True Faith and Allegiance

by Alberto R. Gonzales

  There was some good news. Our intelligence agencies reported that due to improvements in technology, our government was now able to collect electronic information in ways never envisioned by the drafters of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), passed after the Watergate scandal in the 1970s. Technology and electronic communications had changed drastically since then. We could act much faster on intelligence, and we needed to do so.

  Since 1978, our intelligence agencies had been working under FISA, which required advance approval from one member of the FISA Court, consisting (at that time) of seven federal judges—all of whom were selected by the chief justice of the United States.

  Under FISA, the Department of Justice was required to submit an application and obtain a warrant from a federal judge on the FISA Court before collecting certain types of electronic information. While FISA is a valuable law, it could also be burdensome and—in the new terrorism-plagued world in which we now lived—potentially deadly, causing delays in the collection of information and action on it to prevent an attack. Several people in the room encouraged the president to seek legislation that would fix that problem and streamline the FISA procedures.

  The president understood the challenges imposed by FISA, and its unintended consequences of slowing our ability to quickly collect electronic communications between terrorists, especially those communicating on easily transferable or disposable “no monthly contract” cell phones, not to mention stolen phones and computers. These discussions planted the seeds for what would soon grow into some of the most important protections provided by the USA PATRIOT Act, as well as a controversial classified electronic surveillance program authorized by the president.

  Discussion then turned to who was responsible for the deaths of nearly three thousand Americans. Which countries had assisted al-Qaeda, either overtly or indirectly? We discussed the obvious suspects such as Iran and North Korea, sworn enemies of our country. And of course we considered Iraq. With Saddam Hussein’s history of animus toward America, we would have been remiss to disregard Iraq without careful investigation. Nevertheless, when Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz suggested we broaden our efforts beyond Afghanistan and into Iraq, President Bush balked. He wanted the focus on destroying al-Qaeda first in Afghanistan. He did agree, however, with Paul’s contention that wherever we struck, we should make extensive use of our special operations forces, rather than trying to overwhelm the enemy with sheer numbers of soldiers. The leaders around the table nodded in affirmation.

  No one in that room was looking for an excuse to invade Iraq—a popular contention in the media in the years to follow. On the contrary, Powell and Rumsfeld both discouraged such talk because there was no apparent evidence linking Iraq to the horrific attacks. Moreover, if we retaliated by invading Iraq, we could jeopardize support of the United Nations and our North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, which we wanted as we took action against those who had conducted or assisted in the attacks against our country.

  Vice President Cheney and Director Tenet concurred that while we should keep a watch on Iraq, now was not the time for action there. The vice president emphasized that taking down the Taliban was our top priority. Tenet predicted that the Hussein regime in Iraq would make a mistake in judgment at some point, likely providing a stronger justification for the regime change that had been approved by the US Congress during the Clinton administration.

  On the other hand, our working relationship with Pakistan was critical. It was vital that we persuade the Pakistani government that it was not in their best interests to provide sanctuary to al-Qaeda. In the past, the US government had been able to influence the leaders of Pakistan, as well as some in Afghanistan. That might work again. We had to be careful, however, not to push too hard, because if the Musharraf government in Pakistan toppled, their nuclear arsenal would be up for grabs, and the terrorists who had attacked us were probably within closest reach. Nevertheless, the president was emphatic that Pakistan had to make a decision: Were they with us or against us? There was no more sitting on the fence. Fortunately for us—and for the rest of the world—Pakistan at least leaned in our direction and decided to stop serving as a safe haven to al-Qaeda and the Taliban.

  The next question was how we should best initiate military action. All sorts of possibilities were considered. Rumsfeld wondered aloud if we should simply hit Afghanistan; Tenet suggested that we might be able to sway the Taliban to turn against al-Qaeda. Colin Powell suggested that we give the Taliban an ultimatum, a warning, since our country did not go to war without first warning the other side. He also reiterated the warning to Pakistan: Are you with us or against us? General Shelton assured the president the military would be ready, although he stressed the need for cooperation by our “friends’ ” in the region. The vice president cautioned that whatever we did, we must be aggressive in taking out the enemy and discouraging a counterattack.

  The president dismissed the group for a break, and when we reconvened that afternoon, he went around the table asking each principal for his or her best input on the road ahead. By day’s end, the initial stages of America’s response to 9/11 were decided. Top priority was preventing another attack, and that involved drastically improving our intelligence programs to provide better security to the American people. At the same time, we were going to pursue the enemy that had hit us.

  Sitting at the Camp David conference table, I felt a sense of confidence and optimism. More than ever, I was thankful for the willingness of George W. Bush to surround himself with wise counselors. His experienced advisors—Cheney, Powell, Rumsfeld, Shelton, Myers, and others—understood the ramifications of sending young American men and women into battle, and they were only willing to do so cautiously and purposefully.

  The discussion had been lively but serious. President Bush saw matters clearly. He knew that regardless of the legal terminology, America was at war. The president had challenged us, questioned us about capabilities, vulnerabilities, and authorities. Even more than his words, his demeanor impressed me. He was absolutely in charge; he was focused, straightforward, and tough. If anyone had any doubt previously, George W. Bush truly became a commander in chief that weekend.

  The strategy session at Camp David changed the world forever. As I write these words, it has been fifteen years since 9/11. Although we have had some serious setbacks and failures, during that time we have not had another 9/11-type terrorist strike against our homeland. That has not been accidental or merely good luck. There is a direct historical line back to that room at Camp David. The plans, programs, and the unrelenting pursuit of the evil intent on destroying us that came out of those discussions have been enormously significant in maintaining our safety and way of life.

  My mind pondered the many issues as I drove home through the darkness after the meeting at Camp David. I had spent the weekend with the president of the United States and some of the most influential leaders in our country. But when I walked through the front door of my family’s home, I was just Daddy and Becky’s husband. My wife’s and sons’ smiling faces put my work in perspective. Protecting your family and mine was our top priority.

  Back in Washington the following week, I immediately began working with the administration lawyers on the many legal implications arising from the Camp David decisions. A big question was: What are the legal limitations on our ability to collect electronic communications between terrorists, especially if those communications took place between people located in the United States? We also had to sort out jurisdiction issues with the Justice Department. It was clear after Camp David that we were not simply going to treat the terrorist attack as a law enforcement matter and attempt to capture and bring perpetrators back into our courts for trial. We were going to war against the enemies of freedom.

  Tuesday morning, September 18, on the one-week anniversary of the attacks, the entire White House staff went outside and stood on the South Lawn along with President Bush, the First Lady, Vice President Cheney
, and Mrs. Cheney for a period of silence at 8:46 a.m., the moment the first plane hit the South Tower. As I bowed my head, I recommitted myself to always remembering the real human toll of the attacks. Because of evil, mothers and fathers mourned for the loss of their sons and daughters; boys and girls had lost mommies and daddies. Husbands and wives had gone to bed the previous night without their spouses who had been vibrantly alive at 8:45 a.m. on that awful day. As we walked silently back inside the White House, I thought of my own family. I could not imagine losing my wife and sons as so many had on 9/11, helpless to do anything about it. The people who had suffered such pain, and the millions of Americans who were counting on the president to do something about it, were depending on us to speak and act for them.

  That was the president’s focus. And that was my motivation.

  That same day, September 18, 2001, Congress passed a joint resolution granting President Bush an authorization for use of military force (AUMF), clearly acknowledging the president had the constitutional authority to defend America. Although this was technically not a declaration of war, Congress justified a military response to protect our national security and our citizens both at home and abroad. The law empowered the president “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.”7 The AUMF was overwhelmingly approved by both Republicans and Democrats. Our legislators were united in a way they had not been since Pearl Harbor.

  The following day, I went to the Capitol to meet with Senate leaders Tom Daschle and Trent Lott, as well as House leaders Dennis Hastert and Richard Gephardt. The topic was counterterrorism. Attorney General John Ashcroft represented the executive branch, along with his deputy, Larry Thompson; Viet Dinh, the assistant attorney general for policy; and the legislative affairs assistant to the president, Nick Calio. Ashcroft’s group had been working diligently on what would come to be known as the USA PATRIOT Act, and Congress wanted to be a player in those negotiations. Rightly so, they expressed concerns about doing what we needed to do to thwart terrorists, while guarding the civil liberties of American citizens. Nevertheless, nobody at that meeting showed any reluctance to give the president the authority he needed to protect our country.

  On Thursday evening, September 20, 2001, the president addressed the nation in a joint session of Congress. He expressed concern for the families who lost loved ones in the attacks, and he wasted no time in informing the country that we were at war against al-Qaeda: “On September the eleventh, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country.”8

  With conviction and compassion, the president said, “Great harm has been done to us. We have suffered great loss. And in our grief and anger we have found our mission and our moment. Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom—the great achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time—now depends on us . . . We will not tire, we will not falter, and we will not fail.”9

  Throughout the evening, Congress rose to its feet again and again in heartfelt applause, not the politically correct expressions of partisan politicians who know they are on camera. No, these were clear statements that despite our differences, we were united.

  In perhaps the most poignant moment of a speech that had many special moments, the president held up a police badge for the world to see as he said, “Some will carry memories of a face and a voice gone forever. And I will carry this: it is the police shield of a man named George Howard, who died at the World Trade Center trying to save others. It was given to me by his mom, Arlene, as a proud memorial to her son. This is my reminder of lives ended, and a task that does not end.”10

  In a sobering yet inspiring statement, the president concluded, “The course of this conflict is not known, yet its outcome is certain. Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them.”11 There was no question in anyone’s mind that when the president ended by saying, “And may God bless America,” he meant it.

  In a strikingly memorable moment, as President Bush made his way down from the podium and through the House Chamber, shaking hands with attendees as he went, when he met Democrat Senate majority leader Tom Daschle in the aisle, the president stopped and hugged Daschle. That night, in this critically important moment in the history of the United States, we were not Republicans or Democrats; we were all Americans.

  In my estimation, George Bush’s September 20, 2001, speech to the joint session of Congress was one of his best. I was not alone in that opinion. Afterward, Supreme Court justice Clarence Thomas congratulated him and said, “God bless you!”

  President Bush replied, “He already has.”

  A hint of a smile crossed the burly judge’s face. In his deep baritone voice, Justice Thomas said, “Ride tall in the saddle, buddy.”

  Ride tall, indeed. The lawyers on my staff, some of whom had clerked for Justice Thomas, knew exactly what he meant. The road ahead would be treacherous, and there would be many temptations to back down. But President Bush had stated our intention to protect our homeland, while tracking down al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and bringing to justice those responsible for attacking our nation.

  Now it was up to us to do it.

  CHAPTER 16

  BATTLES ON THE HOME FRONT

  The sun was setting in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, when General Tommy Franks appeared on a secure television monitor from Tampa, Florida. In Washington, DC, Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld and the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dick Myers, watched from the Pentagon. The president was at Camp David, but was not on the teleconference.

  General Franks conducted a round-robin, last-minute check with his top commanders in Kuwait, Bahrain, Masira Island off Oman, and Saudi Arabia, and each officer who was tasked with leading a major component into the war in Afghanistan was set to report on the readiness of the US forces under his command. General Franks informed his officers that he had received the execute order from the secretary of defense. As the general moved from one commander to the next, the responses were the same: no issues; all indicators are green; our military forces are set to go. Finally, General Franks looked to the director of the CIA, George Tenet, who was on the teleconference from Langley.

  “No issues, General,” Tenet reported.

  Franks faced his camera in the secure conference room of the US Army’s central command in Tampa. “All right,” he said. “I’m satisfied. Kinetics begin at 1230 hours East Coast time . . . any questions?” He paused momentarily, and when no questions were forthcoming, General Franks gave his officers a final exhortation. “This is the beginning of tomorrow’s history,” he said. “I want you to focus on two things: accomplish the mission, and protect the force.”1

  And with that, Operation Enduring Freedom began. It was the first step in the response of the United States—with the support of thirty-one other nations—to bring to justice those who had killed our citizens on 9/11.

  Following the teleconference, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and General Richard Myers called General Franks. “General, the president said to extend to you his respect and best wishes. We’re going to finish what began on September 11.”

  “God bless you, Mr. Secretary,” General Franks responded. “God bless America.”2

  Don Rumsfeld later recalled, “In the early hours of the Afghan war, I watched video links from aircraft dropping munitions. Among the first targets were the al-Qaeda training camps at Tarnak Farms and Duranta. B-52s dropped two-thousand-pound bombs on the tunneled caves of Tora Bora near the Pakistani border. All known Taliban tanks were targeted. Fuel depots, training camps, radars, runways, and the few dubious aircraft in the Taliban air force were hit. Over the course of five nights, every fixed enemy target that American intelligence had identified in Afghanistan was attacked.”3 Because so many people were suffering under the Taliban, as well as from a recent dr
ought, American aircraft also carried humanitarian aid, dropping more than 210,000 packages of food for the Afghans within the first forty-eight hours of the war.4

  President Bush addressed the nation shortly after the first bombs exploded. “On my orders,” he said, “the United States military has begun strikes against al-Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan . . . A commander in chief sends America’s sons and daughters into battle in a foreign land only after the greatest care and a lot of prayer . . . I’m speaking to you today from the Treaty Room of the White House, a place where American presidents have worked for peace. We’re a peaceful nation. Yet, as we have learned so suddenly and so tragically, there can be no peace in a world of sudden terror. In the face of today’s new threat, the only way to pursue peace is to pursue those who threaten it.”5

  Bush was putting the world on notice: the war was on.

  In the White House the following day, administration lawyers went back to work fighting a different sort of war, confirming that the president had the legal authorities he needed to press the battle against terrorism on the home front as well as overseas. John Ashcroft and his team at the Justice Department, with some input from the counsel’s office, put together the USA PATRIOT Act—USA PATRIOT being the acronym for “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism.” The PATRIOT Act would tear down the wall of separation between our various intelligence and law enforcement agencies—most notably the FBI and CIA—so they could more freely share information about potential threats. It would give to the intelligence agencies many of the same tools employed by law enforcement to track criminals. The PATRIOT Act passed with overwhelming Democrat and Republican support and was signed into law by President Bush on October 26, 2001. And not a moment too soon.