Gallipoli

by Peter Hart

  Corporal Will Weaver, 2nd (New South Wales) Battalion, 1st Brigade, 1st Division, AIF

  Although the front line had been located, there were still many isolated parties of men in shallow trenches or folds in the ground clinging on to their positions further out in front. One such party, under the command of Lieutenant Eric Goldring, was dug in on the forward slopes of MacLaurin’s Hill overlooking Wire Gully.

  Captain Croly was wounded at about this time. He was some distance away to our left, and out of sight; but what he had to say about the Turk could be heard all over the battlefield. In a torrent of invective he traced the ancestry of his assailant through a series of irregular liaisons right back to the time of the Prophet.67

  Corporal Thomas Louch, 11th (Western Australia) Battalion, 3rd Brigade, 1st Division, AIF

  Captain Arthur Croly had his arm badly shattered, but survived his painful injury. Shortly afterwards Goldring decided to edge his men forward to reinforce other Australian outposts clinging on further down Wire Gully. As they ran into the gully itself they came under heavy fire. Most of them never made it.

  Goldring was wounded. There was little room in our pot-hole but we dragged him in. He implored us to give him a drink, but we had been told this would be bad for anyone with an abdominal wound, so we refused. He became delirious, but after dark when a stretcher bearer arrived he pulled himself together and walked back. The possie into which we had stumbled was anything but a home from home. It was overlooked from the higher ground of Johnston’s Jolly, where there were snipers who fired at any sign of movement. After dark there was a lot of movement in front of us, the Turks were shouting ‘Allah, Allah!’ blowing bugles like those used by the tram drivers in Cairo, and we stood to expecting an attack. But after a time we fired a few rounds in the direction of the noise and the Turks departed. We were too worked up and tired to get any sleep, and the night wore on. At first light we saw Turks digging in on Johnston’s Jolly, about 200 yards away on our right, so we opened up on them. But they were being covered by snipers, and in no time Clayden,68 in the next pit, was shot in the head and my rifle was knocked out of my hand by a Turkish bullet just as I was about to fire. My face was spattered by steel splinters which drew blood; but, though a sorry sight, I was more frightened than hurt. On Tuesday night the 3rd Battalion man who had been with us went off to try and get some water, and we did not see him again. Since the Sunday morning when we landed Dick and I had had nothing to drink other than the water in our water-bottles. We had had little sleep, so by Wednesday we were so dazed that we hardly knew what we were doing.69

  Corporal Thomas Louch, 11th (Western Australia) Battalion, 3rd Brigade, 1st Division, AIF

  It was only on the evening of 28 April that they made their way back up on to Second Ridge. Desperate with thirst, exhausted and totally disorientated, they were amazed to find a fully fledged system of trenches. It was evident that their comrades had not been idle in their absence and the Anzacs had taken Hamilton at his word. When Louch rejoined 11th Battalion on Shell Green he was given a large tot of rum and he slept for thirty hours. His experience almost exactly mirrored that of Private Harry Murray from the 16th Battalion.

  One could see men’s heads nodding and drooping – some were sleeping as they stood. Days and nights passed slowly enough. Such sleep as we could get was sauced with wild dreams. But for the continual rifle fire of the Turks, we might have been living in a dream world. Every hour our men were falling; men whom we had just got to know and like would drop suddenly, limbs all aquiver in death, for the Turk seemed always to aim for a vital part. But the boys kept their spirits up, although it was plain that the loss of their mates was affecting them. Two would be chatting together when one would pitch forward, and the expression of the survivor would be eloquent of savage, repressed rage. It was a nerve-racking business and there seemed to be no ending to it all.70

  Private Harry Murray, 16th (Western Australia and South Australia) Battalion, 4th Brigade, NZ&A Division, AIF

  And there they would stay for the next eight months. The shallow Anzac bridgehead had been carved out but what would they do next? Liman sent two more Turkish regiments and additional artillery to Anzac to reach a rough parity of numbers. The avowed intent of the ANZAC Corps to seize control of the high ground around the beach before pushing across the Peninsula to seize Mal Tepe in order to wreck Turkish communications was clearly impossible. And there was no chance of the Corps making a joint attack with the British advancing from Helles on the ultimate objective of the Kilid Bahr Plateau. Instead the Anzacs found themselves pinned back, with their horizons restricted by the enclosing heights of Chunuk Bair, Battleship Hill and Third Ridge. Not far away, but still utterly unattainable. Their landing had been a failure.

  25 APRIL: LANDINGS AT HELLES

  The eyes of the world are upon us, and your deeds will live in history. To us now is given an opportunity of avenging our friends and relatives who have fallen in France and Flanders. Our comrades there willingly gave their lives in thousands and tens of thousands for our King and Country, and by their glorious courage and dogged tenacity they defeated the invaders and broke the German offensive. We also must be prepared to suffer hardships, privations, thirst, and heavy losses by bullets, by shells, by mines, by drowning.1

  Major General Aylmer Hunter-Weston, Headquarters, 29th Division

  THE BRITISH LANDINGS AT HELLES on 25 April 1915 have always been the subject of self-congratulatory myth-making. The British knew that the Turks were expecting them at V and W Beaches and were furthermore worried as to the reception they might get at X, S and Y Beaches. They also believed that they were opposed at Helles by a full division of Turkish troops and indeed continued to believe that throughout the landings and for the duration of the campaign. In other words, they conceived that this was a battle between roughly equal forces, with the Turks having the advantage of prepared defence works, where the British would have to overcome all the odds. Consider for a moment the nature of Major General Sir Aylmer Hunter-Weston’s address to his troops on the eve of battle at the head of this chapter. No one could say that his men had not been warned. Yet the truth was that there was just over one battalion of Turkish troops guarding the Helles Peninsula south of Achi Baba. All that faced the British 29th Division was the 3rd Battalion, 26th Regiment of the 9th Division augmented by a very few elements of the 2nd Battalion, 26th Regiment. They had no machine guns, little artillery support, few land mines; but what they did have was good leadership, experienced, well-trained troops and above all they had their rifles.

  This British overestimate of the Turkish forces was to dominate the day. Men heard the sound of their own supporting machine guns and thought they were being flayed by Turkish machine guns in improbable numbers; minor platoon or company counter-attacks launched to check the British advance were inflated into thousands of screaming Turks bent on death or glory. These fears hampered the British almost as much as the actual Turkish heroes of the 3/26th Regiment.

  The main Helles landings were to be made at V and W Beaches, with flank landings at X, S and Y Beaches. The troops landed at these beaches were to seize tactically significant features before awaiting the general advance of the main force, whose task it was to seize the dominating feature of Achi Baba by the end of the first day. Then the entire force was to advance on Kilid Bahr, mirroring the ANZAC Corps’ attack from the north also planned for 26 April. The account that follows will deal with each landing in turn; this is no literary conceit but simply reflects the physical separation of the beaches and the almost total lack of coordination between the forces once the landings had been made. Each fought their own battle. Success at one had little or no impact on any of the others. Failure impacted everywhere.

  THE LANDING AT Y BEACH had been at the direct instigation of Hamilton, his intention being for those troops to threaten communications with the Turkish advanced parties at the tip of Helles. The British troops were to advance as far as necessary to attract the atte
ntion of the Turkish reserves and deflect them from the main landings at V and W Beaches while threatening the retreat of the Helles garrisons. They were also to make contact with the battalions landing at X Beach while holding their ground before joining the general advance on Achi Baba. Crucially, there was no plan should the main force fail to appear.

  As a landing place Y Beach was almost non-existent, a very narrow rocky strip of land at the foot of two narrow gullies that broke the line of scrub-covered cliffs rising above it to about 150 feet. It was completely undefended with the nearest Turks positioned a mile to the south in trenches covering Gully Beach. Another platoon from the 2/26th Regiment was ensconced on Sari Tepe further to the north. As such the first British landing, made by the 1st King’s Own Scottish Borderers (KOSB), supported by the Plymouth Battalion (detached from the RND), would be carried out unopposed. Given the terrain it was just as well. As the four tows carrying the KOSB approached the shore at 04.15, Private Daniel Joiner was a worried man.

  At first it appeared to be sheer cliffs with no possible chance of gaining the summit; on closer inspection, however, there appeared to be a resemblance of a watercourse, which to agile Switzerland mountain climbers might afford a possible ascent. It was too dark to make out anything of the top of the cliffs or background. No beach was visible, it appeared as if the cliffs ran into the sea. We imagined that the boat would go nearly to the beach. A rude awakening awaited us. The water was quite clear, and we began to notice shelves of rock. About 30 to 40 yards from the beach our boat grounded. This had not been in our reckoning, so for a fraction of a second we were at a loss, not so however with those in the know – as soon as the boat touched out they jumped into the water. No further order was necessary, before we realised what had happened we were waist deep. Instead, however, of the water getting shallower, it got deeper. The smaller men having a difficult job to keep their collars dry. The footing was uncertain. The bed was in layers, some higher than others. Floundering was frequent, and when it is taken into account the weight we were carrying, floundering was not a joke. Our rifles were often submerged in our attempts to retain our balance.2

  Private Daniel Joiner, 1st KOSB, 87th Brigade, 29th Division

  Getting ashore had been a wet business, but now a more exhausting challenge awaited.

  The main object now was to gain the top of the cliffs. This was easier said than done. The scouts had got there and found it unoccupied. We started. No attempt at order was made, nor was it expected, hand over hand, a pull up here, a jump there, and so on. Seemingly the Turks did not know that we had landed, if they had – well, that is a different story, one Boy Scout on the top of the cliffs could have kept fifty men down with ‘Chucky Stones’ so treacherous was the foot hold.3

  Private Daniel Joiner, 1st KOSB, 87th Brigade, 29th Division

  When they reached the top of the cliff they had a good view of the surrounding country and companies were sent forward, initially to the deep Gully Ravine that lay parallel to the coast between them and Krithia. Parties of the Plymouths crossed over to the south-east in an unsuccessful search for a reported Turkish artillery piece in that sector. That was the limit of their exploitation and they failed either to press forward or to contact the troops landing at X Beach. There was still no opposition from the Turks.

  Command and control problems hampered the Y Beach landing right from the start. There was confusion on the ground as to whether Lieutenant Colonel Archibald Koe of the 1st KOSB or Lieutenant Colonel Godfrey Matthews of the Plymouths was in charge, but far more serious was the lack of grip at a higher level. Hamilton was delighted with the initial success of his pet project and wirelessed twice to Hunter-Weston asking, ‘Would you like to get some more men ashore at Y Beach? If so trawlers available.’4 Notice that he asked, not ordered; Hamilton adhered strongly to the code that his role was to issue the overall planning outlines, his divisional generals would fight the battles. Only after 10.35 did Hunter-Weston reply saying that to change the plans would be to delay the landing – the off-the-cuff reply of a man under pressure batting off unwelcome interference. Whether an opportunity was missed is now difficult to determine, but the Y Beach force remained frozen in position between the cliff tops and Gully Ravine. Reprehensibly, they failed either to advance or to dig in until late in the afternoon. Eventually Matthews decided to retire to the cliff top and entrench with his battalion holding the flanks while the KOSB held the centre of the position. By this time the British found that they were under ever increasing fire from Turks moving up from Gully Beach, while the newly arrived advance elements of the Turkish reserves from Serafim Farm – the 1/25th Regiment and an artillery battery – also began to make their presence felt.

  The line was formed by the men’s packs and with entrenching tools. It never reached what could be called a trench, and was constructed under a most harassing and ever-increasing rifle fire. Although never a serious menace, bursts of gunfire, sniping and threats had accompanied the construction of the frail fort.5

  Major Alfred Welch, 1st KOSB, 87th Brigade, 29th Division

  The front line trenches, barely 18 inches deep covered an unnecessarily long section of cliff top, stretching both north and south of Y Beach. The two battalions had achieved nothing of any military importance, apart from attracting the attention of the Turkish reserves. This they soon came to regret.

  The shrapnel was getting annoying, the high explosives dangerous, the bullets dangerous, the sun hot, the throat dry, the water in our bottles precious and warm, the stomach needed food and the eyes of many refused to remain open. We still had one company in reserve. Some of us even tried to make some tea, but no sooner was smoke seen than bullets began to splutter. No need now for the NCOs to shout as on manoeuvres ‘Keep your head down!’ As the sun went down the heat of the day changed to a very chilly night.6

  Private Daniel Joiner, 1st KOSB, 87th Brigade, 29th Division

  As the main body of the Turkish 1/25th Regiment appeared there was an increasing perception among the British that they were in danger of being overwhelmed by sheer numbers, even prior to the first counter-attack, launched at 17.40.

  Shortly after the snipers made their appearance the order was passed along the line, ‘A large body of troops advancing over the skyline!’ This message was followed by another, ‘A larger body of troops advancing over the skyline!’ As our platoon had taken up a position about 10 yards from the top of the cliff it was not possible to see them advancing for some time after. They were 800 to 900 yards away, advancing in massed formation, shouting and waving their rifles above their heads. As soon as they came within a reasonable distance we opened fire upon them. They still rushed on, until the two cruisers who were supporting us, HMS Goliath and HMS Dublin, each fired a broadside which completely scattered them. It was growing dark now and the Turks had taken possession of the trench 600 yards away. We had prepared ourselves for the worst. Shortly after dark they made their first charge, as we expected. They came up within 10 yards of our trench but by keeping up a rapid fire we held them back. They retired for a short time but there was a regular hail of bullets hitting the parapet of the trench and almost blinding us with dirt. The dirt was also getting into the mechanism of our rifles, which added to the difficulty of keeping up rapid fire. The noise was awful: the wounded groaning and calling for stretchers which never came; the incessant rattle of the machine guns and rifles; the wounded and dying Turks in front calling for Allah. To make matters more cheerful it began to rain.7

  Private John Vickers, Plymouth Battalion, Royal Marine Brigade, RND

  At about 19.00 Private Joiner’s company was ordered forward to reinforce the sketchy front line. They found there was a dangerous gap in the line which the Turks were attempting to exploit.

  Captain Antrobus called the charge. The Turks were about 200 to 300 yards off, the ground we had to cover was fairly level, covered with the Gallipoli characteristic gorse, and the air was laden with lead, fired from both flanks. However everyth
ing happened so quickly we had no time to think. We went at it full tilt. The fire of our supporting flank companies sounded as if each man had a machine gun. The Turks seeing we meant business hastily withdrew to the prepared trenches again. Captain Antrobus who led us through it all selected our fire positions. Had the whole company managed to get into the line it would have been alright, but we had lost half of them in the charge. The result was that instead of having a rifle to every yard, we had about one man to every 5 to 10 yards.8

  Private Daniel Joiner, 1st KOSB, 87th Brigade, 29th Division

  They were desperate for reinforcements and running increasingly short of ammunition, but every box – so quickly fired – had to be hauled up the precipitous cliffs behind them.

  The fire from the Turks was now increasing every moment. No guns could support us as our position was so uncertain, we hardly knew where we were. Our only consolation was in fact that our bayonets were kept ready, and would account for something before we said, ‘Bust!’ About midnight not an officer or man expected to see daylight again, men were going mad, others groaning, others prompted by the officers were conversing about cheerful topics to drive away the thoughts that were rapidly becoming facts and reality. We made some attempt of improving our cover scraping with our fingers and feet. In some cases one man was holding as much as 25 to 50 yards, the remainder being held by dead men.9