True Faith and Allegiance

by Alberto R. Gonzales

  As we worked through security issues, access to the West Wing became much more limited, with the guarded perimeter outside the grounds increased. Anyone not working in the White House had to be accompanied by someone authorized to be in the West Wing. That meant that even my team of lawyers working across the street in the Old Executive Office Building could not come to see me unless accompanied by someone authorized to be in the White House. The new rules were inconvenient at times, but everyone understood their necessity.

  Without anyone formally saying so, workdays at the White House stretched on a regular basis from already exhausting fourteen-hour days to eighteen-hour days. Many of us were sleep-deprived so it was not uncommon for somebody to yawn or nearly nod off in a meeting, despite the enormity of the issues being discussed. We simply weren’t home long enough to get a decent night’s sleep. Nobody complained, and while this was undoubtedly hard on our families, everyone understood the necessity of the increased workload.

  Whether it was adrenaline or something else, I don’t know, but I never grew weary. Quite the contrary, I felt energized. I recognized that each of us had an important job to do, regardless how many hours per day or days per week it took. Indeed, most of us in the senior levels of the administration responsible for national security worked seven-day weeks for months after 9/11.

  Soon after the attacks, Andy created a group of experts to focus on individual, domestic areas of our nation’s response to 9/11. This group, chaired by Deputy Chief of Staff Josh Bolten, was called the domestic consequences group and began meeting daily in the Roosevelt Room on the first floor of the White House. I added another meeting to my daily schedule.

  There were plenty of domestic matters with which to cope. The president wanted to know how soon we could reopen the nation’s airports. What about Wall Street, which had been closed down since the attacks? How soon could we get our stock market and banks up and running on some sort of normal basis? What could we do about the protection of power plants or other parts of the power grid, which we knew were considered relatively easy targets by terrorists? What about other aspects of our nation’s vulnerable infrastructure?

  During the first meeting of the new committee on September 13, the group discussed what the Treasury Department, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Federal Reserve Board could do to freeze and seize financial accounts and records used by the terrorists, as well as those of terrorist-linked organizations. Stopping the flow of money to the people trying to kill us was crucial.

  The group also had to consider issues such as how the attacks might affect insurance coverage against loss of life and damage to property in New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania.

  Certainly one of the top priorities on my desk was the matter of drafting the congressional authorization to use military force (AUMF), granting the commander in chief the tools and ability to respond to the terrorist attacks. Frankly, as a simple legal matter, the expert lawyers on our team and I were convinced that the Constitution granted the president the power to protect our country in response to the attacks. A congressional resolution, however, would strengthen his legal authority and, we hoped, avoid politics becoming a factor. In other words, it would be more difficult for Democrats or Republicans to squawk later about President Bush taking action if the full Congress authorized it from the beginning.

  Because of the nature of the attacks, the American response was not simply a matter of declaring war on the enemy. Unlike World War II, in which America was attacked by Japan and we declared war in response, there was not a nation-state on which to declare war. Consequently, part of my responsibilities included determining the legal authorities to use military force against terrorists and to covertly collect intelligence information.

  I asked Tim Flanigan to shepherd the drafting of the AUMF. An outstanding lawyer, Tim was excellent at posing the right questions and presenting the issues in cogent terms. Always ready with a humorous remark—a trait no doubt necessary for a husband and his wife who had a large family—Tim could also defuse tension better than anybody I knew. Most importantly, I had absolute confidence in Tim. He went to work on the AUMF.

  The mountain of legal issues continued to grow, with each group of lawyers assigned to an issue broaching new, unprecedented areas needing clarification. The military lawyers gave extensive briefings on the “law of proportionality” in wartime. Proportionality implies that a nation may respond to an attack using only such firepower as necessary to destroy a target. For instance, if one cruise missile is enough to destroy an enemy facility, it would be disproportional to strike the area with ten missiles. In a more absurd illustration, if an enemy threw an egg and hit our president, we would not blow up their country’s airports. A response should be proportional.

  But what sort of response is proportional to the flagrant killing of nearly three thousand people and destroying billions of dollars’ worth of real estate and resources? The key standard seemed to be “What is reasonable?”—with acceptable levels of collateral damage depending on the circumstances. That sounded good, but it would be a difficult guide for our military commanders, and even more difficult for our troops, since they would be dealing with an enemy that did not wear uniforms and fought and hid among the civilian population, often using them as human shields.

  The lawyers and I also had long discussions over the issues of our country’s self-defense and our ability to preempt potential attacks. How imminent did a threat have to be before we could take action in self-defense? Was it enough for a gun to be loaded and cocked? Or must an enemy actually have to be pointing it in our direction with a finger on a trigger? And what about potential nuclear or biological terrorism? Was even more required to justify self-defense, or less? What about verbal or written threats? Osama bin Laden had spoken quite clearly about his intentions to harm America long before 9/11. And was it legitimate to argue that the magnitude of the attack and the potential horrendous degree of harm that would result from the use of weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, biological, or chemical—justified a preemptive attack by the United States? These matters were no longer intriguing points to debate in a classroom; these were real concerns we were dealing with every day.

  Because we were discussing highly classified activities in a time of tense hostilities, the number of participants in these meetings was kept as small as possible. Nevertheless, the discussions often grew pointed and intense. The lawyers unabashedly challenged one another, but generally the discussions remained civil and respectful. Lawyers tend to disagree on legal issues; that’s what lawyers do. Given the nature of the questions that intersected with the president’s powers under the Constitution, our international obligations, and Congress’s role, I was not surprised that a room full of lawyers did not always arrive at unanimity at the conclusion of the meeting.

  As counsel to the president, I was the top White House lawyer. But I wanted and depended upon the wisdom possessed by the great team of lawyers that surrounded me—not only at the White House, but also those at the Departments of Justice, State, Defense, the CIA, and the NSA. My usual manner in most meetings was to ask questions, as a judge normally would, keeping my opinions to myself, while encouraging others in the room to carry the discussion of contending viewpoints. I wanted to hear everyone’s ideas, and I especially wanted the DOJ lawyers to hear the sometimes opposite opinions and appreciate the various views. In the end, I deferred to the DOJ opinion, since by law the Justice Department was charged with advising the executive branch and, if challenged, the DOJ would defend executive actions in the courts.

  My job was then to report to the president what I considered to be our best option. I could not walk into the Oval Office with multiple legal positions for the president to mull over. Instead, I normally took him only one position—the one DOJ felt strongest about after considering all the other options. I had no statutory authority; I was simply an advisor. If there were strongly divergent views, I’d let the president know about them, but i
n all cases I’d say, “I think you should go with the DOJ.” In addition to legal advice, I sometimes gave President Bush my views on policy. But he was the president, elected to make decisions, and he often reminded me of that, sometimes with a twinkle in his eyes, sometimes with firmness in his voice.

  On Friday, September 14, after several intense national security meetings at the White House, I met Becky and accompanied her to the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance service held in the majestic Washington National Cathedral, the gorgeous stone edifice with soaring one-hundred-foot-high ceilings and magnificent stained glass windows overlooking the city.

  The service was sad, yet inspiring at the same time. The cathedral was packed with people, including five US presidents, two US vice presidents, cabinet secretaries, Supreme Court justices, members of Congress, and the general public. Religious leaders of the three monotheistic religions, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam—the ostensible religion of the terrorists who had attacked us—took part in the service. The music was powerfully evocative, with hymns such as “O God, Our Help in Ages Past,” and “The Lord’s Prayer,” sung by soprano Denyce Graves, setting the tone for a strong but comforting sermon by evangelist Billy Graham.

  President Bush presented an eloquent message crafted by Mike Gerson, including the scripture, “The LORD is my light and my salvation—whom shall I fear? . . . Though war break out against me, even then I will be confident” (Psalm 27:1, 3 NIV). The service concluded with “The Battle Hymn of the Republic,” and the world watched as five American presidents—Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush—and other national leaders stood, singing, “Glory, glory hallelujah, His truth is marching on.”

  Because of our true faith in God, each of us left the cathedral encouraged and more strongly resolved to do what was right. I knew that President Bush would need that extra spiritual strength. He was leaving right after the service on his first trip to New York City and his initial encounter with victims’ families and the rescue workers picking their way through the twisted steel and rubble of what only three days earlier had been a symbol of America’s economic might.

  Meanwhile, I went back to the White House for another meeting of the domestic consequences group, this one focusing on the airline industry. Although the airlines would resume flights the week following the 9/11 attacks, they were reeling financially. The immediate downturn in passenger travel had crippled Northwest, Continental, and America West airlines in particular, and there was a real question whether some of them would survive at all long-term. Industry officials also worried about potential liability for not doing more to prevent their planes being used in the attacks, and had concerns whether their insurance would cover losses. United, Delta, and American, while viable, faced serious challenges.

  The president had called an “all hands on deck” meeting at Camp David on Saturday and Sunday to review our readiness posture and plan for the future. Vice President Cheney, Colin Powell, Don Rumsfeld, and Condi Rice were already there on Friday evening; others were on their way. I worked late on Friday evening, digesting briefing papers and developing a better understanding of how the legal issues might intertwine with policy options to be decided that weekend. Early the next morning, I headed to Camp David, about an hour’s drive from my home.

  Located in Catoctin Mountain Park in Frederick County, Maryland, the presidential retreat is a lushly wooded 125-acre compound with rustic cabins as well as many of the comforts and communications capabilities of the White House. Earlier in the year, the president and First Lady had invited Becky and me to spend a summer weekend with them at Camp David. Pennsylvania governor Tom Ridge and his wife, Michele, joined us, as did Texas Speaker of the House Pete Laney and his wife, Nelda.

  We had all enjoyed a fabulous time of fun and relaxation, taking long walks on Camp David’s many trails, riding bicycles, bowling, shooting skeet, working out in the gym, and at night we watched a movie together.

  When I arrived at Camp David on Saturday, September 15, an entirely different mood pervaded the retreat. Armed navy personnel and marines from the Marine Barracks in Washington were posted at the security gates and checkpoints. There was no friendly banter with the guards, no unnecessary chatter. Everyone was on high alert.

  Although the dress code for the weekend was casual, a brisk autumn chill was in the air, so most of the participants, including me, wore slacks and a sports coat. Several added fleece jackets for warmth. The president wore slacks, a polo shirt, and a green Camp David heavy windbreaker. We met in the wood-paneled conference room of Laurel Lodge, the main conference center at Camp David, containing a large, wooden table accommodating twenty people, with extra chairs along the back walls on both sides for additional participants. On one side of the room stood a grouping of six flags, including the Stars and Stripes and a flag bearing the presidential seal. On the opposite wall, beneath an old wooden clock, hung a large, historic map of the local area.

  The collective wisdom gathered around the large table that morning to discuss America’s immediate course of action was impressive. I allowed my eyes to move from one person to another, noting his or her area of expertise. Starting with the deputy national security advisor, Steve Hadley, my gaze moved to vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Richard Myers; chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Hugh Shelton; the national security advisor, Condi Rice; the White House chief of staff, Andy Card; director of the CIA, George Tenet; the treasury secretary, Paul O’Neill; the FBI director, Bob Mueller; the deputy defense secretary, Paul Wolfowitz; Defense Secretary Don Rumsfeld; Secretary of State Colin Powell; the president; Vice President Dick Cheney; Attorney General John Ashcroft; and the chief of staff to the vice president, Scooter Libby. As the White House counsel, I sat at the far end of the table within earshot of the president.

  Once the meeting convened, in no time, briefing papers cluttered the table along with water bottles, coffee thermoses, and mugs. We are going to be here for a while.

  First up was Director Tenet, who presented a briefing on a plan to send CIA operatives into Afghanistan to begin gathering intelligence on al-Qaeda and Taliban targets. Although both groups were little known to most Americans prior to 9/11, they were well known and feared in Afghanistan. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Islamic fighters from a variety of groups formed a loose alliance known as the mujahideen. With the help of American weapons and cash, as well as funding by Saudi Arabia, these “freedom fighters” drove the mighty Soviet Union out of Afghanistan. The country was loaded with armed Islamic militants flush with victory. The Taliban, an Islamic militant group led by Mullah Omar, seized control of Kabul in 1996, about the time al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, whose Saudi citizenship had been revoked, was “encouraged” to leave Sudan. Bin Laden returned to Afghanistan, where he had once fought with the mujahideen, and found a welcome with the Taliban, who condoned and often supported bin Laden’s efforts to train terrorists at camps in Afghanistan.

  Bin Laden’s terrorist threats were well known by US intelligence throughout the Clinton administration, as Tenet, who had served in the previous administration, could attest. A presidential daily briefing for President Clinton on December 4, 1998, was titled “Bin Laden Preparing to Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks.” As Tenet later said, “Unfortunately, even when our warnings were heard, little was done domestically to protect the United States against the threat.”3

  During his Camp David presentation titled “Destroying International Terrorism,” Tenet was joined by his deputy, John McLaughlin, and counterterrorism chief Cofer Black. The CIA, Tenet said, had the plan and ability to shut down the terrorist havens in Afghanistan, “go after their leadership, shut off their money, and pursue al-Qaeda in ninety-two countries around the world.”4 Tenet and his colleagues emphasized, “We are ready to carry out all these actions immediately, if given the authorities to act,” which implied permission to expand covert operations.5 Tenet suggested we
work closely with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, a ragtag but deeply committed group opposed to the Taliban. The leader of the Northern Alliance, Ahmad Shah Massoud, had been assassinated by al-Qaeda a few days before 9/11—most likely, it was now easier to see, as an effort to diminish the Northern Alliance’s will and ability to counteract the Taliban prior to the attack on America.

  Next up was General Shelton, an imposing military presence at six foot five inches, but his initial presentation produced strong reactions, since his first option, the use of cruise missile strikes in Afghanistan, looked similar to what the United States had done after terrorist attacks in the 1990s. His second option was cruise missiles accompanied by air strikes by bombers. President Bush wasn’t buying that for a moment. He wanted US military forces on the ground as soon as possible. “We need to unleash holy hell,” he told the chairman of the Joint Chiefs. “We’re not just going to pound sand.”6

  As with all meetings of the National Security Council, we had an agenda prepared and facilitated by Condi Rice, but the discussions during that morning session were freewheeling, lurching in various directions. Treasury Secretary O’Neill reported on the difficulties in getting financial information about known terrorists and terrorist groups, sparking a lively discussion about the ability and legal authority of government agencies to search the Internet and examine ATM cards and bank account activities of foreigners suspected of terrorism. Yet everyone agreed that bin Laden’s financial accounts should be found, seized, and the assets used to help offset the enormous damages of 9/11.

  The conversation careened into a candid discussion about our failure to anticipate the 9/11 attacks or to collect actionable intelligence about the hijackers in time to prevent their despicable actions. The president wanted answers. He did not point fingers, but he wanted to know how such a thing could happen in order to prevent a similar tragedy from ever happening again. Everyone agreed that we had to find ways to better collect intelligence information and share it within our agencies, as well as with our allies and state and local governments and law enforcement. We agreed it was vital that we reject policies and practices used in the past that “stove piped” and compartmentalized the collection and analysis of intelligence data. We would seek to change the laws and policies that had discouraged the sharing of intelligence data—especially between the CIA and the FBI. John Ashcroft and the Justice Department were assigned the task of leading the effort to develop a comprehensive new counterterrorism bill that we could send to Congress.