The Crisis of Rome

by Gareth Sampson

  As if the weaknesses of his own side were not bad enough, Jugurtha was faced by a greatly-increased Roman army. As is usual for this period, we are given no figures, but Marius raised a fresh army in Italy and combined it with Metellus’ army already in Africa. This gave him far greater manpower and far greater ability to conduct wider ranging campaigns in Numidia. The only downside for Marius was that he was light on cavalry, which was still being assembled in Italy by his deputy, L. Cornelius Sulla.

  For Marius, his aims were twofold. Having been raised to power on his promise to end the war swiftly, he needed quick results. In short this meant the death or capture of Jugurtha. In a wider context he also had to consider the Roman position in North Africa and ensure that the war did not escalate into a full-blown war against the Mauri and Gaetulians, but was contained to Numidia. If it were not, not only would this weaken the Roman position, but it would undermine his need for a swift resolution. For Jugurtha, this escalation was his only hope. Negotiation was impossible, given that the only terms acceptable to Rome were his head. He had lost the support of the vast majority of the Numidians and was reliant on two other neighbouring powers for his survival. Nevertheless, he had already survived for four years and had seen off three Roman commanders. If the Romans could be ensnared in a long-drawn-out affair in North Africa then it was possible that events in Rome or in Gaul would ensure his survival, which at this point is all he could hope for.

  In terms of strategy, despite the enlarged army, Marius had few other options than the ones that faced Metellus in the previous years: bring Jugurtha to battle and kill him, ensure that he had nowhere left to run and handed himself over, or induce others to hand him over. Given that he had high expectations to live up to, the military option was the preferred route. Therefore, it is no surprise that Marius’ strategy consisted of reducing the few strongholds and towns that were still doggedly pro-Jugurthan, either by siege or intimidation. This would further have the effect of reducing Jugurtha’s bases of operations and sources of money, both essential with a non-native army at his side. Furthermore, it would test the mettle of his allies.

  Such a strategy is what ultimately Sallust provides us with details of, albeit in a particularly-unhelpful manner. The reported siege was at Capsa (modern Gafsa) in the southeast of Numidia. In military terms the attack is noted for the cunning manner in which it was staged, marching his troops at night to catch the town unawares, and the brutal manner in which the town was dealt. Marius’ forces attacked the townspeople just after dawn and caught them defenceless and with the city gates open. Despite their apparent offer of surrender, the male population was massacred and the women and children enslaved, with the town being burnt. Sallust notes that such an act was ‘contra ius belli’ or against the laws of war, but then goes onto highlight the startling effect this massacre had on the other remaining Jugurthan strongholds in the region.289 Thus we have a perfect example of early ‘shock and awe’ tactics, with the destruction of one town ensuring the compliance of the others.

  The Sallustian narrative then switches to the other side of the country. By this point one of the few remaining Jugurthan strongholds was an unnamed fortress near the Muluccha River, which formed the border of Numidia and the kingdom of the Mauri.290 Once again we have a full description of the siege including a colourful story of how a Roman soldier, whilst out hunting snails to eat, discovered an unguarded approach to the mountain-top fortress.291 The key problem we have is that there is no chronology in Sallust’s’ accounts, a problem exacerbated by the fact that these two sieges took place on opposite sides of the country. To reach the fortress at Muluccha, Marius would have had to cross the 800-mile length of Numidia, which is done in total silence in Sallust’s account.

  At this point it would be helpful to turn to our supplementary sources for the war, notably Orosius and Plutarch’s life of Marius. However, here we are to be disappointed once more. Plutarch’s accounts of the Marian campaigns cuts from Marius arriving in Africa to the final capture of Jugurtha, completely missing out any details of the intervening campaigns or battles.292 Orosius is little better, giving these campaigns just one sentence:

  Marius gave an excellent example of this trait [his astuteness], when he outwitted the enemy and captured the city of Capsa, which, they say, was founded by the Phoenician Hercules and which now was filled with royal treasure.293

  Thus we are forced to return to Sallust and try to make sense of the campaigns and their chronology. This subject has been argued over by many a historian and the consensus can be detailed as follows.294 Upon invading Numidia, Marius began a programme of giving his untrained troops combat experience by low-level attacks on Jugurthan strongholds and a number of skirmishes with Jugurtha’s Gaetulian forces (as detailed below), which will have taken place in late 107 BC. Either then or in early 106 BC he moved into the southeast of the country and destroyed the town of Capsa. This makes excellent strategic sense and would have secured the east of Numidia under Roman control. Throughout 106 he undertook a systematic march across Numidia, re-securing the country for Rome and storming any remaining Jugurthan towns or forts. By late 106, this process had taken Marius across the length of Numidia, until he reached the Muluccha River and the siege of the nearby fortress.295

  With this issue dealt with, there are still two unanswered questions. Firstly, how successful a strategy was this for the Romans, and secondly, just what were Jugurtha and Bocchus doing all this time? Upon Marius’ invasion of Numidia (in late 107), Sallust explicitly states that Jugurtha and Bocchus were still together with their respective armies. Faced with the invading Roman force, we are told that the two monarchs separated and withdrew into the Numidian interior. Sallust ascribes this to a desire to avoid open combat and force Marius to divide his forces into two, thus weakening his overall position. Not only did Marius not apparently do this, but we hear no more of Bocchus or his army in Numidia.296 In fact, following the fall of the fortress at Muluccha, Bocchus and his forces are in fact back in his own kingdom without having fired a shot in anger.

  It is clear from this that at some point soon after Marius’ invasion of Numidia, Bocchus and his forces retried back to his own kingdom, without either formally allying with Rome or breaking off his alliance with Jugurtha; clearly Bocchus was playing a waiting game. Although, on his own, Jugurtha’s defeat may have looked inevitable, aided by the full resources of the Mauri victory was still possible, at least in the short term. Bocchus clearly formed a third side to this war, playing both sides off against the other for maximum advantage. Jugurtha may have been a native African prince, but the Numidians had been the dominant power in North Africa. Thanks to this war, however, the tables had been turned and Numidia was now weaker than the Mauri. On the other hand, a Roman conquest of Numidia would put Bocchus’ own position in jeopardy. Thus we can understand Bocchus’ reluctance to commit to one side or another.

  This left Jugurtha on his own in Numidia, with his Gaetulian army. Sallust does inform us of a number of small encounters between the Roman and Gaetulian forces in the initial stages of the Marian campaign:

  He [Marius] made frequent attacks on Jugurtha and the Gaetulians, while they were plundering our allies [the Numidians], routing them and compelling the king’s own troops to throw away their arms not far from Cirta.297

  Although only a brief passage, we learn two interesting facts. Firstly, Jugurtha’s Gaetulian army was living off the land, thus further alienating his own people. This was countered by the Romans defending the Numidians from the Gaetulians. Thus it was clear that Marius was winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the native population, but at the cost of tying up his own forces. If anything, it was Jugurtha and his army that were being seen as the invaders. Secondly, at some point in late 107 BC, Jugurtha and Marius clashed in the vicinity of Cirta, the old Numidian capital.298 Thanks to the gaps in Sallust’s narrative we are not even aware who held Cirta at this time, the two possibilities being that there was still a Roman garrison t
here, left by Metellus in 108 BC, or that it had been abandoned by the Romans under Metellus, when he withdrew back to Africa in late 108. Nevertheless, the clash (it is not described as a full-scale battle) left Jugurtha on the run and Cirta securely in Roman hands.

  The mention of Cirta leads us back to the figure of Gauda, the Numidian prince in the Roman army, and ally of Marius. Although the issue of the government of Numidia is not touched on in the sources until the end of the war, it is tempting to speculate that Marius installed Gauda as a temporary monarch, based in the traditional Numidian capital of Cirta, to provide an alternative source of authority to Jugurtha and the semblance of a normal ruling authority. Thus the war would have become Numidia and Rome fighting together against Jugurtha, a renegade and deposed ruler, rather than Rome fighting Numidia. This may explain Marius’ early move to Cirta in 107, to install Gauda as a ‘legitimate’ ruler of Numidia, although this act would have ultimately needed to have been sanctioned by the Senate and People of Rome.

  After these clashes between Jugurtha and Marius in 107 BC, Jugurtha then disappears from the narrative until the fall of the fortress at Muluccha. We can speculate that he could only look on impotently as his few remaining strongholds fell to the Romans, and he was reduced to skulking around the Numidian deserts living off the land with his foreign army. It was only with the fall of the fortress at Muluccha, that Jugurtha attempted a last throw of the dice and planned to defeat the Romans in battle. For this, it was clear that he needed the combined might of the Gaetulian and Mauri armies. Thus he turned to Bocchus once more and made him a more substantial offer (other than marriage ties and mutual threat from Rome). Jugurtha offered Bocchus one whole third of Numidia to be added to his kingdom, as an inducement to commit to his side.299 Such an act would have greatly enlarged Bocchus’ kingdom and made him the pre-eminent native power in North Africa.

  This offer shows the desperate straights that Jugurtha had been reduced to, which in turn leads us back to our earlier question of how successful Marius’ strategy had been. Following the siege near Muluccha, as 106 BC drew to a close, two years had elapsed since Marius’ election as consul, promising a swift end to the war. Certainly much of the first year had been lost in waiting to take up his consulship, passing the necessary legislation and recruiting and blooding a new army, but on the face of it, was he proving to be any more successful than Metellus?

  We hear little of events in Rome during this period. On the one hand, Marius’ supporters had secured a prolongation of his command, from consular to pro-consular and we hear of no attempts by the Senate to block this. On the other hand, there was the return of Metellus and the celebration of a triumph (in 106 BC) to mark his ‘victory’ in Numidia. As has been seen in the Northern Wars, such a triumph being celebrated whilst the war continued was normal practice, yet this one also resulted in Metellus being given the cognomen of Numidicus, thus becoming Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus. This was a clear provocation to Marius’ position and a sign that the Metelli, who were after all the dominant family/faction within the Senate, would not take Marius’ usurpation of the command lightly. Sallust reports Metellus’ return to Rome, but not his triumph, stating that he was hailed by the Senate and People (which is surprising, given that they had humiliatingly voted him out of his command in an unprecedented manner).300 In any event, a triumph would always have been enthusiastically welcomed by the people, whoever was celebrating it, giving them a public celebration and feast, marking a Roman military success, which would have been especially welcome given the losses in the north.

  Ultimately though, despite the time it had taken, Marius’ strategy of reducing Jugurtha’s remaining strongholds and forcing him into a corner paid off, with the latter determining on a final military confrontation. Having taken the fortress at Muluccha, Marius determined to retire for the winter to the nearby Numidian coastal towns. Jugurtha was able to move his Gaetulian force to the border to meet up with Bocchus’ army entering Numidia from the west, a feat that was managed without alerting the Romans. This combined force then moved towards the Roman army, which was in the region of the city of Cirta.

  What followed were two battles between these armies. However, unusually for this war, we have two separate and somewhat divergent accounts of these battles from two different sources, Sallust and Orosius. To appreciate the problem, we need to examine both of these accounts.

  The First Battle of Cirta (Sallust)

  Sallust presents us with a detailed account of the battle:

  Then, at the very moment that the consul learned from his scouts of the presence of the enemy, they appeared, and before the army could be drawn up or the baggage piled, in fact before any signal or order could be given, the Mauri and Gaetulian cavalry fell upon the Romans, not in order or with any plan of battle, but in swarms, just as chance had brought them together.

  Our men were all bewildered by the unseen danger, but nevertheless did not forget their valour. Some took arms, while others kept off the enemy from their comrades who were arming; a part mounted their horses and charged the foe. The combat was more like an attack of brigands than a battle. Without standards and in disorder, horse and foot massed together, some gave ground, others slew their opponents; many who were bravely fighting against the enemy were surrounded from the rear. Valour and arms were no sufficient protection against a foe who were superior in numbers and attacked on every side. At last the Romans, both the raw recruits and the veterans, who as such were skilled in warfare, if the nature of the ground brought any of them together, formed a circle, thus protecting themselves on every side and presenting an orderly front to the attacks of the enemy.

  In so dangerous a crisis Marius was neither frightened nor less confident than before, but with the bodyguard of his cavalry, which he had formed of the bravest soldiers, rather than of his friends, went from place to place, now aiding those of his men who were in difficulty, now charging the enemy where they were pressing on in greatest numbers. He directed the soldiers by gestures, since in the general confusion his orders could not be heard. The day was now ending, yet the barbarians did not at all ease their efforts but thinking that the darkness would favour them, as the kings had declared, they attacked with greater vigour.

  Then Marius, adapting his tactics to the situation and wishing to provide a place of refuge for his men, took possession of two neighbouring hills, one of which was too small for a camp, but had a large spring of water, while the other was better adapted to his purpose because it was the most part high and steep and required little fortification. He ordered Sulla to pass the night with the cavalry beside the spring, while he gradually rallied his scattered forces and the enemy were in no less disorder, and then led them all at the quick march to the hill. Thus the kings were compelled by the strength of the position to cease the battle. However, they did not allow their men to go far away, but encompassed both hills with their huge army, they camped in loose order.

  Marius, who was especially heartened by the enemy’s lack of discipline, ordered the utmost possible silence to be kept and not even the customary signals to be sounded to mark the night watches. Then, as daylight was drawing near and the enemy having at length become exhausted just beginning to sleep, he [Marius] suddenly ordered the watch and at the same time the horn-blowers of the cohorts of the cavalry and of the legions to sound the signal together, and the soldiers to raise a shout and burst forth from the gates of the camps. The Mauri and Gaetulians, being suddenly awakened by this strange and terrible sound, were incapable of feeling or of arming themselves, or indeed taking any action at all. Their enemy was upon them and no help was at hand. The shouting and din, the confusion and the terror had made them frantic with fear. In the end they were completely routed. Most of their arms and standards were taken, and more were killed than in any previous battle; for they were too tired and too much dazed by the surprise to make good their escape.301

  The First Battle of Cirta (Orosius)

  Orosius on the other
hand presents us with the following account, which is longer than the rest of his account of the whole war:

  Greatly strengthened by the cavalry contingents of the latter [Bocchus], he [Jugurtha] harassed the Marian army by frequent raids. Finally at Cirta, an ancient city, the capital of Masinissa, he encountered the Romans, who were preparing an assault upon that city. He drew up his forces in battle array with a cavalry force numbering 60,000. No battle was ever more turbulent or more harrowing to a Roman soldier. A cloud of dust, raised by the galloping and snorting of the horses as they circled about in attack, veiled the heavens, shut out the daylight, and brought on darkness. So great a shower of missiles poured down upon the Romans that no part of the body was safe. Moreover, the density of the atmosphere prevented them from seeing any distance ahead, while their great numbers, as they crowded together, made manoeuvres for defending themselves difficult to execute.

  III. The First Battle of Cirta (105 BC), Stage 1

  IV. The First Battle of Cirta, Stage 2

  The Mauri and Numidian [Gaetulian] cavalry did not have to exert themselves much to carry out a well-timed javelin attack designed to break up the ranks of their opponents who were occupying a favourable position. They kept on discharging their darts blindly in the confident assurance that the missiles must of necessity strike their mark. Driven into one space, the Roman infantrymen pressed closely together against one another.

  Night afforded the Romans a temporary relief from their perilous situation, but the next day the same conditions of war and of danger prevailed. It was useless for a soldier to rush against the enemy with drawn sword, for he would be driven back by darts hurled from a distance. The infantrymen could not flee, since the cavalry, which had completely hemmed them in, could swiftly overtake them. When the third day came and there was no help from any source, the dread appearance of death presented itself on all sides. Finally, the consul Marius offered a means of escape by undertaking a brave and desperate move. His entire army in battle formation rushed forth simultaneously from valley and open plain and offered battle everywhere at the same time. The enemy, again circling around them, not only cut to pieces the flanks of the line, but also kept overwhelming the centre with darts that reached their mark, though hurled from a distance. Furthermore, the heat of the sun, unbearable thirst, and the presence of death all around them exhausted the disorganized Romans and reduced them to a state of complete despair.