. Lopez and Taylor (2012).
11. Chait (2011).
12. Le (2012).
13. Campbell et al. (1960) and Lewis-Beck et al. (2008).
14. Dawson (1994).
15. Barreto and Pedraza (2009), Barreto and Segura (2010), and Dahl (1961).
16. Nuño (2007) and Barreto and Nuño (2011).
17. Ramírez (2005) and Michelson, “Getting Out the Latino Vote” (2003).
18. In general, African American and Latino unemployment rates exceed those of non-Hispanic whites, and this gap has widened in every postwar recession (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012).
19. Lopez, Livingston, and Kochhar (2009).
20. Taylor, Kochhar, and Fry (2011).
21. Passel, Cohn, and Lopez (2011) and Lopez and Velasco (2011).
22. Golash-Boza (2012).
23. Markus (1988), Lewis-Beck (1988), and Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000).
24. Taylor, Lopez, Velasco, and Motel 2012, 4.
25. Nuño (2007), Abrajano (2010), and Abrajano and Panagopoulos (2011).
26. Barreto, DeFrancesco, and Merolla (2011) and Panagopoulos and Green (2011).
27. New York Times (2011).
28. Camia (2012).
29. Romney cited Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that, for example, the Latino unemployment rate had risen to 11% since January 2009, the beginning of President Obama’s first term.
30. We crafted a statement asking respondents to suppose that they supported a hypothetical candidate’s plan for the economy. We varied randomly whether respondents received a hostile or welcoming cue, approximating actual candidate positions on immigration during the 2012 campaign. The question wording and weighted distribution are detailed in Table 8.3.
31. On “illegal” versus “undocumented,” see Merolla, Ramakrishnan, and Haynes (2013). On cultural threats versus economic threats, see Brader, Valentino, and Suhay (2008). In our survey experiment, we used a hypothetical candidate without specifying the candidate’s partisan affiliation. This strategy—which is also used by others—represents a trade-off between controlling for the independent effect of partisanship and the cost of doubling the number of treatment cells. We address this strategy in further detail in our evaluative discussion in McGraw, Hasecke, and Conger (2003).
32. See, for example, Marcus (2000).
33. After offering respondents the choice “Don’t care what they say,” we found that 21% of them said “Don’t care” in response to the hostile message and 18% responded this way to the welcoming message. The simplest interpretation is that one in five Latinos say they don’t care because they are genuinely not interested in the candidate’s immigration views and care only about whether they agree with the candidate’s plan for the economy. In some states, the share of “don’t care” responses was twice as large as the share of “don’t know” responses. Assessed as a dichotomous indicator (i.e., as a “don’t care” response versus otherwise), the overall difference is statistically significant using a t-test that assumes unequal variance (p < 0.03).
34. Overall, Latino support for a candidate with a welcoming immigration message (mean = 2.55) is statistically different from the distribution of support for a candidate with a hostile message (mean = 1.73; student’s t = 27.22; p < 0.000).
35. Our experiment was limited in two important respects. First, we did not manipulate the candidate’s economic cues, so in this exercise we were unable to evaluate or assign a weight to the relative impact of issues on candidate preference. Second, actual Latino candidate preferences in 2012 were formed in response to candidate statements and policy developments that took place over the course of the Republican primary and general contest.
36. Silver (2012).
37. DeSipio and de la Garza (2005).
38. Latino Decisions/America’s Voice Education Fund, “Latino Influence on 2012 Election: President” (vote map), available at: www.latinovotemap.org.
39. Gelman, Katz, and Tuerlinckx (2002).
CHAPTER 9
1. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996); Fisher v. University of Texas (2013).
2. Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura (2006).
3. See Segura, Falcon, and Pachon (1997), Ramírez (2002), Barreto and Woods (2005), and Barreto, Ramírez, and Woods (2005). The non-Hispanic white population declined from 69.9% in the 1980s to 42.8% in 2010, while its share of the electorate declined from 83% to 65% (DiCamillo and Field 2009). During the same period, Latinos’ share of the California population grew from 19% in 1980 to 38% in 2010, while its electorate increased from 8% in the 1980s to 26% in 2010. Today one in four Californians is an immigrant. Among the 18 million registered voters in the state, 28.9% are “New Americans” (Immigration Policy Center 2013).
4. Barreto and Woods (2005).
5. Pantoja, Ramírez, and Segura (2001).
6. Barreto, Ramírez, and Woods (2005).
7. Tomás Rivera Policy Institute (2000).
8. Barreto and Ramírez (2004).
9. Marinucci (2003).
10. Kousser (2006).
11. DeSipio, Masuoka, and Stout (2006).
12. Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura (2006).
13. Jacobson (2004).
14. Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura (2006).
15. See Hero and Tolbert (2001).
16. Mendelberg (2001).
17. See Nicholson (2005).
18. Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura (2006).
19. Ibid.
20. Nagourney (2012).
CHAPTER 10
1. Sarlin (2013).
2. Republican National Committee (2012), 15.
3. The National Exit Pool survey estimated that 27% of Latino ballots were cast for Romney in 2012. Latino Decisions’ estimate was 23%, based on our election eve survey, which has better sample properties and bilingual interviewing.
4. See, for instance, Smith (2013) and Chen (2013).
5. See Damore (2011).
6. On June 6, 2013, the House of Representatives, on a largely party-line vote, supported defunding President Obama’s Deferred Action for Childhood A
rrivals (DACA) program.
7. During the summer of 2013, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) identified twenty-three Republican districts “where constituents will demand progress on immigration, and where those pressures could persuade our Republican colleagues to support true comprehensive immigration reform.” All but four of these districts are included in our analysis. We exclude the 6th (Jim Gerlach), 7th (Patrick Meehan), and 8th (Michael Fitzpatrick) Districts in Pennsylvania and the 14th District in Ohio (David Joyce) because those districts were easily carried in 2012 (with the House Republicans running much stronger than Mitt Romney, who narrowly won each district) and because they contain small Latino voting-age populations. In other instances, members identified by the DCCC may be supportive of a compromise immigration bill but are not in particularly competitive electoral contexts, such as Florida’s Mario Diaz-Balart (25th), Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (27th), and David Jolly (13th), as well as California’s David Valadao (21st), New Mexico’s Steve Pearce (2nd), and New Jersey’s Frank LoBiondo (2nd). As a consequence, we place these districts in tier 3.
8. For an overview, see Carrubba and Timpone (2005).
9. See Hopkins (2012).
CHAPTER 11
1. Sanchez (2012).
2. Cooper and Schone (1997) and Sanchez and Medeiros (2012).
3. Carrillo et al. (2011).
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.; Pitkin-Derose and Baker (2000), Weinack and Kraus (2000), Fiscell et al. (2002), and Betancourt et al. (2001).
6. Carrillo et al. (2011) and Pitkin-Derose and Baker (2000).
7. Carter-Pokras and Zambrana (2001).
8. Ibid.; see also Rumbaut, Escarce, and Morales (2006).
9. Ramírez et al. (2000).
10. Sanchez and Medeiros (2012).
11. Pachon, Barreto, and Marquez (2004).
12. The first poll conducted by Latino Decisions was done in partnership with Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Center for Health Policy at the University of New Mexico and with ImpreMedia. We surveyed 1,000 Latino registered voters during the period November 1–16, 2009, on their views about the nation’s health care debate, the administration (at the time), and politics more generally.
13. Jones (2011).
14. Barreto and Sanchez (2013).