The Lost History of 1914
Page 40
31 For Fashoda and Omdurman, see Porch, The Conquest of Morocco, 140–42.
32 For Daily Telegraph and Catholic paper, see E. Malcolm Carroll, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 1870–1914 (New York: Century, 1931), 175, 176. For the Times on Fashoda, see Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 322.
33 For at the turn of the century, see Guillen, “The Entente of 1904,” 334. Also see Robert A. Doughty, Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 38. For Paris crowd, see Samuel L. Williamson, Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904–1914 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), 5. For Bois de Boulogne, see Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 1 (New York: Enigma Books, 2005), 146. For Ireland, see Jerome De Wiel, “Austria-Hungary, France, Germany and the Irish Crisis from 1899 to the Outbreak of the First World War,” Intelligence & National Security 21, no. 2 (April 2006): 242–43.
34 For Britain’s courtship of Germany, see Bernadotte E. Schmitt, “Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 1902–1914,” American Historical Review 29, no. 3 (April 1924): 454. For another view of British courtship, see Paul W. Schroeder, “World War I as Galloping Gertie: A Reply to Joachim Remak,” Journal of Modern History 44, no. 3 (September 1972): 326. “Britain never really tried or wanted” an Anglo-German alliance.
35 Guillen, “The Entente of 1914,” 364.
36 For Bismarck, see Gooch, Franco-German Relations, 16. Quotation from Tombs, France 1814–1914, 206.
37 For horse, see Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, 161. Account of the Kaiser’s visit follows Porch, 137–39.
38 Helmuth Stoecker, German Imperialism in Africa (London: C. Hurst, 1986), 237.
39 Bülow seen in Stocker, 237. For the “paltry” fruits of expansion under the Kaiser, see Holger H. Herwig, “Luxury” Fleet: The Imperial German Navy, 1888–1918 (London: The Ashfield Press, 1987), 102.
40 Lenin quoted in Annika Mombauer, The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus (New York: Longman, 2002), 108.
41 For Bülow, Pan-Germans, and Krupp, see Stoecker, German Imperialism, 233, 236, 237, 240. For the “French press,” see Gooch, Franco-German Relations, 43.
42 For Bülow’s memoirs, see Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, 153–54. For conference, see 173–74. For France’s claims, see Stoecker, German Imperialism, 241. For Churchill, see Schmitt, “Triple Alliance and Triple Entente,” 451.
43 For roars of laughter, see Barraclough, From Agadir to Armageddon, 2–3. For wry comment, see A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918, 467, n. 2.
44 For place in the sun, see Hewitson, “Germany and France before the First World War,” 570.
45 For Kiderlen and Russia, see Bernadotte E. Schmitt, The Annexation of Bosnia 1908–1909 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937), 194–95. For Kiderlen to kaiser, see Stoecker, German Imperialism, 246. For Cambon, see Binion, Defeated Leaders, 37. For fuller account, see C. P. Gooch, “Kiderlen-Wächter,” Cambridge Historical Journal 5, no. 2 (1936): 178–92. Agadir was a closed port, Mogador an open one; the chances of “complications”—meeting a foreign warship—were higher there; and so the Mogador option was dropped. See James L. Richardson, Crisis Diplomacy: The Great Powers Since the Mid-Nineteenth Century (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 174.
46 Baron Greindl seen in E. D. Morel, Diplomacy Revealed (Manchester, UK: National Labour Press 1923), 177.
47 For loans, see E. D. Morel, Morocco: Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy (Manchester: National Labour Press, 1920), 37–39. For throne, see Roger Martin du Gard, Lieutenant-Colonel de Maumont, 530. For the lion, see Porch, The Conquest of Morocco, 211.
48 For “pictures were painted,” see Theodore Wolff, The Eve of 1914 (London: Gollancz, 1935), 38. For colonial pressure on the government, see C. M. Andrew and A. S. Kanya, “The French ‘Colonial Party’: Its Composition and Influence, 1885–1914,” in Historical Journal 14, no. 1 (1971): 123. “The height of the Moroccan rebellion in the spring of 1911 coincided with the establishment in France of the weakest Government for more than twenty years, and one particularly vulnerable to colonialist pressure.” For three cabinet members see Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, The Climax of French Imperial Expansion, 12.
49 For Caillaux, see Porch, The Conquest of Morocco, 221.
50 For the Belgian consul, see Morel, Morocco, 199.
51 For Mangin, the French officer, and the backdated request, see Porch, The Conquest of Morocco, 218, 222.
52 Binion, Defeated Leaders, 41.
53 For de Selves, see Barraclough, From Agadir to Armageddon, 44, 134. For Germanophobia, see Berenson, The Trial of Madame Caillaux, 76.
54 Binion, Defeated Leaders, 40.
55 For Izvolski, see Binion, Defeated Leaders, 50.
56 For Lloyd George, Grey, and the escalation in crisis dynamics, see David Stevenson, “Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914,” International Security 22, no. 1 (Summer 1997): 136–38. For Caillaux and Churchill, see Keith Wilson, “The Agadir Crisis, the Mansion House Speech, and the Double-Edgedness of Agreements,” Historical Journal 15, no. 3 (September 1972): 518, n. 32, 521. A. J. P. Taylor argued that the Mansion House speech “was directed against Caillaux, not Kiderlen.” Keith Wilson disputes this interpretation while respecting its logic—that London wanted to restrain Paris as much as it wanted to deter Berlin. See Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 469–71.
57 “Prestige,” see Barraclough, From Agadir to Armageddon, 132–33. For Germany and Churchill, see David Stevenson, “The European Land Armaments Race,” in Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson, eds., An Improbable War? The Outbreak of World War I and European Political Culture before 1914 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2007), 136.
58 Binion, Defeated Leaders, 39.
59 Ibid.
60 Gooch, “Kiderlen-Wachter,” 189.
61 For Fondere, see Binion, Defeated Leaders, 43, 44. For kaiser’s wrath, see Theodor Wolff, The Eve of 1914, 58–59.
62 For Baroness, see Binion, Defeated Leaders, 43, 44. For “Jena without war” and the Pan-German attack on Bethmann Hollweg, see Roger Chickering, We Men Who Feel Most German: A Cultural Study of the Pan-German League, 1886–1914 (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1984), 265.
63 For Asquith, see Shankland, Death of an Editor, 25. For hating Germans, see Binion, Defeated Leaders, 46, 49.
64 See the London Times, January 9–11, 1912.
65 For giggling, see Donald G. Wileman, “Caillaux and the Alliance, 1901–1912: The Evolution of a Disillusioned Conservative,” Canadian Journal of History (December 1988): 368. For squeaky voice, see Theodore Zeldin, France 1848–1945, vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 703. For Caillaux’s interjection, see David Watson, Clemenceau: A Political Biography (New York: McKay, 1974), 241. For attack on progressive reform, see Keith Hamilton, “The ‘Wild Talk’ of Joseph Caillaux: A Sequel to the Agadir Crisis,” International History Review 9, no. 2 (May 1987): 196.
66 The discussion of Caillaux’s political evolution closely follows Wileman, “Caillaux and the Alliance,” 355–73. For number of strikes, see Barraclough, From Agadir to Armageddon, 30. Definition of nationalism is from Eugen Weber, The National Revival in France, 1905–1914 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 7.
67 See David E. Sumler, “Domestic Influences on the Nationalist Revival in France, 1909–1914,” French Historical Studies 6, no. 4 (Autumn 1970): 522.
68 Wileman, “Caillaux and the Alliance,” 371–72.
69 For swing to the left, see Barraclough, From Agadir to Armageddon, 31. For all the countries, 15.
70 Quotation is from Wileman, “Caillaux and the Alliance,” 373.
71 Weber, The Nationalist Revival in France, 95–96; minority, 3; Deschanel, 98; the senator, 99. For the provincial newspaper, see Carr
oll, French Public Opinion, 251. The estimate of the size of the political class is from Charles Maurass, the right-wing nationalist. Cited in Zeldin, France 1848–1945, 387–88. For the “sociology of nationalism,” a quotation from Jean-Jacques Becker, see Paul B. Miller, From Revolutionaries to Citizens: Antimilitarism in France, 1870–1914 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 180.
72 For Poincaré anecdote, see Keiger, Raymond Poincaré, 15. For 1920 article, see Wright, Raymond Poincaré and the French Presidency, 129, n. 99. Wright reports that the article “cannot be found at the Biblioteque Nationale or at the Sorbonne Library.” Poincaré long sought to combat the image of “Poincaré le guerre”—the revanchist eager for war—and this article, with its revanchist recollection, would furnish the wrong sort of evidence. For long defile, see Raymond Poincaré, The Memoirs of Raymond Poincaré (London: Heinemann, 1928), 1.
73 For interview, see Poincaré, The Memoirs of Raymond Poincaré, 31. For French people not fearing war, see Carroll, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 260.
74 For higher standard, see Sumler, “Domestic Influences,” 523, 528. For Joan of Arc and marches, see Miller, From Revolutionaries to Citizens, 181. For diary, see Keiger, Raymond Poincaré, 161.
75 For election, see Sumler, “Domestic Influences,” 532–34. For Calmette’s fog, see Wright, Raymond Poincaré and the French Presidency, 38.
76 For details on reptile fund, see Sidney B. Fay, The Origins of the War, vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan, 1927), 270, n. 79. Also James William Long, “Russian Manipulation of the French Press, 1904–1906,” Slavic Review 31, no. 2 (June 1972): 343–54. Berenson, The Trial of Madame Caillaux, 235–36.
77 For Cossack, see Carroll, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 279. For Poincaré’s implicit promise, see Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics 36, no. 4 (July 1984): 479. For Jaurès, see Brynjolf J. Hovde, “French Socialism and the Triple Entente, 1893–1914,” Journal of Political Economy 34, no. 4 (August 1926): 471.
78 For Izvolski and Kokovtsov, see Carroll, French Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs, 204ff. For return letter, see Wright, Raymond Poincaré and the French Presidency, 53–55. For Izvolski on Poincaré’s victory, see Shankland, Death of an Editor, 47.
79 Berenson, The Trial of Madame Caillaux, 225.
80 For quotations, see ibid., 225, 26, 27.
81 Ibid., 225.
82 For right-wing journalist, see ibid., 149. For nation as family, see 159. For 1895, see Offen, “Depopulation, Nationalism, and Feminism,” 658.
83 For feminism, sterility, and abortion, see Offen, “Depopulation, Nationalism, and Feminism,” For economist, Michael F. Nolan, The Inverted Mirror: Mythologizing the Enemy in France and Germany, 1898–1914 (New York: Berghahn, 2005), 58. For divorce, see Berenson, The Trial of Madame Caillaux, 159, and for marital reform, 154.
84 For instigation and duel, see London Times, April 28, 1914. The contrast between electoral politics and cultural politics follows Berenson, The Trial of Madame Caillaux, esp. 168.
85 Caillaux on the elections seen in Wolff, The Eve of 1914, 285–86. For meeting in Chamber, see Harvey Goldberg, The Life of Jean Jaurès (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1962), 455. For settee, see Shankland, Death of an Editor, 47–48.
86 Breathtaking, from Goldberg, The Life of Jean Jaurès, 455. For Jaurès on Russia, see Hovde, “French Socialism and the Triple Entente,” 470, 72.
87 For comment to German socialist, see Shankland, Death of an Editor, 48.
88 For Sazonov on Poincaré, see Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol. 2, 194. For Poincaré’s pledge of July 27, see Gerd Krumeich, Armaments and Politics in France on the Eve of the First World War (Dover, NY: Berg, 1984), 220.
89 For Paris juries, see Berenson, The Trial of Madame Caillaux, 82.
90 For Labori, see ibid., 241. For “On to Berlin!” see the New York Times, July 26, 1914. Poincaré, The Memoirs of Raymond Poincaré, 310.
91 For Churchill, see Shankland, Death of an Editor, 73. For Caillaux on Calmette’s assault on Henriette’s soul, see the New York Times, July 22, 1914. For details of Henriette’s appearance, see Shankland, 52–53. The best source is the London Times, which ran long stories every day of the trial.
92 For the broken seals and the judge, see Martin, The Hypocrisy of Justice, 178–79.
93 For Figaro, see Shankland, Death of an Editor, 164. For toughs, see Berenson, The Trial of Madame Caillaux, 242.
94 Berenson, The Trial of Madame Caillaux, 243.
95 Details on Jaurès from Goldberg, The Life of Jean Jaurès, 470–72. For Villain, see Eugen Weber, Action Française: Royalism and Reaction in Twentieth-Century France (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), 91. For Agadir, see Holger Afflerbach, “The Topos of Improbable War in Europe before 1914,” in Afflerbach and Stevenson, An Improbable War, 162. Also Brynjolf J. Hovde, “French Socialism and the Franco-German Relations, 1893–1914,” Journal of Political Economy 35, no. 2 (April 1927): 266. Anatole France seen in Shankland, Death of an Editor, 175.
96 For revolvers, see Berenson, The Trial of Madame Caillaux, 242.
97 For Agadir quotation from Caillaux, see Martin, The Hypocrisy of Justice, 183.
98 For Poincaré in the Assembly, see Sumler, “Domestic Influences,” 537.
99 J. M. G. Le Clézio, Desert (Boston: David Godine, 2009), 343, 348.
100 Ibid., 349–51.
101 For Mangin on West African troops, see Joe Lunn, “ ‘Les Races Guerrieres’: Racial Preconceptions in the French Military about West African Soldiers during the First World War,” Journal of Contemporary History 34, no. 4 (October 1999): 517–536. For tribes and recruitment methods, see Myron J. Echenberg, “Paying the Blood Tax: Military Conscription in French West Africa, 1914–1919,” Canadian Journal of African Studies 9, no. 2 (1975): 176. For British observer, see John Terraine, “The Aftermath of Nivelle,” History Today 27, issue 7 (July 1977): 428.
102 Morel seen in Barraclough, From Agadir to Armageddon, 155. For Churchill, see Bernadotte E. Schmitt, “Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 1902–1914,” American Historical Review 29, no. 3 (April 1924): 451. Blind quotations are from Paul W. Schroeder, “Stealing Horses to Great Applause: Austria-Hungary’s Decision in 1914,” in Afflerbach and Stevenson, An Improbable War, 29, 26.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER 7
1 For German patrols, see Margaret H. Darrow, French Women and the First World War: War Stories of the Home Front (Oxford, NY: Berg, 2000), 99. For Belgian poet, Emile Verhaeren, see Barbara W. Tuchman, The Proud Tower: A Portrait of the World before the War, 1890–1914 (New York: Knopf, 1966), 463. The bestselling book was The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relation of Military Power to National Advantage (1910) by Norman Angell, a British journalist. See Howard Weinroth, “Norman Angell and the Great Illusion: An Episode in Pre-1914 Pacifism,” Historical Journal 17, no. 3 (1974): 551–74.
2 Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” International Security 9, no. 1 (Summer 1984): 58–107.
3 “All in all, it can safely be said that the Schlieffen Plan made no sense,” Stig Förster, “Dreams and Nightmares: German Military Leadership and the Images of Future Warfare, 1871–1914,” in Manfred F. Boemke, Roger Chickering, and Stig Förster, eds. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 361. For St. Privat, see Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War (London; Hart-Davis War, 1962), 119. For machine guns, see Martin Van Creveld, “World War I and the Revolution in Logistics,” in Roger Chickering and Stig Förster, eds., Great War, Total War: Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914–1918 (New York: Cambrudge University Press, 2000), 65. “Attack is the best defense” is Schlieffen, seen in Van Evra, “The Cult of the Offensive,” 59.
4 “Specialists in victory” is from Barry Posen quoted in Jack Snyder, “Civil Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984,” International Security 9, no. 1 (Summer 1984): 122. For
Schlieffen’s fear of long wars rousing the “red ghost” of revolution, see Stig Förster, “Dreams and Nightmares,” 360.
5 Follows Förster, “Dreams and Nightmares,” 368.
6 See Gerhard P. Gross, “There Was a Schlieffen Plan: New Sources on the History of German Military Planning,” War in History 15, no. 4 (2008): 431.
7 For von Moltke, the elder, see Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision-Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 25. For Bethmann, see Snyder, “Civil-Military Relations,” 126.
8 For brooding Moltke, see Förster, “Dreams and Nightmares,” 363, 365, 373. For Bethmann, see Van Evra, “The Cult of the Offensive,” 58. For “lip service,” see Holger H. Herwig, “Germany and the ‘Short-War’ Illusion: Toward a New Imterpretation?” Journal of Military History 66, no. 3 (July 2002): 693. Förster’s indictment is on the same page. Also see Annika Mombauer, Helmuth Von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), esp. 287–89.
9 For the new view of Schlieffen, see Terence Zuber, “The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered,” War in History 6, no. 3 (1999): 262–305. For the new view debated, see Terence M. Holmes, “The Reluctant March on Paris: A Reply to Terence Zuber’s ‘The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered’ ” War in History 8, no. 2 (2001): 208–32 and Terence Zuber, “Terence Holmes Reinvents the Schlieffen Plan—Again,” War in History 10, no. 1 (2003): 92–101. For a qualified synthesis, see Terence Zuber, “The Schlieffen Plan’s ‘Ghost Divisions’ March Again: A Reply to Terence Holmes,” War in History 17, no. 4 (2010): 512–25. For an objective assessment, see Keir A. Leiber, “The New History of World War I and What it Means for International Relations Theory,” International Security 32, no. 2 (Fall 2007): 167–77; for Hew Strachan, see 30n.72.
10 For “ploy,” see Lieber, “The New History of World War I,” 9. Quotation from Schlieffen is from Förster, 368n.91. For risk of extending draft, see Gross, “There Was a Schlieffen Plan,” 414.