Gallipoli

by Peter Hart

  Private Daniel Joiner, 1st KOSB, 87th Brigade, 29th Division

  Under the cover of darkness the Turks managed to come close enough to fling hand grenades.

  The bombs came over thick and fast, those that fell short threw the dirt in our eyes, those that fell over set fire to the gorse. Not only did the thoughts of being burned alive cause us to take action, but, the flare being behind us, the Turks opened fire wherever a glare-lit target appeared. We could not retaliate in kind. Firstly we had no bombs and also the position we were in would not allow of us charging or firing at the bombers effectively. As the bombs burst, so men crawled out and put out the flames. We were finally saved from this predicament by the rain.10

  Private Daniel Joiner, 1st KOSB, 87th Brigade, 29th Division

  All night the Turks pressed hard all along the overstretched line. Then, at about 07.00 on 26 April, they launched a final desperate attack.

  Down they came in greater numbers than ever, day was just breaking, no preliminaries this time. Line after line: our rifles got hot, wounded men were loading, officers getting us ammunition, what little could be got. It was impossible to miss, it was also impossible to last – something had to give way – it was us. We retired dropping back about 50 yards. Our remaining officers rallied us and we charged. The Turks were dumbfounded, they turned and ran for it. We tried to hold again but again we were forced back. Back and forward we swayed until the Turks had us on the topmost edge of the cliffs, with a sheer drop of 300 feet. The beach was littered with our wounded, in many cases dying comrades. The Turks had the chance of a lifetime. Another push and we would have been over the cliffs. We had turned at bay, every man that could hold a rifle was brought into the line. Holding like this we waited for the last push. No sooner had the Turks shown a hesitation than our remaining officer grasped the situation and ordered the charge. This time everything was in a mix, bayonets, butts, fists, feet, and in fact everything and anyhow. So mad was the rush, the Turks gave way. We got them right back over the position which we had held all night.11

  Private Daniel Joiner, 1st KOSB, 87th Brigade, 29th Division

  By this time both sides were exhausted and a lull had settled over the battlefield. But at Y Beach there was a state of considerable confusion. All night a flurry of messages requesting reinforcements to 29th Divisional headquarters from Colonel Matthews had been ignored. Hunter-Weston still had his eyes firmly fixed on the situations at V and W Beaches and Hamilton was aboard the Queen Elizabeth monitoring the situation and giving support fire to the struggling Anzacs. The widely disparate landing forces were too far apart to support each other or to share naval resources. The British had spread themselves too thinly.

  Towards the end of the night unsanctioned alarmist messages from unknown individuals on Y Beach caused the navy to evacuate one isolated detachment of the KOSB. They were also doing their best to remove the wounded under difficult conditions.

  We settled down to keep the Turks busy while the stores and wounded were taken off in small boats which the Navy were sending to our aid. The snipers were busy as each boat approached and left the cover of the cliffs. The wounded had to go through the water, up to their necks, in order to reach the boats. Others who were being carried, after getting a ducking as the carriers lost their balance, imagine the conditions of some, blinded, some minus a leg, others a foot or an arm, etc. Each naval boat was ready with its machine gun, the picket boats with 3-pounders. Our battleships were now pounding away at the enemy – we were to advance no more, so they were able to fire without fear of hitting us.12

  Private Daniel Joiner, 1st KOSB, 87th Brigade, 29th Division

  It was not only the wounded who were getting away on the boats. An increasing number of stragglers were drifting back. In the mad confusion many of the men seemed to have thought an evacuation had already begun and in the end the process gained its own momentum. Almost without any conscious decision being made Y Beach was surrendered by default.

  The order to retire was passed from the right of the line. We retired to the extreme edge of the cliffs but as we were short of both stretchers and bearers some of our wounded were left in the trench. We made a counter-attack, driving back their snipers. On regaining our trenches we found they had bayoneted our wounded. Three Scotties near me were in a state of semi-consciousness through loss of blood. They had all been bayoneted through the chest. We got all the wounded away, and not a second too soon, for a large body of Turks made their appearance a few hundred yards ahead.13

  Private John Vickers, Plymouth Battalion, Royal Marine Brigade, RND

  Private Joiner appears to have been one of those holding the clifftop line to give the rest time to get away.

  A rearguard action had to be commenced. We worked them nicely back until we were just near the crest line of the cliffs. There we held, and informed the ships who were keeping the Turks back, that we were ready to clear. By this time the wounded and stores had been taken off. By prearranged signal, we dropped out of the Turks’ sight, below the crest. Many were injured by falling down the cliffs. We were now out of view, but the Turks must have got a shock. No sooner had we got clear the battleships opened fire at the top of the cliffs and intervening ground, and so made it practically impossible for the Turks to follow us. Other ships took up the fire until we had all got into the waiting boats.14

  Private Daniel Joiner, 1st KOSB, 87th Brigade, 29th Division

  The Y Beach fiasco was over shortly after 11.30 when the evacuation was completed. Any brief opportunities that may have existed had been lost through another complete failure of command and control. A lack of clear instructions coupled with a certain pusillanimity on the part of Matthews meant that the troops had been left as sitting ducks awaiting the arrival of the Turkish reserves. Yet it is difficult to say what else they should have done. Advance unsupported on Krithia? Link with the equally static X Beach landing? March towards the sound of the guns at V Beach? In which case why not land as reserves at X Beach, which was considerably nearer? In doing nothing their function had become to act as a lightning rod to attract Turkish counter-attacks and in the end they had not been able to cope with those lethal attentions.

  THE X BEACH LANDING would be conducted by the 2nd Royal Fusiliers of the 86th Brigade on a small beach tucked beneath low cliffs which were relatively easy to climb. It was conceived as a supporting affair to the main landings at V and W Beaches, just around the corner of Cape Helles. The pre-dreadnought Implacable, commanded by the redoubtable Captain Hughes Lockyer, was shepherding in four tows of cutters. Lockyer had disapproved of the orders for the supporting bombardment which concentrated on the coastal ridges rather than the actual beaches. He was determined to maximise the support to the infantry during the last crucial minutes, so he opened fire with the Implacable’s main 12-inch and assorted secondary batteries from close range to blast the cliff tops above X Beach to pieces. After all this effort there was only a small picket of twelve Turks to receive the benefit of his bombardment, but the two four-barrelled Nordenfelts were put out of action. All in all he certainly cleared the way for the Royal Fusiliers as they stormed ashore and straight up the cliffs. By 06.30, the landing had been secured without loss and the whole battalion was ashore by 07.30. As they moved inland the troops encountered a small party of Turks who were on their way to reinforce W Beach. As fighting broke out, the Royal Fusiliers swiftly established a defensive position, before pushing out towards their objective of Hill 114, which was captured by around 11.30, whereupon they established contact with the troops who had landed at W Beach. They were then vigorously counter-attacked by about 250 Turks. This attack had significant effects, for it forced the Royal Fusiliers almost back to the cliffs above X Beach. In the end the 1st Border Regiment was able to stem the Turkish advance and strengthen the screen surrounding the beach pending the arrival of the 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers in the early afternoon. Nevertheless this bold Turkish move had planted the seeds of doubt into the mind of the 87th Brigade comm
ander, Brigadier General William Marshall.

  Heavy firing had started at Y Beach and I was very much tempted to move in that direction, but my hands were tied; because, being divisional reserve, I felt it incumbent to keep the force intact pending an order from the Division. Besides, one never knows. X Beach was now secure from attack and, if all the other landings proved to be failures, everything might have to be transferred there. The fact is, in war, original orders should never go beyond the first stage – eventualities should not be discounted.15

  Brigadier General William Marshall, Headquarters, 87th Brigade, 29th Division

  By the time the requisite orders had come through from divisional headquarters it was nightfall and Marshall decided to remain where he was. And so the moment of possible reinforcement passed and the men of Y Beach were left to fight on alone. Marshall was probably right to be cautious, for the prospects for a night march against unknown numbers of Turks across unfamiliar terrain featuring the chasm of Gully Ravine were not good.

  THE LANDINGS AT S BEACH served a similar function to those at X and Y Beaches. The 2nd South Wales Borderers were to land on the eastern arm of Morto Bay and seize by coup de main the old disused De Tott’s Battery above the beach and then hold their position pending the arrival of the main force from V and W Beaches. They were to be covered by the pre-dreadnought Cornwallis, captained by Captain Alexander Davidson.

  The problem was further complicated for the reason that, instead of there being a beach party and steamboats to assist in landing the troops on this exposed right flank, none were allowed. The trawlers, four in number, each with six transport boats in tow, were to run ashore as best they could; and the battalion had, by their order, to pull ashore, not only in heavy marching gear, but with boats laden with ammunition, water, and provisions. This was beyond the powers of any but highly trained men in pulling against a strong tide, and appeared, on the face of it, certain disaster, as the only chance of success lay in speed, and not giving the enemy an easy target.16

  Captain Alexander Davidson, HMS Cornwallis

  The Cornwallis would give covering fire for as long as possible, but Davidson decided on his own initiative to try to hurry up the landing by supplying a steam pinnace with two cutters and a naval landing party to bring ashore not only ammunition, water and stores but also the Borderers’ kitbags to minimise the amount carried by the men. This naval party would then be responsible for protecting the open left flank of the infantry as they stormed the De Tott’s Battery position.

  As they moved into the Straits heading for Morto Bay the Borderers found that the Asiatic Turkish batteries were preoccupied with an imminent French attack far nearer to home, at Kum Kale. Thus far everything was going according to plan, but what had not been taken into account was the strength of the current. Delays lengthened and the landing scheduled to coincide with the main Helles landings at 06.00 eventually only occurred at 07.30. The plan of action produced by Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Casson was for two of his companies to land on the beach while another company came ashore on the rocky shore at the junction of Morto Bay and the Straits before climbing straight up the rough cliffs. Sapper James Godwyn was attached to the Borderers as they rowed for S Beach itself.

  I was pulling bow in our boat next to the Corporal. We were rowing with all our might when all of a sudden the bullets began to come. One struck the Corporal’s pack, glanced off and hit the man in front in the head. We were the first boat to touch land. As soon as we touched the bottom, the Corporal and myself lay along the boat and started firing at the Turk. The men were jumping out up to their necks in water; some were killed before they left the boats. I was soon out and wading ashore. One of the Borderers was hit just in front of me, but no one could stop and help him ashore, as it was everyone for himself and get on shore in safety. We reached the first mound alright and got under cover; there we had a breather. Then the order came to rush the first trench, it was soon taken but there were not many Turks in it. Then the rush was made for the top of the hill. The men dug a bit of a trench and began picking off any Turks they could see. My Section in the meantime had to go to and fro to the boats and get the ammunition, biscuits and water. We were fired at all the time but nobody was hit. A Turkish sniper somewhere on the hill was picking off a lot of our men during the day. We had to hold the position till we got relieved; it was a nerve-wracking experience, being shelled and sniped at, not knowing who would be the next, or how soon the Turks would try and rush the position.17

  Sapper James Godwyn, 2nd London Field Company, Royal Engineers, 29th Division

  The South Wales Borderers had performed well in taking De Tott’s Battery, but they had grossly overestimated the strength of the Turkish opposition. They claimed they were facing a whole battalion; in fact it was a single platoon from the 2/26th Regiment. Sapper Goodwyn’s account also reveals the sad outcome of the S Beach landing. Having successfully gone ashore, they sat around and did nothing; indeed they had been given nothing to do. Perhaps they should have ignored their instructions and moved to take the defenders of V Beach from the rear. But what if it had all gone wrong? What if in their absence the Turks had reoccupied De Tott’s Battery, this time in strength? Once again, misplaced fear of the strength of the Turks hamstrung any positive action to link up with the troops on the other beaches.

  There was another problem. Captain Davidson’s vigorous support of the landing had made him careless of his allotted role in support of the later stages of the V Beach landing. Worse, he went ashore to act as beach master. Here he was effective, liaising well with the infantry and successfully bringing down support fire from the Cornwallis to target the Turkish batteries firing across the Dardanelles from Asia. But this was inappropriate behaviour for a man of his rank and should have been carried out by a far more junior officer. This would have allowed the Cornwallis to move off earlier without waiting to re-embark her wandering captain. As it was she did not report to V Beach until after 10.00. It is not clear whether bringing in another supporting battleship would have made much difference to the pattern of events at V Beach. But by then it was too late.

  W BEACH, KNOWN TO THE TURKS as Tekke Bay, was one of the two main Helles landing places. It was a promising landing site in the sense that it was a spacious 300-yard beach offering a direct route for a concerted advance up towards Achi Baba, picking up the flanking units from X, S and Y Beaches as they went. Unsurprisingly, the Turks had recognised its potential as a landing site and had dug a ring of trenches on the low cliffs at either side and all around the high ground at the back of the beach. On the sands and in the water were a series of ominous barbed-wire obstacles.

  The 1st Lancashire Fusiliers had been given the task of taking the beach before moving inland to make contact with the Royal Fusiliers to the north around Hill 141 and to seize Hill 138 before establishing a link with the troops landing at V Beach. Because it was so well fortified, the prospect of making a landing at W Beach was intimidating in the extreme for the Fusiliers. Regrettably, too, the ships supporting their landing had failed to get in close and so when, at 06.00, the tows approached the beach the Turkish wire and trenches had not been properly shelled.

  The morning was dead calm and clear but a bad light for us looking towards our landing place as the sun was about to rise right behind it. The bombardment had begun punctually at 5 a.m. but it did not have anything like the visible effect I had expected. I had expected to see the whole end of the peninsula and especially the surroundings of the beaches one cloud of dust and smoke. As the long semi-circle of tows steamed in towards the shore all was perfectly still except for the booming of the ships’ guns – not a sign of life on shore and no one in the boats uttering a sound. Our tows from the Implacable cut in just behind the tows from the Euryalus with the rest of the battalion. The enemy at our beach never made a sign till the leading boats were close to the beach, 50 yards or so, then they fairly let rip.18

  Brigadier General Steuart Hare, Headquarters, 86th Brigade, 29
th Division

  Midshipman Hugh Tate was landed on the far left-hand side of the beach.

  The blast from the 12-pounder guns over our heads was most unpleasant, as were the bullets which were now coming down all round like little wasps. The whole Peninsula was a mass of bursting shell and flame. According to plan the picket boat slipped us and we landed our little load. I was on the extreme left and found a sandy patch and got right in, third boat ashore. Nearly all the rest ran on a reef about 20 yards out and the troops had to jump overboard and swim. As we touched land one of our 12-pounder shells hit the cliff just overhead and filled the boat with earth.19

  Midshipman Hugh Tate, HMS Implacable

  They had to get the troops ashore as quickly as possible. Leading Seaman Gilligan was in charge of one of the boats.

  I told the men to lie down in the bottom of the boat, leaving myself and six oarsmen exposed to the enemy’s fire. I then ordered them all to jump out and get under cover as quickly as they could. As soon as we touched the beach we could see wire entanglements. The fire was terrible; just like a hailstorm. I jumped out of the stern up to my arms in water and pushed the boat in. The Sergeant jumped in front of me and got mortally wounded. The cries of the wounded were terrible. By now the Lancashires were ashore. We came off for more men and one man was killed in my crew. He was shot in the ear, and was quite dead when I picked him up.20

  Leading Seaman Gilligan, HMS Euraylus

  The Lancashire Fusiliers stayed in the rowing boats as long as they could, but eventually they had no choice but to plunge into the water and make for the beach. It was not an inviting prospect.