The Crisis of Rome

by Gareth Sampson

  At this point a storm of wind and rain was sent from the heavens against the Africans. This kind of assistance, which was well known to the Romans, brought unexpected deliverance. The sudden downpour cooled the thirsty and heated Romans and gave them a drink, but so far as the Numidians were concerned, it made the shafts of their darts slippery, which they were accustomed to hurl with their hands without ammenta [a leather thong tied to the shaft to assist the thrower]. Thus their darts became useless. The shields too, which they usually carried and which were made from stretched and toughened elephant hide, though easy to handle and offering adequate protection, were of such a nature that they absorbed the rain like a sponge. This added weight rendering them unmanageable and quite useless in affording protection, since they could not be manipulated with ease. When the Mauri and Numidians (Gaetulians) had thus been unexpectedly thrown into confusion and rendered helpless, Bocchus and Jugurtha took flight.302

  The Key Differences and Similarities

  Thus, we can see that the two accounts contain some notable differences, indicating the use of different sources for the battle. The first clear difference concerns the location of the battle and the initial encounter. In Sallust, Marius is leading his army to their winter quarters at Cirta when he is attacked at dusk, in a classic Jugurthan ambush. In Orosius, Marius is laying siege to Cirta (or intending to) and the attack was preceded by a number of enemy raids upon the Roman army. It seems highly unlikely to say the least that Cirta was still in Jugurtha’s hands by late 106 BC, especially given that Marius had spent the preceding year reducing every remaining Jugurthan fortress in Numidia and that we are told he was in the vicinity of Cirta in late 107 BC. It is this last point that may help to throw some light on Orosius’ account. We know from Sallust that Marius and Jugurtha were in the vicinity of Cirta in late 107 BC and that there were indeed skirmishes between the two sides. Thus, it is entirely possible that Orosius or his source have condensed these two separate events into one account. If this is what has happened, and at this stage we can only speculate, then it actually throws light on Sallust’s account of the campaign of late 107, as it seems that the Romans were forced to lay siege to Cirta, which must have fallen into Jugurthan hands, when Metellus evacuated Numidia in late 106 BC. Thus Cirta fell to Marius in late 107 BC and remained in Roman hands throughout 106 BC.

  Both Sallust and Orosius do agree that the battle was initially a disaster for the Romans. If they were indeed attacked by 60,000 Mauri and Gaetulian cavalry and it was indeed at dusk in an ambush, then we can see the Roman plight. Aside from Orosius’ literary flourish of the skies turning dark with arrows (highly reminiscent of the Battle of Thermopylae), the next major difference was the length of the encounter. In Sallust the battle starts at dusk and ends at dawn the next day. In Orosius, we are given no start time, but the battle dragged on for three days. Orosius makes no mention of the hills that Marius defended in Sallust’s account, but if the Romans did take up a defensive position then the battle could have dragged on, as Orosius suggest, with Jugurtha’s army unable to get to grips with the Romans at close quarters and the Romans unable to break out.

  Orosius’ account is the more detailed for the Mauri/Gaetulian tactics and this fits in well with previous Jugurthan tactics and his analysis of their strengths and Roman weaknesses. Once again Jugurtha chose to utilize weapons of distance and speed, cavalry and javelins, to avoid engaging the Romans at close quarters. On this occasion, if he did have them surrounded and pinned down in a defensive position, then, unlike the Battle of Muthul River, the Romans would find it difficult to charge forwards and engage the enemy.

  The biggest difference between the two accounts comes with the ending of the battle. In Sallust we are presented with a clear-cut example of Roman discipline and barbarian indiscipline, with the highly-improbable account of the Mauri and Gaetulians completely losing all sense of discipline, not to mention common sense, and celebrating when the Romans were trapped in a defensive position and then falling prey to a dawn counterattack, which any half-decent commander could have anticipated. In Orosius, it is chance, or divine intervention, which saves the Roman army, when a ferocious downpour soaks the Mauri/Gaetulian weapons and renders then unable to engage with the Romans. Furthermore, in Sallust the armies of Jugurtha and Bocchus are completely defeated and in Orosius they retreat and regroup, with the Romans skulking off in a hasty withdrawal (though retreat might be a more apt description). Given that Jugurtha and Bocchus were apparently able to mount a second attack just a few days later, withdrawal rather than defeat seems the most likely outcome.

  In both accounts though, it is Marius who engineers this Roman breakout. The only difference being that in Sallust he is aided by the Mauri and Gaetulian indiscipline and in Orosius by the elements. In both accounts Marius is the saviour of the Roman army, though we must question how they got into such a mess in the first place. On both occasions, however, Marius is greatly assisted by what look suspiciously like standard Roman prejudices: barbarian indiscipline and divine favour. The question of which account is more accurate is an impossible one to answer, as we cannot even be sure that either is an accurate description. It is entirely possible that both may have been in circulation at the time and both contain many fabulous elements to turn them into good stories for public consumption.

  What is clear is that the result was inconclusive, with both sides withdrawing and regrouping for a further encounter. On this occasion, although we have another two accounts, Orosius has clearly exhausted himself and relegated the final battle to just a sentence, whilst Sallust again gives us a highly dramatized account.

  The Second Battle of Cirta (Sallust)

  With his opponents scattered, Marius continued the army’s march towards their winter quarters, rather than following up the victory. This is not as strange as it first seems. Although the enemy had been defeated, it is clear from later events that they had not been destroyed as Sallust claims. Furthermore, this battle had been a close run thing and had shown the vulnerability of Marius’ army. Thus, regrouping over winter would have been a priority, as opposed to chasing down Jugurtha. Sallust goes into great detail about the precautions Marius’ army now took on their march, to prevent a repeat of the ambush they had suffered, by marching in battle formation. This clearly indicates that the enemy was still a viable threat and that Marius was in effect attempting to retreat from hostile territory. Marius’ fears were confirmed as the Mauri and Gaetulians attacked on the fourth day of the march, having obviously regrouped under their commanders.

  Once again, Jugurtha apparently demonstrated his superb tactical abilities when he drew up his combined armies into four separate forces, planning on attacking the Romans from all sides. On this occasion Marius’ scouts were apparently able to warn him of this ambush and he drew his army up in square formation to meet this threat. Once again Sallust details the battle:

  Meanwhile, Sulla, whom the enemy had reached first, after encouraging his men, attacked the Mauri with a part of his force, charging by squadrons and in close order as possible; the rest of his troops held their ground, protecting themselves from the javelins which were hurled at long range, and slaying all who succeeded in reaching them. While the cavalry were thus engaged, Bocchus, with his infantry being brought up by his son Volux, who had been delayed on the way and had not taken part in the previous battle, charged the Roman rear.

  Marius at the time was busy at the front of the battle, since Jugurtha was their with the greater part of his forces. Then Jugurtha, on learning of the arrival of Bocchus, made his way secretly with a few men to meet up with him. When he reached them, he cried out in Latin, which he had leaned to speak when at Numantia, that our [Roman] men were fighting in vain, since he had a short time before killed Marius with his own hand.303 With these words he displayed a sword smeared with blood, which he made so during the battle by killing a Roman infantryman. When our men heard this they were shocked, rather by the horror of the deed than because they b
elieved the report, while at the same time the barbarians were encouraged and charged upon the stunned Romans with greater vigour.

  Our men were just at the point of flight when Sulla, who had routed his opponents, returned and fell upon the flank of the Mauri. Bocchus at once gave way. As for Jugurtha, while he was trying to hold his men and secure the victory which he had all but won, was surrounded by the [Roman] cavalry, but though all, on his right and left were slain, he broke through alone, escaping amid a shower of weapons.

  Marius in the meantime, after putting the cavalry to flight, was hastening to the aid of his men, of whose imminent defeat he had now heard. Finally, the enemy were routed in all parts of the battlefield.

  Then there was a fearful sight in the open plains; of pursuit, slaughter or capture. Horses and men were thrown to the ground, many of them wounded, without the strength to escape or the will to remain still, struggled to get up, only to collapse immediately. As far as the eye could see, the battlefield was strewn with weapons, armour and corpses, with patches of bloodied earth showing between them.304

  V. The Second Battle of Cirta (105 BC), Stage 1

  VI. The Second Battle of Cirta (105 BC), Stage 2

  VII. The Second Battle of Cirta (105 BC), Stage 3

  The Second Battle of Cirta (Orosius)

  In comparison, Orosius presents only a brief description of the battle:

  Later, however, these same kings (Jugurtha and Bocchus) threw 90,000 soldiers into a final struggle. When the Romans conquered them, their forces it is said, were slaughtered almost to the last man.305

  The Second Battle of Cirta – Analysis

  Both authors agree that for Jugurtha and Bocchus this attack was the last throw of the dice. They committed their full forces, cavalry and foot, in an all-out attempt to defeat the Romans, with Orosius again providing a figure for Jugurtha’s forces, of 90,000. Overlooking the more dramatic elements, such as Jugurtha’s bluff in Latin we can see the following. Whilst we have no figure for the Roman army, it is clear that they were outnumbered. Such a figure for the Jugurthan forces is a high one, but he was utilizing the manpower of two nations and his forces would have included a huge number of poorly-armed men as well as fully-equipped soldiers.

  There were several differences between the first battle and the second. In the first battle Jugurtha utilized his two strengths, surprise and distance, whilst in the second he had neither, just sheer weight of numbers. In addition, he attacked from all sides hoping to break the Roman army down. In such a case, had they lost heart and broken they would have been slaughtered. However, it is clear that the Roman army maintained its discipline and held firm, again showing their superior close-quarter fighting ability. Whilst they held firm, the tide of the battle was turned by the victory of the Roman cavalry under Sulla, who, after driving off the Mauri cavalry (at least in his sector) then returned to the fray to support the infantry and catch the Mauri from behind. With Bocchus and Jugurtha fleeing, their armies’ discipline broke and the battle turned into a rout and a slaughter.

  What is clear from these accounts is that, surprisingly perhaps, these battles could have gone either way, showing just how the situation had been altered by the addition of the Mauri and Gaetulian forces. This allowed Jugurtha to field armies, probably twice the size of the Roman one. Once again, Jugurtha showed his awareness of his troops’ inferior quality and always attempted to overcome this by using elements such as surprise and distance. The first battle, despite Sallust’s positive presentation, looks for all intents and purposes to have been a stalemate, with the Romans only just being able to extricate themselves from what could have been a massacre. Thus, even after six years of warfare, Jugurtha was still able to engineer a position which could have resulted in military victory. Had he done so then, given events in the north, this could have turned the tide of the whole war in his favour. Here we can clearly see the quality of his military abilities. His ultimate failure once again rested in the poor quality of his soldiers, when face-to-face with the Roman legion. Ultimately, we can see a case of a great commander saddled with inferior troops.

  For Marius, however, these battles reveal both positive and negative aspects of his command. On the positive side, his policy had finally paid off and he had forced Jugurtha to give battle, allowing him the chance of defeating the pan-African alliance and clearly demonstrating Rome’s military superiority to the races of North Africa. The Battles of Cirta clearly established Rome’s military dominance of North Africa, which was not to be challenged for over a century. The battles also revealed Marius’ steady leadership abilities, cool head and clear thinking in battle, marshalling his forces to utilize their strength: close-quarter superiority.

  On the negative side, on both occasions he allowed Jugurtha to choose his ground and time of attack, disastrously so in the first battle. On the first occasion it appears that Jugurtha was able to catch the Romans completely unawares, though we must always exercise caution when Sallust is decrying Marius’ military abilities. On the second occasion, the Roman scouts alerted the army in time and allowed Marius the time to prepare his army and blunt Jugurtha’s tactics.

  Overall we have to consider whether these Roman victories were a result of the finest quality of general being victorious or the finest quality of army. Had Jugurtha been in command of Roman forces, we must suspect that the outcome would be quite different. Ultimately, however, this once again reveals the underlying strength of the Roman system, which allowed it to defeat individual generals of quality, men such as Hannibal, Mithridates or Jugurtha. As for Marius, these battles reveal that, although initially placed on the back foot in terms of pre-battle planning, his clear strengths came to the fore in the midst of battle, which ultimately brought about victory.

  The Abduction of Jugurtha and the End of the War in Africa

  Despite the closeness of these two battles, the end result was clear: a complete military victory for the Romans. Yet, once again, this did not mean that the war itself was over. By the end of 106, the Romans had defeated the armies of three entire nations – the Numidians, the Mauri and the Gaetulians – yet while Jugurtha lived and was free, the war would not end. Marius was now faced with the same problem that had beguiled Metellus in 108 BC, namely how to turn victory on the battlefield into an end to the war.

  Whilst Jugurtha would never surrender to the Romans, the focus shifted to Bocchus, who had gambled and lost heavily. Allying with Jugurtha against the Romans had always been a risk, but the lure of enlarging his kingdom at Numidia’s expense had been too tempting to resist. Now, however, with his army destroyed at the Second Battle of Cirta, his kingdom was the next logical target for Roman anger. It was at this point that Bocchus sought to recover by diplomacy what had been lost by force and just four days after the battle of Cirta, he sent word to Marius to open negotiations. What followed was a protracted series of negotiations between Bocchus and Marius, with the former offering friendship and allegiance to Rome, in much the same position that Jugurtha had once been. What Bocchus ultimately had to offer was of paramount interest to Marius and Rome, namely Jugurtha himself.

  As a precursor to any deal, Bocchus received Marius’ permission to send a three-man delegation to the Senate to express his forgiveness for taking up arms against them, and naturally blaming Jugurtha. Sallust records the Senate’s reply to the petition:

  The Senate and People of Rome do not forget either service or injuries. However, since Bocchus repents, they forgive his offence; he shall have a treaty of friendship when he has earned it.306

  Thus for Bocchus, the situation was clear. Not only could he avert Roman invasion, but could get himself into Roman favour; the price was Jugurtha. To negotiate the deal, Marius sent his deputy, L. Cornelius Sulla, to Bocchus’ court. Sallust reports that Sulla’s column was intercepted en route by Volux, Bocchus’ son, with a warning that Jugurtha was attempting to intercept him.307 Forewarned, Sulla was apparently able to evade the ambush. It is clear that Jugurtha must
have been aware of Bocchus’ manoeuvrings, which were only logical, though we must always be aware of the possibility that the whole incident was staged by Bocchus to publicly demonstrate his new loyalty to Rome. Even if Jugurtha had been preparing an ambush, it is entirely possible that the news was leaked by Bocchus.

  Sallust gives these events his usual dramatic flourish and states that, even at this stage, Bocchus was vacillating between Jugurtha and Rome.308 This is highly unlikely given the relative power of the two sides; Bocchus would have been clearly aware that his future and that of his kingdom depended on the delivery of Jugurtha and, in short, it was a case of Jugurtha or him. That did not mean that he could not protract the situation for his maximum benefit, with an eye on the post-war settlement of the region.

  Jugurtha, meanwhile, was apparently being kept appraised of the situation by his representative at Bocchus’ court, a man named Asper. According to Sallust, Jugurtha was negotiating with Bocchus to kidnap Sulla and use him as a hostage to negotiate a peace treaty with Rome.309 This interpretation relies heavily upon the figure that Sulla became, not the man he was in 105 BC, a deputy commander from an ancient but obscure Roman family. Neither Marius nor the Senate would have concluded a peace treaty with Jugurtha under any circumstance, never mind the holding of such a minor hostage. Again according to Sallust, Bocchus agreed to Jugurtha’s plan and arranged to meet with him and hand Sulla over to him. When Jugurtha and his party arrived, the inevitable happened, and Bocchus’ men attacked and overpowered them, murdering all but Jugurtha, who was handed over to Sulla, and then to Marius and ultimately Rome.310